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2017 DIGILAW 1214 (RAJ)

Pashupati Gaushala v. State Government of Rajasthan Through Its Secretary, Department of Revenue

2017-05-12

MOHAMMAD RAFIQ

body2017
ORDER : This application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed by Shri Pashupati Gaushala, Sarna Doongar, Tehsil and District Jaipur through its Trustee Manager Shri Sita Ram Dass inter alia with the prayer for appointment of independent arbitrator to arbitrate in the matter of dispute with the respondent. 2. Dr. P.C. Jain, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that applicant-Pashupati Gaushala, Sarna Doongar is a registered Gaushala under the Rajasthan Gaushala Act of 1960. Its certificate of registration is placed on record. The aforesaid Rajasthan Gaushala Act of 1960 received the assent of the President on 09.07.1960. The relevant provisions have been made in the said Act for maintenance of proper accounts and their audit with right of inspection by the Registrar and penalties for neglects and failures. The applicant has been running the gaushala in conformity with the provisions of the said Act. The said Act was enacted with a view to promote and protect “COW” which animal had attained national recognition in the field of agriculture as well as in the field of health since centuries. The Government of Rajasthan in exercise of powers conferred upon it, has framed Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment of Land for Gaushala) Rules, 1957. The applicant submitted an application to the State Government for allotment of land of khasra no.133 of Village Sarna Doongar for guashala. 11 acres of the land, out of that khasra was allotted to the applicant on the terms and conditions laid down in the Rules of 1957 by government order dated 10.8.1989 with a further direction to change the classification of the land of the said khasra from Charagah to Gaushala. The allotment was made with the consent of Jaipur Development Authority. Pursuant to the above government order, the Collector, Jaipur vide his order dated 11.09.1989 changed the classification of the said Khasra No.133 from “Charagah” and recorded 11 acres of land out of it as “Gaushala”, which was allotted to petitioner for purposes of Gaushala on the terms and conditions stated in the Rules. Allotment of land was accepted by the petitioner for which as per Rule 9 of the said Rules a lease deed as per Appendix ‘A’ with five parts as detailed thereunder was to be executed. Allotment of land was accepted by the petitioner for which as per Rule 9 of the said Rules a lease deed as per Appendix ‘A’ with five parts as detailed thereunder was to be executed. Under Rule 10 of the said rules, it was specifically provided that the land so leased shall be separately shown as land leased out to Gaushala under these rules. Accordingly, the land so leased was shown in Jamabandi as land allotted to petitioner Gaushala w.e.f. 10.08.1989 and for a further period of ten years upto 10.09.1999. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that Appendix-A lease deed as statutorily provided under the said published rules notified in gazette, the terms and conditions of the five parts have also been stated therein. It has been provided in the introductory part of the deed, which had to be executed by the Collector on behalf of the Government, “to hold the premises hereby granted and demised unto the lessee for the terms of 20 years with effect from and the lessee hereby covenants with the government as in Part-III expressed and the government hereby covenants with the lessee as in Part-IV expressed and it is mutually agreed between the parties in Part-V of these presents”. Applicant had accepted the allotment of the said land with the terms and conditions as laid down in Appendix ‘A’ lease deed with its five parts as statutorily prescribed and notified in gazette and thus publicly made known to the petitioner. This also includes Part- V which provides that “the lessor and the lessee hereby agree that in the event of any dispute arising between the lessor and the lessee in respect of the interpretation or compliance with the terms of the lease or the sufficiency thereof, or to any matter or things in any way connected with this agreement, the same shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 of the Central Legislature (Act No.X of 1940).” 4. Dr. Dr. P.C. Jain, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that since the date of allotment of the said land to the petitioner Gaushala, it is being used till date for the purposes of Gaushala in accordance with the terms and conditions laid down, by maintaining the required number of bulls for breeding as also to feed and take care of the ailing, handicapped and non-milching cows, calves etc. who are being kept apart from the milk giving healthy cows, so as to avoid infection and allied animal diseases. Presently there are more than 400 cows. Plantation has also been carried out by the applicant over the land in question in 1995. Gram Panchayat Sarna Doongar, Gram Panchayat Khora Beesal and MLA of the area, and Gram Panchayat Nangal recommended for its permanent upkeep and extension of period as well as for allotment of additional land to the applicant. However in between this period, the State unilaterally cancelled the said allotment by order dated 29.11.1997. Aggrieved by the said order, a revision petition was also filed by the petitioner Gaushala, which was allowed vide order dated 22.06.1998. The revision petition was allowed by the State and while restoring the lease deed direction was issued for further allotment of lease for ten years vide order dated 03.08.2000. The Rajasthan Gau Seva Ayog also vide its letter dated 24.08.2009 recommended for further extension of lease period. Thereafter, the JDA sanctioned Rs.201 lakhs for construction of boundary wall on all the four sides of Gaushala and out of which work of constructing boundary wall around Gaushala costing Rs. 43.30 Lakhs was completed and remaining work was still in process. Jaipur Development Authority which had no proprietary right or title over the land filed frivolous writ petition bearing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2659/2001 challenging aforesaid order of the government. The said writ petition of the JDA was dismissed vide its judgment and order dated 19.04.2010. Collector, Jaipur vide its letter dated 11.06.2010 wrote to the Government in the department of Revenue to allot the land in question to applicant on permanent basis. The said writ petition of the JDA was dismissed vide its judgment and order dated 19.04.2010. Collector, Jaipur vide its letter dated 11.06.2010 wrote to the Government in the department of Revenue to allot the land in question to applicant on permanent basis. However, despite the aforesaid proceedings and legal position as laid down in Rule 8 (3) of the Rules of 1957, Jaipur Development Authority, which has recorded it as “Gaushala Land” in khatoni jamabandi, which is a record of right, still filed an objection before the Revenue Minister to claim that the entire right and title in the said land belongs to JDA and prayed for deletion of classification of land as “Gaushala” and for recording it as JDA land. 5. It is argued that the applicant filed an application before the Minister for Revenue, Government of Rajasthan on 01.02.2012 for placing the relevant provisions of law and factual positions of the matter contending that JDA has no right or title in the said land and requested for referring the dispute to the already named Arbitrator Mr. Justice S.N. Bhargava (Retd. Chief Justice of this Court) to arbitrate in the matter. Despite the aforesaid application dated 01.02.2012 and expiry of 30 days prescribed, the State Government has not appointed the Arbitrator and has now forfeited its right to do so. Learned counsel in support of his arguments has relied on the judgments of Supreme Court in J.K. Jain & Ors. vs. Delhi Development Authority & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 571 , Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. vs. Enercon GMBH & Anr., (2014) 5 SCC 1 and judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Om Prakash Satish Kumar Thapar vs. UOI, AIR 1996 P&H 250 and judgment of Orissa High Court in M/s. Swasti Traders vs. IVRCL Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. & Anr., 2012 (2) ILR (Cuttack) 893. 6. The application has been opposed by Shri Dharmendra Pareek, learned Additional Government Counsel and also by JDA by filing reply. 7. It is contended in the reply filed by JDA that the applicant was using the land in gross violation of the terms and conditions of the allotment. They have put the land to commercial use by operating dairy industry, instead of growing fodder for the animals. The milk cooling plant was found to be operating therein. 7. It is contended in the reply filed by JDA that the applicant was using the land in gross violation of the terms and conditions of the allotment. They have put the land to commercial use by operating dairy industry, instead of growing fodder for the animals. The milk cooling plant was found to be operating therein. As per the agreement, no pucca construction could be raised, but pucca construction was found at the site. All the cows were of Jersey/Cholistan breed and the milk was being extracted with the help of modern machines and was being put to commercial use. It was found that Aonla trees were planted on the vacant land allotted to the Gaushala and also upon 15 bigha 12 biswa of land encroaching upon by the applicant belonging to the non-applicant. It is also submitted that land of khasra no.133/2 Village Sarnadungar measuring 17 bigha 12 biswa leased out to the applicant was land of Mandir Maafi i.e. Mandir Shri Thakurji. Reference in this regard bearing no.309/05 is subjudice, in which status quo order has been passed. Although reply to the application has been filed by JDA, but in the facts it appears that it is contesting the entire matter on behalf of the State Government as well. 8. Shri Dharmendra Pareek, learned Additional Government Counsel for the respondent no.1 & 3 in the course of arguments has raised the objection with regard to non-production of the lease deed by the applicant. This Court thereupon called the Additional Government Counsel to procure before the Court copy of the lease agreement. The time was granted to him on 4.11.2016, 27.1.2017 and 10.3.2017. Shri Dharmendra Pareek lastly filed an affidavit placing on record copy of the allotment letter dated 30.8.1989 passed by Collector, Jaipur contending that this was all that is available on their record and filed reply on 17.11.2016. It was contended therein that the present application filed for appointment of the Arbitrator has been filed on the basis of presumption of arbitration clause in the format of lease deed provided under the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment of Land for Gaushala) Rules, 1957. Though Part-V thereof provided for arbitration clause, but it is merely a format. Unless a valid enforceable lease deed / agreement containing said clause is agreed to, executed and signed between the parties, the existing arbitration clause cannot be accepted. 9. Though Part-V thereof provided for arbitration clause, but it is merely a format. Unless a valid enforceable lease deed / agreement containing said clause is agreed to, executed and signed between the parties, the existing arbitration clause cannot be accepted. 9. Learned Additional Government Counsel submits that the applicant was allotted land by District Collector, Jaipur vide order dated 11.9.1989. Besides, the applicant has not disclosed the nature of dispute in the application for arbitration and unless their exist a dispute, an arbitration application cannot be accepted. 10. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 11. The Supreme Court in J.K. Jain, supra has held that there must be an arbitration agreement, which confer jurisdiction on the arbitrator to hear and decide the dispute. Where there is no such agreement, there is an initial want of jurisdiction. One of the essential ingredients of submission to arbitration is that the parties should agree that the dispute should be determined by an Arbitrator. Where there is an arbitration clause in a contract, it amounts to two contracts into one, one relating to the execution of the work entrusted in the manner prescribed and the other how to resolve the dispute in event any such dispute arises in respect of the said contract. Whenever one party to the dispute asserts that there is an arbitration agreement by which the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to an Arbitrator which is disputed and challenged by the other party to the agreement, it has to be examined and determined. To constitute "an arbitration agreement" it is not necessary that there should be a formal agreement or that the terms should all be contained in one document. All that is necessary that from documents it must appear that parties had agreed to submit present or future differences to arbitration. 12. The allotment of the land in the present case was strictly made strictly in terms of the Rules of 1957. It is not in dispute that the said Rule is accompanied by format of the lease dead at Appendix-A. The letter of allotment 30.08.1989 has been issued by Collector as per the aforesaid Rules. Now the dispute between the parties is whether applicant has followed the conditions of allotment. The respondents have contended that the applicant has violated terms and conditions of such allotment. Now the dispute between the parties is whether applicant has followed the conditions of allotment. The respondents have contended that the applicant has violated terms and conditions of such allotment. Since the allotment of the land was made as per the Rules of 1957, the Collector was obliged under law to have executed the lease deed as per the format appended in Appendix-A. Even if, therefore, a formal lease deed has not been executed owning to inaction or otherwise on the part of Collector, the intention of the parties to refer their dispute can still be gathered from Part-V of the Rules of 1957, which reads as under: “The lessor and the lessee hereby agree that in the event of any dispute arising between the lessor and the lessee in respect of the interpretation or compliance with the terms of the lease or the sufficiency thereof, or to any matter or things in any way connected with this agreement, the same shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 of the Central Legislature.” 13. Reference to Arbitration Act of 1940 of the Central Legislature in the aforequoted clause should be taken to have been substituted by Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as the intention of the parties to submit their dispute to the arbitration in the event of any dispute arising between them in respect of interpretation or compliance with the terms of the lease or the sufficiency thereof, or to any matter or things in any way connected with this agreement. Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides that in this Part, “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 provides that an arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 provides that an arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. Though sub-section (3) provides that the arbitration agreement shall be in writing, but sub-section (4) raised a presumption thereabout and provides that an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in (a) a document signed by the parties; (b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement; or (c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other. Here the respondents have allotted the land to the applicant as per the Rules of 1957, which the applicant has agreed to accept, the Rules of 1957 would as such bind the parties. The said Rules provides that the Collector was obliged under law to execute the lease deed as per the format appended in Appendix-A. Mere non-execution of the lease deed therefore cannot be taken to mean that parties would not abide by the conditions contained therein. 14. In view of above discussion, the present application succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prashant Kumar Agarwal, (Former Judge, Rajasthan High Court), C-62, Ram Nagar, Shastri Nagar, Jaipur (Telephone No.0141-2304719) is hereby appointed as an independent Arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the parties. Payment of costs of arbitration proceedings and the arbitration fees shall be made as per the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 read with Manual of Procedure for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2009, of this Court, as amended from time to time.