ORDER : B.V. Nagarathna, J. 1. This writ petition is listed for preliminary hearing in B-Group by special orders and with the consent of Learned Counsel on both the sides, it is heard finally. 2. The petitioner herein claims to be the widow of late Thippeswamy and she has challenged endorsement dated 4.1.2013 passed by the first respondent (Annexure-F). By that endorsement, the first respondent has stated that the petitioner herein being the "second wife" of late Thippeswamy is not entitled to appointment on compassionate basis under the Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules' for the sake of convenience). That order is challenged in this writ petition. 3. Petitioner's Counsel has drawn my attention to Rule 5 of the said Rules, which states that in case of the death of a male Government servant, his widow would be entitled to appointment on compassionate ground and that the first respondent herein could not have issued the impugned endorsement stating that the petitioner is the "second wife" of late Thippeswamy, the deceased Government servant and therefore, she is entitled to appointment on compassionate basis. 4. He submitted that the expression used in the Rule is 'widow' and not' legally wedded wife'. When the petitioner has established that she is the widow of late Thippeswamy, the fact whether she is his first wife or second wife, pales into insignificance. That she is the widow of late Thippeswamy has been accepted by the Trial Court in O.S. No. 313/2010 while accepting the compromise entered into between the petitioner and the fourth respondent herein, who claims to be the "first wife" of late Thippeswamy. Therefore, he submitted that the impugned order may be quashed and a direction be issued to reconsider the application filed by the petitioner. 5. Learned Government Pleader appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submits that on quashing the impugned endorsement, if a direction is issued, the matter shall be reconsidered in the light of the Rules. 6. Learned Counsel for the fourth respondent submits that having regard to the compromise entered into between the petitioner and the fourth respondent in the suit, the petitioner is entitled to seek appointment on compassionate basis and the fourth respondent is entitled to terminal benefits of late Thippeswamy. 6. Learned Counsel for the fourth respondent submits that having regard to the compromise entered into between the petitioner and the fourth respondent in the suit, the petitioner is entitled to seek appointment on compassionate basis and the fourth respondent is entitled to terminal benefits of late Thippeswamy. Therefore, in terms of the compromise entered into between the parties on 5.1.2012 in O.S. No. 313/2010, the petitioner could seek appointment on compassionate basis and that the fourth respondent would have no objection in that regard. 7. Having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the materials on record, it is noted that the petitioner herein, being the widow of late Thippeswamy, who died in harness has sought for appointment on compassionate basis and has entered into a compromise with the fourth respondent herein in O.S. No. 313/2010 before the Civil Judge, (Jr.Dn.) Tiptur. The relevant portion of the said compromise decree reads as under: "By passing an order before Lok-Adalat it is ordered and decreed that the suit is decreed in terms of compromise between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and to draw decree in terms of compromise. The terms of compromise petition filed under Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC are as follows:- 1. The plaintiff herein instituted above declaratory suit for the relief claiming that all the death benefits of Late Thippeswamy against the defendant No. 1 Smt. S.G. Leelavathi. 2. At the intervention of well-wishers, elders of their family, the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 agree to resolve the dispute amicably, accordingly, the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 have settled the dispute on the following terms:- 3. That the plaintiff is entitled only compensatory employment from the concerned authority and for agree to maintain her child Nuthan till her marriage and she has no claim any other monitory death benefits of late Thippeswamy in future. 4. That the defendant No. 1 is entitled for the entire monitory death benefits namely, family pension, gratuity etc. of late Thippeswamy and further undertake that the defendant No. 1 has no objection to have the claim of the compensatory employment by the plaintiff T.H. Ashalatha. 5. That the plaintiff has no objection to have all the monitory death benefits of Late Thippeswamy claimed by the defendant No. 1 S.G. Leelavathi. of late Thippeswamy and further undertake that the defendant No. 1 has no objection to have the claim of the compensatory employment by the plaintiff T.H. Ashalatha. 5. That the plaintiff has no objection to have all the monitory death benefits of Late Thippeswamy claimed by the defendant No. 1 S.G. Leelavathi. Wherefore, the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 humbly prays this Hon'ble Court to accept this compromise petition and to decree the above case in terms of this compromise in the interest of justice and equity. Parties to bear their own costs. Given under my hand and the seal of the Court this 5th day of January-2012." As per the compromise decree, the petitioner herein is entitled to seek appointment on compassionate basis and that the fourth respondent would have no objection for the same. 8. On the basis of the compromise decree, the petitioner has sought for appointment on compassionate basis claiming to be the widow of late Thippeswamy as per the Rule 3 of the Rules. The relevant portion of Rule 3 reads as under: "3. Eligibility for appointment - (1) Appointment on compassionate grounds under these rules shall not be claimed as a matter of right and shall not be given as a matter of course. (2) Appointment under these rules shall be restricted to the dependent of a deceased Government servant in the following order of preference, namely- (i) in the case of the deceased male Government servant:- (a) the widow; (b) a son, if widow is not eligible or for any valid reason she is not willing to accept the appointment; (c) an unmarried daughter, if the widow and son are not eligible or for any valid reason they are not willing to accept the appointment; (d) a widowed daughter, if the widow, son and unmarried daughter are not eligible or for any valid reason they are not willing to accept the appointment" A reading of the aforesaid extract makes it clear that the appointment on compassionate grounds under the Rules cannot be claimed as a matter of right and shall not be given as matter of course. The appointment under the Rule shall be restricted to the dependent of the deceased Government servant in the above mentioned order of preference. The first preference is given to widow. The appointment under the Rule shall be restricted to the dependent of the deceased Government servant in the above mentioned order of preference. The first preference is given to widow. The expression "widow" dependent on the deceased Government servant is defined in Rule 2(1)(a) as under: "(a) "Dependent of the deceased Government servant" means:- (i) in the case of deceased male Government servant, his widow, son, unmarried daughter and widowed daughter who were dependent upon him and were living with him; and (ii) in the case of a deceased female Government servant, her widower, son [unmarried daughter and widowed daughter] who were dependent upon her and were living with her." 9. On a conspectus reading of the above, it becomes clear that the widow of the deceased male Government servant is entitled to be considered for appointment on compassionate basis. Any lady, who was married to the male Government servant who dies, is his widow. The Rule does not refer to a widow who was the legally wedded wife of the deceased Government servant. Therefore, when the expression 'widow' is not qualified by the addition of words "legally wedded wife/spouse of the deceased male Government servant", such additional qualification to the expression 'widow' cannot be added. All that needs to be established is that the person seeking appointment on compassionate basis was a dependent of the deceased male Government servant, who died in harness and must be his widow. Therefore, the first respondent could not have rejected her application on the premise that she is the "second wife" of late Thippeswamy, when in fact it is established that she is his widow. 10. While holding so, reliance could be placed on guiding principles of interpretation of statute. One such principle is that the Court is not entitled to read words into a provision of an Act or Rule for the meaning is to be found within the four corners of the provision of the Act or Rules, as in the instant case. Therefore, while it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the Legislature. Therefore, while it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the Legislature. Thus, when the rules under consideration uses the expression "widow", the same must be interpreted so as to give effect to the intention of the Legislature and by not qualifying the expression "widow" by addition of words to mean, "legally wedded spouse of the deceased male Government servant". Thus, the golden rule of construction is that the words of a statute, or the Rule in question, in the instant case must be first understood in the natural, ordinary or popular sense. Phrases and sentences must be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. In other words, the golden rule is that the words of a statute prima facie be given an ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from "unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning". Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges "in light of their own views as to policy" unless it is shown to adopt a purposive interpretation of the statute. However, if the words used in the statute would result in injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective, the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage and no further. 11. In light of the above, it is observed that the expression "widow" in Rule 3 must be understood in its natural, ordinary or popular sense and not by qualification of the said expression to the effect that the widow must have been a legally wedded wife of the deceased male Government servant which would in fact be detrimental to the object and purpose of the Rules under consideration. By using the expression "widow", the rule making authority has deliberately not qualified the same because the intention is that if a deceased male Government servant has left behind two widows, either of them could claim for appointment on compassionate ground and not necessarily restricted to a widow who was the legally married wife of the deceased male servant. By using the expression "widow", the rule making authority has deliberately not qualified the same because the intention is that if a deceased male Government servant has left behind two widows, either of them could claim for appointment on compassionate ground and not necessarily restricted to a widow who was the legally married wife of the deceased male servant. Further, while interpreting the expression "the widow" under the Rules, her status vis-à-vis. the deceased male Government servant as to whether she was the legally wedded wife or not is extraneous and totally foreign, having regard to the object and purpose of the Rules under consideration. The Rules are meant for giving immediate succor to the dependents of the deceased male Government servant and hence, an enquiry as to whether the widow who has made a claim for appointment on compassionate ground was the legally wedded wife of the deceased male Government servant would be extraneous and irrelevant. 12. Therefore, while examining the case of petitioner herein, respondent/authority cannot hold an enquiry as to whether the deceased Government servant had obtained permission before marrying the petitioner herein in terms of Rule 28 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966. Further, in the instant case, there is no finding by any Court or authority that the petitioner herein was not the legally wedded wife of the deceased Thippeswamy. Moreover, petitioner and the fourth respondent have entered into a compromise in O.S. No. 313/2010, wherein the fourth respondent/defendant No. 1 herein has stated that she had no objection to the claim made by the petitioner herein for employment on compassionate ground. 13. Further, in the case of SMT. G. PARVATHI vs. THE CHIEF MANAGING DIRECTOR W.P. No. 27370/2011 (S-RES) disposed of on 10/02/2014, under similar circumstances, this Court directed that the dispute between the two widows of the deceased Government servant could be resolved in terms of the settlement arrived at between them. Also, in the case of SMT. LAKSHMIAND ANOTHER vs. SMT. S.A. ANUSUYA AND OTHERS MFA. No. 1260/1994 disposed of on 25/09/2001, a Division Bench of this Court had directed that the dispute between the parties could be resolved in terms of the compromise arrived at between them. The said Order has also been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 5320/2003 disposed of on 18/11/2009. 14. Therefore, the impugned endorsement at Annexure-F is quashed. The said Order has also been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 5320/2003 disposed of on 18/11/2009. 14. Therefore, the impugned endorsement at Annexure-F is quashed. The matter is remanded to the first respondent to reconsider the application made by the petitioner herein within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order in light of the aforesaid observations and in accordance with the Rules and in terms of the compromise extracted above. 15. Writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No costs.