JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal takes an exception to the judgment and order dated 22.02.2008 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Buldhana in M.A.C.P. No.16/2002, thereby awarding the compensation of Rs.6,11,716/inclusive of no fault liability amount to the respondent-claimants. 2. Brief facts of the appeal can be stated as follows: Respondent No.1 is the widow, respondent Nos.2 and 3 are children and respondent No.4 is the mother of deceased Vijay Sonone. It is the case of respondents that on 22.12.1998 at about 10:50 p.m. while the deceased was on shift duty and returning home on a bicycle, while passing some where in the area of M/s. Steel Authority of India Limited, Durgapur Steel Plant, the dumper bearing No.TX 22 came from opposite direction in a rash and negligent manner. It was driven by Krishnakant Karmarkar, the employee of the appellant. The said dumper gave dash to the deceased. As a result, deceased succumbed to the injuries sustained in the dash. The incident was inquired into and investigated by Durgapur Police Station and chargesheet was filed against the Driver of the dumper for the various offences punishable under Section 279, 304A and 427 of the I.P.C. 3. As per the case of the respondents, on account of the untimely death of the deceased, they have lost their only source of income. It was their contention that deceased was working as a Constable in C.I.S.F. and getting salary of Rs.5,500/per month. Considering, his age of 30 years at the time of accident, they claimed the compensation of Rs.5,00,000/from the appellant herein. 4. This petition came to be resisted by the appellant herein raising the defence of total denial. It was denied that the vehicle involved in the accident was the dumper owned by the appellant and driven by its employee Krishnakant Karmarkar. It was further denied that the cause of the accident was rash and negligent driving of the dumper Driver. Further it was denied that on account of the death of deceased, respondents have lost their only source of income. It was submitted that respondents have already received the ex gratia payment of Rs.5,00,000/from the employer, and therefore, there is no question of the respondents suffering any financial loss. Further it was contended that the amount claimed by the respondent is exorbitant, unreasonable and hence, on this count also the petition needs to be dismissed. 5. It was submitted that respondents have already received the ex gratia payment of Rs.5,00,000/from the employer, and therefore, there is no question of the respondents suffering any financial loss. Further it was contended that the amount claimed by the respondent is exorbitant, unreasonable and hence, on this count also the petition needs to be dismissed. 5. In support of her case respondent No.1 examined herself and also led the evidence of one witness by name Rajendrasingh Chavan from C.I.S.F. to prove the salary certificate of the deceased Exh.46. 6. On appreciation of their evidence, the learned Tribunal was pleased to hold that the involvement of the vehicle of the appellant in the said accident and the negligence on the part of the Driver of the dumper, is sufficiently proved and accordingly held that the appellant liable to pay compensation to the respondents. 7. As regards the quantum of compensation, the Tribunal was pleased to hold, on the basis of the salary certificate produced on record that deceased was earning the income of Rs.4,406/per month. Deducting 1/3rd thereof towards the personal expenses of the deceased and then applying the multiplier of 17' Tribunal held the respondents entitled for the amount of Rs.5,99,216/towards the financial loss and then granting compensation towards the additional head of Rs.5000/for loss of consortium, Rs.5000/for loss of love and affection to respondent Nos.2 and 3 and Rs.2500/for funeral expenses, awarded the total compensation of Rs.6,11,716/. 8. This judgment of the Tribunal is challenged in the appeal by learned counsel for appellant, by submitting that there was absolutely no evidence produced on record before the Tribunal to prove the involvement of the dumper or its Driver in the said accident. It is urged that the Tribunal has placed entire reliance on the F.I.R. and chargesheet, which was filed by Police against the dumper Driver. However, in the criminal case filed against the dumper Driver, he was acquitted and the copy of the judgment was also produced on record, thereby proving that he was not involved in the said accident. Secondly, it is submitted that mere involvement in the said accident is not sufficient. It is also required to be proved that there was negligence on the part of the dumper Driver. Herein in the case, it is submitted that claimant has admitted in her evidence that she was not an eye witness to the incident. Secondly, it is submitted that mere involvement in the said accident is not sufficient. It is also required to be proved that there was negligence on the part of the dumper Driver. Herein in the case, it is submitted that claimant has admitted in her evidence that she was not an eye witness to the incident. Hence, in the absence of evidence proving the identity of the vehicle, and the negligence on the part of the vehicle driver, the liability fixed by the Tribunal upon the appellant to pay amount of compensation to the respondents is totally unwarranted and needs to be set aside. 9. Second submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants pertains to the payment of ex gratia of Rs.5,00,000/to the respondents. It is submitted that the said amount was required to be deducted from the amount of compensation arrived at by the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal has not done so. Hence, on this count also, interference is warranted in the impugned judgment. 10. In the light of these submissions advanced before me the first question arising for consideration is whether the respondents herein had proved not only the involvement, but also the negligence on the part of the dumper Driver? If it is proved, then only the appellant can become liable to compensate the respondents. 11. The Tribunal in this respect has relied upon the F.I.R. Exh.29, the chargesheet Exh.31, seizure panchnama of the dumper Exh.56 and the duty sheet of the dumper Exh.57 to hold the involvement of the dumper and the negligence of the dumper Driver proved on record. Though it was brought to the notice of the Tribunal that in the criminal case filed against the dumper Driver Krishnakant Karmarkar, he was acquitted by the Court of all the offences levelled against him, in my considered opinion, the Tribunal has rightly considered that in criminal trial as the witnesses turned hostile and not supported the prosecution case, the dumper Driver was acquitted, which can be seen from even the perusal of the judgment of that case the copy of which is produced at Exh.72. However, in civil proceeding the burden of proof is not as strict as in criminal proceeding. In civil matters the fact need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, as is necessary to be proved in criminal trial. However, in civil proceeding the burden of proof is not as strict as in criminal proceeding. In civil matters the fact need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, as is necessary to be proved in criminal trial. In civil matters the party can prove its case on the principle of preponderance of probability. Hence, merely because the dumper driver was acquitted in criminal case, his liability for accident in civil cases cannot be wiped out. Herein the case it is not only the F.I.R. and the chargesheet, which were filed against dumper Driver, that too after police carrying out necessary inquiry and investigation, but the evidence on record shows that even the C.I.S.F. had also carried out the requisite inquiry. The copy of that inquiry report is produced on record at Exh.52 and as deposed by the concerned witness from C.I.S.F., Shri Udaysingh Chavan, it was transpired in the inquiry that it was the dumper bearing No.TX 22, which was involved in the accident and the cause of accident was its rash and negligent driving, as it has given the dash to the deceased. The inquiry papers are produced at Exh.52 along with the complaint lodged to that effect against the dumper Driver by the C.I.S.F. vide Exh.53. 12. Further it is pertinent to note that in her evidence respondent No.1 has categorically deposed that the accident has taken place in the premises of Durgapur Steel Plant of the appellant and in the said premises, only the vehicles owned by the steel plant are permitted to ply; other vehicles are not permitted to enter into the premises of the said steel plant. This par of evidence of respondent No.1 is not at all challenged in her cross-examination and it has remained unshattered on record. Her evidence also proves the seizure panchnama Exh.56 of the dumper and duty sheet of its driver Exh.57. Both these documents prove beyond reasonable doubt the involvement of the dumper in the said accident. They are further corroborated with the report of the inquiry, conducted by C.I.S.F. proving that the cause of accident was the rash and negligent driving of the dumper. Absolutely no evidence is adduced on behalf of the appellant to controvert this oral or documentary evidence adduced by the respondents. They are further corroborated with the report of the inquiry, conducted by C.I.S.F. proving that the cause of accident was the rash and negligent driving of the dumper. Absolutely no evidence is adduced on behalf of the appellant to controvert this oral or documentary evidence adduced by the respondents. It is needless to state that if the accidental death has occurred in the premises of the appellant steel plant, there must be several workers as witnesses to the accident and hence appellant could have adduced their evidence. The appellant could have examined the dumper Driver Krishnakant Karmarkar to prove that it was the deceased, who came all of a sudden in front of the dumper and hence the accident took place. In the absence of such evidence on record the inference is inevitable that respondents have succeeded in proving that the cause of accident was rash and negligent driving of the dumper, which was owned by the appellant. Hence, the appellant cannot get itself absolved from paying the compensation to the respondents. 13. As regards the authority relied upon by learned counsel for appellant that of Gulab Chand Dhot v. P.N. Aggarwal 1994 ACJ 887, the facts of the said case were totally different, from the present case. In that case, in the F.I.R. the number of the vehicle involved in the accident was given, but it was found to be different F.I.R. also did not give the particulars of the Driver. Even in evidence before the Court, no such particulars were given and hence it was held that there was no evidence to prove the identity of the vehicle or the negligence on the part of such vehicle Driver. As against it, in the instant case, there is more than sufficient evidence on record to prove the involvement of the dumper owned by the appellant and even the rash and negligent driving of the dumper Driver. 14. The next issue raised for consideration is about the quantum of compensation. In this respect, also there is sufficient evidence produced on record by respondents, who have examined the witness Rajendrasingh Chavan. He was working in the C.I.S.F. unit and according to him, the deceased was also working in the same unit and earning the salary of Rs.4,406/per month. The salary certificate is produced on record at Exh.46. In this respect, also there is sufficient evidence produced on record by respondents, who have examined the witness Rajendrasingh Chavan. He was working in the C.I.S.F. unit and according to him, the deceased was also working in the same unit and earning the salary of Rs.4,406/per month. The salary certificate is produced on record at Exh.46. Having regard to the age of the deceased, which was 30 years at the time of accident, the multiplier applied by the Tribunal of 17' also cannot be faulted with. Therefore, the total amount of compensation towards the financial loss on account of the death of the deceased, which is arrived at by the Tribunal, after deducting 1/3rd of his income towards personal expenses is Rs.5,99,216/. 15. The Tribunal has however, not added any amount towards future prospects of the deceased. In view of the judgment of Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , considering the age of the deceased 50% of the amount of his monthly salary was required to be added as additional income towards future prospects, which Tribunal has not done. Now that amount needs to be added. 16. Moreover the amount awarded by the Tribunal towards loss of consortium to respondent No.1, Rs.5000/and Rs.5000/to respondent No.2 and 3 towards the loss of love and affection and Rs.25,00/towards funeral expenses is quite meagre. Having regard to the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajesh vs. Rajbir Singh 2013 ACJ 1403 (SC), that amount is to be enhanced to the tune of Rs.1,00,000/towards loss of consortium to respondent No.1 to Rs.1,00,000/towards loss of love and affection to respondent Nos.2 and 3 and Rs.50,000/for the loss of love and affection to respondent No.4 who has lost her son, and Rs.25,000/towards funeral expenses. Thus, the total amount of compensation can be assessed as follows: Sr. No. Heads Calculation 1. Salary Rs.4406/per month 2. 50% of above (i) to be added as future prospects. (Rs.4406 + Rs.2203)= Rs.6609/per month 3. 1/3 of deducted as personal expenses of the deceased. Rs.6609 – 1652 = Rs.4957/p.m. 4. Compensation after multiplier of 17 is applied. Rs.4957 x 12 x 17 = Rs.10,11,228/. 5. Loss of love, affection and estate Rs.2,50,000/ 6. Funeral expenses Rs.25,000/ Total compensation awarded Rs.12,86,228/ 17. (Rs.4406 + Rs.2203)= Rs.6609/per month 3. 1/3 of deducted as personal expenses of the deceased. Rs.6609 – 1652 = Rs.4957/p.m. 4. Compensation after multiplier of 17 is applied. Rs.4957 x 12 x 17 = Rs.10,11,228/. 5. Loss of love, affection and estate Rs.2,50,000/ 6. Funeral expenses Rs.25,000/ Total compensation awarded Rs.12,86,228/ 17. Now, the question is whether the amount of Rs.5,00,000/which respondents have received as ex gratia payment from C.I.S.F. is required to be deducted from the amount of compensation or not? In the case of “Reliance General Insurance Company Limited v. Shashi Sharma and others” reported in (2016) 9 SCC 627 , relied upon by learned counsel for appellant the Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High in Smt. Kashmiran Mathur and others v. Sardar Rajendrasingh and another AIR 1983 Madhya Pradesh 24, was upheld. In this judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in para 26, it was held that, such ex gratia payment made by the State to the widow of an employee of the Industries Department where the deceased was in service is required to be deducted as it is not a voluntary payment on charitable grounds “on the occasion of the death”, but it is an advantage “by reason of the death”. This amount cannot be claimed by the dependent unless death of the employee has occurred. This amount was therefore, deductible from the amount of compensation. 18. The same view is adopted by the Apex Court in the case of Reliance General Insurance, wherein the exact issue framed for its consideration was, “whether the compensation received from the Government under Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependants of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 (or otherwise) is to be deducted from the total compensation, which is payable to the dependents of the deceased who dies in the accident, while computing financial benefits through ex gratia payments by the Government?” While deciding this issue Apex Court took not of its earlier decision in Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC (1999) 1 SCC 90 , and observed as under: “18. The principle discernible from the exposition in Helen C. Rebello case is that if the amount “would be due to the dependants of the deceased even otherwise”, the same shall not be dudctibile from the compensation amount payable under the 1988 Act. The principle discernible from the exposition in Helen C. Rebello case is that if the amount “would be due to the dependants of the deceased even otherwise”, the same shall not be dudctibile from the compensation amount payable under the 1988 Act. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that loss of income is a significant head under which compensation is claimed in terms of the 1988 Act. The component of quantum of “loss of income” inter alia, can be “pay and wages” which otherwise would have been earned by the deceased employee if he had survived the injury caused to him due to motor accident. If the dependants of the deceased employee, however, were to be compensated by the employer in that behalf, as is predicated by the 2006 Rules—to grant compassionate assistance by way of ex gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds to the dependants of the deceased government employee who dies in harness, it is unfathomable that the dependants can still be permitted to claim the same amount as a possible or likely loss of income to be suffered by them to maintain a claim for compensation under the 1988 Act. Thereafter perusing the scheme of 2006 Rules, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that under the said Scheme, the dependents of the deceased Government employee were suitably compensated by way of financial assistance in the form of ex gratia payment on compassionate grounds and hence it was held in para 26 that, 26. Indeed, similar statutory exclusion of claim receivable under the 2006 Rules is absent. That, however, does not mean that the Claims Tribunal should remain oblivious to the fact that the claim towards loss of pay and wages of the deceased has already been or will be compensated by the employer in the form of ex gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds under rule 5(1). The Claims Tribunal has to adjudicate the claim and determine the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. The amount receivable by the dependants/claimants towards the head of “pay and allowances” in the form of ex gratia financial assistance, therefore, cannot be paid for the second time to the claimants. True it is, that the 2006 Rules would come into play if the government employee dies in harness even due to natural death. The amount receivable by the dependants/claimants towards the head of “pay and allowances” in the form of ex gratia financial assistance, therefore, cannot be paid for the second time to the claimants. True it is, that the 2006 Rules would come into play if the government employee dies in harness even due to natural death. At the same time, the 2006 Rules do not expressly enable the dependants of the deceased government employee to claim similar amount from the tortfeasor or insurance company because of the accidental death of the deceased government employee. The harmonious approach for determining a just compensation payable under the 1988 Act, therefore, is to exclude the amount received or receivable by the dependants of the deceased government employee under the 2006 Rules towards the head financial assistance equivalent to “pay and other allowances” that was last drawn by the deceased government employee in the normal course. This is not to say that the amount or payment receivable by the dependants of the deceased government employee under Rule 5(1) of the rules, is the total entitlement under the head of “loss of income”. So far as the claim towards loss of future escalation of income and other benefits is concerned, if the deceased government employee had survived the accident can still be pursued by them in their claim under the 1988 Act. For, it is not covered by the 2006 Rules. Similarly, other benefits extended to the dependants of the deceased government employee in terms of subrule (2) to subrule (5) of Rule 5 including family pension, life insurance, provident fund, etc., that must remain unaffected and cannot be allowed to be deducted, which, any way would be paid to the dependants of the deceased government employee, applying the principle expounded in Helen C. Rebello and Patricia Jean Mahajan cases.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. Herein the case, the letter issued by the office of the Deputy Inspector General of C.I.S.F. on 14.08.2003 is produced on record, which states that as per Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pension, Department of Pension and Pension Welfare Office memorandum No.45/56/97P& PW(C) dated 11.09.1998 while death occurring due to accident in the course of performance of duties the next of kin (family member) of Central Government Civilian Employees is eligible for ex gratia lump sum compensation of Rs.5,00,000/. Accordingly, the compensation case was taken up and the amount of Rs.5,00,000/was paid to the respondent No.1 as ex gratia payment. 20. Thus, it is clear that the ex gratia payment of Rs.5,00,000/is made to the respondent No.1 on account of accidental death of the deceased while on duty. This fact is not disputed by respondents also. Hence the said amount needs to be deducted from the amount of compensation payable to the respondents. After all, the amount of compensation has to be 'just' which means fair, adequate and reasonable. Compensation is not intended to be a bonanza or a source of profit. It must be equitable, fair and reasonable. Therefore, even if this criteria is applied then it becomes clear that as the respondents have already received this amount of Rs.5,00,000/as ex gratia payment, due to accidental death of the deceased while on duty, the said amount needs to be deducted from the total amount of compensation payable to the respondents. If such amount of Rs.5,00,000/is deducted from the total of Rs.12,86,228/then respondents become entitled for the compensation of Rs.7,00,000/inclusive of no fault liability amount of Rs.50,000/. 21. As a result, the appeal is partly allowed. 22. The judgment and order of the Tribunal is modified to the extent that appellant to pay compensation of Rs.7,00,000/to the respondent Nos.1 to 4 with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of application till its realization. 23. Rest of the judgment of the Tribunal stands confirmed. On the request of learned counsel for respondents, respondents are permitted to withdraw the amount of compensation, which is already deposited in the Court. 24. Appellant is directed to pay directly or to deposit, the balance amount of compensation in the Court within the period of eight weeks. 25. The appeal is disposed of in above terms.