JUDGMENT : Gopal Krishan Vyas, J. In this special appeal filed under Rule 134 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, the State of Rajasthan has challenged the judgment dated 3.3.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in SBCWP No. 2102/2002 whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent Dr. R.P. Gaur was allowed and quashed the order impugned in the writ petition dated 24.4.2002 passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the petitioner-respondent from service as a consequence to disciplinary action taken under memorandum dated 6.5.1997 and further held the petitioner respondent entitled for receiving all consequential relief’s and benefits flowing as a result of quashing of order dated 24.4.2002. 2. As per facts of the case, the respondent-petitioner preferred SBCWP No. 2102/2002 against the order dated 24.4.2002 (Annex.46) passed by the Government whereby the respondent-petitioner was dismissed from service in a departmental inquiry conducted against him under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1958 for short). 3. In the said inquiry, a charge-sheet was served upon the respondent-petitioner on 6.5.1997 (Annex.18) under Rule 16 of the Rules in which four charges were levelled against the respondent-petitioner, which reads as under: ^^izFke vkjksi ;g fd mDr Mk0 vkj0ih0 xksM+] dfu"B fo'ks"kK 'kY; rRdkyhu lh ,p lh vkcw jksM+ fuyafcr futh uflZx gkse esa izsfDVl djrs gS] tks vuq'kklughurk gSA tSls fd vkjksi fooj.k i= esa of.kZr gSA f}rh; vkjksi ;g fd mDr Mk0 vkj0ih0 xkSM+] dfu"B fo'ks"kK 'kY; fuyafcr izHkkjh u gksrs gq, Hkh Lo;a izHkkjh cudj vius LoSfPNd lsokfuo`fr ,ao dk;ZeqfDr ds vkns'k tkjh djus ds mRrjnk;h gS o mPp vf/kdkfj;ksa ds vkns'kksa dh vogsyuk dh gS tSls fd vkjksi fooj.k i= esa of.kZr gSA r`rh; vkjksi ;g fd Mk0 vkj0ih0 xkSM+ dzfo] 'kY; }kjk vfu;fer ,ao vukf/kd`r :i ls >wBs nLrkost /kks[kk/kM+h djus gsrq cuk;s x;s gS ,oa mPp vf/kdkfj;ksa ds vkns'kksa dh vogsyuk dh gSA tSlk fd vkjksi fooj.k i= esa of.kZr gSA prqFkZ vkjksi ;g fd mDr Mk0 xkSM+ fofHkUu fnolksa ij fcuk vodk'k Lohd`r djok;s ,ao LoSPNk ls vuqifLFkr jgs gSA tSlk dh vkjksi fooj.k i= esa of.kZr gSA g0 'kklu mi lfpo** 4. The details of the charges were also served upon him along with the aforesaid charge-sheet issued under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. The details of the charges were also served upon him along with the aforesaid charge-sheet issued under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. As per pleadings, when the respondent-petitioner was posted at Abu Road in the year 1996 a notice was given to him to explain about rendering services in the private clinic. The respondent-petitioner filed his reply to the notice on 11.6.1996 and prayed that he is going to file an application for voluntary retirement, therefore, his service record may kindly be completed, but no prayer was made for voluntary retirement in the communication dated 11.6.1996, in reply a communication was received from the office of Dy. Secretary, Medical and Health Department, Jaipur dated 17.6.1996 in which it is informed to the respondent -petitioner that departmental inquiry is contemplated against him, therefore, your prayer for voluntary retirement cannot be accepted. 5. On 20.6.1996, when respondent-petitioner was on leave and away from headquarter for personal medical investigation. On that date, the then Hon'ble Minister of Medical and Health Department, Government of Rajasthan visited Abu Road for inspection to upgrade Public Health Center and after joining on 26.6.1996 an application for voluntary retirement w.e.f. 21.10.1996 was moved by the petitioner. The said notice given by the petitioner was forwarded by the CM and HO, Sirohi to the Director, (Family Welfare), Medical and Health Services, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur and it was further forwarded by the Directorate of Medical and Health Services to the Secretary, Medical and Health Department on 29.8.1996. As per facts, on 26.6.1996 when the respondent-petitioner was working at Abu Road he was transferred from Abu Road to Makrana on 26.06.1996, therefore being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of transfer dated 26.6.1996, the respondent-petitioner preferred SBCWP No. 2155/1996, in which ex-parte interim order was granted by this Court. 6. The appellants Department in order to circumvent the interim order passed by this Court passed an order for awaiting posting orders for the petitioner-respondent. The respondent-petitioner again preferred writ petition before this court against the order of awaiting posting order. The said writ petition was registered as SBCWP No. 3066/1996, in which on 16.09.2016, an order was passed to issue notice to show cause and operation of the order dated 31.8.1996/6.9.1996 was stayed. The respondent-petitioner was again transferred to Sardulshahar vide Annex.10. The respondent-petitioner again preferred writ petition before this court against the order of awaiting posting order. The said writ petition was registered as SBCWP No. 3066/1996, in which on 16.09.2016, an order was passed to issue notice to show cause and operation of the order dated 31.8.1996/6.9.1996 was stayed. The respondent-petitioner was again transferred to Sardulshahar vide Annex.10. Against said order, the respondent-petitioner preferred SBCWP No. 3500/1996 in which the effect and operation of the order of transfer was stayed by this Court. 7. In the writ petition it is contended by the respondent-petitioner that in terms of his application for voluntary retirement was relived himself because on the said date, he was senior most person and holding the charge of CM and HO, Sirohi because he was on leave. The CM and HO after joining on 6.11.1996 cancelled the order of relieving of the respondent-petitioner on the ground that prayer for voluntary retirement has been refuse by the State. In pursuance of order dated 6.11.1996, the respondent-petitioner again joined his duties on 9.11.1996 and after joining, an order for suspension dated 29.11.1996 was issued by the respondent while exercising powers conferred by Rule 13 of the Rules of 1958 for the reason that an inquiry was contemplated against the respondent-petitioner. The respondent-petitioner again preferred SBCWP No. 328/1997 in which order of suspension was challenged. The learned Single Judge stayed the effect and operation of order dated 29.11.1996 but respondent-petitioner was not taken on duty for five months. 8. On 1.6.1998 a notice was issued by the respondent No. 3 to the effect that you have been transferred elsewhere from Abu Road, therefore, vacate the Government quarter occupied by you. The respondent-petitioner filed reply to the said notice and preferred SBCWP No. 1968/1998 in which the learned Single Judge admitted the writ petition and passed interim order to stay the notice dated 1.6.1998 and confirmed the same later on. 9. On 6.6.1998, a charge-sheet was served upon the respondent-petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 in which aforesaid four charges were levelled against him. 9. On 6.6.1998, a charge-sheet was served upon the respondent-petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 in which aforesaid four charges were levelled against him. The respondent-petitioner filed his reply to the said charge sheet, thereafter on 4.5.1998 the inquiry officer submitted his report after inquiry but after filing representation against the said inquiry report by the respondent-petitioner on 4.5.1998, the disciplinary authority vide order dated 29.5.1998 passed an order for re-inquiry against the respondent-petitioner after considering the reply filed by him. In the re-inquiry the statement of only one witness Bhanwar Singh Deora (DW-2) who was working as CM and HO, Sirohi were recorded. The statement of Dr. K.K. Bafna who was working as CM and HO, Sirohi at relevant point of time was examined. The respondent-petitioner participated in the inquiry and filed his written statement on 29.11.1999. A number of documents were also produced by the respondent-petitioner in the re-inquiry conducted by the appellants. 10. The inquiry officer finally heard and submit report to the disciplinary authority for taking action against the petitioner. The disciplinary authority gave a notice to the respondent-petitioner on 04.04.2000 asking him to make representation upon inquiry officer's report. The copy of the inquiry officer's report was also annexed with the notice. The respondent-petitioner preferred a representation against the inquiry report communicated to him and after lapse of two years, an order was passed by the disciplinary authority whereby penalty of dismissal was imposed against the respondent-petitioner. 11. In the writ petition filed by the respondent-petitioner against the order of dismissal number of grounds were raised including the ground that the State Government has passed an order of dismissal in breach of principles of natural justice, so also, on the ground that order of dismissal is non-speaking order, therefore, suffers from non-application of mind. 12. The respondent-petitioner raised legal ground that the order of dismissal is in breach of mandatory requirement of rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958 because as per the Rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958, the disciplinary authority is under obligation to record its finding upon each charge, but there is no compliance of the provision by the disciplinary authority as contemplated under Rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958. The other grounds were also raised with regard to inquiry conducted by the inquiry officer. The other grounds were also raised with regard to inquiry conducted by the inquiry officer. The learned Single Judge after providing an opportunity of hearing finally heard the arguments and vide judgment dated 3.3.2009 allowed the writ petition on the ground that order passed by the disciplinary authority whereby the respondent-petitioner was dismissed from service is based upon an inquiry suffers from fundamental infirmities and mandatory provisions of the Rules of 1958. 13. In this appeal, filed by the appellant, the judgment dated 3.3.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge is under challenge. 14. The learned AAG vehemently argued that the entire judgment of the learned Single Judge is based upon the ground that proceedings conducted against the respondent-petitioner was in contravention of doctrine of reasonable opportunity and principles of natural justice but the finding of the learned Single Judge on aforesaid grounds is not tenable in law because full-fledged inquiry was conducted against the respondent-petitioner in which after recording evidence, the disciplinary authority passed an order of dismissal because all the charges were proved in the inquiry. With regard to the mandatory provisions which is rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958 it is submitted that order was passed while considering the entire record of the inquiry and the inquiry report, therefore, in no way it can be said that disciplinary authority has acted in casual manner and passed in contravention of the Rules of 16(9) of the Rules of 1958. The order impugned speaks loudly in clear terms about holding respondent-petitioner guilty and to inflict the penalty of dismissal against him. It is also argued that prior to passing the order of punishment, the procedure provided under Rule 16(1) of the Rules of 1958 seeking advise from the RPSC was followed and upon receiving concurrence from the RPSC the order of penalty was passed, therefore, the judgment impugned in this appeal is illegal because it is based only on the ground that order of dismissal is non-speaking order, so also, in violation of rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958 but that finding is contrary to the record. Therefore, it is prayed that judgment impugned may kindly be quashed. 15. Per contra, learned senior advocate Sh. M.S. Singhvi assisted by learned counsel Sh. Hemant Dutt vehemently argued that it is a case in which the respondent-petitioner was victimized due to arbitrary exercise of powers by the appellant. Therefore, it is prayed that judgment impugned may kindly be quashed. 15. Per contra, learned senior advocate Sh. M.S. Singhvi assisted by learned counsel Sh. Hemant Dutt vehemently argued that it is a case in which the respondent-petitioner was victimized due to arbitrary exercise of powers by the appellant. As per facts of the case, respondent was transferred twice so also placed under suspension and, the departmental inquiry was initiated against him, but in the writ petitions filed by him all the transfer orders and suspension order was stayed by this Court. The learned Senior Advocate further argued that although there is power left with the disciplinary authority to take action under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 if any misconduct is committed by the employee but at the same time, it is the duty of the disciplinary authority to follow the procedure laid down in the rules for inquiry and to provide reasonable opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer. It is also submitted that at the time taking action against delinquent employee, the mandatory provisions provided in the CCA Rules were required to be followed and principles of natural justice is also required to be observed, but in this case, not only the respondent-petitioner was victimized due to arbitrary action of the appellants and in the inquiry, without considering and discussing the grounds raised by the respondent-petitioner in his representation against inquiry report, the disciplinary authority passed an order for dismissal. 16. The learned Single Judge while considering the rule 16(9) of the CCA Rules, so also, the fact that order of dismissal is non-speaking order deemed it fit to quash the same, therefore, no interference is called for in this special appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan. In support of his arguments, the learned Senior Advocate invited our attention towards the judgments in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Amolak Chand Sanghi reported in RLR 1983 page 246, S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India reported in ( 1990 4 SCC 594 , State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Ch. Gandhi reported in (2013) 5 SCC 111 and in the case of Oriental Bank of Commerce and Ors. v. S.S. Sheokand and Anr. v. Ch. Gandhi reported in (2013) 5 SCC 111 and in the case of Oriental Bank of Commerce and Ors. v. S.S. Sheokand and Anr. reported in (2014) 5 SCC 172 and submits that in view of the aforesaid judgments no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge to quash the order of dismissal dated 24.4.2002 passed by the disciplinary authority, therefore, this appeal may kindly be dismissed. 17. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, first of all, we have perused the charge-sheet issued against the respondent-petitioner in which four different charges were levelled against the respondent-petitioner. Admittedly, on 4.5.1998, a inquiry report was submitted by the inquiry officer to the disciplinary authority but the inquiry proceedings was not found temporary to be valid, therefore, on 21.12.1998 a decision was taken to hold the inquiry afresh. During the course of inquiry conducted afresh, the statements of Dr. K.L. Bafna were never put down, however, the inquiry officer considered and relied upon the statement of K.L. Bafna recorded on 24.2.1998 in earlier inquiry. It is admitted position of the case that neither copy of the statement of Dr. K.L. Bafna was given to the respondent-petitioner nor he was allowed to cross-examine the witness Dr. Bafna and while holding the respondent-petitioner guilty for the charges levelled against him, relied upon the preliminary inquiry report given by the SDO, Abu Road, but the said SDO, Abu Rod was not even called to prove the preliminary inquiry report, which is relied upon by the inquiry officer. It is also pointed out by the respondent-petitioner that the document submitted by the prosecution were relied upon by the inquiry officer but copies were not supplied, therefore, the learned Single Judge held that it is a case of denial of reasonable opportunity to defence. The learned Single Judge considered the fact that disciplinary authority sought comments from the Joint Director, Medical and Health Department, Jaipur while considering the record of inquiry and relied upon but those comments were not part of the record of the inquiry. 18. The learned Single Judge considered the fact that disciplinary authority sought comments from the Joint Director, Medical and Health Department, Jaipur while considering the record of inquiry and relied upon but those comments were not part of the record of the inquiry. 18. Upon examination of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the finding of the learned Single Judge so as to quash the order of dismissal upon aforesaid grounds does not suffer from any illegality because it is apparent from the record that four different charges were levelled against the respondent-petitioner and as per rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958 the finding against the different charges were to be recorded by the disciplinary authority but in the order of dismissal, neither reasons are incorporated nor the representation submitted by the respondent-petitioner was considered objectively by the disciplinary authority, more so, it is apparent from the order of dismissal dated 24.4.2002 that disciplinary authority has passed an order in very casual manner, that too, without considering the representation as well as finding of the inquiry report. 19. The Division Bench of this Court while considering the rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958 in the case of State of Raj v. Amolak Chand Sanghi (supra) held that in case where disciplinary authority is not inquiry officer as contemplated under Rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958, the disciplinary authority should apply its mind and after discussing the representation should record specific finding on different charges. Para no 16 of the said judgment is as under: "16. It follows from the rules referred to above as well as the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court that the Disciplinary Authority before imposing any one of the penalties specified in r.14 of the Rules should record reasons in support of it so that the Courts may be able to examine its correctness. No reasons whatsoever have been given by the Government in support of the order Ex.5. The explanation of the petitioner has also not been considered. There does not appear to be any application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority to the record and enquiry report. The order Ex.5 dated September 17, 1965 is not in accordance with rr. 14 and 16 (9) of the Rules. The explanation of the petitioner has also not been considered. There does not appear to be any application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority to the record and enquiry report. The order Ex.5 dated September 17, 1965 is not in accordance with rr. 14 and 16 (9) of the Rules. We agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that in the absence of any reasons having been recorded, the order Ex.5 dated September 17, 1965 is vitiated." 20. Upon perusal of the dismissal order and finding of the learned Single Judge in the light of the aforesaid judgments, we are of the opinion that dismissal order has been passed by the Government in violation of rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958. 21. We have also considered the finding of the learned Single Judge whether non-supply of the documents which is taken into consideration by the inquiry officer to hold delinquent guilty suffers from infirmity or any illegality. In our opinion, in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Bank of Commerce and Ors. v. S.S. Sheokand and Anr. (supra) it is not permissible in law to consider any report without supply the said document to the incumbent or to grant an opportunity to scrutinize the said inquiry report. In this case, admittedly, a preliminary inquiry was conducted by the SDO has been relied upon by the inquiry officer but SDO was not even called in the inquiry to prove said inquiry report nor the said inquiry report was made available to the respondent -petitioner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Bank of Commerce and Ors. v. S.S. Sheokand and Anr. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court gave the following verdict in this regard in para No. 20. The para No. 20 of the said judgment reads as under: "20. We have considered the submissions of both the counsel. When we come to the question of imposition of punishment on the respondent, what we find is that undoubtedly, there was a serious allegation against him, and as it has been held in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regl. Manager, such acts could not be condoned. At the same time, we have also to note that the bank management itself had taken the view in the initial stage that the action did not require a major penalty. Manager, such acts could not be condoned. At the same time, we have also to note that the bank management itself had taken the view in the initial stage that the action did not require a major penalty. It is also relevant to note that the High Court was also informed at the stage of review that the Bank was considering imposition of a minor penalty. It is quite possible to say that the bank management did arrive at its decision to maintain a major penalty at a later stage on its own, and not because of the dictate of CVC, but at the same time it has got to be noted that CVC report had been sought by the management of the Bank, and thereafter the punishment had been imposed. As observed in SBI, may be that the disciplinary authority had recorded its own findings, and had arrived at its own decision, but when this advise from CVC was sought, it could not be said that this additional material was not a part of the decision-making process. When this report was not made available to the respondent, it is difficult to rule out the apprehension about the decision having been taken under pressure. Any material, which goes into the decision-making process against an employee, cannot be denied to him. In view of the judgment in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regl. Manager, the decision of the Bank could have been approved on merits, however, the two judgments in Nagraj Shivarao Karjagi and SBI lay down the requisite procedure in such matters, and in the facts of this case, it will not be appropriate to depart from the dicta therein. On this yardstick alone, the part of the judgment of the High Court interfering with the punishment will have to be sustained." We have considered the finding of the learned Single judge that order impugned is non-speaking order, therefore, not sustainable in law. Admittedly, the respondent-petitioner was dismissed from service vide order (Annex.46) dated 25.4.2002 in which neither finding is given upon each charges levelled against the respondent-delinquent nor there is consideration of the grounds taken by the respondent petitioner in his representation against the inquiry report, therefore, obviously, the order of dismissal can be termed as non-speaking order and in contravention of the principles of natural justice. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (supra) held that the authority exercising quashi-judicial function must record its reason for its decision irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review, so also reason should be clear and explicit though may not be elaborated because this is one of the embodied rule of natural justice. The paras Nos. 35, 36 and 40 of the said judgment are as under: "35. The decision of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other consideration which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (I) guarantee considerations by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. 36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 40. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision." 22. In the light of above discussion, we are of the opinion that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge to allow the writ petition filed by the respondent - petitioner and to quash the order of dismissal which is in violation of Rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958, so also, in contravention of procedural law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in aforesaid cases. 23. Consequently, we find no force in this special appeal and therefore, the same is hereby dismissed.