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2017 DIGILAW 1235 (GAU)

Pranita Das W/o- Subal Rabha, R/o- Vill- Haluapara Lakhipur v. State of Assam

2017-09-05

HITESH KUMAR SARMA

body2017
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. By this common judgment, I propose to dispose of the Crl Petition No. 989/2016 and Crl Petition No. 1028/2016 preferred under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC). The petitioners in Crl Petition No. 989/2016 are Smt. Pranita Das, Sri Anisur Rahman, Sri Abdur Rofique, Sri Bodiot Zaman, Sri Alok Chandra Rabha whereas in Crl Petition No. 1028/2016 the petitioners are Smt. Pranita Das and Sri Anisur Rahman. The Crl Petition No. 989/2016 has been preferred by the petitioners for quashing of investigation pertaining to Lakhipur P.S Case No. 413/16 under Section 418/420/423/406 IPC and The Crl Petition No. 989/2016 have been preferred by the petitioners for quashing of Lakhipur P.S Case No. 493/16 under Section 418/420/423/406 IPC. 2. Both the petitions are taken up together for hearing and disposal by a common judgment as agreed to by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties as the matter in both the petitions being closely connected. 3. The facts leading to the Crl Petition No. 989/2016 are as follows; 4. An FIR was lodged by one Sri Nur Islam alleging that a tender notice was issued by the Lakhipur Town Committee on 2.2.2016 for settlement of Lakhipur Weekly Market, Goat market, Cow market and Daily Market. As against the tender notice 23 tenders were received for Lakhipur Daily Market, 31 tenders for Lakhipur weekly market, 24 tenders for Goat Market and 28 tenders for cow market. A comparative statement of the tenders was prepared whereafter one Monindra Chandra Paul was selected for Lakhipur Daily market for an amount of Rs. 3,31,990,/- Ananda Prakash Prasad for Weekly Market for an amount of Rs. 12,12,912,/- Anowar Hussain for Goat Market for an amount of Rs.3,91,999/- and Sri Mostak Hussain for Cow Market for an amount of Rs. 72,26,000/-. These selected persons deposited 50% of their tendered amount and the markets were settled with them. Thereafter, the remaining tenderers applied for withdrawal of their bank drafts deposited at the time of tender. After about a month one of the selected tenderers, Sri Mustak Hussain withdrew his bid showing financial constraints and prayed for release of his 50% deposit which was released to him by flouting all norms. After the release of tender amount to Sri Mustak Hussain the Cow Market was settled with Sri Parimal Sen at Rs. After about a month one of the selected tenderers, Sri Mustak Hussain withdrew his bid showing financial constraints and prayed for release of his 50% deposit which was released to him by flouting all norms. After the release of tender amount to Sri Mustak Hussain the Cow Market was settled with Sri Parimal Sen at Rs. 19,99,999/- which is a much lesser amount compared to the other bids. Thus, the accused petitioners, as Office bearers of Lakhipur Town Committee, as alleged caused a revenue loss to the State to the tune of Rs. 65 lakhs. A case being Lakhipur P.S Case No. 413/16 was registered on the FIR, which is put to challenge in Crl. Petition No. 989/16 5. On the other hand, the allegations leading to Lakhipur P.S 493/16, put to challenge in Crl. Petition No. 1028/2016, are substantially the same except the fact that in this FIR the allegation is that all the selected bidders were allowed to take back 50% of their tender amounts by flouting the tender norms. 6. Heard Mr. Diganta Das, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in in Crl Petition No. 989/2016 and Crl Petition No. 1028/2016. Also heard Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 2 in Crl Petition No. 989/2016 and also in Crl Petition No. 1028/2016. Also heard Mr. N K Kalita, learned Addl Public Prosecutor for the State Respondent No. 1 in both the cases. 7. The common arguments of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, in both the cases, is that FIR should be quashed as the allegations are purely civil in nature and further investigation would be an abuse of process of Court. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in Crl. Petition No. 1028/2016, further argued that in law there cannot be a second FIR hence the second FIR vide Lakhipur P.S Case No. 493/16 deserves to be quashed. 8. Let me first deal with the aspect of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with respect to second FIR. 9. In the case of Anju Chaudhary vs State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 6 SCC 384 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. 9. In the case of Anju Chaudhary vs State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 6 SCC 384 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. Hence, it will be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. 10. Thus, in the light of law it needs to be seen whether the FIR dated 5.12.2016, vide Lakhipur P.S Case No. 493/16 can be termed as second FIR. 11. The allegations in the FIR dated 5.12.16, vide Lakhipur P.S Case No. 493/16 as lodged by one Sri Bidyut Chakravorty is that for the settlement of markets four persons namely, Manindra Chandra Paul, Anand Prakash Prasad, Anowar Hussain, Mustak Hussain were chosen for various markets. These persons deposited their 50% of the bid amount after their selection. Surprisingly, after one month from the date of selection of the above named persons they filed applications before the Executive Officer, Lakhipur Town Committee, that they wanted to withdraw their bids due to their financial constraints and as such they prayed for order releasing their tendered amounts. As per rules, the amounts could not have been released rather; should have been forfeited. But flouting all norms, the money was released. Thereafter, without issuing any fresh notice of tender, the markets were illegally settled with other persons at a much lesser amount ignoring various other higher tender bids. The petitioners, thus, misappropriated a sum of Rs 65 lakhs. 12. But flouting all norms, the money was released. Thereafter, without issuing any fresh notice of tender, the markets were illegally settled with other persons at a much lesser amount ignoring various other higher tender bids. The petitioners, thus, misappropriated a sum of Rs 65 lakhs. 12. It will be seen that the allegations in the second FIR and the allegations in the first FIR are substantially the same that once the tenders were accepted from amongst the highest bidders and then those bidders were allowed to take back their deposits in contravention of the Rules of tender, and thereafter without a fresh tender/notice bidder of much less amount were selected depriving the bidders with substantially higher amount. All these aspects are covered in the first FIR hence the second FIR cannot be maintained. 13. Hence in view of the law laid down in Anju Chaudhary (supra), the second FIR, if allowed to be investigated, would be an abuse of process of law. Hence, it is liable to be quashed. 14. The only question, which survives for consideration, now is whether the first FIR, in Lakhipur P.S Case No. 413/16, when read in its entirety, gives rise to any criminal dispute. 15. In Binod Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 10 SCC 663 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while summarizing the principles of quashing complaints and criminal proceedings laid down the following factors; (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. (ii) For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (iii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iv) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. (iv) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (v) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (vi) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 16. Again, in the case of Indian Oil Corporation vs NEPC (2006) 6 SCC 736 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. 1. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. 1. Again, in the case of In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down categories of cases by way of illustration wherein power under Section 482 CrPC could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Those circumstances are as follows; (i) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (ii) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (iii) Where the un-controverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (iv) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 17. Apparently, in the present case when the first set of selection of tenderers was made it was fair and in accordance with Rules. At least the informant has no grievance so far as the selection of the highest bidders are concerned. The dispute seems to have arisen when the selected bidders, having deposited 50% of their bid amount, withdrew the said amount and thereafter some other bidders were selected. The decision, so taken by the petitioners, may be contrary to the established norms but does it not necessarily lead to a criminal offence is the question. 18. In the present case even if the allegations are held to be true the statement of the informant in the FIR shows that accused petitioners have caused a revenue loss to the State to the tune of Rs. 65 lakhs because of the improper decisions taken by them. There is no allegation that accused petitioners had taken any money. It is obvious that FIR has been lodged only with a view to convert an otherwise dispute of civil nature into a criminal character. 19. It may be pointed out in this context that in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down. Emphasis supplied 20. Thus, if the petitioners have chosen a different set of tenderers after the withdrawal of the previously selected tenderers it may or may not be arbitrary decision, a question which does not arise in the present proceedings, but when a right is vested in an authority to select a tenderer, amongst the various options available, a criminal offence cannot be made on the ground that by exercising the option of selecting a tenderer revenue loss has been caused to the State. 21. This apart, the ingredients of cheating, which the petitioners are alleged to have committed, are entirely missing even when the allegations are taken on its face value. The allegations in the FIR are that petitioners caused loss to the State by their decision to select the bidders, when other bidders, offering higher bid value, were available. 22. Section 420 IPC deals with cheating. The essential ingredients of Section 420 IPC are: (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security, and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. 23. In the present case, looking at the allegations in the complaint on the face of it, no allegations are found attracting the ingredients as to cheating or the dishonest intention of the petitioners in retaining the bid money in order to have wrongful gain to them or causing wrongful loss to the informant. 24. 23. In the present case, looking at the allegations in the complaint on the face of it, no allegations are found attracting the ingredients as to cheating or the dishonest intention of the petitioners in retaining the bid money in order to have wrongful gain to them or causing wrongful loss to the informant. 24. As held in Binod Kumar (supra), criminal proceedings are not a shortcut for other remedies. Since no case of cheating is made out the FIR in Lakhipur P.S Case No. 413/2016 is liable to be quashed. 25. In view of the above discussions, and reasons recorded therein, Crl Petition No. 989/2016 and Crl Petition No. 1028/2016 are allowed. The FIRs in Lakhipur P.S Case No. 413/2016 and the FIR in Lakhipur P.S Case No. 493/2016 are hereby quashed. 26. Both the Criminal Petitions are disposed of accordingly.