JUDGMENT : 1. Present writ petition has been filed for quashing of judgment dated 08.04.2016, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dhanbad in M.J. Case No. 15 of 2015 and also for a direction upon respondent no. 2 to pay dues of domestic coal supply in terms of 12 baskets per month w.e.f. January 1997 to February 2014. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had filed an application under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as the 'Act') before Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dhanbad being M.J. Case No. 15 of 2015 stating the fact that he was a permanent employee of M/s B.C.C.L. Ltd. posted on the post of senior accountant in PB area office, area no. VII, Dhanbad and retired from service on 28.02.2014. He could not get his monthly quota of coal for domestic use in terms of 12 baskets per month since January 1997 to February 2014 as per the provisions of National Coal Wages Agreement. Thus, the petitioner is entitled for either free coal supply for domestic use to the extent of 2472 baskets equivalent to 137 tonnes and 6 baskets or payment of money in lieu thereof. It is further submitted that the learned Labour Court, Dhanbad vide order dated 08.04.2016 rejected the application of the petitioner filed under Section 33 C (2) of the Act which is put to challenge in the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the learned Labour Court committed serious error in rejecting the application of the petitioner filed under Section 33 C (2) of the Act, as the quota of coal was easily computable in terms of money and the said application of the petitioner was maintainable before the Labour Court. Since the petitioner did not avail the facility of monthly quota of coal to be used for domestic purpose since 1997, he is entitled for payment of money in lieu of 137 tonnes of coal which accrued in his favour w.e.f. January 1997 to February 2014. Under the said circumstance, the impugned judgment dated 08.04.2016 passed by the Labour Court, Dhanbad is erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. Under the said circumstance, the impugned judgment dated 08.04.2016 passed by the Labour Court, Dhanbad is erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2 submits that the learned Labour Court, Dhanbad in its judgment dated 08.04.2016 has considered the scope of Section 33 C (2) of the Act as well as the factual aspect of the claim made by the petitioner and thereafter reached a conclusion that the application filed by the petitioner under Section 33 C (2) of the Act is not maintainable in law or in facts. The impugned judgment being completely legal and justified does not warrant any interference by this Court. 5. Having heard learned counsels for the parties and on going through the relevant documents placed on record, it appears that the petitioner made a claim under Section 33 C (2) of the Act before the Labour Court, Dhanbad for payment of money in lieu of 137 tonnes of coal as per National Coal Wages Agreement on account of monthly quota of coal to be used for domestic purpose w.e.f. January 1997 to February 2014. On perusal of impugned judgment passed by the learned Labour Court, Dhanbad it transpires that the application filed by the petitioner under Section 33 C (2) of the Act was found not maintainable for the reason that there has been no pre existing right of the petitioner to claim such quantum of coal from the respondents, as the petitioner did not bring on record any circular making him entitled for the said specified quota of coal per month since January 1997. However, refering to letter no. 158(H) 14/19.8.1997 the learned Labour Court has observed that the said letter reveals that the officer concerned was directed to supply the domestic quota of coal to the petitioner, yet in usual practice, the employees used to go to the declared point to collect the coal as per their domestic requirement under the prescribed quota. However, if the petitioner could not collect the said quota of coal for his personal reasons, the management cannot be said to be responsible for that. The learned Labour Court also observed that two letters filed by the petitioner i.e. letter dated 29.06.2005 and 21.05.2010 were manipulated just to make out a case before the court. However, if the petitioner could not collect the said quota of coal for his personal reasons, the management cannot be said to be responsible for that. The learned Labour Court also observed that two letters filed by the petitioner i.e. letter dated 29.06.2005 and 21.05.2010 were manipulated just to make out a case before the court. It has also been observed by the learned Labour Court in the impugned order that nothing was brought on record by the petitioner to show as to how he was availing said facility from the date of joining till 1996. A copy of the coal issuance card revealed that it was issued in the month of January 2012, however, no entry of the said card was found filled up. On due consideration of the impugned judgment, I find that the learned Labour Court has thoroughly gone into the facts of the case as well as the scope of Section 33 C (2) of the Act and thereafter dismissed the application filed by the petitioner. The scope of Section 33 (C)2 of the Act has been dealt with in catena of judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, some of which are quoted hereunder:- 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Workmen, (1974) 4 SCC 696 has held as under:- "12. It is now well-settled that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. vs. Rameshwar it was reiterated that proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the position of an executing court. In Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. vs. Rameshwar it was reiterated that proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the position of an executing court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer." 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterating the same principle in the case of State Bank of India vs. Ram Chandra Dubey and Others, (2001) 1 SCC 73 at paragraph no. 8 has held as under:- "8. The principles enunciated in the decisions referred by either side can be summed up as follows: Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33-C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Further when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Further when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent......" 8. In the present case, the petitioner may have the right or benefit for the claim made through an application filed under Section 33 C (2) of the Act, but he failed to prove any pre-existing right or benefit for the same. The difference between right or benefit on the one hand and pre-existing right or benefit on the other hand has been explained in detail by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India vs. Ram Chandra Dubey and Others (supra). 9. Considering the facts and circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 8.04.2016, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court Dhanbad in M.J. Case No. 15 of 2015. The writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.