JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. 1. The petitioner under Annexure P-1, was designated as Registrar (Administration)-cum- Principal Private Secretary to Hon'ble the Chief Justice, from, his hitherto employment in the Registry of this Court, as Additional Registrar-cum-Principal Private Secretary to Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The conditions of his designation, as Registrar (Administration)- cum-Principal Private Secretary, to Hon'ble the Chief Justice, read as under: “(i) This will not be treated as promotion, but only re-designation and he shall draw the pay and allowances admissible to an Additional Registrar only. (ii) He shall have no right to continue to enjoy the designation of Registrar (Administration) and will be re-designated as Additional Registrar as and when any District Judge or Additional District Judge is appointed as fourth Registrar on the establishment of the High Court Registry.” Readings whereof, unfold that the designation of the petitioner, as Registrar (Administration)-cum-Principal Private Secretary, to Hon'ble the Chief Justice, being (a) not reckonable as promotion rather it being merely a simplicitor re-designation and his being only entitled to draw the pay and allowances admissible, to an Additional Registrar; (b) his being entitled to enjoy the apposite re-designation, uptill, the appointment of any District and Sessions Judge/Addl. District & Sessions Judge, as fourth Registrar, on, the Registry of the High Court, whereafter, his being amenable for being re-designated, as Additional Registrar. However, the petitioner upto his seeking voluntary retirement on 21.08.2013, continued to serve in the Registry of this High Court, as Registrar (Administration)-cum-Principal Private Secretary to Hon'ble the Chief Justice. 2. The petitioner under Annexure P-10, made a representation to the Registrar General, of, this Court, wherein, he espoused that given his working as Registrar (Administration)- cum-Principal Private Secretary, to Hon'ble the Chief Justice also his performing duties akin to the ones performed by other Registrars drawn from the cadre of District & Sessions Judges, his being hence entitled to parity of pay vis-a-vis the ones drawn by the Registrars, drawn from the cadre of District and Sessions Judges. The aforesaid representation stood under Annexure P-11, hence rejected. The aforesaid representation stood under Annexure P-11, hence rejected. The reason as borne in the order rejecting the representation of the petitioner, in representation whereof, he espoused the aforesaid claim, is anvilled upon the factum of his (a) re-designation being conditional (b) besides his accepting all conditions borne in Annexure P-1, whereupon, he stood designated, as Registrar (Administration)-cum-Principal Private Secretary, to Hon'ble the Chief Justice and (c) Acceptance whereof being visible from his joining the duties of the re-designated aforesaid post (d), thereupon, his being estopped to agitate the aforesaid claim. 3. The petitioner would be entitled to stake a legitimate claim for his being entitled to parity of pay vis-a-vis the pay, drawn by other Registrars, drawn from the cadre of District & Sessions Judges/Addl. District & Sessions Judges, only upon, his initially satiating the conscience of this Court, of, his performing duties alike the ones performed by the other Registrars, belonging to the cadre of District and Sessions Judges. With Annnexure P-2, revealing, of, (i) the petitioner while serving as Registrar (Administration)-cum- Principal Private Secretary to Hon'ble the Chief Justice, his apparently performing functions akin to the ones performed by the other Registrars working in the Registry of the High Court, Registrars whereof stood drawn from the cadre of District & Sessions Judges, therefrom, (ii) the ensuing conclusion is of the petitioner evidently proving his performing functions bearing a close affinity vis-a-vis the duties and functions performed by the other Registrars, as, stood, drawn from the cadre of District and Sessions Judges. Fortification vis-a-vis the aforesaid conclusion is garnered, from, the hereinafter extracted relevant portion of Annexure-P-13, Annexure whereof, comprises information supplied to the petitioner under the Right to Information Act, the relevant portion whereof occurring at page 53 of the paper book reads as under: “Vide notification dated 26th April, 2010 (Flag 'A') Hon'ble the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 229 of the Constitution of India and all other enabling powers in this behalf was pleased to amend Schedule 'A' as under:- “Schedule-A OFFICERS DRAWN FROM THE H.P. JUDICIAL SERVICE RULES IN THE CADRE OF DISTRICT JUDGE/ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE S. No. Name of the post No. of posts Pay Scale 1. Registrar General 1 Time Scale/Selection Grade/Super Time Scale in own cadre + Secretariat Allowance 2. Registrar (Vigilance) 1 -do- 3. Registrar (Rules) 1 -do- 4. DISTRICT JUDGE S. No. Name of the post No. of posts Pay Scale 1. Registrar General 1 Time Scale/Selection Grade/Super Time Scale in own cadre + Secretariat Allowance 2. Registrar (Vigilance) 1 -do- 3. Registrar (Rules) 1 -do- 4. Registrar (Inspection) 1 -do- Note: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the HP High Court Officers and the Members of the Staff (Recruitment, Conditions of Service, Conduct and Appeal) Rules, 2003 and the Schedule, it will be open to Hon'ble the Chief Justice to appoint one Registrar from amongst the Additional Registrars, to be the Registrar In-charge of the Administration of the High Court.” (i) the aforesaid “note” occurring in Schedule-A, where-within Hon'ble the Chief Justice is enabled to, other then out of four Registrars borrowed from the cadre of District & Sessions Judges/Addl. District & Sessions Judges, also hence appoint, one Registrar from amongst the Additional Registrars, (ii) wherefrom the apt sequitur, is, of the appointment of the petitioner in the establishment of the High Court, as Registrar (Administration)-cum- Principal Private Secretary, being within, the domain of the apposite “Note” (iii) hence, with his manning the aforesaid post, otherwise to be manned by judicial officers, drawn from the cadre of District & Sessions Judges/Addl. District & Sessions Judges, thereupon, a right being e-gendered in the petitioner to validly claim, of his performing duties akin to the Registrars, belonging tot he cadre of District & Sessions Judges. The rejection, of, the representation of the petitioner is anvilled upon the afore-extracted apposite conditions, being accepted by him, acceptance whereof, is comprised in his subsequent to his appointment made under Annexure P-1, (i) his proceeding to join the duties appertaining to the post of Registrar (Administration)-cum- Principal Private Secretary, to Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Moreover, the rejection of the representation of the petitioner, is hinged upon the factum of his thereupon being estopped to claim the benefit of parities of pay vis-a-vis the pay drawn by Registrars belonging to the cadre of District and Sessions Judges, parity whereof, is harboured upon his performing duties alike the ones performed in the Registry, of this Court by Registrars drawn from the cadre of District & Sessions Judges/Addl. District & Sessions Judges. In aftermath, validities thereof are also enjoined to be firmly determined. 4. District & Sessions Judges. In aftermath, validities thereof are also enjoined to be firmly determined. 4. The test, for determining the contentious issue with respect to the relevant conditions embodied in Annexure P-1, of, the petitioner, upon, his joining the post of Registrar (Administration)-cum-Principal Private Secretary to Hon'ble the Chief Justice, his thereupon accepting them, besides qua his being concomitantly estopped to assail the validities thereof, hence being unreasonable, given their imposition upon him, being engendered by the superior bargaining powers, of the employer, is squarely embedded, in a authoritative judicial pronouncement, rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another, (1986) 3 SCC 156 , relevant paragraphs whereof read as under: “88. As seen above, apart from judicial decisions, the United States and the United Kingdom have statutorily recognized, at 1 least in certain areas of the law of contracts, that there can be unreasonableness (or lack of fairness, if one prefers that phrase) in a contract or a clause in a contract where there is inequality of bargaining power between the parties although arising out of circumstances not within their control or as a result of situations not of their creation. Other legal systems also permit judicial review of a contractual transaction entered into in similar circumstances. For example (i) section 138(2) of the German Civil Code provides that a, transaction is void "when a person" exploits "the distressed situation, inexperience, lack of judgmental ability, or grave weakness of will of another to obtain the grant or promise of pecuniary advantages.......which are obviously disproportionate to the performance given in return." The position according to the French law is very much the same. 89. Should they still continue to cling to outmoded concepts and outworn ideologies? Should we not adjust our thinking caps to match the fashion of the day? Should all jurisprudential development pass us by, leaving us floundering in the sloughs of nineteenth-century theories? Should the strong be permitted to push the weak to the wall? Should they be allowed to ride roughshod over the weak? Should the courts sit back and watch supinely while the strong trample under foot the rights of the weak? We have a Constitution for our country. Should the strong be permitted to push the weak to the wall? Should they be allowed to ride roughshod over the weak? Should the courts sit back and watch supinely while the strong trample under foot the rights of the weak? We have a Constitution for our country. Our judges are bound by their oath to "uphold the Constitution and the laws." The Constitution was enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country social and economic justice. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part of the case is in consonance with right and reason, intended to secure social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of the great equality clause in Article 14. This principle is that the courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No court can visualize the different situations which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. In today's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infra-structural organizations and with the State through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances.” 5. Also the aforesaid view is firmly reiterated in a decision recorded by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Bhupendera Nath Hazarika and Another vs. State of Assam and Others, (2013) 2 SCC 516 , relevant paragraphs whereof read as under:- “61. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to reiterate the oft- stated principle that the State is a model employer and it is required to act fairly giving due regard and respect to the rules framed by it. But in the present case, the State has atrophied the rules. Hence, the need for hammering the concept. 62. Almost a quarter century back, this Court in Balram Gupta vs. Union of India, 1987 Supp. SCC 288 had observed thus (SCC p.236, para 13) “13......As a model employer the Government must conduct itself with high probity and candour with its employees.” In State of Haryana vs. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 , the Court had clearly stated: (SCC p.134, para 21) “21.....The main concern of the court in such matters is to ensure the rule of law and to see that the Executive acts fairly and gives a fair deal to its employees consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16.” 63. In State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 (SCC P.18, para 6) the Constitution Bench, while discussing the role of state in recruitment procedure, stated that if rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accordance with the rules, for the State is meant to be a model employer. 64. 64. In Mehar Chand Polytechnic vs. Anu Lamba, (2006) 7 SCC 161 (SCC p.166, para 16) the Court observed that public employment is a facet of right to equality envisaged under Article 16 of the Constitution of India and that the recruitment rules are framed with a view to give equal opportunity to all the citizens of India entitled for being considered for recruitment in the vacant posts. 65. We have stated the role of the State as a model employer with the fond hope that in future a deliberate disregard is not taken recourse to and deviancy of such magnitude is not adopted to frustrate the claims of the employees. It should always be borne in mind that legitimate aspirations of the employees are not guillotined and a situation is not created where hopes end in despair. Hope for everyone is gloriously precious and a model employer should not convert it to be deceitful and treacherous by playing a game of chess with their seniority. A sense of calm sensibility and concerned sincerity should be reflected in every step. An atmosphere of trust has to prevail and when the employees are absolutely sure that their trust shall not be betrayed and they shall be treated with dignified fairness then only the concept of good governance can be concretized. We say no more.” 6. A close reading thereof, unfolds, of the State being enjoined to emulate the role of a model employer, un-bereft of, despite its holding a superior bargaining power vis-a-vis the employee, its rather proceeding, to, through executive fiats ingrained with pervasive exploitative tendencies, impose unfettered carte blanche conditions upon him, fiats whereof are erosive of the trite validatory rubric of good conscience and equity. The State as a model employer would befittingly, be construable to cast itself in the role of an enviable model employer, (i) upon its refraining, from, given its holding a paramount bargaining power, impose upon its employee, exacting conditions of service, conditions whereof openly bespeak of theirs being unconscionable and arbitrary, (ii) elements whereof ingraining, the contract of employment, would surge forth, upon the employer evidently snatching all valid rights of the employees, predominantly appertaining vis-a-vis his legitimate entitlements qua the emoluments/salary accruable vis-avis the posts, whereon, they/he perform duties. Upon application of the aforesaid tests vis-a-vis the conditions aforestated, scribed, below Annexure P-1, hence render (iii) open a conclusion no other than the one, of, thereupon the respondent through its empowered superior bargaining power vis-a-vis the petitioner also by sheer executive fiat, its hence, settling upon him exacting conditions, whereby, he stood deprived of the natural incidents of salary and of the benefits vis-a-vis the apposite post, whereon, he rendered services in the establishment of the High Court. In aftermath, in the respondent imposing the apposite ill conditions, upon the petitioner, render it to be construable, to its hence not casting itself in the pristine besides enviable role of a model employer. The apt sequitur thereof, is, dehors the petitioner subsequent, to, issuance of Annexure P-1, proceeding to join the duties of the post referred therein, his acceptance, not, being construable to beget any inference (a) of his waiving his rights, to receive pay/emoluments, incidental to the post whereon he rendered employment in the establishment of the High Court, nor the aforesaid condition, obviously operating as an embargo, nor forestalling him to claim the benefits of the emoluments/salary, appertaining to the post whereon, he stood appointed under Annexure P-1. 7. Be that as it may, even if, this Court, upon anvil of the extracted relevant expostulation of law, laid, by the Hon'ble Apex Court, has concluded of the aforesaid conditions, scribed, in Annexure P-1, not operating, as an estoppel against him nor upon his accepting them, his being construable to waive, his legitimate rights vis-a-vis all valid claims vis-a-vis pay/salary admissible qua the apposite post. (i) It is also incumbent, for, firming up the aforesaid conclusion, to allude to the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 152 , (1982) 1 SCC 618 , (1988) 3 SCC 354 , (1986) 1 SCC 637 , (1991) 1 SCC 619 , (1988)1 SCC 122 , (2014) 1 SCC 150 and (2014) 13 SCC 588 , wherein it stands expostulated that upon an employee evidently rendering duties, against a post, his being entitled, to pay, appertaining thereto also his being entitled to draw pay, at par, with other co-employees, who render alike function vis-a-vis him. Since, this Court has made the aforesaid conclusion, of, the petitioner performing duties alike the ones performed by other Registrars in the Registry of this Court, who stand drawn, from the cadre of District and Sessions Judge, hence, with his evidently rendering duties alike them, he is obviously entitled to parity of pay scales vis-a-vis them, (i) since the time of his manning the office as Registrar (Administration)-cum-Principal Private Secretary i.e. from 30.11.2010 till his standing voluntarily retired, i.e. on 21.08.2013, (ii) reason being, of, all the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, foisting in the petitioner a valid right to stake parity of pay with all co-employees, especially when he alike them also performed duties in the Registry of this Court, as, Registrar (Administration)-cum-Principal Private Secretary, to Hon'ble the Chief Justice. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is allowed and the order rejecting the representation of the petitioner is set aside. Consequently, the respondent is directed to accord pay to the petitioner equal vis-a-vis other Registrars working in the establishment of the High Court, who stand drawn from the cadre of District & Sessions Judges/Addl. District and Sessions Judges, from 1.12.2010 to 20.8.2013 and his pension be fixed accordingly. The aforesaid exercise be completed within two months from today, failing which the petitioner shall entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum upon the aforesaid benefits from the date of the petition till realisation. All pending applications also stand disposed of.