Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this writ petition is order, dated 3rd March, 2016 (Annexure P3), made by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Circuit at Shimla (for short “the Tribunal”) in OA No. 1683/HP/2013, titled as Raj Kumar versus Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. And others, whereby the OA filed by the writ petitioner came to be dismissed (for short “the impugned order”). 2. We have gone through the impugned order. It appears that the writ petitioner had not approached the Tribunal within a reasonable time and invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after ten years, that too, after noticing that the benefits have been granted by the Tribunal to the similarly situated persons. 3. It is beaten law of the land that delay takes away the settings of law and a person, who is fencesitter cannot claim any benefit after noticing that the same has been granted to the similarly situated persons, is caught by delay and laches, as held by the Apex Court in the case titled as Nadia Distt. Primary School Council vs. Sristidhar Biswas, reported in AIR 2007 SC 2640 . It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of para 4 herein: “4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the persons who had not approached the Court in time and waited for the result of the decision of other cases cannot stand to benefit. The Court only gives the benefit to the persons who were vigilant about their rights and not who sit in fence. Mallick’s case was decided in 1982, in 1989 Dibakar Pal filed the petition and thereafter in 1989 respondents herein filed the writ petition. Thereafter petition filed by Dibakar Pal challenging the panel of 1980 was hopelessly belated. Likewise the present writ petition filed by the respondents herein. The explanation that the respondents waited for the judgment in Mallick’s case of Dibakar’s case, is hardly relevant……” 4. The Apex Court in another case titled as Ghulam Rasool Lone vs. State of J & K, reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5260, laid down the same principles of law. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of paras 14 and 18 herein: “14. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may, however, be denied on the ground of delay and latches. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of paras 14 and 18 herein: “14. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may, however, be denied on the ground of delay and latches. It is now well settled that who claims equity must enforce his claim within a reasonable time……. 18. While considering the question of delay and latches on the part of the petitioner, the court must also consider the effect thereof. Promotion of Hamidullah Dar was effected in the year 1987. Abdul Rashid Rather filed his writ petition immediately after the promotion was granted. He, therefore, was not guilty of any delay in ventilating his grievances. It will bear repetition to state that the petitioner waited till Abdul Rashid Rather was in fact promoted. He did not consider it necessary either to join him or to file a separate writ petition immediately thereafter, although even according to him, Abdul Rashid Rather was junior to him. The Division Bench, therefore, in our opinion rightly opined that the petitioner was sitting on the fence.” 5. The same principles of law have been laid down by the Apex Court in the case titled as State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors., reported in JT 2014 (12) SC 94, wherein it has been held as under: “23. ..…… 1 …….. (2) However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fencesitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.” 24. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above.” 6. Viewed thus, the Tribunal has rightly made the discussion in para 10 of the impugned order and dismissed the OA, needs no interference. 7 Having said so, the impugned order is upheld and the writ petition is dismissed alongwith all pending applications.