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2017 DIGILAW 121 (ORI)

Sadananda Dharua v. Debadi Bhue

2017-01-27

A.K.RATH

body2017
JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. The defendants are the appellants against a reversing judgment. 2. The respondent as plaintiff instituted Title Suit No.15 of 1995 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Jr.Division), Padampur for declaration of right over the suit land, permanent injunction retraining the defendants from creating any disturbance in his peaceful possession and for mandatory injunction to demolish the unauthorized construction made over the suit land. The case of the plaintiff is that his father Mangalu Bhue had purchased the suit plot comprising Ac.0.14 dec. appertaining to M.S. Plot No. 373 by means of an unregistered sale deed dated 27.4.1956. The said land is a portion of the suit plot comprising only Ac.0.02 dec. His father Mangalu Bhue was in possession of the suit land. After death of his father, he continued to possess the same. The defendants proclaiming themselves as the office bearers and members of Indira Club, Purena trespassed into the suit Bari, damaged the vegetables and forcibly started construction over a portion of the suit land. The defendants 1 and 2 initiated a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. before the S.D.M., Padampur on the plea that they had purchased the suit land in the year 1967 from the widow of Mahadeb Bhue. On 16.8.1995, the Executive Magistrate dropped the proceeding after lapse of the statutory time of two months. After the proceeding was dropped, the defendants unauthorisedly raised walls over the suit land in spite of protest by him. 3. Pursuant to issuance of summons, the defendants entered appearance and field a joint written statement denying possession of the plaintiff over the suit land or alleged purchase by the father of the appellant. It is stated that there was a Kacha house of one Jaga Kandha on the suit land. After his death, his sons, namely, Ramhari and Srihari remained there. Before migrating to another village, they entrusted the same to Indira Club in the year 1976, whereafter, Indira Club is in possession of the same. The club was registered in the year 1987. It made a pucca construction on the suit land. The club is in possession of the suit land for more than 12 years before institution of the suit and as such it perfected its title by way of adverse possession. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court struck eight issues. It made a pucca construction on the suit land. The club is in possession of the suit land for more than 12 years before institution of the suit and as such it perfected its title by way of adverse possession. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court struck eight issues. To substantiate case, the plaintiff had examined four witnesses and on his behalf, five documents were exhibited. The defendants had examined five witnesses and on their behalf, two documents were exhibited. 5. The learned trial court held that Mahadeb was the owner of the suit land. He got the same by means of a unregistered sale deed dated 27.6.56, vide Ext.2. He had title over it and answered issue No.2. With regard to Issue No.3, it held that the sale deed, vide Ext.2, is genuine and valid. With regard to Issue No.4, it held that the suit land was never in possession of Ramahari and Srihari and, as such, it could not have been delivered in favour of Indira Club. With regard to issue no.5, it held that possession of the defendants to be just before the suit and did not believe the possession of the defendants over the suit land much less for 12 years and thereby concluded that Indira Club had never perfected its title over the suit land. With regard to issue nos.6 and 7, as the same were not pressed by the parties, no finding was given. With regard to issue no.8, even though the learned trial court held that the defendants forcibly possessed the suit land before institution of the suit and thereby concluded that in a case of this nature, the plaintiff should have sought for the consequential relief of recovery of possession from the defendants and since the plaintiff had filed the suit for a mere declaration without the prayer of recovery of possession that suit was not maintainable. Held so, the learned trial court dismissed the suit. 6. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the appellant filed Title Appeal No.4 of 1996 before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Padampur, which was allowed. 7. This appeal was admitted on 26.2.1998 on the substantial questions of law enumerated in Grounds A, C, D and E mentioned in the appeal memo. 6. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the appellant filed Title Appeal No.4 of 1996 before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Padampur, which was allowed. 7. This appeal was admitted on 26.2.1998 on the substantial questions of law enumerated in Grounds A, C, D and E mentioned in the appeal memo. The same are:- “A. Whether permanent injunction can be granted if the plaintiff is out of possession and has not asked for recovery of possession ? B. Whether damages to be allowed instead of demolition, when order of demolition of a construction causes hardship to defendants and existence causes no irreparable injury to plaintiff ? C. Whether adverse possession by nature implies the ownership of another, where one person is in possession of property under any title and another person claims to be rightful owner of the property under a different title, the possession of the former is said to be adverse possession, with reference to later ? D. Whether the onus lies on the plaintiff to establish/to prove for acquiring the title over the suit land on the strength of unregistered sale deed, wherein there are a lot of contradiction in evidence so far as it is concerned to boundary of the suit land ? E. Whether admission in the pleading of formal litigation is an admission available for all purpose and for all times to come and in all other suit.” 8. Mr. R.B. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land. He has not sought for any relief for recovery of possession. Thus, the simple suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable. He further submitted that the defendants are in possession of the suit land peacefully, continuously and to the hostile animus of the true owner for more than twelve years and as such perfected title by way of adverse possession. He relied on the decisions of this Court as well as the apex Court in the case of Hari Mallick Vrs. Chittranjan Samal and others, 1992 (I) OLR-177, Narasingha Padhi (dead) and after him Rangabati Padhi and others Vrs. Sasibhusan Tripathy and another, 1995 (II) OLR-497, Damaodar Behera and another Vrs. State of Orissa, 1995 (II) OLR-502, The Executive Officer, Puri Municipality (in all) Vrs. Chittranjan Samal and others, 1992 (I) OLR-177, Narasingha Padhi (dead) and after him Rangabati Padhi and others Vrs. Sasibhusan Tripathy and another, 1995 (II) OLR-497, Damaodar Behera and another Vrs. State of Orissa, 1995 (II) OLR-502, The Executive Officer, Puri Municipality (in all) Vrs. Rama Naik and others, 1991 (1) OLR-175, K.V. Swamynathan and others Vrs. E.V. Padmanabhan and others, 1991 (I) OLR (S.C.)-167, and Gurbinder Singh and another Vrs. Lal Sing and another, AIR 1965 SC 1553 . 9. Per contra, Mr. B. Dash, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the plaintiff has instituted the suit for declaration of right, title, interest and permanent as well as mandatory injunction. In view of the same, there is no need to make the prayer for recovery of possession. Learned appellate court in a well-discussed judgment set aside the judgment of the learned trial court. 10. In Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 2008 SC 2033 , the apex Court held that where the title of the plaintiff is not disputed, but he is not in possession, his remedy is to file a suit for possession and seek in addition, if necessary, an injunction. A person out of possession cannot seek the relief of injunction simpliciter, without claiming the relief of possession. 11. Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate (Things should not be multiplied without necessity) is a well known principle in the administration of justice. In view of the same, this Court has not multiplied the authorities cited at the Bar since the ratio in all the decisions is same. 12. The submission of Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the appellant though at a first blush is attractive, but on a deeper scrutiny, the same appears to be billabong. This is not a case of permanent injunction simplicitor. The plaintiff has prayed for inter alia for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land, for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction. 13. In Sant Lal Jain V. Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857 , the plaintiff-appellant's case was that he had taken on lease under a lease-deed dated 26.8.1963 for a term of 10 years a plot of land measuring 51' x 118' situate near the Army Headquarters, Lower Mall, Patiala for M/s Jain Motors from its owner Lt. Col. Sadan Singh. In Sant Lal Jain V. Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857 , the plaintiff-appellant's case was that he had taken on lease under a lease-deed dated 26.8.1963 for a term of 10 years a plot of land measuring 51' x 118' situate near the Army Headquarters, Lower Mall, Patiala for M/s Jain Motors from its owner Lt. Col. Sadan Singh. He was only a partner of M/s Jain Motors in 1963, but later became its sole owner in 1967. The defendant-respondent took from the appellant on licence for one year under a deed dated 10.12.1969 the suit shed for carrying on the work of repair of motors, tractors, etc. But since he did not vacate the shed after the expiry of the period he terminated the licence and filed the suit on 15.2.1973 for a mandatory injunction directing him to vacate the premises. The respondent opposed the suit contending that the appellant sublet to him a plot of land in 1966-67 and he had raised a new construction thereon and is carrying on workshop business therein since then. He further contended that the relationship between the parties was that of landlord and tenant and that the suit for mandatory injunction was not maintainable. The trial court found that M/s Jain Motors were the lessees and that the respondent become a sub-tenant of a piece of land and constructed the suit shed thereon and that the suit for mandatory injunction is not maintainable and dismissed the suit. In the appeal the learned Additional District Judge set aside the trial court's findings recorded in favour of the respondent and allowed the appeal. The High Court allowed the second appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge and restored the trial court’s decree dismissing the suit. The apex Court in para-7 of the report held thus:- “7. In the present case it has not been shown to us that the appellant had come to the court with the suit for mandatory injunction after any considerable delay which will disentitle him to the discretionary relief. Even if there was some delay, we think that in a case of this kind attempt should be made to avoid multiplicity of suits and the licensor should not be driven to file another round of suit with all the attendant delay, trouble and expense. Even if there was some delay, we think that in a case of this kind attempt should be made to avoid multiplicity of suits and the licensor should not be driven to file another round of suit with all the attendant delay, trouble and expense. The suit is in effect one for possession though couched in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction as what would be given to the plaintiff in case he succeeds is possession of the property to which he may be found to be entitled. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant should not be denied relief merely because he had couched the plaint in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction.” 14. The same ratio proprio vigore applies to the facts of this case as well. 15. Adverse possession is not a pure question of law, but blended one of fact and law. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 at para 11, the apex Court observed as under :- "In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Nonuse of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nec vi, nec clam, nec precario", that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period." The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period." The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession”. 16. On an anatomy of the pleadings and evidence on record, both oral and documentary, the learned trial court came to hold that the suit schedule land belonged to one Mahadeb and the plaintiff had acquired the same by means of an unregistered sale deed vide Ext.2, which is genuine. The suit land was never in possession of Ramahari and Shrihari. Thus, the same could not have been delivered to Indira Club. The plea advanced by the defendants with regard to acquisition of title by way of adverse possession has been negatived. The defendants have forcibly trespassed on the suit land. The same was affirmed by the learned appellate court. In a well discussed judgment, the learned appellate court affirmed the same. There is no perversity or illegality with regard to the said findings. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law enumerated in ground nos. A to E are answered. 17. In the result, the appeal, sans merit, is dismissed. No costs.