ORDER : 1. The present petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. praying to set aside the order dated 22.2.2001 passed by the JMFC-II Court, Bijapur in CC.No.110/2001 and the order dated 18.7.2012 passed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Bijapur, in Crl.RP. No.100/2001. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the complaint are that complainant Revanasiddappa is a practicing advocate. He had his office in the premises of Sri Siddeshwar Samsthe, Gandhichowk, BLDE Association Road, Bijapur. Since 1975 he was in possession of Rooms bearing CTS.No.61/1 of Ward No.III in first floor and using the said premises for his professional work. Out of the said premises two rooms were let out to S.R.Yarnal who is the father-in-law of the complainant. With the permission of Sri S.R.Yarnal who was the then President of the Samsthe, complainant was doing his profession. It is further case of the complainant that during 1992-97 complainant was the Vice-President of the said Samsthe. During 1994-95 he made an application to Samsthe to enter his name as a tenant in respect of two rooms which were in his occupation. When the matter was placed before the Executive Committee, it was resolved to increase the rent of all the rooms. In that light, accused Nos.1 to 12 made a conspiracy to evict the complainant from the said two rooms highhandedly with force. In that context, they hatched a plan and on 7.8.1998 with the help of accused Nos.1 to 3, 6, 7 and 13 to 17 at about 11.00 p.m. they entered the premises by breaking open the lock. They intended to remove the articles belonging to the complainant. At that time, one Shivalingappa Nagappa Pattanashetti and Ravinder Basavaraj Awati were returning after watching the movie. When they were passing near the premises in question, they observed the said act of the accused. As they were close relatives of the complainant, they were watching the rooms of the complainant and by seeing the act of the accused they asked them as to why they are breaking open the lock and removing the articles of the complainant. At that time, accused Nos.1 to 3, 6, 7 and 13 to 17 threatened them with life and tried to assault them with knife. Accused Nos.1 to 3, 6 and 7 threatened them by saying not to shout otherwise they will kill them. At that time, accused Nos.1 to 3, 6, 7 and 13 to 17 threatened them with life and tried to assault them with knife. Accused Nos.1 to 3, 6 and 7 threatened them by saying not to shout otherwise they will kill them. Thereafter all the accused persons detained both of them in the said premises till 7.00 O’clock next day morning. Accused persons removed all the articles of the complainant worth about Rs.7,000/- to 8,000/-. They also took the documents belonging to the complainant. It is further alleged in the complaint that Sri Siddeshwar Samsthe is a prestigious institution and as such the complainant requested the elderly persons, but they expressed their inability and the complainant was constrained to file a private complaint since the police did not take any action because of the influence of the accused. In pursuance of the complaint, after recording the evidence, the case was registered and the process was issued to the accused. Being aggrieved by the said order, accused persons preferred criminal revision petition before the District and Sessions Judge, Bijapur. The learned Sessions Judge after considering all the materials on record, dismissed the revision petition. By assailing the said order, the accused persons are before this Court in this petition. 3. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned counsel for first respondent as well as the learned HCGP appearing on behalf of the second respondent-State. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has mainly contended that the trial Court has not assigned any valid reasons while issuing the process and has not applied his mind before taking the cognizance. He has further contended that the complainant has filed the complaint only with an intention to pressurize the accused to settle the internal dispute in Samsthe. The trial Court without referring the matter under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. to the police to ascertain the truth, has directly recorded the sworn statement and has issued the process which is bad in the eye of law. He has further contended that though there is no sufficient material, the learned Magistrate has taken the cognizance and issued the process. The continuation of the proceedings is nothing but an abuse of process of law. He has further contended that though there is no sufficient material, the learned Magistrate has taken the cognizance and issued the process. The continuation of the proceedings is nothing but an abuse of process of law. The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance against the accused persons by dropping the proceedings against accused No.17 which itself clearly goes to show that there is a pick and choose theory adopted by the learned Magistrate. As such, the said proceedings are not maintainable in law. He has further contended that earlier, two petitions were filed before the District Court and subsequently they were withdrawn without any just cause. The said aspect has not been considered and appreciated by both the Courts below. In order to substantiate his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decisions in the cases of Ramesh Rajagopal Vs. Devi Polymers Private Limited, reported in (2016)ACR 441; Vineet Kumar & others Vs. State of U.P. & another, reported in (2017) ACR 396. On these grounds, he prayed for allowing the petition by setting aside the impugned orders. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent-complainant has vehemently argued and contended that the trial Court after considering all the materials and after application of the mind has taken the cognizance and issued the process. The learned Magistrate while issuing the process has to find out prima facie material to proceed against the accused, he need not require to go in detail about merits and demerits of the case and he need not pass a detailed reasoned order. He further contended that if the ingredients are satisfied and the contents of the complaint make out a prima facie case against the accused persons, then the Court can issue process. Defence is always open to the accused to consider the said fact after their appearance not at this premature stage. In order to substantiate his contention, he relied upon the decisions in the cases of Anil Saran Vs. State of Bihar & another, reported in 1996 Cri.L.J. 408; M/s.Medchl Chemicals and Pharma Pvgt.Ltd. Vs. M/s.Biological E. Ltd. & others, reported in 2000 Cri.L.J. 1487; U.P.Pollution Control Board Vs. M/s.Mohan Meakins Ltd. & others, reported in 2000 Cri.L.J. 1799; Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of Maharashtra & another, reported in AIR 2014 SC 957 . On these grounds he prayed for dismissal of the petition. M/s.Biological E. Ltd. & others, reported in 2000 Cri.L.J. 1487; U.P.Pollution Control Board Vs. M/s.Mohan Meakins Ltd. & others, reported in 2000 Cri.L.J. 1799; Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of Maharashtra & another, reported in AIR 2014 SC 957 . On these grounds he prayed for dismissal of the petition. Learned HCGP appearing on behalf of the second respondent-State supported the impugned orders. 6. I have gone through the submissions made by the learned counsel for both parties and perused the papers, including the Lower Courts Records. 7. The first and foremost contention taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that instead of recording the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and issuing the process, the learned Magistrate ought to have directed the jurisdictional police to investigate the whole case to ascertain the truth under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. 8. For the purpose of brevity, I quote Sections 190 and 200 of Cr.P.C. “Section 190 - Cognizance of offences by Magistrates - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence- (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx Section 200 - Examination of complainant - A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses- (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192: Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them.” 9. As could be seen from Section 190 of Cr.P.C. the learned Magistrate is empowered to take the cognizance of any offence on receipt of the complaint of facts constituting an offence either on police report or upon receipt of information from any persons other than a police Officer, the learned Magistrate will have an option immediately after receipt of the complaint to order for an investigation under Section 156 of Cr.P.C. or he may take cognizance of an offence on a complaint after examination of the complainant and his witnesses. When the option has been left to the learned Magistrate how to take cognizance of a particular complaint, then under such circumstances, non-referring the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and directly recording of sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses does not violate the procedure as contemplated in law. In view of the said preposition of law, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is not acceptable. 10. The second contention taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned Magistrate has not applied his mind judiciously while taking the cognizance of the offence and he has been swayed away by the evidence of the complainant. 10. The second contention taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned Magistrate has not applied his mind judiciously while taking the cognizance of the offence and he has been swayed away by the evidence of the complainant. He further contended that though the complainant has dropped the proceedings against accused No.17, this aspect has not been properly considered and appreciated by the learned Sessions Judge. As could be seen from the records of the trial Court, complaint came to be filed on 9.9.1998 and thereafter the case was posted for recording of sworn statement of the complainant. The sworn statement of the complainant was recorded on 10.9.1998. Thereafter his further statement was recorded on 3.11.1998 and subsequently the case was adjourned on several times. PW.2 was examined on 10.11.1998; PW.3 was examined on 11.12.1998; PW.4 was examined on 19.1.1999; PWs.5 and 6 were examined on 8.2.1999; PWs.7 and 8 were examined on 2.3.1999 and 9.3.1999 respectively; and PW.9 was examined on 16.3.1999. After examination of all the witnesses, getting marked 40 documents and after hearing the complainant cognizance was taken on 22.2.2001 and after registering the case, process was issued against accused Nos.1 to 3, 6, 7 and 13 to17. On going through the records, it clearly indicates that the learned Magistrate after applying his judicious mind has passed the impugned order and has not acted mechanically without application of mind. 11. Be that as it may, even though the complainant has made allegation against accused Nos.1 to 17, the learned Magistrate has not taken any cognizance against accused Nos.4, 5, 8 to 12 that itself clearly indicates the fact that the learned Magistrate has fully applied his mind and has taken the cognizance. In this behalf also, the contention of the petitioners’ counsel is not sustainable in law. 12. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the proceedings initiated by the complainant constitute an abuse of process of Court and as such the said proceedings require to be quashed. In order to substantiate the said contention, he has relied upon the decisions quoted supra. I have gone through the said decisions carefully and cautiously. The said decisions are not applicable to the present case. In order to substantiate the said contention, he has relied upon the decisions quoted supra. I have gone through the said decisions carefully and cautiously. The said decisions are not applicable to the present case. While exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the only requirement which the Court has to see whether the continuance of the proceedings would be a total abuse of process of Court. But, as could be seen from the material which has been produced by the complainant and the allegations, they clearly make out a case as contended by the complainant. When the learned Magistrate after application of his mind has come to the conclusion that there is a prima facie material to proceed against the accused, then under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the proceedings initiated and continued amount to an abuse of process of law. In that light, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not acceptable. 13. Be that as it may, it is now well established principles of law that when an accused approaches the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings, the merits of the case have not to be assessed at that stage, it is for the trial Court to consider the said aspect and thereafter a decision has to be taken. Under what circumstances the inherent power vested with this Court has to be exercised under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been discussed by the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa & another Vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, reported in (2005)13 SCC 540 at paragraphs-9 and 10 as under:- “9. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 10. 10. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 14. The above principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Taramani Parakh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & others, reported in (2015)11 SCC 260 , at paragraphs-11 and 12 as under:- “11.Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, it was observed: (SCC pp 482-84, para 27) “27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2.The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basis ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3.The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4.Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6.The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7.The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8.Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9.Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10.It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11.Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12.In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13.Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14.Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15.Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. [Ref. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. [Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, Janata Dal v. H.S.Chowdhary, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, G.Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., ajay Mitra v.State of M.P., Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, State of U.P. v. O.P.Sharma, Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S.Bangarappa, Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.Sharaful Haque, Medchl Checmicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E.Ltd., Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala, V.V.S.Rama Sharma v. State of U.P., Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu, Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar, M.Krishnan v. Vijay Singh, Savita v. State of Rajasthan and S.M.Datta v. State of Gujarat]. 27.16.These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 12. In Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., it was observed (SCC p.553, paras 8-9): “8. We have gone through the FIR and the criminal complaint. In the FIR, the appellants have not been named and in the criminal complaint they have been named without attributing any specific role to them. The relationship of the appellants with the husband of the complainant is distant. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab it was observed (SCC p.217, para 5): “5….A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab it was observed (SCC p.217, para 5): “5….A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.” The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning distant relatives without there being specific material. Only the husband, his parents or at best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or to harass the wife but not distant relations, unless there is tangible material to support allegations made against such distant relations. Mere naming of distant relations is not enough to summon them in the absence of any specific role and material to support such role. 9. The parameters for quashing proceedings in a criminal complaint are well known. If there are triable issues, the Court is not expected to go into the veracity of the rival versions but where on the face of it, the criminal proceedings are abuse of Court’s process, quashing jurisdiction can be exercised. Reference may be made to K.Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar, Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P”. 15. Leave apart this, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners by relying upon the evidence of the witnesses and the documents produced, contended that the said proceedings are to be quashed. But, now it is well settled principle of law that the said contentions are to be considered by the learned Magistrate and the accused can raise those contentions by filing an appropriate application before the learned Magistrate, if they are advised to do so. This preposition has been laid down in the case of Umesh Vs. State of Kerala, reported in 2017 (3) SCC 112 ., wherein it is observed by the Apex Court at paragraphs-4 to 6, as under:- “4. We find it difficult to appreciate the contention. This preposition has been laid down in the case of Umesh Vs. State of Kerala, reported in 2017 (3) SCC 112 ., wherein it is observed by the Apex Court at paragraphs-4 to 6, as under:- “4. We find it difficult to appreciate the contention. Even if all contentions taken by the appellant are taken on their face value also, it is for the Magistrate concerned to consider those contentions in an appropriate application filed under Section 239 Cr.P.C. 5. In that view of the matter, we do not propose to go into all the contentions taken by the appellant. The appeals are hence disposed of as follows: the appellant shall surrender before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chavakkad, where the criminal cases are pending, within four weeks from today. On thus surrendering, on the appellant’s furnishing a bond for a sum of Rs.50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand), in each case, along with two solvent sureties for the like amount, the appellant shall be released on bail. The appellant will be free to file applications under Section 239 Cr.P.C. 6. We direct the learned Magistrate to consider the applications, if any filed, having regard to the contentions taken by the appellant and dispose of the same, in accordance with law.” 16. I have gone through the orders passed by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge. The said orders are neither capricious nor without applications of mind. Hence, the impugned orders are liable to be confirmed and accordingly, the same are confirmed. In view of the above, petition stands dismissed. Since the matter is of the year 1998, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible, but not later than the outer limit of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Office is directed to send back the Lower Court Records.