JUDGMENT : A.G. URAIZEE, J. 1. These two applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act have been preferred to condone the delay of 2523 days, which has occurred in preferring appeals to challenge the common judgment and order dated 10th September, 2009 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Auxi.), 2nd F.T.C at Rajkot in MACP Nos. 853/2004 & 559/2004; and order dated 07th October, 2016 passed in Civil Misc. Application No. 61 of 2012. 2. We have heard Mr. Rathin P. Raval, learned advocate for the applicant - Insurance Company and Mr. Tushar Seth, learned advocate appearing for Mr. Sandeep R. Limbani, learned advocate for the respondent nos. 1 to 3. 3. Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the applicant vehemently urges that the applicant was diligently pursuing the remedy of review for correction of inadvertent delay that has crept in the common judgment and award and therefore, as such, cannot be said that applicant had abandoned the cause for questioning the judgment and award of the Tribunal, so far as it relates to the apportionment of the liability of the drivers of the offending vehicles involved in the accident. In support of his submission, he has relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in case of DSR Steel (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2012) 6 SCC 782 . He further urges that the applicant as well as other Insurance Company namely respondent no. 7 herein had preferred the Review Application promptly within the limitation period and after rejection of the Review Application the present appeals are preferred within limitation period, therefore, as such technically it cannot be said that there is delay in preferring the appeals. He therefore, urges that the applications may be allowed and delay may be condoned. 4. per contra, Mr. Seth, learned advocate for the claimants has vehemently opposed the present applications. He submits that the so called Review Application was a claver device to delay the payment of compensation to the victims. It is his submission that if we peruse the so called Review Application, in fact it is not a Review Application, but it is an application under Section 152 of the CPC for correction of arithmetic error. He relying upon the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in case of Sasi (D) Through Lrs. It is his submission that if we peruse the so called Review Application, in fact it is not a Review Application, but it is an application under Section 152 of the CPC for correction of arithmetic error. He relying upon the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in case of Sasi (D) Through Lrs. v. Aravindakshan Nari, passed in Special Leave Petition No.(CC 433/2017) of 2017, urges that it cannot be said that the applicant has satisfactorily explained the delay and therefore he constantly urges that the present delay application may be dismissed. 5. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. It is settled proposition of law that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court should not be goaded by the quantum of the delay, but has to examine whether the delay is sufficiently and satisfactorily explained or not? 6. Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the applicant has produced the copy of Civil Misc. Application i.e so called Review Application. The perusal thereof reveals that in fact it is an application under Section 152 of the Code for correction of mistake, which according to the applicant had crept in the judgment and award. We are therefore, not impressed by the submission of Mr. Raval that the Insurance Company was pursuing Review Application for reviewing of the impugned judgment and award, so far as, it relates to the quantification of the negligence of the drivers of the offending vehicles. 7. Nonetheless it is undisputed fact that the applicant Insurance Company as well as respondent no. 7 - Insurance Company had preferred an application under Section 152 of the Code for seeking some clarification in the judgment and award, so far as the quantification of the negligence of the drivers of the offending vehicles involved in the accident. The contention of learned advocate for the claimants that the Civil Misc. Application was preferred for delaying the payment of compensation so the victim in terms of the award cannot be accepted for the simple reason that nothing is brought on record to show that an attempt was made by the Insurance Company to avoid the hearing of the Misc. application with sole purpose of delaying the payment of compensation. The decision of the Supreme Court in case of Sasi (D) Through Lrs. v. Aravindakshan Nari (supra), that relied upon by Mr. application with sole purpose of delaying the payment of compensation. The decision of the Supreme Court in case of Sasi (D) Through Lrs. v. Aravindakshan Nari (supra), that relied upon by Mr. Seth, learned advocate for the claimants, would not help the claimants for resisting the present application for the simple reason that in the case before the Supreme Court, the Review Application was kept pending in the registry of the High Court by not removing the defect which has caused delay in disposal of the Review Application. The Supreme Court while deprecating the registry of the High Court for keeping the Review Application pending for removal of defects for unreasonably long time refused to condone the delay of 1700 days that had occurred in preferring the Special Leave Petition. It is thus very vividly clear that it was the petitioner who had shown indolence in not removing the office objections and thereby keeping the Review Application pending. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court did not condone the delay and dismiss the Special Leave Petition on the ground of delay as well as on merits. 8. From the case on hand, it appears that a serious question of quantification of contributory negligence is involved in the main appeals. The Tribunal has while considering the Misc. Application preferred under Section 152 of the Code has also not addressed this issue properly and dismissed the Review Application on the ground that the Court has already recorded the findings on the negligence. We are, therefore, of the view that the delay needs to be condoned, albeit, conditionally. 9. For the foregoing reasons, the applications succeed and they are hereby allowed on condition of applicant depositing Rs. 10,000/- in each application within two weeks from today in the registry of this Court. As and when the amount of cost is deposited, in terms of this order, the same is ordered to be disbursed in favour of the claimants.