JUDGMENT : A.K.Rath, J. This is a defendants’ appeal against an affirming judgment. The suit was for partition. 2. The following genealogy would show the relationship of the parties. Genealogy Piru Majhi 1 st wife 2 nd wife Leta (dead) Majhia Alias Majha (dead) Gamai (dead) Baiju (dead) Sankha (dead) Natai (dead) Piru alias Lengda Piru (dead) Piru (dead) Baiju (dead) Sawan (P-1) Baghrai (P-1) Gamai alias Samai (dead) Widow-Tusu (D-3) Jagadish D-1) Raban (D-2) The case of the plaintiffs is that the parties are Scheduled Tribes. They are governed under the Mitakhara School of Hindu Law. Piru Majhi was the common ancestor of the parties. He had two wives. Majhia, Gamai, Baiju, Sankha and Natai are sons of Piru through first wife. Leta is the son of Piru through second wife. All sons of Piru are dead. The land of Majhia was recorded in his name under Khata No. 91, mouza-Baliasahi. Baiju died unmarried. Plaintiff no.1 is the son of Natai. Plaintiff no.2 is the son of Sankha. Other sons of Sankha namely Piru and Baiju are dead. The defendants are sons of Lengda Piru, who is the son of Gamai. The suit schedule properties are the joint family property. The same has not been partitioned by metes and bounds. 3. Defendant nos.1 and 2 filed their joint written statement denying assertions made in the plaint. According to them Leta Majhi had no issue. He was living jointly with his brothers Majhia Majhi and Gamai Majhi even though their lands were separately recorded in their respective names. Leta Majhi adopted Piru @ Lengda Piru, the father of defendant nos.1 and 2 about 53 years back as his son. Lengda Piru was possessing all the lands till his death. Therefore, his sons (defendants) are in possession of the suit land openly, peacefully and without interruption and to the knowledge of all the plaintiffs. During the current settlement operation, the plaintiffs staked a claim over the suit lands, to which defendants did not agree, for which they filed the suit. 4. On the, inter se, pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court struck five issues. Both the parties led evidence, oral and documentary, to substantiate their cases. On a threadbare analysis of evidence on record as well as pleadings, the learned trial court came to hold that Lengda Piru was not the adopted son of Leta Majhi. 4. On the, inter se, pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court struck five issues. Both the parties led evidence, oral and documentary, to substantiate their cases. On a threadbare analysis of evidence on record as well as pleadings, the learned trial court came to hold that Lengda Piru was not the adopted son of Leta Majhi. Held so, it decreed the suit. The unsuccessful defendants challenged the judgment and decree of the learned trial court before the learned District Judge, Mayurbhanj at Baripada in T.A. No. 03 of 1986, which was eventually dismissed. 5. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law enumerated in the ground nos.2, 3 and 5 of the appeal memo:- “2. For that the adoption of Lengda Piru is an ancient adoption and the fact of giving and taking cannot be adduced because of lapse of time. The circumstance that the share of properties left by Leta is enjoyed and possessed by the defendants on payment of rent is a circumstance to prove the adoption has not been taken into consideration. 3. For that it is wrong to hold that Lengda Piru being the only son of his father could not be adopted. 5. For that the defendants and prior to them Lengda Piru were in continuous possession peacefully, openly and to the knowledge of the plaintiff. It has been pleaded in W.S. also. The finding in regard to adverse possession by defendants is illegal.” 6. Heard Mr.Pradip Kumar Khuntia, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Maheswar Mohanty, learned counsel for the respondents. 7. Mr. Khuntia, learned counsel for the appellants submits that Lengda Piru, father of the defendants, was adopted by Leta Majhi. It was a case of ancient adoption. The defendants adduced evidence. There is ample evidence on record that Lengda Piru was adopted by Leta Majhi. On untenable and unsupportable grounds, learned trial court negatived the plea of adoption. 8. Per contra, Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the respondents submits that though the defendants have taken a plea that their father Lengda Piru was adopted by Leta Majhi, but the date of adoption has not been mentioned. There is no pleading with regard to giving and taking ceremony. The defendants have insignificantly failed to prove the plea of adoption. Both the courts below concurrently held that Lengda Piru is not the adopted son of Leta Majhi. There is no pleading with regard to giving and taking ceremony. The defendants have insignificantly failed to prove the plea of adoption. Both the courts below concurrently held that Lengda Piru is not the adopted son of Leta Majhi. 9. In Sauney Majhi and another vs. Duli Dei and others, AIR 1985 Orissa 22, a Division Bench of this Court has succinctly stated the principles governing ancient adoption. This Court held:- “6. The law is fairly settled that the evidence in support of an adoption is sufficient to satisfy the very grave and serious onus that rests upon any person who seeks to displace the natural line of succession by alleging an adoption. The fact of adoption must be proved in the same way as any other fact, but where there is a lapse of long period between the date of adoption and the time when it is being questioned, every allowance for the absence of evidence to prove such fact must be favourably entertained, as after the lapse of a long period, direct evidence to prove adoption may not be available. The Supreme Court in the case of L. Debi Prasad v. Smt. Tribeni Devi, AIR 1970 SC 1286 , observed :- "In the case of all ancient transactions, it is but natural that positive oral evidence will be lacking. Passage of time gradually wipes out such evidence. Human affairs often have to be judged on the basis of probabilities. Rendering of justice will become impossible if a particular mode of proof is insisted upon under all circumstances. In judging whether an adoption pleaded has been satisfactorily proved or not, we have to bear in mind the lapse of time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on which the concerned party is required to adduce proof. In the case of an adoption said to have taken place years before the same is questioned, the most important evidence is likely to be that the alleged adoptive father held out the person claiming to have been adopted as his son; the latter treated the former as his father and their relations and friends treated them as father and son. There is no predetermined way of proving any fact. There is no predetermined way of proving any fact. A fact is said to have been proved where after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Hence if after taking an overall view of the evidence adduced in the case, we are satisfied that the adoption pleaded is true, we must necessarily proceed on the basis, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is a valid adoption as well." The aforesaid view of the Supreme Court has been followed in a number of cases of this Court and of other High Courts. The aforesaid principle only regulates the mode of proof of the factum of adoption. In the decision in the case of Sri Kanchumarthi Venkata Seetharama Chandra Row v. Kanchumarthi Raju, AIR 1925 PC 201 , which has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Voleti Venkata Ramarao v. Kesaparagada Bhasararao, AIR 1969 SC 1359 , it has been authoritatively said that in the case of an ancient adoption, it stands to reason that after a very long term of years and a variety of transactions of open life and conduct upon the footing that the adoption was a valid act, the burden must rest heavily upon him who challenges its validity. The appellants in this case rely upon the aforesaid principles and have contended that the date of adoption as available from the evidence on record was 1909 and it is not possible to prove the factum of adoption by direct evidence. Thus, according to them the overall view of the evidence on record should lead to the conclusion that there was a valid adoption as alleged by them. 7. The law is equally well settled that where direct evidence is available for establishing the ceremony of adoption irrespective of lapse of time, the relaxation permissible in the case of an ancient adoption is not available to be applied. (Vide (1968) 34 Cut LT 778, Jadumani Patra v. Padan Patra and AIR 1973 Orissa 160, Jagannath Mohanty, v. Chanchala Bewa).” 10. On a cursory perusal of the written statement, it is evident that defendants have not mentioned the date of adoption. (Vide (1968) 34 Cut LT 778, Jadumani Patra v. Padan Patra and AIR 1973 Orissa 160, Jagannath Mohanty, v. Chanchala Bewa).” 10. On a cursory perusal of the written statement, it is evident that defendants have not mentioned the date of adoption. There is no pleading or evidence with regard to giving and taking ceremony. Both the courts below, on a threadbare evidence on record and pleadings, negatived the plea of adoption. There is no perversity or illegality in the findings of the courts below. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 11. A priori, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.