JUDGMENT : Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. By way of the present appeal, the appellants have laid challenge to the judgment, passed by the learned District Judge, Kinnaur, Civil Division at Rampur Bushahr, H.P., in Civil Appeal No. 08 of 2003, dated 23.08.2003, vide which the learned Lower Appellate Court has partly set aside the judgment and decree, dated 31.12.2002, passed by the then learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Anni, District Kullu, H.P. in Case No. 13-1 of 1998. 2. Material facts, necessary for adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal, are that respondents No. 1 & 2/plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as ‘plaintiffs’) maintained a suit against the appellants/defendants (hereinafter referred to as ‘defendants’), seeking declaration to the effect that gift deed executed by Shri Bhagwan Dass, in favour of defendants No. 2 & 3, through his Power of Attorney, on 18.11.1997 at Ani, is illegal, null and void and in-operative, qua the rights of plaintiffs and proforma defendants with consequential relief of injunction. The plaintiffs have alleged that Finu was the common ancestor and he was having two sons, namely, Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Salig Ram, who had expired and proforma defendants No. 4 to 6 are the sons of deceased Salig Ram. They formed Hindu Joint Family and coparcenery and the property inherited by Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Salig Ram is ancestral coparcenery qua the plaintiffs in the hands of Shri Bhagwan Dass. The plaintiffs have further alleged that Shri Bhagwan Dass had got executed gift deed of land, bearing Khassra Nos. 1221 and 1222, measuring 6-19 bighas, situated at Mauza Janja, Phati Kungash, Tehsil Anni, District Kullu, through his Power of Attorney, Shri Bansi Lal, on 18.11.1997, in favour of defendants No. 2 & 3, without any legal right, as the property in question is ancestral and coparcenery and Shri Bhagwan Dass had no right to gift away the suit property to defendants No. 2 & 3, without the consent of other coparceners, including the plaintiffs and as such, the gift deed is illegal, null and void and in-operative and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants. The plaintiffs have also pleaded that defendants No. 2 & 3, who are minors, have been sued through their father-natural guardian, Shri Bansi Lal, who has no interest adverse to them. The plaintiffs have also pleaded that defendants No. 2 & 3, who are minors, have been sued through their father-natural guardian, Shri Bansi Lal, who has no interest adverse to them. The plaintiffs have further alleged that they requested the defendants to get the gift deed revoked, but in vain. 3. Defendants resisted and contested the suit by raising preliminary objections of non-compliance under Order 32, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, suit not being properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction, estoppal, locus standi and non-joinder of necessary parties. On merits, the defendants have denied that Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Salig Ram formed a Joint Hindu Family and coparcenery property. They had pleaded that after coming into force the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the concept of ancestral coparcenery property has completely extinguished. The defendants have denied that Shri Bhagwan Dass had no legal right to execute gift deed. The defendants have alleged the gift deed to be legal, valid and operative. They have further alleged that the plaintiffs have been given their share in a family arrangements in the year, 1994 and since then, the parties are living separately The defendants have also alleged that that the suit is frivolous, vexatious and the same has been filed maliciously and with intention to pressurize and harass the defendants. 4. The plaintiffs filed replication, in which the averments contained in the plaint were re-affirmed and re-asserted and the allegations contained in the written statement were denied. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues on 17.08.1999:- “1. Whether gift deed dated 18.11.1997 is illegal, null and void, as alleged? ...OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of injunction, as prayed? …OPP 2-A Whether Shri Bhagwan Dass had allotted the land amongst his sons in the year, 1994 by way of family arrangement? …OPD 2-B Whether the parties to the suit are residing separately? ….OPD 3. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit? …OPD 4. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? …..OPD 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party? ….OPD 6. Relief.” 6. …OPD 2-B Whether the parties to the suit are residing separately? ….OPD 3. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit? …OPD 4. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? …..OPD 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party? ….OPD 6. Relief.” 6. The learned Trial Court, after deciding Issues No. 1 & 2 in favour of the plaintiffs and issues No. 2 to 5 against the defendants, decreed the suit, by declaring Gift Deed dated 18.11.1997, attested in favour of defendants No. 2 & 3, to be illegal, null and void and not binding on their rights. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment, passed by the learned Trial Court, the defendants maintained first appeal before the learned District Judge, Kinnaur, Civil Division at Rampur Bushahr, assailing the findings of the learned Trial Court below, being against the law and without appreciating the evidence and pleadings of the parties to its true perspective. The learned Lower Appellate Court affirmed the findings returned by the learned Trial Court on Issues No. 1, 2-A, 2-B, 3, 4 & 5 and set aside the findings returned on Issues No. 2 & 6, by holding that the plaintiffs-respondents are not entitled for the relief of injunction qua mutation because mutation proceedings can be challenged by way of alternative remedy under the H.P. Land Revenue Act, which is a Special Act and mutation proceedings do not confer any title or interest and are only meant for fiscal purpose. The learned Lower Appellate Court further held that declaratory judgments and decrees passed by the Civil Courts are binding upon the Revenue Court under the provisions of law. 8. Now, the appellants have maintained the present Regular Second Appeal, which was admitted for hearing on 17.10.2003, on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the learned trial Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit? 2. Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable?” 9. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has argued that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Court below is without appreciating the fact that the suit land was not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. He has further argued that the suit deserves to be dismissed, as the plaintiffs have not affixed the required court fee. He has further argued that the suit deserves to be dismissed, as the plaintiffs have not affixed the required court fee. He has also argued that the property was not a coparcenery property and the learned Court below has failed to take into consideration this aspect, also. He has further argued that the appeal is required to be allowed and the case is required to be remanded back to the learned Court below. He has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Renikuntla Rajamma (D) by LRs versus K.Sarwanamma, reported in AIR 2014, SC 2906. 10. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Bawa, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 1, 2 & 4 has argued that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Court below is just and reasoned and needs no interference. To support his case, he has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Ramchandra versus Balla Singh (deceased by LRs) and others, reported in AIR 1986 Allahabad 193 and the judgment passed by this Court in case titled as Surjit Singh versus Kaushalya Devi reported in 2000 (1) Shimla Law Cases, 357. 11. In rebuttal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has argued that as the gift was complete and with possession, it cannot be set aside and prayed that the appeal be allowed. 12. To appreciate the arguments of the parties, I have gone through the record in detail. 13. In order to prove its case, plaintiff No. 1-Shri Bholu Ram, appeared in the witness box as PW-2, who has deposed his grand father Shri Finu Ram has two sons, i.e. Bhagwan Dass and Salig Ram. Shri Bhagwan Dass, the father of the plaintiff, was having further three sons, i.e. plaintiffs No. 1 & 2 and defendant No. 7. Shri Salig Ram had also three sons and two daughters. The pedigree table is as under:- Finu Ram Bhagwan Dass Salig Ram Mani Devi (widow) Bholu (plaintiff No.1) Kewal Ram (plaintiff No. 2) Bansi Lal (defendant No. 7) Anarkali (daughter) Sita Ram (defendant No. 4) Lal Dass (defendant No. 5) Charan Dass Defendant No. 6) Bhupender (appellant No. 1) Parveen (appellant No. 2) PW-1 has also produced copy of mutation No. 985, Ext. PW- 1/A on record. PW- 1/A on record. He has further deposed that the suit land is ancestral one. Shri Bhagwan Das had executed a power of attorney in favour of defendant No. 7-Shri Bansi Lal. Defendant No. 7, on the basis of that power of attorney, gifted the land to his sons to the tune of three bighas nine biswas, by way of gift deed. He also stated that Shri Bhagwan Dass has no right to execute a gift deed in favour of the sons of defendant No. 7, i.e. defendants No. 2 & 3. He further deposed that Shri Finu Ram, his grand father, had 20 bighas of land, which was divided into two shares of 20 bighas each, between Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Salig Ram. He produced on record Gift Deed, Ext. PW-2/A, copy of Mutation, Ext. PW-2/B, its Hindi translation, Ext. PW-3/A and Jamabandi. 14. Defendants examined defendant No. 7-Shri Bansi Lal as DW-1, who deposed that his father-Bansi Lal had executed a power of attorney in his favour for sale, mortgage and gift, of half share of land of Khasra Nos. 1221 and 1222. The power of attorney was executed on 19.05.1997 and on 17.11.1997, he executed a sale deed in favour of defendants No. 2 & 3 on behalf of Shri Bhagwan Dass with respect to the suit land. He further deposed that Shri Gumat Ram accepted the gift on behalf of defendants No. 2 & 3. He also deposed that plaintiffs have acquired no right, title or interest over the suit land. He further deposed that Shri Bhagwan Dass has all right, title and interest of mortgage, sale, gift or will with regard to the suit land. He further deposed that as per the Hindu Succession Act, legal heirs have acquired equal rights in the land. He also deposed that on the death of Shri Bhagwan Dass, suit land was mutated in the name of plaintiff, his name and in the names of Anarkali and Mani Devi. He further deposed that similarly, the land of Shri Bansi Lal was mutated in the names of his sons and daughters, as per mutation of inheritance No. 717, dated 02.11.1965. Same is the case of Shri Shibu, Salig Ram, Kishan Dass and Nand Lal, whose land has been mutated in favour of their widow, sons and daughters in inheritance. He further deposed that similarly, the land of Shri Bansi Lal was mutated in the names of his sons and daughters, as per mutation of inheritance No. 717, dated 02.11.1965. Same is the case of Shri Shibu, Salig Ram, Kishan Dass and Nand Lal, whose land has been mutated in favour of their widow, sons and daughters in inheritance. As per him, the value of the suit land is more than rupees 2.00 lacs and the plaintiffs have not affixed the proper court fee. 15. The next witness, examined by the defendants, is DW-2 (Shri Dewki Nand), who deposed that Shri Bhagwan Dass and Salig Ram were real brothers and land stood partitioned between them. Shri Bhagwan Dass had also partitioned the land amongst his three sons. He also deposed that as per the custom, sons have got no right in the ancestral land till the father is alive. He has deposed that father has got every right, title or interest to alienate the suit land. 16. DW-3 (Shri Jai Chand) has tried to prove on record Gift Deed dated 18.11.1997 and stated that power of attorney and gift deed are correct as per the record maintained by the Sub Registrar, Anni. 17. Ext. PW-2/A is the Gift Deed, which was executed by defendant No. 7-Shri Bansi Lal in favour of defendants No. 2 & 3, i.e. Shri Bhupinder Singh and Parveen Singh, respectively. Ext. PW-2/B is the copy of mutation, which is written in Urdu. The translated copy of same has been proved in Hindi, after getting it translated in Hindi from PW-1. The true translation of copy of mutation (Ext. PW-2/B) is Ext. PW-1/A. This copy of mutation bearing No. 965 is, in fact, inheritance with mutation attested in favour of Shri Bhagwan Dass and Salig Ram on the demise of Shri Finu Ram. 18. Similarly, ancestral property is a property inherited from paternal ancestral. All property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is ancestral property. The essential feature of ancestral property according to Mitakshara Law of School is that the sons, grand-sons and great grand-sons of the person, who inherits it, acquire an interest in it by birth. Their right attaches to it at the moment of their birth. 19. The suit land is ancestral and coparcenery. The essential feature of ancestral property according to Mitakshara Law of School is that the sons, grand-sons and great grand-sons of the person, who inherits it, acquire an interest in it by birth. Their right attaches to it at the moment of their birth. 19. The suit land is ancestral and coparcenery. DW- 1 (Bansi Lal) admitted that the suit land was inherited by his father, Shri Bhagwan Dass from his grand father, Shri Finu Ram and his grand father had inherited the same from his great grand-father. He again admitted that mutation of inheritance was attested in his favour and the plaintiffs. He also admitted that he has no knowledge with regard to the partition effected between his father Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Salig Ram. He also admitted that there was no active partition effected by meets and bounds between him and the plaintiffs. He further deposed that he did not ask the plaintiffs, while gifting the suit land in favour of his sons. He further admitted that the suit land is joint one and ancestral property. The case of the plaintiffs again stands proved from the mouth of DW-2, who stated that the suit land is ancestral one at the hands of Shri Bhagwan Dass. He further stated that there was no partition effected between the plaintiff and defendants. The defendants themselves have admitted the suit land to be un-partitioned ancestral one. Shri Bansi Lal- (DW-1) has admitted that the suit land was inherited by his father, Shri Bhagwan Dass from Shri Finu Ram, who further inherited the same from his great grand-father. The defendant has thereby proved it on the record that a coparcenery is created between the parties. The plaintiffs have also come with the plea that defendants have got no right, title and interest to gift the suit land in favour of defendants No. 2 & 3, as the suit land is joint un-partitioned and ancestral one. 20. Interestingly, defendant No. 7 has gifted the suit land to defendants No. 2 & 3 on behalf of Shri Bhagwan Dass. In fact, defendant No. 7 is the father of defendants No. 2 & 3. Defendants No. 2 & 3 were minors. The intention of defendant No. 7 becomes clear when he, in order to grab more portion of property, has executed a gift deed in favour his own sons. In fact, defendant No. 7 is the father of defendants No. 2 & 3. Defendants No. 2 & 3 were minors. The intention of defendant No. 7 becomes clear when he, in order to grab more portion of property, has executed a gift deed in favour his own sons. It is shown in the gift deed that one Shri Gumat Ram appeared before the Sub Registrar on behalf of minors-defendants No. 2 & 3. In fact, Shri Gumat Ram has not been examined by the defendants. There is not even a single averment in the gift deed that the donees-defendants No. 2 & 3 through this Gumat Ram, have accepted the gift or they have received the delivery of possession of the suit land on the spot. There is no iota of evidence either ocular or documentary, pleaded or proved, that for such pious purpose, Shri Bhagwan Dass has gifted the suit land to defendants No. 2 & 3. As per the Hindu Law, ‘pious purposes’ are ‘Apatkal’, i.e. the time of distress, ‘Kutumbarthe’, i.e. for the sake of family and ‘Dharmbarthe’, i.e. for the performance of indispensable duties. There is no pious purposes either pleaded or proved in the present case. However, a father has a right to make a gift out of natural love and affection. There is no averment to the effect that Shri Bhagwan Dass had executed the gift deed in favour of defendants No. 2 & 3, out of natural love and affection. In fact, the gift deed was executed on behalf of Shri Bhagwan Dass by way of general power of attorney procured by the father of donee, Shri Bansi Lal in favour of defendants No. 2 & 3. Defendant No. 7 cannot make such a gift of immovable property in favour of his own sons, as land was ancestral land and the same is otherwise also suspicious. 21. Examination-in-chief of DW-2-Shri Devki Nand was also recorded by way of affidavit. There is recital in the affidavit that deceased Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Salig Ram were brothers, but family partition took place inter-se the parties and they used to reside separately. There is also recital in the affidavit that deceased Shri Bhagwan Dass had allotted the land to his three sons separately during his life time, about 8-9 years ago. There is recital in the affidavit that deceased Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Salig Ram were brothers, but family partition took place inter-se the parties and they used to reside separately. There is also recital in the affidavit that deceased Shri Bhagwan Dass had allotted the land to his three sons separately during his life time, about 8-9 years ago. There is further recital in the affidavit that sons inherit the property after the death of father, as per the custom of the area and father can alienate the property in any way. In cross-examination, he has stated that Shri Finu Ram was the father of Shri Salig Ram and Shri Bhagwan Dass and he has admitted that Shri Finu Ram had inherited the property from his father. He has also admitted that the suit land is joint inter-se the parties and has not been partitioned. 22. Now, coming to the question-whether the court fee, as required under the Himachal Pradesh Court Fee Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Court Fee Act’), is affixed or not, Section 7(c) and proviso thereto provide as under: “Computation of fees payable in certain suits-The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:- ……………………………………………………………… (C) For a declaratory decree and consequential relief; to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed; ……………………………………………………… Provided further that in suit coming under sub clause (c) in case where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided by paragraph (v) of this section.” 23. The Second Schedule of the Court Fee Act provides as under:- “The Second Schedule (See Section 3) (Fixed Fees) ………………………………… 13. Plaint or memorandum of appeal in each of the following suits:- (i)……………………………… (ii)……………………………. (iii) To obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed;” Nineteen rupees fifty paise. 24. In the present case, the land is assessed to the land revenue. It is not proved on record that any structure is existing on the land and the value of the land has been increased. The well settled principle of law is that the land is assessed to the land revenue and the court fee is to be affixed as per the Court Fee Act. It is not proved on record that any structure is existing on the land and the value of the land has been increased. The well settled principle of law is that the land is assessed to the land revenue and the court fee is to be affixed as per the Court Fee Act. The Court Fee Act provides that court fee for suit for declaration is Rs. 19/-. I find no force in the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellants/defendants that the court fee is not properly affixed, as it is not proved that the land is having another structure on it, which has increased its value. Similarly, the statement of defendant No.7 that the value of the suit land is more than Rs. 2.00 lacs, is without any basis and the court fee, as required under the Court Fee Act, has been affixed, and the land is assessed to land revenue. 25. Now, coming to the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants/defendants that the suit land is a coparcenery property, there is nothing on record to suggest that the land was divided and further there is nothing to come to the conclusion that there was any legal necessity for the karta to transfer the property in the name of minors the sons of Bansi Lal, i.e. the grand sons of the transferee, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. It has also come on record that general power of attorney was also not given to Bansi Lal for the purpose of transferring the land in favour of his sons by Bhagwan Dass. So, I find no infirmity with the findings recorded by the learned Court below that the gift deed is not sustainable. 26. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants/defendants that gift deed was complete, as the delivery of possession was not mandatory in case of immovable property, is considered in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Renikuntla Rajamma (D) by LRs versus K.Sarwanamma, reported in AIR 2014, SC 2906. It is apt to reproduce para- 15 of the said judgment herein:- “The matter can be viewed from yet another angle. Section 123 of the T.P. Act is in two parts. The first part deals with gifts of immovable property while the second part deals with gifts of movable property. It is apt to reproduce para- 15 of the said judgment herein:- “The matter can be viewed from yet another angle. Section 123 of the T.P. Act is in two parts. The first part deals with gifts of immovable property while the second part deals with gifts of movable property. Insofar as the gifts of immovable property are concerned, Section 123 makes transfer by a registered instrument mandatory. This is evident from the use of work “transfer must be effected” used by Parliament in so far as immovable property is concerned. In contradiction to that requirement the second part of Section 123 dealing with gifts of movable property, simply requires that gift or movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery”. The difference in the two provisions lies in the fact that in so far as the transfer of movable property by way of gift is concerned the same can be effected by a registered instrument or by delivery. Such transfer in the case of immovable property no doubt requires a registered instrument but the provision does not make delivery of possession of the immovable property of the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be valid and effective. If the intention of the legislature was to make delivery of possession of the property gifted also as a condition precedent for a valid gift, the provision could and indeed would have specifically said so. Absence of any such requirement can only lead us to the conclusion that delivery of possession is not an essential prerequisite for the making of a valid gift in the case of immovable property.” 27. However, in the present case, though, had the land been not coparcenery and ancestral one, the delivery of possession could have been presumed in favour of the donees, if it was a written gift deed, but the gift deed otherwise, is not valid, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case, supra, as it is against the legal necessity and from the coparcenery property, on which the donees were having no absolute right. 28. 28. On the other hand, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Ramchandra versus Balla Singh (deceased by LRs) and others, reported in AIR 1986 Allahabad 193, in para 20 has held as under:- “Thus the plaintiffs were entitled to the cancellation of the sale deed and to recover the possession. This is again a concurrent finding of fact which cannot be disturbed by me in this appeal. Mere fact that defendant No. 1 was occupying a portion in ancenstral house could not make him ostensible owner of such property so as to attract the provisions of S. 41 of Transfer of Property Act.” 29. The aforesaid judgment is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the gift deed of the ancestral property is without any basis, as held by the learned Court below. 30. This Court in the judgment rendered in case titled as Surjit Singh versus Kaushalya Devi, reported in 2000 (1) Shimla Law Cases, 357, has laid down the same principle, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramchandra’s case, supra. It is appropriate to reproduce paras 4 & 5 of the said judgment herein:- “4. It is also by now settled that the property in which a person acquires interest by birth is called a coparcenery and merely because the right to it is not accepted by the existence of an owner and that the right to it arise from the mere fact of the birth in the family and they become coparceners with the parental ancestral property immediately on their birth. This being the indisputable position of the Hindu Law governing the members governed by Mitakshra law, there can be no hesitation to hold that the grand-son who has acquired on his own, a share in the coparcenery property though no doubt through his father, but which is distinct and separate from the rights and interest of his father, has an indefeasible right to challenge an alienation by any other coparcener or by even a manager provided he could succeed in challenging the sale on the permissible legal grounds. Whatever may be the fate of an individual claim or challenge to an alienation in a particular case, depending upon the merits of the case, the right of a coparcener to challenge cannot be defeated merely because his father, a nearest reversioner, is also alive. Whatever may be the fate of an individual claim or challenge to an alienation in a particular case, depending upon the merits of the case, the right of a coparcener to challenge cannot be defeated merely because his father, a nearest reversioner, is also alive. As indicated earlier, the rights of the father as well as the son are distinct and separate though held in common in the undivided coparcenery property under the Mitakshra Law. Consequently, the conclusion of the learned first appellate Judge is non-suiting the plaintiff on the ground that he has no locus standi to file a suit in the teeth or the existence of his father cannot be sustained in law. The same is hereby set aside. 5. On this ground alone, the plaintiff cannot be granted any relief unless he is able to succeed in proving that the sale was not for a necessity legally binding on the family. On this question, it cannot be said to be a mere question of law only. The courts below have concurrently recorded a finding against the plaintiff holding that the alienation in question was proved to have been for necessities, legally binding on the family and all the coparceners including the plaintiff. Though the learned Counsel for the appellant sought to derive inspiration from the observation that there is no cogent evidence on record, it is not with reference to the entirety of the consideration but the observation has to be understood as referable to only in respect of one item of the expenses for which the sale was made, namely, house-hold expenses, but at the same time the other reasons or causes justifying alienation were found acceptable even to the lower appellate Court. Turning to this aspect of the matter into the judgment of the learned trial Judge, considered under issue No. 7, in my view, the learned trial Judge has elaborately and extensively considered the same in paras 20 and 21 meticulously by referring to the recital in the document as also the oral evidence in the justification and support and proof thereof and arrived at a categorical finding that the sale was for binding necessity and, therefore, the same cannot be assailed and was binding upon the interest of the plaintiff also. This finding of fact concurrently recorded by both the courts below for just and sufficient reasons supported by proper and relevant evidence cannot be successfully challenged in this appeal within the limited scope of the second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nothing could be made against the correctness and legality or propriety of the finding also in this court, even for undertaking any such consideration in this second appeal.” 31. This judgment is also fully applicable to the facts of the present case and so this Court holds that the gift deed of the ancestral property is without any basis for the reasons as discussed hereinabove, i.e. there is nothing on record to suggest that the land was divided and further there was no legal necessity for the karta to transfer the property in the name of minors-the sons of Bansi Lal, i.e. the grand sons of the transferee, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. 32. The judgment passed by the Court below is not required to be interfered with and the substantial question of No. 1 is answered, holding that the learned Court below has got the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit, as the land was assessed to the land revenue and further, it was within the jurisdiction of the learned Court below and no material has come on record, even otherwise, to show that the learned Court below was having no jurisdiction. 33. Substantial question of law No. 2 is answered holding that the suit, as framed, was maintainable, as one of the coparceners has challenged the gift deed without any necessity made by the son of the doner on the basis of general power of attorney, obtained from his father, in favour of his sons and the property was coparcenery and ancestral and so, the substantial question of law No. 2 is answered against the appellants. 34. The net result of the above discussion is that the appeal, which sans merit, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. 35. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.