JUDGMENT : DR. A.K.RATH, J. 1. Plaintiff is the appellant against a reversing judgment in a suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and permanent injunction. 2. Case of the plaintiff is that the then Thekadar of village Sirtol had allotted the suit property in his favour in the year 1938. The plaintiff reclaimed the suit land. He had constructed a house over Schedule-A property. He was in cultivating possession over Schedule-B property. The settlement authority wrongly recorded the suit land in Government Khata. In the remarks column of the ROR, his possession has been mentioned. The Tahasildar, Nuapara, defendant no.2, initiated encroachment case against him. Thereafter, defendant no.2 leased out the suit land and granted patta in his favour in Lease Case Nos.4/71 and 656/77. Defendant no.2 accepted nazarana. While the matter stood thus, the Collector, Kalahandi, defendant no.1, initiated suo motu Revision Case Nos.40/81 and 41/82 and cancelled the lease by order dated 31.5.83 and 24.5.83 respectively. It was pleaded that he was in possession of the suit land for more than thirty years and perfected title by way of adverse possession. With this factual scenario, he instituted the suit seeking the reliefs mentioned supra. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the second appeal, the sole plaintiff died, where after his legal heir has been substituted. 3. Defendants filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. Case of the defendants is that the suit land was recorded in the name of the State in Abad Jogya Anabadi Khata. The ROR was published in the year 1965 in the name of the Government. The land belongs to Government. The plaintiff was an encroacher. He had no semblance of right, title and interest over the same. The Collector, Kalahandi, defendant no.1, in Suo Motu Revision Case Nos.40/81 and 41/82 had cancelled the lease granted by defendant no.2 on the ground that village-Sirtol had been declared as urban area in the year 1969 and the land could not be leased out to any person for agricultural purpose. Further, a part of the suit land has been reserved for communal use. The same could not be settled as homestead. Defendant no.2 initiated encroachment case for eviction of the plaintiff. The order of eviction had been passed in due process of law. 4. Further, a part of the suit land has been reserved for communal use. The same could not be settled as homestead. Defendant no.2 initiated encroachment case for eviction of the plaintiff. The order of eviction had been passed in due process of law. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck seven issues. To substantiate the case, the plaintiff had examined two witnesses and on his behalf, three documents had been exhibited. The defendants neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. Learned trial court came to hold that in the remarks column of the ROR, note of possession of the plaintiff had been mentioned. Even though there was no written document with regard to settlement of land by Thekadar in the year 1938, but the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing the fact that he remained in possession of the suit land even before the lease was granted in the year 1971 and 1977 respectively. The possession of the plaintiff could be traced back prior to 1965. The land was settled to him by the Thekadar. It was further held that “whatever the case may be since the plaintiff has proved that he has acquired the land from the then Thekadar and has remained in possession of the suit lands since 1938, the plaintiff undoubtedly has perfected title over the suit lands”. Held so, it decreed the suit. Feeling aggrieved, defendants filed appeal before the learned District Judge, which was subsequently transferred to the court of learned Sub-Judge, Nuapara and renumbered as Title Appeal No.12/7 of 1985-87. The same was partly allowed. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the questions of law enumerated in Ground Nos.(a) and (b). The same are - “A. Whether the respondent no.1 has been vested with power to initiate a suo motu revision proceeding and cancel the lease of the appellant while the lands were settled in the year 1977 and power of suo motu revision vested with the Collector by virtue of an amendment to the Orissa Government Land Settlement Act carried on and from 6th May, 1981 ? B. Whether the respondents after settling the land on taking royalty and accepting the rent can cancel the said lease ? B. Whether the respondents after settling the land on taking royalty and accepting the rent can cancel the said lease ? C. Whether the appellate court could come to a conclusion that Ex-Thikadar has no right to allot the suit land when the aforesaid question was never raised nor did any evidence was led by way of documentary or orally to that effect by the respondents in the trial court ? D. Whether the inception of encroachment proceeding is barred by limitation ? E. Any other substantial question of law that may be raised during the time of hearing ? In course of hearing, the following substantial question of law was formulated; “Whether the judgment of the learned appellate court is vitiated for non-consideration of the evidence on record ?” 6. Heard Mr. Bikram Pratap Das, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. R.P. Mohapatra, learned AGA for the respondents. 7. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit land originally belonged to the Thekadar. The Thekadar had allotted the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff reclaimed the suit land and constructed a house over Schedule-A land. He was in cultivating possession over Schedule-B land. ROR neither creates title nor extinguishes title. He further contended that in Lease Case Nos.4/71 and 656/77, defendant no.2 leased out the suit land and granted patta in favour of the plaintiff, but the same was subsequently cancelled by defendant no.1 without any rhyme or reason. The plaintiff was in possession of the suit land for more than thirty years openly, peacefully and with hostile animus to the defendants and as such, perfected title by way of adverse possession. He further contended that the learned trial court, on a threadbare analysis of the evidence as well as pleadings, decreed the suit. But the learned lower appellate court on untenable and unsupportable grounds reversed the judgment and decree with regard to Schedule-A property. The judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court is vitiated in law. 8. Per contra, Mr. Mohapatra, learned AGA submitted that there is no document on record that Ex-Thekadar had allotted the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. The land granted by the defendant no.2 was subsequently cancelled by defendant no.1. The village, where the land situates, was declared as urban area. The ROR was published in the name of the State. Per contra, Mr. Mohapatra, learned AGA submitted that there is no document on record that Ex-Thekadar had allotted the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. The land granted by the defendant no.2 was subsequently cancelled by defendant no.1. The village, where the land situates, was declared as urban area. The ROR was published in the name of the State. The plaintiff has no right, title and interest over the same. 9. The plaintiff asserted that Ex-Thekadar had allotted the suit land in favour of the plaintiff in the year 1938. But then, no document had been produced before the court below. Though the learned trial court came to hold that there is no written document in favour of the plaintiff with regard to settlement of the land by Thekadar in the year 1938 but abruptly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing the fact that he has remained in possession of the suit land even before the lease was granted in the year 1971 and 1977 respectively. The land was acquired by the plaintiff prior to last settlement and that in the absence of any contrary evidence, the claim of the plaintiff that the land was settled by Thekadar can not be believed. It further held that “whatever the case may be since the plaintiff has proved that he has acquired the land from the then Thekadar and has remained in possession of the suit lands since 1938, the plaintiff undoubtedly has perfected title over the suit lands”. The judgment suffers from internal inconsistency. Rightly the learned lower appellate court interfered with the same. 10. The next question crops up whether the plaintiff has acquired title by way of adverse possession ? 11. Adverse possession is not a pure question of law, but a blended one of fact and law. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 , the apex Court observed as under : "In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nec vi, nec clam, nec precario", that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period." The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” (Emphasis laid) 12. The date of entry into the suit land has not been mentioned in the plaint. Mere possession of the suit land for long time is not suffice to hold that the plaintiff has perfected title by way of adverse possession, unless the classical requirements of adverse possession nec vi, nec clam, nec precario are pleaded and proved. 13. The plaintiff was a rank trespasser for which encroachment case was initiated against him. Though lease was granted in his favour but subsequently the same was cancelled. There is no prayer in the plaint to set aside the orders passed by the defendant no.1. 14. In State of Kerala vs. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar, AIR 1996 SC 906 , the apex Court held that even a void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. There is no prayer in the plaint to set aside the orders passed by the defendant no.1. 14. In State of Kerala vs. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar, AIR 1996 SC 906 , the apex Court held that even a void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact be effective inter parties until it is successfully avoided or challenged in higher forum. Mere use of the word "void" is not determinative of its legal impact. The word "void" has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity, depending upon the gravity of the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 15. In the wake of the aforesaid, the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs.