JUDGMENT AND ORDER : N. Kotiswar Singh, J. Heard Mr. Rakesh Meihoubam in person as well as Mr. A.Bimol, learned Amicus Curiae. Heard also Mr. H.Samarjit, learned Government Advocate for the State respondents as well as Ms. Sobhana, learned Government Advocate for respondent No.2, Kangla Fort Board. 2. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the decision taken by the Kangla Fort Board on 24.01.2013 by which the Board approved the relaxation of age for general public from 60 years to 50 years for allowing morning and evening walk inside the Kangla Fort on payment of prescribed fees. Earlier to the said relaxation, permission was given for morning and evening walk inside the Kangla Fort only to persons who are above 60 years and Government employees. The said decision of Kangla Fort Board to restrict members of public other than Government employees who are below 50 years has been assailed by the petitioner on the ground that it is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and also violative of Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution. Further, it has been contended by Mr. Rakesh that in any event, such a decision could not have been taken by Kangla Fort Board as it was beyond its jurisdiction and violative of the provisions of Kangla Fort Act, 2004. 3. Before we advert to the respective contentions of the parties, it may be relevant to mention that Kangla Fort Board was constituted in terms of Kangla Fort Board Act, 2004 which was enacted by the Manipur Legislative Assembly for administration and control of the Kangla Fort located in the heart of Imphal after the same was handed over by the authorities of the Assam Rifles to the State authorities on 20.11.2004. Kangla Fort, an ancient capital complex of the Meetei Kingdom since time immemorial, was earlier under the control of the Assam Rifles, and handed over to the State authorities. For effective administration and control of the same, the Kangla Fort Act, 2004 was enacted. Kangla Fort, an ancient capital complex of the Meetei Kingdom since time immemorial, was earlier under the control of the Assam Rifles, and handed over to the State authorities. For effective administration and control of the same, the Kangla Fort Act, 2004 was enacted. Under Section 4 of the Act, the Kangla Fort Board is to be constituted consisting of the Chief Minister, Manipur as the President, the Minister-in-charge, Art and Culture Department, Manipur as the Vice President, leader of the Opposition in the Manipur Legislative Assembly, 3 (three) members of the Manipur Legislative Assembly to be nominated by the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly, the Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (North East), Govt. of India, Director General, Archaeological Survey of India, Govt. of India, Director General of Police, Manipur, 2(two) other non-official members/experts, and Commissioner/Secretary, Art & Culture Department, Govt. of Manipur are to be members of the said Board. The duties, power and responsibilities of the Board are enumerated in Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. It has been specifically provided under Section 12 of the Act that the Board shall make necessary arrangements for preservation and protection of the Kangla Fort in recognition of the sanctity of the historical monuments, archaeological sites and remains within the Kangla Fort immediately after the commencement of this Act in consultation with the State Government. Section 13 spells out the powers and duties of the Board as below:- "(a) To administer the affairs of the Kangla Fort and to keep the Kangla Fort in proper order and in the state of good repaire; (b) To organize and regulate such periodical seasonal functions in the Kangla Fort; (c) To do such other things as may be incidental or conducive to the efficient administration of the affairs of the Kangla Fort; (d) To rise resources for maintenance of Kangla Fort including levy of entry fee and such other fees as considered necessary." Section 3 of the Act imposes prohibitions on alienation of land and structures etc. located inside Kangla Fort. Section 15 provides for grants by the State Government for utilization for the purpose of this Act. Section 16 enables creation of Kangla Fort Fund. located inside Kangla Fort. Section 15 provides for grants by the State Government for utilization for the purpose of this Act. Section 16 enables creation of Kangla Fort Fund. Section 17 authorises the Board to undertake and execute plans, schemes and constructions relating to or in connection with the matter to be wholly or partly framed by the State Government. Section 22 mandates that any celebration of ceremony and religious festivals in the Kangla Fort shall be under the supervision of the Board. 4. It seems the Kangla Fort Board took a decision by which entry in the Kangla Fort for morning and evening walk inside the Kangla Fort was restricted except for Government servants and civilians who are of the age of 60 years and above. However, as regards entry during the office hours, there is no such restriction placed as anybody can enter the Fort on payment of certain fees. Subsequently, in view of public demand for further relaxation of the cut-off age of the non-Government employees which was earlier fixed at 60 years, the Kangla Fort Board took the decision for relaxation of the cut-off age for the general public at 50 years who can enter for morning and evening walk inside the Kangla Fort. This decision of the Kangla Fort Board taken on 24.01.2013 in the 16th meeting of the Board has been assailed in this writ petition. 5. Mr. Rakesh states that he is a chronic diabetic patient for the last more than five years and as such he requires walking everyday for not less than an hour. Though he has been walking in the morning upto the Palace Compound outside Kangla Fort, he has been greatly inconvenienced by the poor regulation of traffic on the public road and desired to walk inside Kangla where there is hardly any vehicular traffic which is thus secure and safe, and accordingly, made the request to the Kangla Fort Board authorities by submitting an application. However, his request was turned down on the ground that the petitioner's age is below 50 years and no civilian who is not a Government employee and whose age is below 50 years is allowed to go for morning or evening walk in the Kangla Fort in terms of the decision taken by the Board on 24.01.2013. 6. Mr. However, his request was turned down on the ground that the petitioner's age is below 50 years and no civilian who is not a Government employee and whose age is below 50 years is allowed to go for morning or evening walk in the Kangla Fort in terms of the decision taken by the Board on 24.01.2013. 6. Mr. Rakesh submits that by denying him the right to enter Kangla for morning/evening walk, his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) has been violated. He also submits that denial of morning walk in a clean environment, specially when he is suffering from diabetes amounts to violation of his right to lead a healthy life, as an inalienable part of the right to life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 7. Mr. Rakesh has raised the ground that such a decision is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He submits that Article 14 mandates equality before law. Though law permits classification, such a classification must be reasonable and must be founded on an intelligible differential and such differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, which however, has not been fulfilled in the present case, Mr. Rakesh contends. 8. Mr. Rakesh has submitted by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subramanium Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 that if there be any classification, such classification must conform to the object for which such classification has been made. Mr. Rakesh submits that in the present case, it has been specifically mentioned by the authorities that the purpose for making such restriction was to prevent over-crowding. He contends that if that is the purpose, one fails to understand how the same can be accomplished by reducing the age of the entrants from 60 years to 50 years as the number of entrants would stand to increase and would lead in turn to over-crowding rather than reduction of crowd. Mr. Rakesh, therefore, submits that by reducing the age from 60 years to 50 years, it has actually increased the volume of visitors and as such, it has no nexus with the avowed purpose of controlling the volume of traffic or visitors in Kangla Fort. Mr. Rakesh, therefore, submits that by reducing the age from 60 years to 50 years, it has actually increased the volume of visitors and as such, it has no nexus with the avowed purpose of controlling the volume of traffic or visitors in Kangla Fort. He further submits that as mentioned in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents, the other reason was to prevent destruction of properties inside the Kangla, which also cannot be said to have any nexus with the said purpose inasmuch as it cannot be said that only civilian entrants are responsible for the same and no such materials has been produced or relied on by the authorities in that regard in support of such stand taken by the authorities. 9. Mr. Rakesh has also submitted by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & ors. reported in (2002) 6 SCC 562 that any such classification must be based on scientific study and after collecting the necessary relevant data. Mr. Rakesh submits that though the purpose of restricting entry of civilians other than Government employees for morning and evening walk inside the Kangla Fort has been to prevent over-crowding and also disturbance/destructions caused by the civilian walkers to the gardens/monument and holy places inside the Kangla, as claimed by the respondents, no scientific study had been undertaken by the authorities concerned and the same has been based on mere surmises which is not permissible in law. Thus, Mr. Rakesh has submitted that since classification had been done without empirical data or survey or scientific study undertaken by the authorities, such a classification cannot be sustained. 10. In support of his contention that Kangla Fort Board has no authority to take such a decision, Mr. Rakesh has drawn the attention of this Court to Section 13 of the Kangla Fort Act. He submits that the main function and duty of the Kangla Fort Board is to administer the affairs of the Kangla Fort and to keep the Kangla Fort in proper order and in the state of good repair. Rakesh has drawn the attention of this Court to Section 13 of the Kangla Fort Act. He submits that the main function and duty of the Kangla Fort Board is to administer the affairs of the Kangla Fort and to keep the Kangla Fort in proper order and in the state of good repair. Section 13 of the Act enables Kangla Fort Board to do such other things as may be incidental or conducive to the efficient administration of the affairs of the Kangla Fort and to raise resources for maintenance of Kangla Fort including levy of entry fee and such other fees as considered necessary. Mr. Rakesh contends that however, no such power has been given for imposing a blanket ban on the entry of people of a specified category of persons as has been done by the impugned decision. 11. Mr. Rakesh submits that such absolute power to impose a blanket ban on the entry of the aforesaid category of persons/civilians is not authorised under the Act. Therefore, if any decision has been taken or rule framed in that regard, since it is contrary to the principal Act, such act or rule cannot be held to be valid. In this regard, Mr. Rakesh Singh has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India & Anr. reported in (1989) 4 SCC 187 . 12. Similarly, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. H.Ganesh Kamath & ors. reported in (1983) 2 SCC 402 , Mr. Rakesh submits that it is a well settled principle of interpretation of statutes that conferment of rule-making power to an authority by an Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make a rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto. Similarly, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in General Officer Commanding-In-Chief & anr. v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav & anr. Similarly, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in General Officer Commanding-In-Chief & anr. v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav & anr. reported in (1988) 2 SCC 351 that before a rule can have the effect of a statutory provision, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) it must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed; and (2) it must also come within the scope and purview of the rule-making power of the authority framing the rule. If either of these two conditions is not fulfilled, the rule so framed would be void. It has been submitted by Mr. Rakesh that since no such power has been conferred under the Act to the Kangla Fort Board to impose a blanket ban on the entry of a certain category of persons, such a decision, being not in conformity with the Act, cannot be sustained. He submits that at best, it can control entry by levying necessary fees, as has been done for visit during office hours where no such blanket ban is imposed as in the case of morning and evening walk inside the Kangla for certain category of persons. Accordingly, it has been submitted by Mr. Rakesh that the impugned decision of the Kangla Fort Board cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. 13. Mr. Bimol, learned Amicus Curiae on the other hand has placed the position of law and facts as follows. He submits that it cannot be said as alleged by the petitioner, that the Kangla Fort Board has no power and authority to take such a decision. Referring to Section 12 of the Act, he submits that Kangla Fort Board has been empowered to take necessary arrangements for preservation and protection of the Kangla Fort in recognition of the sanctity of the historical monuments, archaeological sites and remains within the Kangla Fort and for the purpose of administration of the affairs of the Kangla Fort. Under Section 13 of the Act, the Kangla Fort Board is also empowered to do such other things as may be incidental or conducive to the efficient administration of the affairs of the Kangla Fort. Under Section 13 of the Act, the Kangla Fort Board is also empowered to do such other things as may be incidental or conducive to the efficient administration of the affairs of the Kangla Fort. Therefore, Kangla Fort Board is authorised to take all such steps as may be necessary to accomplish the aforesaid functions and there is nothing in the Act which prohibits the Board from taking such decisions which can be taken as an incidence for effective administration and preservation and protection of the Kangla Fort, which includes regulating the visit to Kangla Fort. Mr. Bimol further submits that it is also not correct, as contended by Mr. Rakesh that the purpose of such decision is contrary or inconsistent to the avowed object of minimizing visitors. He submits that when the decision was taken by the Kangla Fort Board to restrict the number of visitors for morning and evening walks inside the Kangla Fort, it was done with the object of preventing over-crowding in the Kangla Fort for which the Board had initially fixed the cut-off age at 60 years for eligibility of persons who would be entitled to enter Kangla Fort for morning and evening walks. However, the said cut-off age was reviewable at the instance of the Board, and it was so reviewed, but the main purpose of imposing such restriction still remains the same, i.e. to prevent overcrowding in the Kangla Fort. Therefore, even if by reducing the cut-off age from 60 to 50 years and it leads to certain increase in the number of entrants, it cannot be said that it is against the main purpose to reduce over-crowding in the Kangla Fort, for restriction still continues though it has been liberalised. Hence, it cannot be said that the aforesaid decision is contrary to the avowed purpose of making Kangla Fort less crowded. 14. Mr. Hence, it cannot be said that the aforesaid decision is contrary to the avowed purpose of making Kangla Fort less crowded. 14. Mr. A.Bimol, learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that the decision of the Kangla Fort Board in imposing restriction on general public upto the age of 50 years in entering Kangla in the morning and evening period and while at the same time, allowing general public who are of the age of 50 years onwards and also Government employees during that period is not discriminatory in nature and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and as such, such a decision of the Kangla Fort Board cannot be said to be illegal. In this regard, Mr. Bimol, learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that what Article 14 prohibits is class legislation but it does not prohibit rational classification for the purpose of legislation. Referring to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa, AIR 1955 SC 166 and Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 , which have been subsequently relied in later decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gauri Shanker & ors. v. Union of India & ors., (1994) 6 SCC 349 ; Dharam Dutt & ors. v. Union of India & ors., (2004) 1 SCC 712 ; Municipal Committee, Patiala v. Model Town Residents Assn. & ors., (2007) 8 SCC 669 , Mr. A.Bimol, learned Amicus Curiae submits that the aforesaid decision of Kangla Fort Board by classifying those civilians who are 50 years and above and government employees, who are allowed to walk in Kangla Fort in the morning and evening while denying the same to others, can be said to be a classification based on intelligible differentia in as much as the group of persons who have been allowed by the Board can be clearly distinguishable from those who are not allowed. He submits that as far as the classification between these two groups are concerned, it is quite intelligible, easily distinguishable. Further, there is a rational relation with the said differentia between these two groups with the object sought to be achieved by the said decision. He submits that as far as the classification between these two groups are concerned, it is quite intelligible, easily distinguishable. Further, there is a rational relation with the said differentia between these two groups with the object sought to be achieved by the said decision. In the present case, the object sought to be achieved is to prevent overcrowding/congestion in the morning and evening period in Kangla Fort which also leads to disturbance/destruction by walkers in the gardens, monuments and holy places located inside the Kangla Fort. 15. As regards the second requirement of law under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the purpose for such classification is clearly relatable to the aforesaid object to prevent congestion and over-crowding in the morning and evening inside the Kangla Fort which also leads to disturbance and destruction of properties inside Kangla Fort. Mr. A.Bimol, learned Amicus Curiae submits that the said decision was taken after observing the increased volume of human traffic inside Kangla Fort during the aforesaid time and hence, the Kangla Fort Board authorities, after taking into consideration the increased volume of human traffic inside the Kangla Fort, in order to avoid congestion and destruction of properties inside the Kangla Fort, had taken the decision. According to him, by preventing the public at large, except for those who are 50 years and above and government employees, the authorities have sought to prevent over-crowding and destruction of properties. Mr. A.Bimol, learned Amicus Curiae submits that in the morning and evening period, normally it is only those people who stay near and along the periphery of the Kangla Fort who visit and by restricting the entry in Kangla Fort during the aforesaid time, the authorities are seeking to prevent congestion. He submits that it is not the case of complete denial of entry to the public as it has been also admitted by the petitioner in the writ petition that the members of the public, irrespective of age or status, are allowed entry during day time/office hours on payment of necessary fees. However, as regards entry in the morning and evening in Kangla Fort for walk, that is regulated by allowing only such persons who are 50 years and above and government employees, on payment of requisite fees. 16. Mr. However, as regards entry in the morning and evening in Kangla Fort for walk, that is regulated by allowing only such persons who are 50 years and above and government employees, on payment of requisite fees. 16. Mr. A.Bimol, learned Amicus Curiae accordingly, submits that these two groups who are categorized, i.e. who are allowed entry and who are barred, are clearly distinguishable and as such distinguishing differentia has also a close nexus with the object of avowed public purpose, which is traceable to the fact of preventing congestion and over-crowding in the Kangla Fort, as mentioned above. Accordingly, Mr. Bimol submits that the twin tests for reasonable classification, which is permissible under the law, are clearly met in the present case and as such, the decision of the Board cannot be said to be discriminatory. 17. Mr. Samarjit, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State has highlighted the importance of Kangla. He submits that Kangla is not merely a park but an important historical site, a holy place and a heritage site in which a number of important sacred and holy places are located, apart from the fact that many of the artefacts/buildings inside the Kangla Fort can be traced back to pre-historic times and as such, because of the importance of the Kangla Fort, the State Government had specifically enacted the Kangla Fort Act, 2004 with the principal purpose to preserve and protect the area as provided under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, if the aforesaid decision was taken by the Kangla Fort Board, the same had been done in order to protect and preserve the Kangla Fort and as such, the decision taken by the Kangla Fort Board in restricting the entry of civilians below 50 years other than Government servants, is in consonance with the main purpose for which the Board had been established. 18. Mr. Samarjit, learned Government Advocate has also submitted that the Board has the authority to take such steps for preservation and protection of the Kangla Fort and could place reasonable restrictions on the freedom of movement which cannot be assailed to be arbitrary or violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. In this regard, Mr. Samarjit has relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & ors. v. Shri Justice S.R.Tendolkar & ors. reported in AIR 1958 SC 538 and Mrs. In this regard, Mr. Samarjit has relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & ors. v. Shri Justice S.R.Tendolkar & ors. reported in AIR 1958 SC 538 and Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & anr. reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 . Accordingly, he submits that reasonable restrictions can be placed on the fundamental rights. Similarly, reasonable classification made by excluding those civilians below 50 years other than Government servants from entering for morning and evening walks inside the Kangla, which has a nexus with the avowed purpose i.e. for the preservation and protection of Kangla Fort and also for preventing overcrowding and destruction of items within the Kangla Fort. 19. Ms. Sobhana, learned counsel for the Kangla Fort Board has also submitted that the aforesaid decision of the Kangla Fort Board does not violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and such classification and differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved and has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Welfare Association A.R.P. v. Ranjit P. Gohil & Ors, Appeal (Civil) 5168 of 1998 decided on 18.02.2003. 20. It has been also submitted on behalf of the Respondent authorities that allowing entry to the Government employees does not mean that all the Government employees will enter the Kangla for morning or evening walks, as only those who are staying near the Kangla would enter and it would not be convenient for those Government employees who are staying in far away places to come to Kangla for morning or evening walk. Further, the Government employees will be more easily identifiable and can be held liable for any untoward incident in the Kangla. Hence, allowing Government servants inside Kangla can not be said to be discriminatory. 21. Accordingly, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent authorities that the decision of the Kangla Fort Board cannot be said to be contrary to the mandate of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India or violative of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution or beyond its authority. 22. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials on record. 23. 22. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials on record. 23. The petitioner, who is about 45 years now and desirous of having morning and evening walks inside the Kangla Fort, is aggrieved by the decision of the Kangla Fort Board to allow entry only to government employees and civilians who are of 50 years and above for morning and evening walks inside the Kangla as being infringement of his fundamental right as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as discriminatory and also depriving the benefit of taking morning and evening walks inside the Kangla for enjoyment of better life as part of right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and on various grounds as already discussed above. 24. As evident from the above, the stand of the respondent authorities is that such a decision was taken to prevent congestion and over-crowding inside Kangla considering the increased volume of persons who want to do physical exercise like walking or jogging in the campus of the Kangla Fort. The Kangla Fort Board also took into consideration the disturbance, destruction caused by some of the walkers/public to the gardens, monuments, holy places located inside the Kangla Fort. As mentioned above, the defence of the respondents authorities is that such an act does not amount to discrimination and cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as Article 14 itself permits classification for legitimate purposes. It has been contended by the respondent authorities that this classification of Government employees and civilians who are 50 years and above for the purpose of permitting them to go for morning and evening walks inside the Kangla beyond office hours is for the avowed public purpose of preventing congestion and over-crowding in the Kangla Fort area which leads to harmful effect in the Kangla Fort by way of destruction of parks, garden, monuments, historical sites inside the Kangla Fort, and is permissible. 25. Thus, one of the core issues involved in this writ petition is about the applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution of India by way of classification which the petitioner claims to be discriminatory, which has been rebutted by the respondents authorities as a permissible classification. 26. 25. Thus, one of the core issues involved in this writ petition is about the applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution of India by way of classification which the petitioner claims to be discriminatory, which has been rebutted by the respondents authorities as a permissible classification. 26. The scope of Article 14 of the Constitution of India has been the subject matter of judicial pronouncements from the early stages of the enforcement of the Constitution of India. One of the earliest decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India explaining the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is Charanjit Lal Choudhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to the corresponding law of equal protection under the American Constitution, after the 14th Amendment, applied similar principles in upholding different classification of persons as constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it and bear a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which it is proposed. In the said case of Charanjit Lal Choudhury (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the classification even for a single person for the purpose of a special legislation applicable to it alone in the interest of the public at large. 27. Article 14 mandates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before law or equal protection of laws. Therefore, Article 14 abhores discrimination by mandating equal treatment to all. Yet, it is also an aspect of this equality clause that unequals cannot be treated equally as it would in reality result in inequality. Equal treatment and equal protection actually means equal treatment in similar circumstances and prohibits unequal treatment of persons similarly situated. [vide Kishan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 795 , M. Nagraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212 ]. Thus, in order to categorise and differentiate the equals from the unequals, the need for classification arose which has led to evolution of the well established legal doctrine of reasonable classification having a nexus with the purpose for which such a classification has been made. Otherwise, any classification would lead to discrimination as Article 14 abhores discrimination. Thus, in order to categorise and differentiate the equals from the unequals, the need for classification arose which has led to evolution of the well established legal doctrine of reasonable classification having a nexus with the purpose for which such a classification has been made. Otherwise, any classification would lead to discrimination as Article 14 abhores discrimination. Therefore, in order to avoid the pitfall of discrimination, such classification must be reasonable and be based on distinguishable features which stands out from the rest and such a classification must have a reasonable relation to the purpose for which such a decision for classification has been taken. 28. Through a series of illuminating decisions, the law relating to permissible classification under Article 14 of the Constitution of India has now come to be firmly established in our jurisprudence, which has been succinctly put by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Budhan Choudhry (supra) in the following words:- "(5) The provisions of article 14 of the Constitution have come up for discussion before this Court in a number of cases, - namely, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 ; State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318 ; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 ; Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123 ; Lachmandas Kewalram v. State of Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 235 ; and Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1953 SC 156 and Habeeb Mohamad v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1953 SC 287 . It is, therefore, not necessary to enter upon any lengthy discussion as to the meaning, scope and effect of the article in question. It is now well-established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. The contention now put forward as to the invalidity of the trial of the appellants has, therefore to be tested in the light of the principles so laid down in the decisions of this Court." 29. Thus, the twin litmus tests which have been also adopted by the Indian Courts to examine the validity of any classification as not offending Article 14 are as follows:- (i) That the classification must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those left out of the group; (ii) That differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. Therefore, the first requirement of the twin test is that the classification must be distinct, having certain unique characteristics which are not available to the other groups from which it is distinguished and should be easily identifiable. Secondly, such differentiation between these groups must have a real and reasonable nexus with the purpose for which such a differentiation has been made and objective sought to be achieved. When these two conditions are fulfilled, any classification will not be violative of the mandate of Article 14. 30. Keeping the aforesaid principles embodying the twin tests in mind in the present case, we may proceed to examine the issue at hand. As regards the first leg of the test, whether the classification i.e. the Government employees and civilians who are 50 years and above as opposed to the rest of the society, as has been classified by the Kangla Fort Board for the purpose of allowing entry for morning and evening walks inside the Kangla Fort area, is founded on an intelligible differential or not, it has to be seen that as regards the first category of class, it actually consists of two groups of persons, namely, Government employees irrespective of age and status, and non Governmental employee civilians who are 50 years and above. It is, these two categories of persons, who are allowed morning and evening walks inside the Kangla, who form one class as opposed to the rest who are not allowed. The question which arises for consideration is whether these two groups of persons, viz., Government employees and civilians, 50 years of age and above, who are allowed morning/evening walks form one distinct and well defined class as opposed to those who are not allowed access. This Court does not think so, as there is hardly any common trait or attribute or thread which runs through these two groups forming one category of persons who are allowed morning and evening walks as opposed to the rest of the society who are not allowed the said benefit. The classification of persons for legislative purpose must belong to a "well defined class", to use the expression one finds in State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 , another landmark decision in this field of law. This Court finds difficulty in noticing any common attribute or characteristic in these two groups of persons forming one class who are allowed morning and evening walks in the Kangla. It may be also observed that though in respect of civilians, restriction has been put in terms of age, there is no such restriction put in respect of government employees. 31. Apart from the aforesaid problem relating to classification as regards these two groups of persons who are allowed morning and evening walks, assuming that they form a distinct category and class and hence identifiable from the rest who are not allowed morning and evening walks inside Kangla, the other test to be satisfied is to establish the real and reasonable nexus of such classification with the avowed purpose for which the said decision was taken. It is the specific case of the respondents that the purpose for taking such a decision by the Kangla Fort Board was to avoid overcrowding in the Kangla Fort area which in turn leads to damage or destruction of properties inside Kangla Fort. It is the specific case of the respondents that the purpose for taking such a decision by the Kangla Fort Board was to avoid overcrowding in the Kangla Fort area which in turn leads to damage or destruction of properties inside Kangla Fort. If the avowed purpose for taking such a decision was to prevent overcrowding in Kangla, placing restriction on the entry of persons inside Kangla, fixing the age limit of the entrants, can be said to have reasonable nexus with the classification, and such a classification of those civilians who are allowed and who are not allowed may be permissible. However, adopting a criterion of occupation of the persons in terms of government employment or non-government employment for permitting entry in the Kangla for morning/evening walks does not seem to have any reasonable nexus with the aforesaid avowed purpose of preventing congestion. One fails to understand how the status of a person as a government employee or not has a nexus with the avowed purpose of preventing overcrowding and congestion in Kangla. If the Kangla authority wishes to prevent overcrowding and congestion in the Kangla they may do so by restricting entry of persons by fixing the age limit irrespective of the occupation or status of the person concerned. But, in the present case, the Kangla fort Board has gone beyond it by allowing the Government employees irrespective of their age. As far as government employees are concerned, there is no such restriction in entry for morning/evening walk. In other words, a civilian who is 35 years old but not a Government employee cannot have access to Kangla Fort for morning/evening walks as he has not reached 50 years but the said limitation will not apply to a government employee who is 35 years old because of the aforesaid decision of the Board. A Government employee who has not yet reached 50 years, will always be permitted as opposed to any civilian non Government employee who has not yet reached 50 years. This Court is not able to discern any connection or nexus between the occupation of a person of being a Government employee with the avowed aim of the Board to prevent congestion in the Kangla. 32. The respondents including the Ld. This Court is not able to discern any connection or nexus between the occupation of a person of being a Government employee with the avowed aim of the Board to prevent congestion in the Kangla. 32. The respondents including the Ld. Amicus Curiae have tried to explain the permission given to government employees irrespective of age by stating that the government employees can be easily held accountable for any misconduct or destruction inside Kangla which may be difficult to be fastened to in case of civilians. According to them government employees can always be subjected to departmental action or disciplinary proceeding which is not available in respect of the civilians. Secondly, it has been also explained by stating that the number of government employees who would normally avail the benefit of morning/evening walk inside Kangla would be negligible as most of the government employees do not stay nearby Kangla and only those Government employees who are staying nearby Kangla would have access to Kangla for morning/evening walk and not those government employees who are staying in far away locations. Therefore, by allowing a few government employees it cannot lead to congestion or overcrowding and accordingly, the government employees have been allowed. Thus, one of the criteria adopted by the Kangla Fort Board to allow Government employees for morning/evening walk is their easy accountability as well as the numerical consideration. In this context, it may be stated that there are other categories of persons, viz., employees of Banks, public undertakings, co-operative societies, etc. who may not be "Government employees" but who also possess similar attributes as Government employees in terms of accountability and are also numerically less, who may also like to go for morning/evening walks, but have been omitted from the permissible group of persons. These categories of persons who are similarly situated as the "Government employees" as far as the number and accountability are concerned, are not given the similar benefits as the "Government employees" though they could have been also included along with Government employees. Therefore, picking out only the category of "Government employees" to the exclusion of such similar persons can be said to be discrimination and cannot form the valid basis for classification. Therefore, picking out only the category of "Government employees" to the exclusion of such similar persons can be said to be discrimination and cannot form the valid basis for classification. Thus, the occupation of the person as a Government employee cannot be a valid and reasonable basis for classification qua the avowed purpose of keeping the Kangla less congested and it cannot be said that it has a real nexus to that purpose. 33. Further, one of the reasons for taking the decision by the Kangla Fort Board is the presupposition that it is the civilians who indulge in destruction of properties inside Kangla Fort Board and also that it will be difficult to proceed against civilians for their misconduct. This Court is of the view that such an adverse presumption against the civilians of misbehaviour cannot be a valid legal basis for making a classification as contemplated under Article 14 of the Constitution without there being any material basis for such presumption. There cannot be any presumption that only civilians would cause destruction of properties and that the government employees would not do so as all the civilians are also expected to abide by rules and laws of the land. In this context, the submission of the petitioner that no proper studies or survey had been conducted by the Kangla Fort authorities about any such congestion by civilians or destruction or damage caused by civilians cannot be said to be without any basis. However, if the respondents are to be believed, the decision of the Kangla Fort Board was based on the aforesaid premise, and such a premise must be supported by certain materials, which are absolutely lacking in the present case. Therefore, without any material basis, the supposition of the Kangla Fort Board that the civilians damage and destroy flowers/plants/articles inside Kangla is merely assumptive and speculative and cannot form a valid legal basis for classification. 34. It may be also stated that though the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of W.B., AIR 1953 SC 40, held that "Article 14 does not insist that legislative classification should be scientifically perfect or logically complete", and in State of Karnataka and Anr. 34. It may be also stated that though the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of W.B., AIR 1953 SC 40, held that "Article 14 does not insist that legislative classification should be scientifically perfect or logically complete", and in State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Mangalore University Non-Teaching Employees' Association and Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 302 that "It is not prudent or pragmatic to insist on a mathematically accurate classification covering diverse situations and all possible contingencies", it was emphasised in Kailash Chand Sharma (supra) that the classifications should be based on empirical study or survey conducted by the State. It may be stated that the Kangla Fort Board had not conducted any study as to how many Government employees are actually residing near Kangla and how many of them are using Kangla for morning/evening walk. In any event, impugned decision is not confined to any specific category of Government employees, but allows all Government employees irrespective of age, status, location. It is a different matter that many Government employees may not avail this benefit or privilege as claimed by the respondents. But since it is open to all Government employees, the explanation given before this Court that in fact, only a few Government employees go for morning/evening walk cannot justify such a classification, without any material basis. 35. Further, if the logic and reasoning of the Kangla Fort Board that since the number of government employees who use Kangla for morning/evening walks are less and negligible is accepted, such a premise can also be used for other questionable purposes. The authorities may make a law for preventing pollution in the city area by which, purchase of vehicles by only government employees may be allowed, by prohibiting purchase of vehicle by civilians on the ground that number of government employees will be less and hence will cause less pollution. The fact remains that whether a vehicle is owned by a civilian or by a government employee, the effect of pollution would not be different and as such occupation of the owner of the vehicle as to whether he is a Government servant or not, cannot be a reasonable basis for classification, if the purpose of such legislation is to reduce pollution. The effect of pollution cannot be less just because a vehicle is owned by a Government employee, even though the fact would remain that the Government employees will always be less in any society and non-Government employee will be always more. Similarly, in the present case, the effect of congestion or overcrowding cannot be said to be lessened by permitting few numbers of government employees and to the total exclusion of the public who are below 50 of age. Therefore, the occupational status of a person as a Government servant or not, cannot be a valid basis for classification unless the purpose of legislation has nexus with the employment status of the persons. The matter would, of course, be different, if certain project is taken up for Government employees, then, they can form a distinct class. For example, if the Government, because of paucity of residential accommodation for Government employees, seek to acquire certain land and build a residential complex, to cater to the needs of Government employees, in such a situation, classification for that purpose of the Government employees as a distinct class may be permissible. In that event, the Government employees can be classified as a distinct class which will have a rational nexus with the avowed purpose of making residential complex for them. 36. In the present case, it is to be noted that Kangla was not developed as a special area for Government employees. It is a public area of historical importance where everyone, whether a Government employee or not has some interest in developing, maintaining and preserving the nature and character of the Kangla for which the Kangla Fort Act, 2004 was enacted and by constituting a Board to carry out numerous functions. Reading Sections 3, 12, 17 and 18 of the Act would indicate that the desire of the legislature was to preserve, protect and maintain the site as of historical, religious and heritage importance for which the Board has been given such powers and responsibilities under Section 13 of the Act. Sections 15, 16, 20, etc. provide for availability of funds for the aforesaid purpose. Since Kangla is also a sacred religious site, any ceremony or festivity inside it has to be performed under the supervision of the Board. Sections 15, 16, 20, etc. provide for availability of funds for the aforesaid purpose. Since Kangla is also a sacred religious site, any ceremony or festivity inside it has to be performed under the supervision of the Board. Thus, the scheme of the Kangla Fort Act, 2004 would clearly show that Kangla is not only a historical and heritage site but also a sacred religious site for which special provisions have been made, and need to preserve, maintain and protect the site seems to be the overriding consideration for enactment of the Act. The management of it has been handed over to the Kangla Fort Board and the State Government has no direct role, though it has been invested with the power of general supervision and to issue directions as provided under Section 23 of the Act. That being the situation, it cannot be said that the Government employees will have any special relationship with the Kangla. If the Kangla had been developed specially for the Government employees, the matter would have been different and special provisions could have been made for the Government employees. Therefore, even if the Government employees form a distinct class of their own which is distinguishable from the rest, yet there is no nexus for such classification with the avowed purpose of the decision of the Kangla Fort Board, that is, to prevent congestion or overcrowding which is directly related to its proper preservation, maintenance and protection. This Court is of the view that there is no real or reasonable nexus between such a classification and the avowed purpose of the decision. 37. It may be noted that the nexus, which the classification must have with the avowed purpose of legislation, must be just, reasonable and real. Such nexus cannot be imaginary and based on speculation, suppositions, but based on empirical foundation. Neither such nexus can be remote and indirect. Such nexus must be clearly evident, direct and obvious, which is not required to be established through a series of inferences and reasoning. In the present case, the status of a person of being a Government employee does not seem to have any nexus with the avowed purpose to prevent overcrowding, in absence of any empirical study or demonstrable material and basis that actually only a few Government employees use the same for morning and evening walk. 38. In the present case, the status of a person of being a Government employee does not seem to have any nexus with the avowed purpose to prevent overcrowding, in absence of any empirical study or demonstrable material and basis that actually only a few Government employees use the same for morning and evening walk. 38. It is to be also noted that the right to go for morning and evening walks inside Kangla is a kind of benefit which any health conscious person would like to avail of, irrespective of his occupation, whether a government employee or not. To that extent, such a benefit is of universal application and cannot be denied to any person without reasonable basis. The claim of the petitioner is also based on this right which he would like to enjoy by availing the benefit of morning and evening walks in a secure, clean and healthy environment as Kangla. Seen from the aforesaid perspective, restriction placed on a civilian who is below 50 years while keeping no such restriction in respect of government employees does not seem to be a valid classification but clearly arbitrary and discriminatory. 39. There is yet another dimension to this avowed purpose for which the Kangla Fort Board took the decision, which is to prevent congestion. It is to be noted, as admitted by all the parties that there is no restriction whatsoever about the entry in the Kangla by anyone during the office hours on payment of certain fees. The restriction is only during the morning and evening, which has an added element to it, that is, the benefit or privilege of walking in the morning and evening. Thus, it is not very clear as to the actual and real purpose of the restriction, though the avowed purpose is to prevent congestion, which again cannot be said to be the purpose during the office hours. Therefore, the avowed purpose to prevent congestion can be only during the morning and evening and not during the office hours. If that is so, why there is the need to prevent congestion only during morning and evening and not during the office hours? Is it to prevent damage and destruction caused during the morning and evening hours? Therefore, the avowed purpose to prevent congestion can be only during the morning and evening and not during the office hours. If that is so, why there is the need to prevent congestion only during morning and evening and not during the office hours? Is it to prevent damage and destruction caused during the morning and evening hours? If so, whether such a conclusion by the Kangla Fort Board that it is caused by civilians and who are not Government employees and there is congestion is supported by any such finding? The Respondents, more particularly, the Kangla Fort Board however, has not come forward with any such study or finding. In such a situation, question may be raised as to real purpose for this impugned decision, rather than the purported decision, for such a purpose need to be properly demonstrated in order to justify any classification. In the present case, this Court is doubtful, in absence of proper materials to support that the purpose of the decision to restrict entry during morning and evening time, other than office hours, is to prevent congestion. In such a situation, when the real purpose cannot be ascertained with certainty, the classification itself becomes questionable. 40. As discussed above, the avowed purpose of the said decision of the Kangla Fort Board is to prevent congestion and overcrowding in the morning and evening, which in the opinion of this Court does not have a reasonable and just relation with the basis for classification as government employees and non government employees. Accordingly, in that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid decision of the Kangla Fort Board to allow government employees irrespective of age while restricting other non-government employees who are below 50 years, to be arbitrary and discriminatory and such a decision does not seem to have succeeded the twin tests of permissible classification. 41. 41. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, this Court would hold that while the decision of the Kangla Fort Board to put a limit on the age of the persons to be allowed entry in Kangla for morning and evening walks may be held to be permissible and valid, but the other part of the decision for allowing government employees irrespective of age, to exclusion of other non-government employees who are below 50 years for morning and evening walks suffers from the vice of discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 as discussed above. To that extent, the decision of the Kangla Fort Board is declared illegal. 42. As regards the contention of the petitioner that the Kangla Fort Board does not have the authority to take such decision, this Court is of the view that such a contention is without merit. Section 12 itself authorizes the Kangla Fort Board to make necessary arrangements for preservation and protection of the Kangla Fort for which Section 13 of the Act empowers the Board to do such things as may be incidental or conducive to the efficient administration of the affairs of Kangla Fort. Accordingly, the Kangla Fort Board does have the power and authority to take such decision, as has been done here, though, it is a different matter whether such a decision satisfies the other legal requirements. 43. Since, this Court has already arrived at a finding that the impugned order suffers from the vice of discrimination being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court is of view that the other claims made by the petitioner that the impugned decision also violates Article 19(1) (d) and 21 of the Constitution of India, need not be examined. 44. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the impugned decision of the Kangla Fort Board taken on 24.01.2013 is set aside as far as allowing Government employees irrespective of age limit is concerned, as violative of Article 14 without interfering with its decision to allow persons of 50 years and above for morning/evening walk inside the Kangla. In other words, the cut off age will also be applicable for Government employees for the purpose of morning and evening walks inside Kangla Fort. 45. The petition stands partly allowed accordingly.