JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Instant appeal having been filed under Section 100 CPC is directed against judgment and decree dated 2.1.2006 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh in Civil Appeal No. 30/2003, 63/2005, affirming the judgment and decree dated 30.12.2000 passed by learned Senior Sub Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, in Civil Suit No. 159/96/91, 97/2000/96/91. 2. Undisputed facts, as emerge from the record are that Hima Devi plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter, ‘plaintiff’) was granted land under “Himachal Pradesh Nautor Land Rules, 1968”, (hereinafter, ‘Rules”) under the Scheme known as “The Himachal Pradesh Grant of Nautor Land to Landless persons and Other Eligible Persons Scheme 1975” (hereinafter, ‘Scheme’), vide File No. 69 dated 12.2.1975, comprising of Khasra No. 1427/1, 1432/1 and 1611/1, measuring 2-4-16 Bigha on 20.1.1976. As per the plaintiff, she was put in physical possession of the suit land and mutation No. 411 was also attested on 23.12.1977 and since then, she is owner-in-possession of the land. Consequently, in the month of August, 1990, suit land comprised in Khasra No. 1050 measuring 1-1-15 Bigha was forcibly taken into possession by the defendants, through their field official, without any right, title or interest over the same, at the back of the plaintiff. plaintiff further alleged before the Court below that in the last week of November, 1990, she returned to her home and noticed that defendants have started construction work on the suit land. Plaintiff got defendants served with legal notice under Section 80 CPC on 3.4.1991 but since defendants failed to restore the piece of the land to the plaintiff, she was compelled to prefer instant suit before the learned Senior Sub Judge, Mandi, District Mandi. At this stage, it may be noticed that during pendency of the above mentioned suit, defendants filed an appeal under Section 28 of the Rules before Deputy Commissioner, who vide order dated 20.1.1992 (Exhibit DA), allowed the appeal and ordered for resumption of land in favour of the defendants. Since aforesaid order came to be passed by Deputy Commissioner, during pendency of the suit, plaintiff amended her plaint and while praying for decree for possession also sought quashing of aforesaid order dated 20.1.1992 passed by Deputy Commissioner (Exhibit PA). Since aforesaid order came to be passed by Deputy Commissioner, during pendency of the suit, plaintiff amended her plaint and while praying for decree for possession also sought quashing of aforesaid order dated 20.1.1992 passed by Deputy Commissioner (Exhibit PA). While admitting claim of the plaintiff that land comprised in Khasra No. 2699/1427, 2701/1432 and 2703/1611, Kita 3, measuring 4-4-16 Bigha, situate in Riwalsar, Elaka Bagera, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, was granted as Nautor land to the plaintiff on 20.1.1976, defendants emphatically denied that the possession of land was handed over to the plaintiff. Defendants further claimed before the Court below that mutation, if any, in favour of the plaintiff does not confer any right, title or interest over the suit land. Defendants while denying allegations with regard to forcible possession taken by them of the suit land, alleged that suit land was declared by the HP Government vide Notification No. 8-3/74-SF Part-II dated 15.10.1976 as Demarcated Protected Forest (in short, ‘DPF’), after having afforded due opportunity of being heard to the right holders of the area, whereafter, Forest Department constructed boundary pillars all around area of new DPF. Defendants further alleged that since plaintiff failed to breakup land within prescribed period of one year for agricultural purpose hence, land remained as forest land and same deserved to be resumed to the Forest Department. Defendants further claimed that it had started construction work over the suit land during August, 1989, for the construction of building of Range Office and residence and they have spent Rs.1,50,000/- and, at no point of time, objection, if any, was ever raised by the plaintiff. Apart from above, defendants further claimed that immediately after having come to know about factum with regard to allotment of Nautor land to the plaintiff, it preferred an appeal against the same before the Deputy Commissioner, Mandi, who vide order dated 20.1.1992, cancelled the grant made in favour of the plaintiff. Learned trial Court in Civil Suit No. 159/1996 of 1991, vide judgment and decree dated 30.9.1996, decreed the suit of the plaintiff, after giving its findings on following issues: “1. Whether the order dated 20.1.1992 of the Deputy Commissioner, Mandi is illegal and null and void and liable to be set aside? O.P.P. 2. If issue No.1 is proved, whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the suit land as alleged? O.P.P. 3. Whether the order dated 20.1.1992 of the Deputy Commissioner, Mandi is illegal and null and void and liable to be set aside? O.P.P. 2. If issue No.1 is proved, whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the suit land as alleged? O.P.P. 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? O.P.D. 4. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? O.P.D. 5. Whether the suit is within limitation? O.P.P. 6. Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? O.P.P. 7. Whether no valid notice under section 80 CPC has been issued, if so, its effect? O.P.D. 8. Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the present suit? O.P.D. 9. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit? O.P.D. 10. Whether the suit land was D.P.F. before its allotment to the plaintiff, if so, its effect? O.P.D. 11. If issue No. 10 is not proved, whether the suit land declared as D.P.F. after the allotment of the suit land to the plaintiff, if so, its effect? O.P.D. 12. Relief.” 3. However, fact remains that subsequently, learned District Judge, Mandi, in appeal having been preferred by the defendants remanded the case back to the trial court, for deciding the same afresh. Pursuant to aforesaid remand order passed by District Judge, Mandi, trial court reheard the matter and vide judgment dated 30.12.2000, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff (Civil Suit No. 159/96/91, 97/2000/96/91). plaintiff feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with aforesaid dismissal of her suit, preferred an appeal under Section 96 CPC before the Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, who vide judgment and decree dated 2.1.2006, dismissed the appeal, as a result of which, judgment and decree passed by trial court, came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, plaintiff approached this Court in the instant proceedings praying therein for decreeing her suit, after setting aside judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. 4. This Court vide order dated 21.6.2007, admitted the Regular Second Appeal, on the following substantial questions of law: “(1) Whether the Deputy Commissioner was competent to have cancelled the grant made to the appellant? 4. This Court vide order dated 21.6.2007, admitted the Regular Second Appeal, on the following substantial questions of law: “(1) Whether the Deputy Commissioner was competent to have cancelled the grant made to the appellant? (2) Whether respondent No.3, who has been held trespasser in previous litigation between the parties, is liable to restore possession of the land to the appellant and whether the findings of the two Courts below contrary to these facts can be sustained on the basis of evidence on record? 5. Learned counsel, while inviting the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi vs. Rajat Vidyarthi, (2009)3 SCC 287 , (2000)3 SCC 708 and Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 , forcibly contended that present appeal is not maintainable, in view of concurrent findings of fact recorded by learned Courts below and as such same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 7. Since specific objection with regard to maintainability of present appeal, in view of concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below, has been taken by the defendants, this Court deems it necessary to deal with the same at first instance before exploring answer, if any, to the substantial questions of law formulated hereinabove. Though learned counsel representing the defendants has placed reliance upon the judgments, as have been taken note above, this Court deems it proper to take into consideration latest judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma’s case supra, wherein it has been held as under:- “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 8. Perusal of the aforesaid judgment suggests that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. This Court, after having taken note of observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment supra, sees no reason to differ with the argument having been made by learned counsel representing the defendants that in normal circumstance concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below should not be interfered with by the High Courts, rather, High Courts, while exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, are restrained from re-appreciating the evidence available on record. But, aforesaid judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, nowhere suggests that there is complete bar for High Courts to upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below, especially when finding recorded by Courts below appears to be perverse. 9. It is well settled by now that a finding of fact itself may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said findings, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chandna Impex Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi, (2011) 7 SCC 289 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “14. In Hero Vinoth Vs. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chandna Impex Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi, (2011) 7 SCC 289 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “14. In Hero Vinoth Vs. Seshammal, (2006)5 SCC 545 , referring to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co.Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 , as also a number of other decisions on the point, this Court culled out three principles for determining whether a question of law raised in a case is substantial. One of the principles so summarised, is : (Hero Vinoth case, SCC p.556, para 24) "24.(iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to ‘decision based on no evidence’, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding". (p.294) 10. Hon’ble Apex Court in D.R. Rathna Murthy vs. Ramappa, (2011)1 SCC 158 , has specifically held that High Court can interfere with the findings of fact even in the second appeal, provided the findings recorded by Courts below are found to be perverse. It has further been held in the case supra that there is no absolute bar on the re-appreciation of evidence in those proceedings; however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “9. Undoubtedly, the High Court can interfere with the findings of fact even in the Second Appeal, provided the findings recorded by the courts below are found to be perverse i.e. not being based on the evidence or contrary to the evidence on record or reasoning is based on surmises and misreading of the evidence on record or where the core issue is not decided. There is no absolute bar on the re-appreciation of evidence in those proceedings, however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. (Vide Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa, (2000)6 SCC 120 ; Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed, (2001) 7 SCC 189 and Bharatha Matha & Anr. v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010)11 SCC 483 .)” (p.162) 11. Hon’ble Apex Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By LRs., (2001)3 SCC 179 , has held that appellate Court ought not to interfere with the findings of trial Judge on a question of fact unless the latter has overlooked some peculiar feature connected with evidence of a witness or such evidence on balance is sufficiently improbable so as to invite displacement by appellate Court. 12. Careful reading of aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court clearly suggests that there is no blanket bar for High Courts to upset the concurrent findings of Courts below, especially when it emerge from the record that (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. Hon’ble Apex Court in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through LRs and Others vs. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) through LRs and Others, (2013)15 SCC 161 , has held as under: “35. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006)5 SCC 545 , wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarized in para 24, which is extracted below : (SCC pp.555- 56) “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” We have to place reliance on the afore-mentioned case to hold that the High Court has framed substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC, and there is no error in the judgment of the High Court in this regard and therefore, there is no need for this Court to interfere with the same.” (pp.174-175) 13. It is quite evident from the aforesaid exposition of law that even concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below can be interfered with/upset by the High Courts, while exercising power under Section 100 CPC, if it is convinced that findings recorded by Courts below are not based upon any evidence and same are perverse. At this stage, it may be noticed that during the proceedings of the case, learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff was able to point out certain material irregularities/illegalities committed by Courts below, while examining/analyzing the evidence adduced on record by both the parties and as such this Court deems it proper to examine the pleadings/evidence adduced on record by the respective parties in support of their respective claim so that correctness and genuineness of arguments made by learned counsel to the effect that judgments passed by Courts below are wholly perverse, is ascertained. 14. Keeping in view the contents and text of substantial questions of law, reproduced hereinabove, this Court intends to take all substantial questions of law together as they are interconnected. 15. Factum with regard to allotment of suit land under the Rules, in favour of the plaintiff is not in dispute, as has been taken note above. It is also not in dispute that aforesaid allotment was made in favour of the plaintiff on 20.1.1976, whereafter mutation No. 411 came to be attested on 23.12,1977, reflecting plaintiff to be owner-in-possession of the land as is evident from Jamabandi for the year 1989-90 (Exhibit PA). It is also not in dispute that suit land came to be allotted to the plaintiff under Clause-5 of the Scheme, 1975, wherein Nautor land upto 1 Acre for the purpose of agriculture/horticulture can be granted to landless persons on simple application in the revenue estate, in which he/she resides or in nearby revenue estate. Clause-7 of the Scheme empowers Sub Divisional Officer(Civil) of the Sub Division and Tehsildar of the Tehsil, in which land is situate, to sanction/grant Nautor land. Clauses-5 and 7 of the Scheme, 1975 are reproduced hereunder: “5. Grant of Nautor Land. Clause-7 of the Scheme empowers Sub Divisional Officer(Civil) of the Sub Division and Tehsildar of the Tehsil, in which land is situate, to sanction/grant Nautor land. Clauses-5 and 7 of the Scheme, 1975 are reproduced hereunder: “5. Grant of Nautor Land. – (1) Nautor Land upto l acre for the purpose of Agriculture/Horticulture shall be granted to a landless person on a simple application in the Revenue estate in which ordinarily resides or in a nearby revenue estate as far as possible in the following order:- (i) in the revenue estate; (ii) in the Patwar circle if no land is available in the Revenue estate; (iii) in the Kanungo circle if no land is available in the Patwar circle; (iv) in the Tehsil, if no land is available in the Kanungo circle. 2(2) The allotment of land to eligible persons under the scheme shall be made in the following order of preference. (i) members of Scheduled castes/Scheduled Tribes, ex-servicemen, Freedom fighters and Ex-MLA personnel, covered under the Govt. of India scheme and also those freedom fighters who hove been awarded commendation certificates by the State Government; (ii) landowners or tenants whose holdings as a result of implementation of Section 104 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 are reduced below one acre; and (iii) to remaining eligible persons; Provided that no land containing more than 40 trees of valuable species per acre shall be granted under this scheme. (3) If there are trees on the land granted under this scheme and the grantee is not in a position to pay the price of the trees at market rate, the trees shall be Cleared by the Forest Department within a month from the date of grant of the land. 7. Sanctioning Authority.-The Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) of the Sub-Division and the Tehsildar of the Tehsil in which the land is situated shall be the sanctioning authority for the purpose of this scheme. The sanction order of nautor land shall be made by the Tehsildar on the application and its operative part entered in the register to be maintained for the purpose in the Tehsil. Issue of Patta under the scheme will not be necessary.” 16. Pursuant to aforesaid sanction, detailed procedure is provided under Rules-18 and 19 of the Rules, 1968, for the grant of Patta in favour of the allottee, containing therein terms and conditions. Issue of Patta under the scheme will not be necessary.” 16. Pursuant to aforesaid sanction, detailed procedure is provided under Rules-18 and 19 of the Rules, 1968, for the grant of Patta in favour of the allottee, containing therein terms and conditions. Rule-22 of the Rules, 1968, is also reproduced herein below: “22. In the case of nautor land granted for agricultural or horticultural purposes, the Patwari of the area shall report immediately on the expiry of two years from the grant of the nautor land, whether the land has been brought under cultivation/plantation by the grantee. In the case of nautor land granted for a water mills shall be reported immediately on the expiry of two years whether the mill has been started and if not, yet whether at least construction of the mill has substantially begun. In other case, he shall report at the expiry of two years, whether any substantial start has been made for the use of the land for the purpose it was granted giving details thereof. The date on which the above report is due from the Patwari shall be entered in the appropriate column of the missal Band Register. Explanations:--The Patwari shall at the time of inspection of each harvest (girdawari) make specific entries about the use to which each field number granted as nautor land ahs been put to.” 17. As per aforesaid Rule, in case, entire land granted for horticultural/agricultural purpose is not put to use for the purpose for which it was granted, within a period of two years, from the grant, Patwari concerned shall at the time of inspection of each harvest (Girdawari) make specific entry about use to which the field number is granted as Nautor land has been put to. Subsequent to aforesaid report submitted by Patwari concerned under Rule-22, Sub Divisional Officer(Civil), if is satisfied that grantee has committed breach of conditions of grant, shall order resumption under the Rules, after affording opportunity of being heard to the allottee/ grantee. Rule 25 further authorizes Deputy Commissioner to pass order regarding resumption of possession on receipt of report submitted to him under sub-rule (b) of Rule 24. Needless to say, before passing order, if any, under Rule 25, Deputy Commissioner is required to afford opportunity of hearing to the allottee/grantee. Rules 24 and 25 of the Rules, 1968 are reproduced hereinbelow: “24. Needless to say, before passing order, if any, under Rule 25, Deputy Commissioner is required to afford opportunity of hearing to the allottee/grantee. Rules 24 and 25 of the Rules, 1968 are reproduced hereinbelow: “24. Report by the Range Forest Office regarding defaulter to be called before resumption.-When the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) is satisfied that a grantee has committed a breach of the conditions of his grant, he shall before ordering resumption under these rules, give the grantee an opportunity to appear and state his objections to the cancellation and resumption, and having recorded the statement, he may either (a) extend the period for the fulfillment of the conditions of the grant by one year for valid reasons to be recorded in writing or (b) recommend to the Deputy Commissioner that a longer extension of time may be granted within which to fulfill the conditions 'or, that the 'breach of conditions may be condoned with or without payment of penalty or that the grant be resumed.” 25. Deputy Commissioner to pass orders regarding resumption of possession.-The Deputy Commissioner, may on receipt of a report submitted to him under Sub-Rule (b) of the last foregoing rules, pass such orders as he deems fit after giving an opportunity to the person affected to be heard.” 18. In the case at hand, allotment of suit land was made in favour of the plaintiff on 20.1.1976 by Tehsildar under the Scheme 1975. Mutation was also attested in favour of the plaintiff on 23.12.1977 as is evident from Jamabandi for the year 1989-90 (Exhibit PA). But, after fourteen years of allotment, defendants, as has been admitted in their written statement, fixed barbed wires for boundary purpose around the suit land and thereafter raised construction of building for office/residence of Range Officer. Though, defendants, in their reply have stated that suit land which was granted to the plaintiff under the Scheme was subsequently declared by Himachal Pradesh Government as DPF on 15.10.1976, after, affording due opportunity of hearing to the right holders of the area but this Court was unable to lay its hand on any document save and except order dated 15.10.1976, suggestive of the fact that plaintiff was afforded opportunity of hearing by the authorities concerned before passing aforesaid order. Defendants have also admitted in their written statement that they started raising construction work over the suit land during August, 1989, for the construction of building of Range Office i.e. after thirteen years of allotment. Defendants in their written statement set up a case that since plaintiff failed to break up land within prescribed period of one year for agricultural purpose, they preferred an appeal under Section 28 of the Rules, before Deputy Commissioner, Mandi. Rule 28 of the Rules, provide as under: “28. An appeal from the order of the S.D.O.(C) under rule 16 shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner within 60 days from the date of the order. A further appeal from the appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner shall lie to the Commissioner within 60 days from the date of the order. In the case of original grant mode by the Deputy Commissioner, an appeal from his order shall lie to the Commissioner within 60 days from the dote of order.’ Provided that no second appeal shall lie when the original order is confirmed on first appeal. 29. Review. The Financial Commissioner or the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer (C) may either of his own motion or on application of any party interested, review, and modify, reverse or confirm any order . 29. Review. The Financial Commissioner or the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer (C) may either of his own motion or on application of any party interested, review, and modify, reverse or confirm any order . passed by himself or any of his predecessors in office: provided as follows:- (a) when the Sub-Divisional Officer (C) thinks it necessary to review any order, he shall first obtain the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner; (b) when the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner think it necessary to review any order which he has not himself passed, he shall first obtain the sanction of the Financial Commissioner in the case of the Commissioner and the Commissioner in the case of the Deputy Commissioner; (c) the application for review of order shall not be entertained unless it is made within 90 days from the passing of the order and unless the applicant satisfied the Financial Commissioner or the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within that period; (d) an order Shall not be modified or reversed in review unless reasonable notice has been given to the parties affected thereby to appear and be heard in support of the order; (e) on order against which an appeal has been preferred shall not be reviewed.” 19. Mr. Digvijay Singh, learned counsel representing the plaintiff, while inviting attention of this Court to Rule 28 of the Rules, 1968, vehemently argued that appeal, if any, from the order of Sub Division Collector/Tehsildar, who had allotted the land under Scheme could be filed within 60 days from the date of order, but, in the instant case, as is evident from the admission made by the defendants in their written statement as well as appeal (Exhibit PX) that the appeal came to be filed on 26.7.1991, i.e. after fifteen years of allotment, as such, Deputy Commissioner had no power to cancel the allotment made in favour of the plaintiff under the Scheme. 20. At this stage, Mr. 20. At this stage, Mr. P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General, while refuting aforesaid submissions having been made by the learned counsel representing the plaintiff, contended that the order dated 20.1.1992 Exhibit DA, passed by Deputy Commissioner, is not under Section 28 of the Rules, rather Deputy Commissioner, while exercising powers under Rule 29, reviewed the order passed by Tehsildar, who had made allotment in favour of the grantee/allottee, vide order dated 20.1.1976. Mr. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General further contended that bare perusal of averments contained in the plaint as well as statement made by the plaintiff before the court clearly suggests that the plaintiff was not able to breakup the land after allotment for almost fifteen years, whereafter in the year 1991, defendants fenced the suit land, as such, there is no illegality or infirmity in the order of resumption passed by Deputy Commissioner. 21. As far as power of Deputy Commissioner to pass order of resumption under such Rules is concerned, same is not in dispute. Under Rule 25 of the Rules, Deputy Commissioner can pass order with regard to resumption of possession on the basis of report submitted to him under Sub-rule (b) of Rule 24. Similarly, Deputy Commissioner can entertain appeal from the order of Sub Divisional Officer(Civil) passed under Rule 16, whereby he/she is authorized to grant Nautor land upto the maximum as prescribed under Rule-5, but in both the situations, Deputy Commissioner can only act upon the report, if any, submitted by Sub Divisional Officer(Civil) or for that matter Tehsildar, who, under Rule-5 also enjoys power to grant Nautor land to landless persons. 22. It is none of the case of the defendants that Deputy Commissioner cancelled allotment made in favour of allottee/grantee while exercising powers under Rule 25, rather, specific case of the defendants is that order dated 20.1.1992 has been passed by Deputy Commissioner while exercising power under Rules-28 and 29 of the Rules. But, aforesaid contention/submission made by learned Additional Advocate General is totally contrary to record as well as Rules occupying the field. 23. First of all, perusal of Exhibit PX i.e. appeal filed by the defendants itself suggests that they being aggrieved by allotment of land in favour of the plaintiff under Scheme, preferred an appeal under Rule 28 of the Rules, 1968. Mr. 23. First of all, perusal of Exhibit PX i.e. appeal filed by the defendants itself suggests that they being aggrieved by allotment of land in favour of the plaintiff under Scheme, preferred an appeal under Rule 28 of the Rules, 1968. Mr. P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General, while referring to Exhibit DA, order dated 20.1.1992, passed by Deputy Commissioner, contended that before passing order under Rule 28, Deputy Commissioner called for the report of Tehsildar, who had granted land in favour of plaintiff, but bare perusal of Rule 28 itself suggests that power, if any, under Section 28 can/could be exercised by Deputy Commissioner, to ascertain correctness and legality of order, if any, passed by Sub Divisional Officer(Civil) or for that matter, Tehsildar, but, in the case at hand, as has been taken note, no order of Sub Divisional Officer(Civil)/Tehsildar granting land under the Scheme was challenged, rather, challenge is/was on the ground that since suit land subsequently came to be declared as DPF and it was never put to specific use as was required in terms of the Patta/grant made in favour of the plaintiff, allotment/grant deserves to be cancelled. 24. Leaving everything aside, Mr. P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General, was unable to dispute that appeal filed under Rule 28 by defendants was not within prescribed period of 60 days from the date of grant of allotment. Perusal of order dated 20.1.1992 (Exhibit DA) compels this Court to agree with the contention of Mr. Digvijay Singh learned counsel representing the plaintiff that appeal having been preferred by the defendants was accepted by Deputy Commissioner, without condoning delay, which he otherwise was not competent to condone. There is no mention as such in the order passed by Deputy Commissioner with regard to explanation, if any, rendered by the defendants, for not laying challenge to grant made in favour of the plaintiff for more than fourteen years, as such, order passed by Deputy Commissioner deserves to be set aside, on this sole ground. 25. Another contention raised by Mr. 25. Another contention raised by Mr. P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General, is also not tenable that order dated 20.1.1992 passed by Deputy Commissioner came to be passed under Rule 29, whereby Deputy Commissioner can/could modify, reverse or affirm any order passed by himself or any of his predecessor in office, because Rule 29(b) categorically provides that if Deputy Commissioner thinks it necessary to review any order, which he has not himself passed, he shall first obtain sanction of the Commissioner. 26. Admittedly, in the case at hand, order of grant in favour of plaintiff was passed by Tehsildar, under Clause-5 of the Scheme as is evident form order passed by Deputy Commissioner itself, and as such, Deputy Commissioner could only review the order passed by above named authority after obtaining sanction from the Commissioner. But in the case at hand there is nothing available on record suggestive of the fact that prior sanction was ever obtained by Deputy Commissioner to review order of grant passed by Tehsildar. 27. After having carefully perused pleadings adduced on record, as well as Rules applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that both the learned Courts below erred in not appreciating the fact that Deputy Commissioner had no power to cancel grant made in favour of plaintiff after prescribed period of limitation i.e. 60 days. Deputy Commissioner could only cancel grant/allotment of land while exercising power under Rule 28, if he/she had received appeal from the order of Sub Divisional Officer(Civil) or for that matter Tehsildar, within 60 days from the date of order. In the case at hand, as is clearly evident from the pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties that no steps, whatsoever were taken by the Forest Department to approach Deputy Commissioner either under Rule 25 or under Rule 28, for more than fourteen years seeking therein resumption of land on the ground that plaintiff failed to break up the land for agricultural purpose within the prescribed period of two years. 28. Similarly, while exercising power under Rule 29, Deputy Commissioner could only order resumption of suit land after obtaining prior sanction from the Commissioner. 28. Similarly, while exercising power under Rule 29, Deputy Commissioner could only order resumption of suit land after obtaining prior sanction from the Commissioner. In the case at hand, no due procedure as is envisaged under Rules 25, 28 and 29 of the Rules was followed by Deputy Commissioner, before passing order dated 20.1.1992 and as such same can not be termed to be sustainable. 29. As far as another argument having been made by Mr. P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General that land subsequently came to be declared as DPF, is concerned, that can not be accepted solely for the reason that suit land came to be allotted to plaintiff on 20.l1.1976 i.e. prior to issuance of Notification dated 15.10.1976, whereby Government declared part of suit land as DPF. If, for the sake of argument, aforesaid contention of the learned Additional Advocate General is accepted that no land declared as DPF could be granted to the plaintiff, in that eventuality, it is not understood how defendants could be allowed to raise construction on DPF, without there being any clearance/sanction from the Government of India. It has specifically come in the statement of DW-1, Daleep Singh, retired Range Officer that no prior sanction/clearance from Central Government was obtained by the Department before raising construction of office of Range Officer on the DPF. Substantial question of law No.1 is answered accordingly. 30. At this stage, both the learned counsel fairly stated that substantial question of law No.2 does not appear to be based upon the pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by the respective parties as such same is not required to be answered in light of finding given by this Court qua the substantial question of law No.1, above. 31. This Court after having perused pleadings and evidence adduced on record by the respective parties as well as Rules occupying the field, has no hesitation to conclude that the findings returned by both the learned Courts below are not based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties as well as Rules/Scheme occupying the field. Both the learned Courts below have drawn wrong inferences from the proved facts by applying law erroneously, as such, have ended up in returning erroneous findings, which are wholly perverse and can not be allowed to be sustained. Both the learned Courts below have drawn wrong inferences from the proved facts by applying law erroneously, as such, have ended up in returning erroneous findings, which are wholly perverse and can not be allowed to be sustained. Since findings recorded by the learned Courts below are not based upon any evidence and are contrary to the Rules, as such, same being perverse can be interfered with by this Court, while exercising power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 32. Though this court, has held on the basis of material available on record as well as Rules occupying the field that Deputy Commissioner had no power to cancel the grant made in favour of the plaintiff after fourteen years of the grant/allotment, while exercising power under Rule 28 but this Court can not lose sight of the fact that some portion of land has been already declared as DPF and same can not be put to non-forestry use, as has been held in case titled as T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad vs Union Of India & Ors decided on 12.12.1996 by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 33. Mr. Digvijay Singh, learned counsel representing the plaintiff, while inviting attention of this Court to the appeal preferred by the defendants before Deputy Commissioner, (Exhibit PX) fairly submitted that land comprising of Khasra No. 1432/1 and 1611/1 measuring 1-03-01 Bigha, which is separate from land declared as DPF, can be handed over to the plaintiff as was offered by the defendants in the appeal. Bare perusal of Exhibit PX, appeal filed by the defendants suggests that Forest Department has no objection in case land other than DPF is handed over to the plaintiff, who is admittedly grantee of entire chunk of land allotted by Tehsildar under the Scheme, 1975. 34. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, judgments and decrees passed by the first appellate court as well as trial Court are set aside being contrary to the Rules governing the field. Suit of the plaintiff is decreed to the extent that she shall be entitled to possession of land measuring 1-03-01 Bigha comprising of Khasra Nos. 1432/1 and 1611/1, whereas land comprising of Khasra No. 1427/1 measuring 1-01-15 Bigha, which has now been converted into DPF, shall remain in the possession of the Forest Department. Suit of the plaintiff is decreed to the extent that she shall be entitled to possession of land measuring 1-03-01 Bigha comprising of Khasra Nos. 1432/1 and 1611/1, whereas land comprising of Khasra No. 1427/1 measuring 1-01-15 Bigha, which has now been converted into DPF, shall remain in the possession of the Forest Department. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. Interim directions, if any, are also vacated.