JUDGMENT : Abdul Rehim, J. In this appeal filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as the Act for short) challenge is against an order passed by the II Additional District Court, Kozhikode in O.P.No.433/2013, dated 4th September, 2015. The appellants herein are the petitioners and the respondent is the respondent before the court below. The appellants challenged an award passed by the sole Arbitrator, before the District Court. The District Court declined interference by observing that, the scope of judicial review in an arbitral award is very narrow and limited and it is substantially reduced by confining the grounds under Section 34 of the Act. Referring to a catena of decisions rendered by the hon'ble Supreme Court, it was held that the petitioners have not made out any case which is falling within the scope of Section 34 of the Act. It is challenging the said decision the present appeal is preferred. 2. One of the main contention raised is that, at the time when the arbitration proceedings commenced, the subject matter of the dispute, which is a claim for money raised by the respondent company, remained time barred. Therefore it is contended that the Arbitrator was not having jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. Hence the impugned award ought to have been set aside by the District Court based on the finding that the dispute in question was not capable of settlement through the arbitration, as it is a ground falling under Section 34(2)(b)(i) of the Act. 3. Heard; Adv. V.V. Surendran, learned counsel for the appellants and Adv. Rajesh Nambiar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent company. 4. Counsel for the appellants specifically pointed out that the case put forth by the respondent company before the Arbitrator, as enumerated in the petition filed under Section 7 of the Act was that, the cause of action for the arbitration arose on 25.03.2004, the date on which the agreement of loan was executed, on 31.12.2005, when the amount demanded was fallen due after adjusting the sale proceeds of the vehicle, on 19.05.2006 when the appellants issued the cheque, on 25.03.2007 which is the due date for payment of the last installment and further on 20.08.2010 the date on which the demand for the arbitration was sent to the appellants. Learned counsel had drawn our attention to Section 43 of the Act, in order to content that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations, as if it applies to proceedings in the court. It is pointed out that, the dispute in question pertains to liability of the appellants for payment of money based on a loan agreement executed between the parties. Therefore it is contended that, the period of limitation with respect to the cause of action had fallen due either on the date on which the borrower had lastly acknowledged the debt or on the due date stipulated for payment of the last installment of the loan amount. It is pointed out that, admittedly the last date which can be courted in this case is the due date for the payment of the last installment which was on 25.03.2007. Therefore, on applying provisions of the Limitation Act, the arbitration proceedings should have commenced within 3 years thereof. Since the Arbitration proceedings was commenced only through the notice issued on 20.08.2010, the proceedings remained time barred and the Arbitrator was lacking jurisdiction in adjudicating the dispute, is the contention. Therefore the appellants sought for setting aside the award. 5. Contentions of the appellants were refuted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent company by raising various grounds. Firstly it was contended that, the dispute arose only when the appellants had failed to make payment of the amount, which may be on any occasion after the due date fixed for payment of the last installment. In other words, the contention is that, commencement of the cause of action need to be construed as the date on which the dispute arose and not based on the due date fixed for payment of the last installment. But, it is clear from the claim petition filed by the respondent before the Arbitrator (copy of which was made available for our perusal) that respondent had no case that the dispute arose on any date after 25.03.2007. In this respect we need to look into the nature of the dispute. The dispute is with respect to liability of the appellants for payment of money allegedly due based on a loan agreement executed by the appellants with the respondent company. In this respect we need to look into the nature of the dispute. The dispute is with respect to liability of the appellants for payment of money allegedly due based on a loan agreement executed by the appellants with the respondent company. Therefore application of the provisions of the Limitation Act need to be analysed as if it is a claim for payment of money based on a loan agreement. In such case, there is no relevance for the date on which the borrower had refuted the liability. The claim will get time barred under the provisions of the Limitation Act on completion of 3 years from the date of commencement of the cause of action, which can only be either the date of last acknowledgement of the debt by the borrower or the due date stipulated for payment of the last installment. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the contention that the date on which the dispute arose may be on any date later than 25.03.2007. 6. Another contention raised by the respondent is that, the date of the demand for arbitration need to be considered as the date on which the dispute arose. Such an argument cannot be accepted in view of the specific provisions contained in Section 43(2) of the Act, which provides that, an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred in Section 21. Section 21 provides that the arbitral proceedings in respect to any particular dispute commences on the date on which a request for referring that dispute for arbitration is received by the respondent. Therefore, the receipt of notice dated 20.08.2010 can only be considered as the date of commencement of the arbitral proceeding and the said date cannot be considered in any manner as the date on which the dispute arose. 7. Yet another contention raised by counsel for the respondent is that, the question of bar of limitation was neither raised nor agitated by the appellants, either before the sole Arbitrator or before the District Court. Hence the appellants cannot be permitted to raise such an issue for the first time before this Court. 7. Yet another contention raised by counsel for the respondent is that, the question of bar of limitation was neither raised nor agitated by the appellants, either before the sole Arbitrator or before the District Court. Hence the appellants cannot be permitted to raise such an issue for the first time before this Court. In this regard, learned counsel had drawn our attention to the provisions contained in Section 16(2) of the Act, in order to contend that the appellants should have raised the plea at any point not later than the date of submission of the statement of defence. Otherwise they will be precluded from raising such a contention at any further stage of the arbitral proceedings. Provision under Section 16(2) insists that, a plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. Therefore, the contention is that, a party who had not raised a question regarding jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, will be precluded from raising such question at any later stage. In support of the above contention, learned counsel had also referred to Section 34(2)(b)(i) of the Act. It is pointed out that, the court exercising power under Section 34 will get jurisdiction to set aside the award, only if it is convinced that the subject matter of the dispute was not capable of settlement by the Arbitrator under the law for the time being in force. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the question of limitation is a question of law, which can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. If a party could establish that the proceedings remained time barred under the Limitation Act, the award will become a non est in the eye of law and need to be set aside. 8. While evaluating the rival contentions on the point discussed above, we are of the opinion that a question of jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and a question of non maintainability of the arbitral proceedings based on the bar of limitation, are slightly distinct and stands on different footings. The question of limitation, is a mixed question of law and facts. On the facts of the case at hand, there is no dispute that the due date stipulated for payment of the last installment was on 25.03.2007. The question of limitation, is a mixed question of law and facts. On the facts of the case at hand, there is no dispute that the due date stipulated for payment of the last installment was on 25.03.2007. Going by the claim statement (petition filed under Section 7 of the Act) the respondent company had no case that the borrower had acknowledged the debt in any manner after 25.03.2007. Even though learned counsel for the respondent had raised a feeble contention that there may be any demand notice issued prior to 20.08.2010, the same cannot be accepted due to lack of any material available on record. Moreover, the respondent company cannot go beyond what is stated in the claim statement filed before the Arbitrator. Hence, on the facts it is a evident that, the arbitration proceedings should be deemed to have commenced only when the appellants have received the demand notice issued, dated 20.08.2010, through which the respondent company had requested to refer the dispute for arbitration. Hence the contention of the appellants that, as on the date of commencement of the arbitration proceedings, the dispute, which is the liability of the appellants for payment of money, remained time barred in accordance with the relevant provisions in the Limitation Act, need to be accepted. Therefore, this court is of the opinion that, the issue is not one purely relating to jurisdiction of the sole Arbitrator. But it is a question of limitation for entertaining such a dispute for settlement by the Arbitrator. As contended by learned counsel for the appellants, it remains trite by this time that a question of limitation with respect to any proceedings can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Therefore, we are not persuaded to accept the contention that the appellants will be precluded from raising such an issue at the stage of this appeal, without raising the same either before the Arbitrator or before the District Court. 9. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondent company contended that, even if this court is satisfied that there exists a question regarding the bar of limitation, it need to be evaluated. Hence it is requested that the matter may be remanded for fresh a consideration by the District Court, after affording both the parties to adduce evidence on the said aspect. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondent company contended that, even if this court is satisfied that there exists a question regarding the bar of limitation, it need to be evaluated. Hence it is requested that the matter may be remanded for fresh a consideration by the District Court, after affording both the parties to adduce evidence on the said aspect. But, as already observed, from the available records, especially from the pleadings submitted by the respondent company before the Arbitrator, it is clear that the company has no case that there arose any cause of action with respect to the claim on any date after 25.03.2007. Further, the company cannot make any successful contention that the arbitration proceedings have commenced on any date prior to the date of receipt of the notice of demand dated 20.08.2010 by the appellants. Therefore we are of the opinion that, there is no necessity for remitting the matter to the District Court for further consideration. Since this court is convinced from the records available that the dispute remained barred by the limitation as on the date of commencement of the arbitral proceedings, we are inclined to set aside the award of the Arbitrator, which was impugned before the court below. 10. In the result, the above appeal is hereby allowed. The impugned order of the District Court declining interference with respect to the award of the Arbitrator is reversed. The award passed by the Sole Arbitrator in O.P.No.414/2010 dated 28.12.2012 is hereby set aside. The parties shall bear their respective costs.