JUDGMENT : Antony Dominic, J. (On behalf of himself and Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.) 1. The Dental Council of India (DCI) has filed this appeal against the order dated 09/10/2015 passed in W.P.(C) 25782/15, whereby its preliminary objection that the writ petition filed by respondents 1 and 2 before this Court was not maintainable for absence of territorial jurisdiction was rejected. 2. Before the Division Bench, respondents 1 and 2 placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Dr. Joseph Issac v. Union of lndia, ILR 2010 (3) Ker. 399. The case was elaborately heard and the Division Bench passed order dated 11th January, 2016 referring the appeal to be heard by a Larger Bench and the questions which are referred for consideration are: (i) whether the exercise of function by DCI throughout the territories of India would confer jurisdiction of every Court in India to challenge election of the 4th respondent as its President when the election is held at New Delhi, the place of office of DCI, and the nomination of the fourth respondent is by a University in the State of Jharkand? (ii) whether the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac (supra) lays down the correct proposition of law in regard to territorial jurisdiction especially in the light of the judgments of the Apex Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 532 and Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 329 . 3. Respondents 1 and 2 are practicing Dental Surgeons registered in Part A Register of DCI. They alleged that the 4th respondent herein, a full time employee in the West Bengal Government service, was nominated by the Government of West Bengal as a Member of the DCI in terms of Section 3(e) of-the Dentists Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 4. It is stated that though his five year term ended on 31/05/2015, both respondents allegedly got elected to DCI from the fifth respondent University on 23/10/2013 under Section 3(d) of the Act. It is alleged that the fourth respondent thereafter manipulated the system in such a way that he got elected as the President of the DCI on 16th April, 2015. According to respondents 1 and 2, the election of the third respondent is illegal and the third respondent was ineligible even to be nominated as member of the DCI. It is alleged that the fourth respondent thereafter manipulated the system in such a way that he got elected as the President of the DCI on 16th April, 2015. According to respondents 1 and 2, the election of the third respondent is illegal and the third respondent was ineligible even to be nominated as member of the DCI. With these allegations, they filed the writ petition with the following two prayers: (i) issue a writ in the nature of Quo warranto or such writ, order or direction declaring that the 3rd respondent is incompetently continuing as a member of the Dental Council of India insofar as he is unlawfully elected under Section 3(d) of the Dentists Act, 1948 from the 4th respondent University to the Dental Council of India, inasmuch as the said University does not have any Dental Faculty in the University. (ii) Issue a writ in the nature of Quo warranto or such writ, order or direction declaring that the 3rd respondent is incompetently continuing as the President of the Dental Council of India insofar as he has ceased to be a member of the Dental Council of India after 31/05/2015, his nomination by the West Bengal Government made on 31/05/2010 under Section 3(e) of the Dentists Act, 1948 has expired by 30/05/2015 and hence lacks the basic eligibility to continue in the Dental Council of India. 5. On entering appearance before the learned Single Judge, the appellant raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition was not maintainable before this Court for lack of territorial jurisdiction. However, relying on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Joseph Issac's case (supra) that plea was negatived by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 9th October, 2015. It was this order, which is challenged in this writ appeal, which, as already stated, was referred to be heard by a Larger Bench. It is accordingly that the matter came up for our consideration. 6. We heard the counsel for the appellant, learned Senior Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent and the Senior Counsel appearing for the fourth respondent. 7. Answer to the two questions that are referred to the Full Bench would depend upon our decision on the correctness of the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac's case (supra). Therefore, we shall consider that issue first. 8. 7. Answer to the two questions that are referred to the Full Bench would depend upon our decision on the correctness of the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac's case (supra). Therefore, we shall consider that issue first. 8. The facts of Dr. Joseph Issac's case are that the petitioner therein, a Dental Surgeon, was an elector to the DCI constituted under the Act. DCI is constituted under Section 3 of the Act, which reads thus: Section 3 of the Act reads: 3. Joseph Issac's case (supra). Therefore, we shall consider that issue first. 8. The facts of Dr. Joseph Issac's case are that the petitioner therein, a Dental Surgeon, was an elector to the DCI constituted under the Act. DCI is constituted under Section 3 of the Act, which reads thus: Section 3 of the Act reads: 3. Constitution and composition of Council.— The Central Government shall, as soon as may be, constitute a Council consisting of the following members, namely: (a) one registered dentist possessing a recognised dental qualification elected by the dentists registered in Part A of each [State] register; (b) one member elected from amongst themselves by the members of the Medical Council of India; (c) not more than four members elected from among themselves, by— (a) Principals, Deans, Directors and Vice-Principals of dental colleges in the States training students for recognised dental qualifications: Provided that not more than one member shall be elected from the same dental college; (b) Heads of dental wings of medical colleges in the States training students for recognised dental qualification; (d) one member from each University established by law in the States which grants a recognised dental qualification, to be elected by the members of the Senate of the University, or in case the University has no Senate, by the members of the Court, from amongst the members of the Dental Faculty of the University or in case the University has no Dental Faculty, from amongst the members of the Medical Faculty thereof; (e) one member to represent [each State] nominated by the Government of each such State from among person registered either in a medical register or a dental register of the State; Explanation.— In this clause, "State" does not include a Union territory;] (f) six members nominated by the Central Government, of whom at least one shall be a registered dentist possessing a recognised dental qualification and practising or holding an appointment in an institution for the training of dentists in a [Union territory], and at least two shall be dentists registered in Part B of a [State] register; (g) the Director-General of Health Services, ex officio:] Provided that pending the preparation of registers the [State] Governments may nominate to the first Council members referred to in parts (a) and (e) and the Central Government members referred to in part (f) out of persons who are eligible for registration in the respective registers and such persons shall hold office for such period as the [State] or Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify. 9. The Government of India issued notification dated 15/02/2010, whereby the respondents 4 to 7 therein were nominated to the DCI under Section 3(f) of the Act. The aforesaid notification and more particularly, the nomination of respondents 5 and 7, hailing from the States of U.P. and Rajasthan respectively, was challenged in the writ petition. A preliminary objection was raised that this Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition on the ground that no part of cause of action arose within its territorial limits. It was contended that since the impugned notification was issued by the Government of India and the nominations were made by the Government of India at New Delhi, the cause of action or the grievance of the petitioner arose exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. In the judgment, after explaining the concept of cause of action, the Division Bench regretted its inability to accept the preliminary objection holding thus: "5. The impugned notification of the Union of India, published in the Gazette of India, evidences the nominations made by the Government of India to DCI (a statutory body corporate). DCI is the apex body created by the Act to regulate the profession of Dentistry in the entire country. It has the authority to recognise or de-recognise any qualification in Dentistry. The prior permission of the Government of India contemplated under Section 10A for the establishment of an institution for imparting training for grant of recognised dental qualification is required to be given only in consultation with the DCI. Such investiture of authority necessarily affects the entire society and all the people of India, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, to deny ourselves the jurisdiction on the basis of the location of the office of the DCI or on the belief that seat of office of the Government of India is located in Delhi would be a pedantic understanding of the jurisdiction of this Court and unjust to the people of this country. We are of the opinion that the Union of India, which has the statutory authority to make nominations under Section 3 of the Act, owes a legal and constitutional obligation to every person, who is subject to the laws of this country, to act rationally and in accordance with the requirements of Article 14. We are of the opinion that the Union of India, which has the statutory authority to make nominations under Section 3 of the Act, owes a legal and constitutional obligation to every person, who is subject to the laws of this country, to act rationally and in accordance with the requirements of Article 14. Such a Constitutional obligation, in our view, flows from the fact that the Government of India is charged with the obligation under the Dentists Act to enforce the provisions of the Act by appropriate executive action including the constitution of the DCI. We regret our inability to accept the preliminary objection." 10. The aforesaid paragraph of the judgment would show that the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench is that the investiture of authority on DCI affects the entire society and all the people of the country, either directly or indirectly and, therefore, to deny jurisdiction to this Court on the basis of location of the office of the DCI or on the belief that the seat of the office of the Government of India is located in Delhi would be a pedantic understanding of the jurisdiction of this Court and unjust to the people of this country. This being the only reasoning adopted, it is the correctness of this principle laid down by the Division Bench, which calls for examination. 11. The power to issue writs is conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Prior to the insertion of Clause (1-A) by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, Article 226 of the Constitution of India read as follows: "226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.— (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32." 12. (2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32." 12. Language of Article 226 would show that the power of the High Court to issue writs extended throughout the territories to which it exercised its jurisdiction and did not extend beyond. The scope and ambit of the power of the High Court under Article 226, as it stood prior to its amendment, came up for consideration of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in its judgment in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of lndia, AIR 1961 SC 532 . That was a case where an order issued by the Government of India regarding the premature retirement of the appellant from service was challenged before the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir. The petition was opposed contending that the Union of India against which the writ was sought being outside its territorial jurisdiction, the writ petition before the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, was not maintainable. The preliminary objection was upheld by the High Court and the petition was dismissed. The appeal before the Apex Court came up for consideration before a bench of five learned Judges. In the course of hearing, the correctness of the decisions in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, 1953 SCR 1144 and K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, 1954 SCR 738 was questioned. Accordingly, the case was referred to the Larger Bench. In the judgment, the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution was examined and the Apex Court held thus: "13. This brings us to the first question, namely, whether the Government of India as such can be said to be located at one place, namely. New Delhi. The main argument in this connection is that the Government of India is all-pervasive and is functioning throughout the territory of India and therefore every High Court has power to issue a writ against it. as it must be presumed to be located within the territorial jurisdiction of all State High Courts. This argument in our opinion confuses the concept of location of a Government with the concept of its functioning. A Government may be functioning all over a State or all over India; but it certainly is not located all over the State or all over India. This argument in our opinion confuses the concept of location of a Government with the concept of its functioning. A Government may be functioning all over a State or all over India; but it certainly is not located all over the State or all over India. It is true that the Constitution has not provided that the seat of the Government of India will be at New Delhi. That, however, does not mean that the Government of India as such has no seat where it is located. It is common knowledge that the seat of the Government of India is in New Delhi and the Government as such is located in New Delhi. The absence of a provision in the Constitution can make no difference to this fact. What we have to see, therefore, is whether the words of Article 226 mean that the person or authority to whom a writ is to be issued has to be resident in or located within the territories of the High Court issuing the writ? The relevant words of Article 226 are these— "Every High Court shall have power... to issue to any person or authority... within those territories...". So far as a natural person is concerned, there can be no doubt that he can be within those territories only if he resides therein either permanently or temporarily. So far as an authority is concerned, there can be no doubt that if its office is located therein it must be within the territory. But do these words mean with respect to an authority that even though its office is not located within those territories it will be within those territories because its order may affect persons living in those territories? Now it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Article 226 does not depend upon the residence or location of the person applying to it for relief: it depends only on the person or authority against whom a writ is sought being within those territories. Now it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Article 226 does not depend upon the residence or location of the person applying to it for relief: it depends only on the person or authority against whom a writ is sought being within those territories. It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Article 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction. Thus if a person residing or located in Bombay, for example, is aggrieved by an order passed by an authority located, say, in Calcutta, the forum in which he has to seek relief is not the Bombay High Court though the order may affect him in Bombay but the Calcutta High Court where the authority passing the order is located. It would, therefore, in our opinion be wrong to introduce in Article 226 the concept of the place where the order passed has effect in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court which can give relief under Article 226. The introduction of such a concept may give rise to confusion and conflict of jurisdictions. Take, for example, the case of an order passed by an authority in Calcutta, which affects six brothers living, say, in Bombay, Madras, Allahabad, Jabalpur, Jodhpur and Chandigarh. The order passed by the authority in Calcutta has thus affected persons in six States. Can it be said that Article 226 contemplates that all the six High Courts have jurisdiction in the matter of giving relief under it? The answer must obviously be "No", if one is to avoid confusion and conflict of jurisdiction. As we read the relevant words of Article 226 (quoted above) there can be no doubt that the jurisdiction conferred by that Article on a High Court is with respect to the location or residence of the person or authority passing the order and there can be no question of introducing the concept of the place where the order is to have effect in order to determine which High Court can give relief under it. It is true that this Court will give such meaning to the words used in the Constitution as would help towards its working smoothly. If we were to introduce in Article 226 the concept of the place where the order is to have effect we would not be advancing the purposes for which Article 226 has been enacted. On the other hand, we would be producing conflict of jurisdiction between various High Courts as already shown by the illustration given above. Therefore, the effect of an order by whomsoever it is passed can have no relevance in determining the jurisdiction of the High Court which can take action under Article 226. Now, functioning of a Government is really nothing other than giving effect to the orders passed by it. Therefore it would not be right to introduce in Article 226 the concept of the functioning of Government when determining the meaning of the words "any person or authority within those territories". By introducing the concept of functioning in these words we shall be creating the same conflict which would arise if the concept of the place where the order is to have effect is introduced in Article 226. There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion that these words in Article 226 refer not to the place where the Government may be functioning but only to the place where the person or authority is either resident or is located. So far therefore as a natural person is concerned, he is within those territories if he resides there permanently or temporarily. So far as an authority (other than Government) is concerned, it is within the territories if its office is located there. So far as a Government is concerned it is within the territories only if its seat is within those territories. 14. The seat of a Government is sometimes mentioned in the Constitutions of various countries but many a time the seat is not so mentioned. But whether the seat of a Government is mentioned in the Constitution or not, there is undoubtedly a seat from which the Government as such functions as a fact. 14. The seat of a Government is sometimes mentioned in the Constitutions of various countries but many a time the seat is not so mentioned. But whether the seat of a Government is mentioned in the Constitution or not, there is undoubtedly a seat from which the Government as such functions as a fact. What Article 226 requires is residence or location as a fact and if therefore there is a seat from which the Government functions as a fact even though that seat is not mentioned in the Constitution the High Court within whose territories that seat is located will be the High Court having jurisdiction under Article 226 so far as the orders of the Government as such are concerned. Therefore, the view taken in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission that there is two-fold limitation on the power of the High Court to issue writs etc. under Article 226, namely, (i) the power is to be exercised 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and (ii) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be "within those territories" which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories, is the correct one. 15. This brings us to the second point, namely, whether it is possible to introduce the concept of cause of action in Article 226 so that the High Court in whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose would be the proper one to pass an order thereunder. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the judgment of the Privy Council in 70 Ind App 129 : AIR 1943 PC 164 . In that case the Privy Council held that even though the impugned order was passed by the Board of Revenue which was located in Madras the High Court would have no jurisdiction to issue a writ quashing the order, as it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ beyond the limits of the city of Madras except in certain cases, and that particular matter was not within the exceptions. This decision of the Privy Council does apparently introduce an element of the place where the cause of action arose in considering the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ. The basis of that decision, however, was the peculiar history of the issue of writs by the three Presidency High Courts as successors of the Supreme Courts, though on the literal construction of clause 8 of the Charter of 1800 conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Madras, there could be little doubt that the Supreme Court would have the same jurisdiction as the justices of the Court of King's Bench Division in England for the territories which then were or thereafter might be subject to or depend upon the Government of Madras. It will therefore not be correct to put to much stress on the decision in that case. The question whether the concept of cause of action could be introduced in Article 226 was also considered in Saka Venkata Subba Rao's case, 1953 SCR 1144 : AIR 1953 SC 210 and was repelled in these words: "The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority 'within the territories' in relation to which the High Court exercise jurisdiction." 16. Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction. Proceedings under Article 226 are not suits; they provide for extraordinary remedies by a special procedure and give powers of correction to the High Court over persons and authorities and these special powers have to be exercised within the limits set for them. These two limitations have already been indicated by us above and one of them is that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Is it possible then to overlook this constitutional limitation and say that the High Court can issue a writ against a person or authority even though it may not be within its territories simply because the cause of action has arisen within those territories? Is it possible then to overlook this constitutional limitation and say that the High Court can issue a writ against a person or authority even though it may not be within its territories simply because the cause of action has arisen within those territories? It seems to us that it would be going in the face of the express provision in Article 226 and doing away with an express limitation contained therein if the concept of cause of action were to be introduced in it. Nor do we think that it is right to say that because Article 300 specifically provides for suits by and against the Government of India, the proceedings under Article 226 are also covered by Article 300. It seems to us that Article 300 which is on the same line as Section 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935, dealt with suits as such and proceedings analogous to or consequent upon suits and has no reference to the extraordinary remedies provided by Article 226 of the Constitution. The concept of cause of action cannot in our opinion be introduced in Article 226, for by doing so we shall be doing away with the express provision contained therein which requires that the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued should be resident in or located within the territories over which the High Court has jurisdiction. It is true that this may result in some inconvenience to persons residing far away from New Delhi who are aggrieved by some order of the Government of India as such, and that may be a reason for making a suitable constitutional amendment in Article 226. But the argument of inconvenience, in our opinion, cannot affect the plain language of Article 226, nor can the concept of the place of cause of action be introduced into it for that would do away with the two limitations on the powers of the High Court contained in it. 17. We have given our earnest consideration to the language of Article 226 and the two decisions of this Court referred to above. 17. We have given our earnest consideration to the language of Article 226 and the two decisions of this Court referred to above. We are of opinion that unless there are clear and compelling reasons, which cannot be denied, we should not depart from the interpretation given in these two cases and indeed from any interpretation given in an earlier judgment of this Court, unless there is a fair amount of unanimity that the earlier decisions are manifestly wrong. This Court should not, except when it is demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt that its previous ruling, given after due deliberation and full hearing, was erroneous, go back upon its previous ruling, particularly on a constitutional issue. In this case our reconsideration of the matter has confirmed the view that there is no place for the introduction of the concept of the place where the impugned order has effect or of the concept of functioning of a Government, apart from the location of its office concerned with the case, or even of the concept of the place where the cause of action arises in Article 226 and that the language of that article is plain enough to lead to the conclusion at which the two cases of this Court referred to above arrived. If any inconvenience is felt on account of this interpretation of Article 226 the remedy seems to be a constitutional amendment. There is no scope for avoiding the inconvenience by an interpretation which we cannot reasonably, on the language of the Article, adopt and which the language of the Article does not bear.(emphasis supplied) 13. This judgment was followed by another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Madan Gopal Rungta v. The Secretary to the Government of Orissa and others, AIR 1962 SC 1513 where in para 4, it was held thus: 4. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court beginning with Venkata Rao's case, 1953 SCR 1144 : AIR 1953 SC 210 that there is two-fold limitation on the power of the High Court to grant a writ under Article 226. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court beginning with Venkata Rao's case, 1953 SCR 1144 : AIR 1953 SC 210 that there is two-fold limitation on the power of the High Court to grant a writ under Article 226. These limitations are firstly that the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction, that is to say, the writs issued by the High Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and secondly that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be within those territories, which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. The view taken in this case has been recently re-affirmed by this Court in Khajoor-Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 532 : 1961 (2) SCR 828 . Prima facie, therefore, as the final order in this case was passed by the Central Government which is not located within the territories over which the High Court has jurisdiction, the High Court will have no power to grant a writ in this case. 14. This interpretation of Article 226 of the Constitution in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh's case (supra) resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens of this country to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts. This led to the Constitution (15th Amendment) Act, 1963 inserting Clause (1A) in Article 226, which was subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 01/02/1977. 15. The developments leading to amendment to the Constitution inserting Clause (1 A) in Article 226 conferring jurisdiction on High Courts based on cause of action, were noticed by the Apex Court, in its judgment in Alchemist Ltd. and Another v. State Bank of Sikkim and Others, (2007) 11 SCC 335 thus: 15. The effect of the above decisions was that no High Court other than the High Court of Punjab (before the establishment of the High Court of Delhi) had jurisdiction to issue any direction, order or writ to the Union of India, because the seat of the Government of India was located in New Delhi. The effect of the above decisions was that no High Court other than the High Court of Punjab (before the establishment of the High Court of Delhi) had jurisdiction to issue any direction, order or writ to the Union of India, because the seat of the Government of India was located in New Delhi. Cause of action was a concept totally irrelevant and alien for conferring jurisdiction on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. An attempt to import such concept was repelled by this Court. In the circumstances, Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and after Clause (1), new Clause (1-A) was inserted which read as under: "226. (1-A) The power conferred by clause (1)to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories". 16. It may be stated that by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment Act, 1976, Clause (1-A) was renumbered as Clause (2). The underlying object of amendment was expressed in the following words: "Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226 so that when any relief is sought against any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions, order or writs."(emphasis supplied) The effect of the amendment was that the accrual of cause of action was made an additional ground to confer jurisdiction on a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. As Joint Committee observed: "This clause would enable the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. 17. As Joint Committee observed: "This clause would enable the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Committee feels that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises in part only should also be vested with such jurisdiction." 18. The legislative history of the constitutional provisions, therefore, makes it clear that after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or in pad arises. 16. Article 226 of the Constitution of India as amended reads as under: "Article 226(1): Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." 17. A plain reading of the amended provisions of Clause (2) makes it clear that now the High Courts are entitled to issue writs even when the person or authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if cause of action arises, wholly or in part, within the High Court's territorial jurisdiction. What is cause of action, which is not an expression defined in the Constitution, was examined by a Full Bench of this Court in Nakul Deo Singh v. Deputy Commandant, 1999 (3) KLT 629 . 7. The expression 'cause of action' is not defined in the Constitution. What is cause of action, which is not an expression defined in the Constitution, was examined by a Full Bench of this Court in Nakul Deo Singh v. Deputy Commandant, 1999 (3) KLT 629 . 7. The expression 'cause of action' is not defined in the Constitution. Nor is it defined in the Code of Civil Procedure when Section 20 provided for the exercise of jurisdiction when a cause of action wholly or in part arose within the jurisdiction of a Court. Mulla in Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edn., Vol.1 at page 251 has stated: "Cause of action" means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words it is bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded." The scope of the expression as understood in English law was recently summed up by Millet LJ in the Court of Appeal in Paragon Financev. D. B. Thakerar & Co., (1999) 1 All ER 400 at 405 thus: "The classic definition of a cause of action was given by Brett J. in Cooke v. Gill, (1873) LR 8 CP 107 at 116: "Cause of action" has been held from the earliest time to mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed,— every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse'. (My emphasis). In the Thakerar case Chadwick J. cited the more recent definition offered by Diplock LJ in Letang v. Cooper, (1964) 2 All ER 929 at 934, (1965) 1 QB 232 at 242-243, and approved in Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Trollope & Colls Ltd., (1986) 6 Con LR 11 at 30: A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person'. I do not think that Diplock LJ was intending a different definition from that of Brett J. However it is formulated, only those facts which are material to be proved are to be taken into account. The pleading of unnecessary allegations or the addition of further instances or better particulars do not amount to a distinct cause of action. The selection of the material facts to define the cause of action must be made at the highest level of abstraction." In South East Asia Shipping Company Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprise, (1996) 3 SCC 443 the Supreme Court stated: "It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts which can cause to enforce the legal injury for reliefs in a Court of law. Cause of action means, therefore, every fact which if traversed it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise." 18. We may, in this context, also refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India and Others, (2014) 9 SCC 329 where, examining the scope of Article 226(2), it has, inter alia, been held thus: "On a plain reading of the amended provisions in clause (2), it is clear that now the High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the Court's territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. The term "cause of action" as appearing in clause (2) came up for consideration time and again before this Court." 19. Again, only such High Courts, within whose jurisdiction the order of the Subordinate Court has been passed, would have jurisdiction to entertain a challenge thereto, has been reiterated in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhageeratha Engg. Ltd. and others, (2006) 3 SCC 658 . In Alchemist Ltd. and Another v. State Bank of Sikkim and Others, (2007) 11 SCC 335 also, referring to all precedents, the Apex Court has reminded itself that, as wide were the powers conferred, limitations upon its exercise have been placed in Article 226 of the Constitution of India itself. 20. In Nakul Deo Singh v. Deputy Commandant, 1999 (3) KLT 629 a Full Bench of this Court had to resolve a conflict between the two Division Bench judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Kunhabdulla, 1985 (1) LLJ 331 and Thomas Kutty v. Union of India, 1994 (2) KLT 258 . The facts of the two cases which were considered by the Full Bench are that, punishment was imposed on the petitioners therein, while they were working outside the State, in the Central Industrial Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force. Their appeals were also dismissed by the authorities outside the State. However, the orders were served while the petitioners were in Kerala. It was challenging the aforesaid orders, writ petitions were filed before this Court and the question considered by the Full Bench was whether on the facts stated above, this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original petitions. The question was considered and answered in the negative by the Full Bench thus: "20. It appears to us that the decisions in M/s. Swaika Properties case and the decision of the Supreme Court and that of the High Court subsequent thereto clearly establish that the receipt of communication by itself does not constitute a fact in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. It appears to us that the decisions in M/s. Swaika Properties case and the decision of the Supreme Court and that of the High Court subsequent thereto clearly establish that the receipt of communication by itself does not constitute a fact in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. At best receipt of the order or communication only gives the party a right of action based on the cause of action arising out of the action complained of. When that action complained of takes place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and an appeal therefore is dismissed by an authority located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court cause of action wholly arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court and Article 226(2) of the Constitution cannot be invoked to sustain a Writ Petition in this High Court on the basis that a part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, merely because the appellate order communicated from the seat of the Appellate Authority was received while the petitioner was residing or working within the jurisdiction of this Court. Acceptance of the argument that the situs of the receipt of the order will determine the jurisdiction can lead to a position where a litigant would be in a position to choose his own Court for the purpose of redressal of his grievance. All that he need do is to move over to a particular place for receiving the communication from the Appellate Authority and then approach the High Court of that place with a plea that Court had jurisdiction because the order of the Appellate Authority was served on him while he was residing within the jurisdiction of that High Court. No litigant can have a right to choose the Court for seeking relief and the mere introduction of clause 2 of Article 226 does not alter that position. 21. No litigant can have a right to choose the Court for seeking relief and the mere introduction of clause 2 of Article 226 does not alter that position. 21. It is now settled after the decision of the Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P, AIR 1990 SC 10 that when there is an appeal against the original order even in a service dispute, there is a merger of the original order in the appellate order and the decision rendered by the Appellate Authority whether it be of dismissal, reduction, allowance or modification of the order of the original authority, a cause of action accrues to the aggrieved person to challenge the appellate order since the order of the original authority merges in the order of the Appellate Authority. What furnishes the cause of action is the rejection of the appeal by the Appellate Authority. Communication of that order though the order become effective only on such communication to the aggrieved person only furnishes the aggrieved person with a right of action. Receipt of the communication is not a fact in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. Even though only on receipt of the order the aggrieved person may be able to challenge that order, receipt of the order cannot be said to be a fact forming the cause of action. For, the cause of action arises on the appeal being dismissed by the authority outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The fact that until an order is published or made known, the order does not became effective since it will be open to the authority to change his mind before releasing the order, is not a ground to hold that the communication of the order also forms part of the cause of action to the aggrieved person. The fact that a person who was dismissed from service while he was in service outside the State would have to suffer the consequence of that dismissal when he is in his native place by being rendered jobless, is not a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action in his favour to challenge his dismissal. That right accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he lost his employment. That right accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he lost his employment. Similarly when an appeal is filed by him to an Appellate Authority who is outside the jurisdiction of this High Court and that appeal is dismissed by the Appellate Authority, the merger in the decision of the Appellate Authority takes place when the appeal is dismissed and not when the appellant receives the order. What a writ petitioner need plead as a part of his cause of action is the fact that his appeal was dismissed wholly or in part and not the fact that the order was communicated to him. That plea is relevant only to show when the right of action arose in his favour. The receipt of the order only gives him a right of action on the already accrued cause of action and enables him to meet a plea of laches or limitation raised in opposition. That the consequences of a proceeding in the larger sense are suffered by a person in his native place is not a ground to hold that the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the native place is situate is also competent to entertain a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person is dismissed or reduced in rank, he suffers the consequences where he was employed at the relevant time and not in his native place to which he might have retired on his dismissal." 21. These judgments were followed by another Full Bench of this Court in Indian Maritime University v. Viswanathan, 2014 (4) KLT 798 . That was a case where in response to a notification issued at Chennai, the respondent made an application from Palakkad in Kerala state for appointment as Professor under the Indian Maritime University. He attended the interview at Chennai, he was offered appointment from Chennai and he also reported for duty at Chennai. Subsequently, by a communication issued from Chennai, the appointment order was cancelled and this communication was received at Palakkad. A writ petition was filed before the Kerala High Court challenging the cancellation of his appointment. Maintainability of the writ petition was referred to Full Bench and the Full Bench upheld the preliminary objection that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, holding thus: 28. A writ petition was filed before the Kerala High Court challenging the cancellation of his appointment. Maintainability of the writ petition was referred to Full Bench and the Full Bench upheld the preliminary objection that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, holding thus: 28. Thus, law is settled that in view of the provisions contained in Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, a Writ Petition can be maintained in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which an integral part of the cause of action has arisen. Though the expression "cause of action" is not defined either in the Constitution or in the Code of Civil Procedure, it has to be understood in the light of Section 20(c) of the CPC and it means a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for a petitioner or a plaintiff to seek relief in a Court of law. It is also the settled principle of law that in a service dispute, issue of an order of termination gives rise to cause of action and service of that communication, though is necessary to give effect to the order, does not amount to a part of the cause of action much less an integral part of the cause of action. In other words, the issue of the order gives rise to the cause of action and the service of the order gives rise to a right of action. 29. Having understood the principles laid down in Nakul Deo Singh as above, the further question is whether there is any distinction between the service of the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and the order of the Appellate Authority rejecting an appeal filed against the order of dismissal. We have already seen from the Full Bench judgment that when an appeal is filed against an order of dismissal and the Appellate Authority passed an order thereon, the order of the disciplinary authority would merge into the Appellate Authority's order. We have already seen from the Full Bench judgment that when an appeal is filed against an order of dismissal and the Appellate Authority passed an order thereon, the order of the disciplinary authority would merge into the Appellate Authority's order. If the principles governing cause of action with respect to the order issued by the disciplinary authority are applied in the context of an order issued by the Appellate Authority, the conclusion is irresistible that the cause of action arises on the issue of the appellate order and the service of the Appellate Authority's order does not become any part of the cause of action except that it gives right of action to the aggrieved. If service of the appellate order is not an integral part of the cause of action, the service of the order of the disciplinary authority also will not give rise to any part of the cause of action. This will be so even in a case where the situation is in the reverse and the fact that only on service on the addressee, such orders become effective does not alter the situation in any manner; except that it gives right of action to the aggrieved. 30. In this context, we should also make reference to paragraph 27 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd., where, the Apex Court has held that challenge can be maintained against an order passed by the original authority and the Appellate Authority where the seats of the original authority and Appellate Authority are situated and the Apex Court did not mention that such challenge is possible at the place where orders are served. Therefore, irrespective of whether it is the disciplinary authority's order or Appellate Authority's order, service of order does not give rise to any pad of the cause of action to an aggrieved person. 22. The aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, would, according to us, make it pellucid that while determining the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court to entertain the writ petition filed before it, the fact that the statutory authority, against which relief is sought, has been invested with the authority affecting the entire society and all people of India, either directly or indirectly, cannot be of any moment. Such a test has not been evolved by the Apex Court or this Court to decide whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of a Court. On the other hand, what is relevant is the satisfaction of the conditions that are incorporated in Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India which require that the cause of action, should arise wholly or partly, within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises its jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or residence of the person against whom writ is sought, is not within those territories. 23. In Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has also answered the question regarding the Court which is competent to entertain challenge against parliamentary legislation, thus: 19. Passing of a legislation by itself in our opinion does not confer any such right to file a writ petition unless a cause of action arises therefor. 20. A distinction between a legislation and executive action should be borne in mind while determining the said question. 21. A parliamentary legislation when it receives the assent of the President of India and is published in the Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner. A writ Court, it is well settled, would not determine a constitutional question in a vacuum. 22. The Court must have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. An order passed on a writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act, whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act. 24. In the above judgment, the Apex Court has also explained the Court which has jurisdiction to entertain a challenge against an order passed by a Court, Tribunal or an executive authority thus: 26. 24. In the above judgment, the Apex Court has also explained the Court which has jurisdiction to entertain a challenge against an order passed by a Court, Tribunal or an executive authority thus: 26. The view taken by this Coud in U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government would come within the meaning of the expression "cases arising" in clause 14 of the (Amalgamation) Order is not a correct view of law for the reason hereafter stated and to that extent the said decision is overruled. In fact, a legislation, it is trite, is not confined to a Statute enacted by Parliament or the Legislature of a State, which would include delegated legislation and subordinate legislation or an executive order made by the Union of India, State or any other statutory authority. In a case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule, executive instructions issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview thereof. Situs of office of Parliament, Legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a Statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a Court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof. 27. Where an order, however, is passed by a Court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a Statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the Appellate Authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the Appellate Authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the Appellate Authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the Appellate Authority 25. In spite of all these precedents and principles, according to counsel for respondents 1 and 2, the writ petition has to be held maintainable, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra), and reliance was placed on paragraphs 20 to 22, which read thus: "20. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the documents relied upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the appellant reported sickness on account of various ailments including difficulty in breathing. He was referred to hospital. Consequently, he was signed off for further medical treatment. Finally, the respondent permanently declared the appellant unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscles disease). As a result, the Shipping Department of the Government of India issued an order on 12/04/2011 cancelling the registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the letter was sent to the appellant at his native place in Bihar where he was staying after he was found medically unfit. It further appears that the appellant sent a representation from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent claiming disability compensation. The said representation was replied by the respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation. It is further evident that when the appellant was signed off and declared medically unfit, he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made all claims and filed representation from his home address at Gaya and those letters and representations were entertained by the respondents and replied and a decision on those representations were communicated to him on his home address in Bihar, Admittedly, appellant was suffering from serious heard muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place, wherefrom he had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability compensation. Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together, a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him from disability compensation. 21. Apart from that, from the counter-affidavit of the respondents and the documents annexed therewith, it reveals that after the writ petition was filed in the Patna High Court, the same was entertained and notices were issued. 21. Apart from that, from the counter-affidavit of the respondents and the documents annexed therewith, it reveals that after the writ petition was filed in the Patna High Court, the same was entertained and notices were issued. Pursuant to the said notice, the respondents appeared and participated in the proceedings in the High Court. It further reveals that after hearing the counsel appearing for both the parties, the High Court passed an interim order on 18/09/2012 directing the authorities of Shipping corporation of India to pay at least a sum of Rs.2.75 lakhs, which shall be subject to the result of the writ petition. Pursuant to the interim order, the respondent Shipping Corporation of India remitted Rs.2,67,270/- (after deduction of income tax) to the bank account of the appellant. However, when the writ petition was taken up for hearing, the High Court took the view that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of action, has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. 22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated hereinbefore including the interim order passed by the High Court, in our considered opinion, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. As noticed above, at the time when the writ petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the respondents instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the writ petitioner appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to accept the same and challenged the order granting severance compensation by filing the writ petition. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case."(emphasis supplied) 26. However, we find from Indian Maritime University v. Viswanathan (supra) that these paragraphs in Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) itself were relied on and the Full Bench, declined to accept the contention, holding thus: 49. Reading of the above paragraphs in the judgment rendered by the Apex Coud shows that this judgment was rendered in the peculiar facts noticed by the Coud in the aforesaid paragraphs and the Apex Coud was not attempting to strike a note of departure from the law settled by it as is evident from the judgments to which we have referred to in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment. 27. 27. To substantiate his argument that in case where prayer sought is for a writ of quo warranto, every citizen in this country is entitled to seek such relief and that every High Court in this country is entitled to entertain the petition when the order issued is by the Central Government or by an authority exercising jurisdiction all over the country, learned counsel for the respondents relied on N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose, (2009) 7 SCC 1 . Having gone through this judgment, we find that though the principles governing writ of quo warranto have been explained by the Apex Court, we do not find anything in the judgment laying down a principle that every High Court can entertain a petition for a writ of quo warranto, ignoring its territorial jurisdiction and cause of action. According to us, on the issuance of an order, though every aggrieved citizen would get a right of action, the petition, even if it is for writ of quo warranto, should necessarily be filed only in a Court having jurisdiction to entertain the same. 28. That a plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction should be determined taking into consideration all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action has been laid down by the Apex Court in its judgment in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Others, (1994) 4 SCC 711 : 6. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 29. These principles are again reiterated in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another, (2004) 6 SCC 254 where it was held that the answer to the question regarding territorial jurisdiction must be arrived at on the basis of the averments in the petition, the truth or otherwise thereof being immaterial. Law being the above, we have referred to the pleadings in the writ petition, which to our dismay, do not contain any pleading supporting the case of respondents 1 and 2 that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 30. The upshot of the above discussion is that a writ petition can be maintained only in a High Court, within whose territorial jurisdiction, the person, authority or the Government against which relief is sought is situated and within whose jurisdiction, cause of action, either wholly or in part, has arisen. For determining the question of jurisdiction, the fact that the authority or Government concerned has been invested with power all over the country or affecting all citizens, is not of any relevance. Viewed in that manner, we are unable to persuade ourselves to uphold principles laid down in the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac's case (supra). Therefore, the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac v. Union of India, ILR 2010 (3) Ker. 399 is overruled. 31. In the light of the discussions and conclusions, the questions referred are answered in the negative. 32. Viewed in that manner, we are unable to persuade ourselves to uphold principles laid down in the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac's case (supra). Therefore, the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac v. Union of India, ILR 2010 (3) Ker. 399 is overruled. 31. In the light of the discussions and conclusions, the questions referred are answered in the negative. 32. The facts of the case of respondents 1 and 2, who have filed the writ petition, show that they are challenging the election of the party respondent in the writ petition to DCI, under Section 3(d) of the Act and his continuance as President of DCI. It is in this factual background, the prayer for writ of Quo warranto is sought in the writ petition. The maintainability of the writ petition filed before this Court has to be decided in the light of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the principles laid down in the judgments referred to and the conclusions herein above. First of all, in the absence of any special provision in that behalf in Article 226, the maintainability of a writ petition for quo warranto has to be decided applying the principles which govern writ petitions. High Courts are competent to issue writs even when the person or authority against whom writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction if cause of action arises, either wholly or in part, within the High Court's territorial jurisdiction. Since prayers in the petition are against authorities outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, we have to examine whether cause of action, either wholly or in part, arose within its jurisdiction. Even ignoring the absence of pleadings in the writ petition in that behalf, the admitted case of the petitioner is that the election has taken place outside Kerala State and the election is to DCI, which has its office at New Delhi. If election is the cause of action, such cause of action has arisen entirely outside Kerala State, and is beyond the territorial limits of this Court. Our conclusions would not have been different, even if it were a case of nomination, for, according to us, in such a case also, if nomination is made outside the State, be it by the Central Government or any other State Government, no part of the cause of the cause of action arises in Kerala State. Our conclusions would not have been different, even if it were a case of nomination, for, according to us, in such a case also, if nomination is made outside the State, be it by the Central Government or any other State Government, no part of the cause of the cause of action arises in Kerala State. In this context, we should necessarily examine whether, since the petitioners are residents of Kerala State, they can claim that part of the cause of action arose within Kerala and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Here also, the answer has to be in the negative. The residence of the petitioners, as in the case of the plaintiff in a suit, does not confer the Court jurisdiction, it being not recognised as part of the cause of action. True an election or nomination made outside the State to DCI, may affect petitioners also, but law does not treat that as part of cause of action, and it only gives them a right of action, entitling them to institute the lis in the Court having jurisdiction. Otherwise, the resultant situation would be that every High Court in this country would be entitled to entertain petitions, leading to utter chaos and confusion in Khajoor Singh (supra). The aforesaid discussion leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the petition filed before this Court is not maintainable for absence of territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the appeal is allowed and the order impugned is set aside. Devan Ramachandran. J. 33. It is the rule of prudence that substantially concurring judgments require not to speak long or elaborately. 34. When I started by saying that I am in concurrence, then why this separate opinion, it may be justifiable asked. I am persuaded to write this brief supplement of my own because on one of the issues referred before us, I am unable to find myself in agreement with the view of my learned brothers. 34. When I started by saying that I am in concurrence, then why this separate opinion, it may be justifiable asked. I am persuaded to write this brief supplement of my own because on one of the issues referred before us, I am unable to find myself in agreement with the view of my learned brothers. 35.1 had the benefit of reading the detailed analysis and view of my senior brother Justice Antony Dominic on the issues involved in this reference and I must say immediately that I am in full affirmation and concurrence with the ultimate opinion and finding of his that the writ petitioner/respondent does not obtain the cause of action or competence to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution on account of the barricade of limits of territoriality in such exercise by this Court. 36. However, while arriving at his final conclusion, with which I am in complete and absolute concurrence, Justice Antony Dominic has proceeded to hold that the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac v. Union of India, ILR 2010 (3) Ker. 399 does not lay the correct law and that it deserves to be overruled. I cannot, even after long contemplation, obtain myself to be in agreement with this view and this compels me to indite this brief opinion of mine. 37. I am of the view that on account, for the cause ut infra, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Joseph Issac (supra), is irreproachable and deserving of deference as a precedent. 38. I am of the further opinion, as I will presently say, that it is not required to hold Dr. Joseph Issac (supra) as contra legis and that even by following it, which, according to me, deserves to be, the same opinion which is ultimately entered into by Justice Antony Dominic, in the factual scenario of this case, would be inevitable. 39. I will first refer to the most essential and constitutive facts of this case and the circumstances under which the matter was referred to the Larger Bench. 40. The writ petition was filed by two petitioners, claiming to be practising as Dental Surgeons, registered in Part A Register of the Dental Council of Kerala. 39. I will first refer to the most essential and constitutive facts of this case and the circumstances under which the matter was referred to the Larger Bench. 40. The writ petition was filed by two petitioners, claiming to be practising as Dental Surgeons, registered in Part A Register of the Dental Council of Kerala. They impugn the election of the third respondent as a member of the Dental Council of India on the allegation that he was unlawfully elected, contrary to the provisions of Section 3(d) of the Dentists Act, 1948 ('the Act' for short). Based on this singular allegation the petitioners have sought the following reliefs in the writ petition: "(i) Issue a writ in the nature of Quo warranto or such writ, order or direction declaring that the third respondent is incompetently continuing as a member of the Dental Council of India insofar as he is unlawfully elected under Section 3(d) of the Dentists Act, 1948 from the fourth respondent University to the Dental Council of India, inasmuch as the said University does not have any Dental Faculty in the University. (ii) Issue a writ in the nature of Quo warranto or such writ, order or direction declaring that the third respondent is incompetently continuing as the president of the Dental Council of India insofar as he has ceased to be a member of the Dental Council of India after 31/05/2015, his nomination by the West Bengal Government made on 31/05/2010 under Section 3(e) of the Dentists Act, 1948 has expired by 30/05/2015 and hence lacks the basic eligibility to continue in the Dental Council of India. (iii) Grant such other relief that is prayed for and is deemed just and proper to grant in the interest of justice. (iv) Award the entire costs of the petitioners." 41. Before the learned Single Judge a contention was raised by the respondents that since the election of the third respondent was conducted not in Kerala, this Court could not obtain jurisdiction to consider the writ petition or to grant the reliefs sought for, on account of the constraints of territorial jurisdiction invested in it, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge, however, repelled these contentions, relying on the judgment of the Division Bench in Joseph Issac (Dr.) v. Union of India and Others, ILR 2010 (3) Ker. The learned Single Judge, however, repelled these contentions, relying on the judgment of the Division Bench in Joseph Issac (Dr.) v. Union of India and Others, ILR 2010 (3) Ker. 399 and held that "normally the challenge of an election of a member in another State would not be maintainable before this Court as the cause of action is wholly accrued in the other State. However, certainly a challenge against the election of President of the Dental Council of India is maintainable for the reason that the President of the Dental Council of India discharges his function for the service of the entire Nation" (sic). The learned Single Judge proceeded to hold that if ineligible persons are elected, that legality would have an impact in the country as a whole and therefore, that this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 42. This order of the learned Single Judge was called into question by the Dental Council of India by filing W.A. No. 2306/2015 before a learned Division Bench. After exhaustively considering the various precedents in the purlieu of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Division Bench concluded that Dr. Joseph Issac (supra) requires re-consideration, finding that the Bench in that case proceeded on the basis that when substantial powers are invested in Dental Council of India under a Statute and since their authority effects the entire society and all the people of India either directly or indirectly, jurisdiction can be exercised by this Court. The Division Bench, which made the present reference, found that the relevant case law relating to territorial jurisdiction had not been considered in Dr. Joseph Issac case (supra) and that merely because the Dental Council of India exercises authority in the whole of the country and merely because its President has been arrayed among the respondents, it would not be sufficient to concede territorial jurisdiction to this Court. The Division Bench proceeded to find, prima facie, that no part of the cause of action has arisen in the State of Kerala in this case and that a writ of quo warranto cannot be issued against the third respondent herein solely because he is the President of the Dental Council of India, which concededly has the authority across the nation for the matters specified in the Act. 43. 43. On the conclusions as afore indicated, the learned Division Bench made a reference to a Full Bench specifying the questions for consideration as under: "(i) Whether the exercise of function by DCI throughout the territories of India will confer jurisdiction on any Court in India to challenge election of the fourth respondent when the election is held at New Delhi, the place of office of DCI is at New Delhi and the fourth respondent has been nominated by the University in the State of Jharkand? (ii) Whether the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac (supra) lays down the correct proposition of law in regard to territorial jurisdiction especially in the light of the judgments of Apex Court in Khajoor Singh (supra) and Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra)?" It is in such circumstances that the matter is before this Bench. 44. The only issue that I am referring in detail in this opinion of mine is whether the ratio in Dr. Joseph Issac (supra) is bad in law. An assessment of this would require a complete reading of the relevant provisions of the Act relating to constitution and composition of the Dental Council of India. 45. The Central Government is empowered, under Chapter II of the Act, to constitute a Dental Council consisting of certain specified number of persons. Section 3 of the Act provides the precise manner in which the Council has to be constituted and the qualifications of the persons to be included in the said Council. Since the entire edifice of the issues in the writ petition and in this Reference is built on the provisions of the Act relating to constitution of Dental Council of India, it is idoneous that same is read in full. Since the entire edifice of the issues in the writ petition and in this Reference is built on the provisions of the Act relating to constitution of Dental Council of India, it is idoneous that same is read in full. I, therefore, extract the same as under: "Constitution and composition of Council.— The Central Government shall, as soon as may be, constitute a Council consisting of the following members, namely: (a) One registered dentist possessing a recognised dental qualification elected by the dentists registered in part A of each [State] register; (b) One member elected from amongst themselves by the members of the Medical Council of India; [(c) not more than four members elected from among themselves, by— (a) Principals, Deans, Directors and Vice-Principals of dental colleges in the States training students for recognised dental qualifications: Provided that not more than one member shall be elected from the same dental college; (b) Heads of dental wings of medical colleges in the States training students for recognised dental qualifications;] [(d) One member from each University established by law in the States which grants a recognised dental qualification, to be elected by the members of the Senate of the University, or in case the University has no Senate, by the members of the Court, from amongst the members of the Dental Faculty of the University or in case the University has no Dental Faculty, from amongst the members of the Medical Faculty thereof;] [(e) One member to represent [each State] nominated by the Government of each such state form among persons registered either in a medical register or a dental register of the State;] [Explanation.— In this clause, "State" does not include a Union territory;] (f) Six members nominated by the Central Government, of whom at least one shall be registered dentist possessing a recognised dental qualification and practising or holding an appointment in an institution for the training of dentists in a [Union territory], and at least two shall be dentists registered in Part B of a [State] register; (g) the Director-General of Heal Services, ex officio:] Provided that pending the preparation of registers the [State] Governments may nominate to the first Council members referred to in parts (a) and (e) and the Central Government members referred to in part (f) out of persons who are eligible for registration in the respective registers and such persons shall hold office for such period as the [State] or Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify." 46. A reading of Section 3 makes it perspicuous that the power to constitute a Dental Council is invested on the Central Government by the Act. Under the mandate of Section 3, certain members of the Dental Council are to be elected from the Constituencies shown therein and others are to be nominated by the Government of India and some by the Governments of the States. Under clauses (a) to (d), the members are selected by election while clauses (e) and (f) provides that members are to be nominated by the Government of the State and the Central Government respectively. 47. As regards the elections are concerned, as is the case in this writ petition, they are held within the specified Constituencies. Under clause (a) of Section 3, one registered Dentist is elected by the Dentists registered in Part A of each State Register; under clause (b), one member is elected by the members of the Medical Council of India; under clause (c), four members are elected from among the Principals, Deans, Directors and Vice Principals of Dental Colleges in the State and from among the Heads of Dental wings of Medical Colleges of the State; and finally, clause (d) provides for election of one member from each University established by law in the states, to be elected by the members of the Senate of such University. 48. However, when comes to nominations, clause (e) provides that one member, to represent each State, shall be nominated by the Government of such State from among the persons registered either in a Medical or Dental register of the State and clause (f) provides that six members shall be nominated by the Central Government, one of whom shall be a registered Dentist practising in an institution for the training of Dentists in a Union Territory and that at least two shall be Dentists registered in Part B of the State Register. The last member of the Council is the Director General of Health Services, who shall hold the office as ex officio. 49. It is in the background of the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Act that one will have to make an assessment as to the availability of jurisdiction to a State High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 50. 49. It is in the background of the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Act that one will have to make an assessment as to the availability of jurisdiction to a State High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 50. As far as elections are concerned, they are conducted within a particular State or Constituency that is exclusively available in a particular State. When such elections are challenged, there would not be any confusion regarding territorial jurisdiction, since such challenge has to be mounted before that High Court within whose jurisdiction the elections were held. It would be the same in the case of nomination by the Government of a particular State. If a nomination is made by one State Government that could also be subjected to a challenge before the High Court which has jurisdiction over that State. 51. However, it is only in the case of nomination by Government of India, as is provided under Section 3(f) of the Act, that there could be some cause for concern. The question is, when the Government of India nominates members under this provision, would a High Court, before whom a challenge is made against such nomination, be constrained by the manacles of territorial jurisdiction because such nomination was made by the Central Government from Delhi. 52. The provisions of Section 3 of the Act, as can be seen from the above discussion, empower the Central Government to constitute a Dental Council. The Central Government would obviously be entitled to issue a notification listing the names of the members so to constitute the said Council. As I have already shown above, some of the members, so included in the notification, will be persons who are elected from the respective Constituencies and some of them would be nominated by the respective State Government and six of them could be nominated by the Central Government. 53. Quad hoc, those members who are included in the Council after an election is conducted in their respective Constituencies at a particular place, only that High Court having jurisdiction over that territorial area would Obtain jurisdiction when a challenge is made against inclusion of such person/s consequent to the election. This is because, when the inclusion of an elected person is challenged, what is assailed is not merely his inclusion but his election as well. This is because, when the inclusion of an elected person is challenged, what is assailed is not merely his inclusion but his election as well. Such election having been conducted in a particular place, it would not, even by the extended meaning of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as we perceive it today, invest jurisdiction territorially to a High Court except to that within whose jurisdiction, the place where the elections were conducted, is situated. 54. In the case at hand, the third respondent was elected in the elections that were conducted not in Kerala but in Jharkand. The question, therefore, whether this Court would get jurisdiction can easily be answered in the negative, since the elections were not conducted within its territorial area of jurisdiction and since no part of the cause of action against such election can be seen to have arisen within the State of Kerala. This is why I am also in affirmation of the view that this Court would not obtain jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition. 55. That being said, the question is whether Dr. Joseph Issac (supra) requires re-consideration or deserves to be declared as bad in law. 56. To appreciate this, one will have to see the issue involved in Dr. Joseph Issac case (supra). In that case, the writ petitioners had challenged the nomination of certain persons made by the Government of India under Section 3(f) of the Act. The whole issue in that case revolved around the nomination made by the Central Government and when an objection was raised that this Court would not obtain jurisdiction to consider the said writ petition, it was repelled by the learned Division Bench in paragraph 5 of the said judgment which reads as under: "The impugned notification of the Union of India, published in the Gazette of India, evidences the nominations made by the Government of India to DCI (a statutory body corporate). DCI is the apex body created by the Act to regulate the profession of Dentistry in the entire country. It has the authority to recognise or de-recognise any qualification in Dentistry. The prior permission of the Government of India contemplated under Section 10A for the establishment of an institution for imparting training for grant of recognised dental qualification is required to be given only in consultation with the DCI. It has the authority to recognise or de-recognise any qualification in Dentistry. The prior permission of the Government of India contemplated under Section 10A for the establishment of an institution for imparting training for grant of recognised dental qualification is required to be given only in consultation with the DCI. Such investiture of authority necessarily affects the entire society and all the people of India, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, to deny ourselves the jurisdiction on the basis of the location of the office of the DCI or on the belief that seat of office of the Government of India is located in Delhi would be a pedantic understanding of the jurisdiction of this Court and unjust to the people of this country. We are of the opinion that the Union of India, which has the statutory authority to make nominations under Section 3 of the Act, owes a legal and constitutional obligation to every person, who is subject to the laws of this country, to act rationally and in accordance with the requirements of Article 14. Such a Constitutional obligation, in our view, flows from the fact that the Government of India is charged with the obligation under the Dentists Act to enforce the provisions of the Act by appropriate executive action including the constitution of the DCI. We regret our inability to accept the preliminary objection." (emphasis supplied) 57. A reading of the opinion of the learned Division Bench in Dr. Joseph Issac (supra), makes it ineluctable that their Lordships were guided by the view that Union of India, which has the statutory authority to make nominations under Section 3 of the Act, owes a legal and constitutional obligation to act rationally and in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 58. The nominations, being made by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Act not being through a process of election, it is irrefragable that such notification of the Government could be challenged by any one, subject to consideration of locus standi, in any of the High Courts of this country, invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 58. The nominations, being made by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Act not being through a process of election, it is irrefragable that such notification of the Government could be challenged by any one, subject to consideration of locus standi, in any of the High Courts of this country, invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This is because nominations of such persons by the Central Government are made through its notification/order and such being issued by the Union of India under a statutory prescription, it would certainly invest every High Court of this country, the power to judicially examine its competence, before which a challenge is raised by a citizen or a person aggrieved by it. In such event, what is being challenged and sought to be forensically examined is the nomination made by the Government of India and the validity of the orders issued by it, which cannot be then delimited by an argument that such notification/order was issued by the Central Government having its office at Delhi. This is why in Dr. Joseph Issac (supra) the learned Division Bench said that interpretation of the territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on such attenuated lines would be too pedantic and unjust to the people of this country. Every action or order of the Government of India, in its normal course, is always susceptible to the judicial scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in any High Court where such challenge is made. 59. As far as constitution of the Dental Council is concerned, it is always in limine by a formal notification/order of the Government of India. Such notification/order would contain the names of the persons who are included therein, both as elected representatives and as the nominated members. Even though a member is elected from a Constituency within the jurisdiction of another High Court, it may still technically be possible to assail the said notification, it being that of the Government of India, including the name of such person, but the Government of India would certainly take a defence that such inclusion is on account of an election conducted within a Constituency situated elsewhere. The challenge would thereafter stand repelled for the reason that the High Court in question does not obtain territorial jurisdiction over the area in which the elections were held. 60. The challenge would thereafter stand repelled for the reason that the High Court in question does not obtain territorial jurisdiction over the area in which the elections were held. 60. This would not be the case when a notification of the Government of India, including the persons who are nominated by it, are subjected to a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Such a notification/order issued by the Central Government, certainly would be amenable to a judicial scrutiny by any of the High Courts, if sufficient cause is shown, under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The issue in Dr. Joseph Issac (supra) was one such case. What was challenged before it was a notification issued by the Central Government including the persons who were nominated by them. There is no doubt in my mind that such a notification could be subjected to a challenge before any High Court since the subject matter of the challenge is a notification/ order issued by the Government of India. 61. In such view of the matter and taking note of the specific view of the learned Division Bench in Dr. Joseph Issac (supra), as has been extracted above, I am certainly of the view that Dr. Joseph Issac (supra) does not state anything contrary to the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the various judgments relating to territorial jurisdiction. I, therefore, answer the Reference as under: (a) I am of the view that the judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac v. Union of India, ILR 2010 (3) Ker. 399 lays the correct proposition of law relating to the question of territorial jurisdiction, while considering the validity of a notification of the Government of India, nominating members to the Dental Council of India, under Section 3(f) of the Dentists Act. (b) As regards elected members of the Dental Council of India are concerned, a challenge to their election or inclusion in the Council, through a writ of certiorari or quo warranto or such other writ, order or direction, would be maintainable only in that High Court within whose territorial area of jurisdiction such elections were held and in no other. (b) As regards elected members of the Dental Council of India are concerned, a challenge to their election or inclusion in the Council, through a writ of certiorari or quo warranto or such other writ, order or direction, would be maintainable only in that High Court within whose territorial area of jurisdiction such elections were held and in no other. (c) As regards the members of the Dental Council of India nominated by Governments of the State, challenge to their nominations through a writ petition would only be maintainable before the High Court having jurisdiction of the respective State. (d) As regards the members of the Dental Council of India nominated by the Central Government are concerned, a writ petition, challenging the notification issued by the Government of India under Section 3(f) of the Dentists Act, including their names in it, will be territorially competent before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the result, I concur with the view of Justice Antony Dominic that this Court does not obtain territorial jurisdiction to consider or order the writ petition, from which this Reference arises, since what is challenged is the inclusion of the third respondent in the Dental Council of India under Section 3(a) of the Dentists Act, consequent to an election conducted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala. ORDER OF THE COURT 62. The judgment in Dr. Joseph Issac v. Union of India, ILR 2010 (3) Ker. 399 is overruled. 63. The writ appeal is allowed and the order impugned is set aside.