JUDGMENT : 1. The 1st defendant in OS No.41/2004 of the Munsiff's Court, Kuthuparamba, against whom the suit was decreed in terms of the plaint, preferred AS No.105/2009 before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Thalassery. The lower appellate court also concurred with the findings entered by the trial court and dismissed the appeal with costs. It has to be noted that OS No.9/2000, which involves the question of title, was also jointly tried along with OS No.41/2004. 2. OS No.9/2000 filed by one Ramesh Babu, against one Majeed as the 1st defendant, K.E.N. Ahammed as the additional 2nd defendant, and one Mayan as the additional 3rd defendant, was dismissed by the trial court. Challenging the said dismissal, the said Ramesh Babu had preferred AS No.123/2009 before the lower appellate court. The 1st defendant in OS No.9/2000 also preferred AS No.124/2009 before the lower appellate court. All the appeals stand dismissed. Presently, the 1st defendant in OS No.41/2004 alone has come up in Second Appeal. 3. According to the plaintiff in OS No.41/2004, he had purchased the property and the plaint schedule building from one Majeed, who is the 1st defendant in OS No.9/2000, and the said Majeed had purchased the property from Ramesh Babu, who is the plaintiff in OS No.9/2000. It is the case of the plaintiff that the present appellant is the tenant in respect of the building. When the plaintiff in OS No.41/2004 wanted an order directing the present appellant/tenant to put him in possession of the scheduled building, he preferred RCP No.55/2000 before the Rent Control Court, Kuthuparamba, on the grounds under Sections 11(2)(b), 11 (3) and 11(4)(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. 4. The tenant resisted the RCP by contending that the plaintiff in OS No.41/2004, who was the petitioner in the RCP, has no title and therefore, he was not entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) or an order under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(1) of the Act. The appellant contended that the scheduled building belongs to Ramesh Babu was sold by Ramesh Babu to Mayan(DW1 in the case) and he attorned to the said Mayan. The appellant further contended that he is a tenant under Mayan(DW1) and not under the plaintiff in OS No.41/2004. The appellant contended that the scheduled building belongs to Ramesh Babu was sold by Ramesh Babu to Mayan(DW1 in the case) and he attorned to the said Mayan. The appellant further contended that he is a tenant under Mayan(DW1) and not under the plaintiff in OS No.41/2004. The Rent Control Court found that there is a bona fide denial of title by the tenant within the meaning of the second proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act and consequently, dismissed the RCP on that ground. Immediately thereafter, K.E.N. Ahammed, who is the plaintiff in OS No.41/2004, approached the civil court and preferred the suit for eviction, on the very same grounds mentioned in the RCP. 5. It has to be noted that the trial court has non-suited Ramesh Babu, who had approached the trial court with OS No.9/2000, seeking a declaration that the present 1st respondent has no title over the scheduled building and that he (Ramesh Babu) had transferred the building to DW1. The appeal preferred by Ramesh Babu as AS No.123/2009 and the appeal preferred by Mayan as AS No.124/2009 challenging the judgment and decree were dismissed by the lower appellate court. The appeal preferred by the present appellant as AS No.105/2009 as well as the appeal preferred by DW1 as AS No.119/2009 challenging the judgment and decree in OS No.41/2004 were also dismissed. It has to be noted that the said Ramesh Babu as well as DW1 has not chosen to prefer any Second Appeal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the 1st respondent on the question of admission. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the courts below have not considered that this is a case wherein there is forfeiture of lease within the meaning of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. He has forwarded an argument that the civil court may pass a decree for eviction under Section 11(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 within the meaning of its second proviso, 'notwithstanding that the court finds that such denial of title does not involve forfeiture of the lease'. He has forwarded an argument that the civil court may pass a decree for eviction under Section 11(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 within the meaning of its second proviso, 'notwithstanding that the court finds that such denial of title does not involve forfeiture of the lease'. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the said aspect has not been considered by both the courts below and when there is a forfeiture, the person claimed title ought to have gone to the original side by instituting a suit for title. The argument is that in such case, the said person cannot directly sue for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, within the meaning of the second proviso to Section 11(1). 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the 1st respondent has argued that the status of the appellant can only be that of a tenant under the present 1st respondent when Ramesh Babu, who had sought for reliefs against title of the 1st respondent, had lost the legal battle. It is true that Ramesh Babu had challenged the sale in favour of Majeed, thereby challenging the validity of the sale made by Majeed in favour of the 1st respondent. According to Ramesh Babu, he had sold the property to Mayan(DW1). It has to be noted that the appeals preferred by Ramesh Babu as well as Mayan have been dismissed. They have not so far chosen to challenge the judgments and decrees against them in Second Appeal and therefore, at present, the finding against them have become final. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that he is not aware of the judgment and decree in OS No.9/2000 since he was not made a party to the said suit. That suit was filed by Ramesh Babu against Majeed as the sole defendant. Subsequently, the present 1st respondent and DW1 were impleaded in the suit as additional defendants 2 and 3. When that suit involves the question of title in respect of the scheduled building and with regard to the validity of the sale deed allegedly executed by Ramesh Babu in favour of Majeed, it is idle on the part of the learned counsel for the appellant to contend that the appellant was not impleaded in the said suit. When that suit involves the question of title in respect of the scheduled building and with regard to the validity of the sale deed allegedly executed by Ramesh Babu in favour of Majeed, it is idle on the part of the learned counsel for the appellant to contend that the appellant was not impleaded in the said suit. The appellant was not the necessary party to the said suit. Even according to the appellant, he was only a tenant in the building under Ramesh Babu and thereafter, when Ramesh Babu allegedly sold the building to DW1, he had attorned to DW1. Whatever it is, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, the status of the appellant is only as that of a defendant in respect of the building and nothing more. The appellant had never claimed title over the building. 10. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent has pointed out that Ext.B12 is the reply notice caused to be issued by the appellant to the learned counsel for the plaintiff in OS No.41/2004. Ext.B12 reply notice dated 16.07.2002 was issued against Ext.B10 notice dated 20.06.2002. Both the courts below have clearly pointed out that in Ext.B12, the present appellant has clearly admitted that he had surrendered vacant possession of the scheduled building to DW1. DW1 allegedly purchased the property through Ext.B2 dated 07.10.1999. The learned counsel for the appellant has answered that the appellant had attorned to DW1 and again entered into a lease arrangement in respect of the scheduled building with DW1 through Ext.B4 kychit. Ext.B4 is dated 10.12.1999. When the appellant has clearly admitted in Ext.B12 that he has surrendered possession of the scheduled building to DW1, in Ext.B12 reply notice dated 16.07.2002, it could not have been a surrender made in the year 1999. The trial court has clearly stated in Ext.B12 that, the appellant had admitted that he had surrendered vacant possession of the building to DW1 and he has not been conducting any business or trade at the premises of the scheduled building. In the light of the said admission, it seems that the present Second Appeal is of no use at all as far as the appellant is concerned. 11. In the light of the said admission, it seems that the present Second Appeal is of no use at all as far as the appellant is concerned. 11. Regarding the other argument forwarded by the learned counsel for the appellant, on going through the second proviso to Section 11(1), this Court is of the view that the non-obstante clause is used in the sense that "notwithstanding that the court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of lease", the legislature has taken the stand that it is immaterial whether there is a forfeiture of lease or not in that circumstance. In a case covered by Section 11(1), when there is a bona fide denial of title, the landlord, who claims eviction, can have recourse to the proceedings before a civil court for a decree on the very same ground contemplated under Section 11. In such a case, this Court is of the view that there is no application of the provisions contained under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. 12. It has to be noted that even in Section 111(g), what has been prescribed is a notice in writing to the lessee. Here, that question does not arise merely for the fact that the appellant does not claim any leasehold right under the 1st respondent. According to the appellant, he is not a tenant under the 1st respondent. Therefore, he cannot expect any further notice within the meaning of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. On considering all these aspects, this Court is of the view that the questions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant as substantial questions of law, do not emerge from this Second Appeal. This Second Appeal is devoid of merits and is only to be dismissed, and I do so. In the result, this Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. All pending interlocutory applications in this appeal are closed.