ORDER : Tashi Rabstan, J. Through the medium of this petition, the petitioner is seeking quashment of Order No.87 of 2003 dated 21.02,2003 issued by Commandant, 2nd Battalion, Jammu, respondent No.2 herein, whereby he has been dismissed from service with immediate effect under the provisions of Rule 337 of Police Manual, Vol. II on account of his having produced fake School Leaving Certificate. 2. The facts-in-brief as projected in the writ petition, are that the petitioner came to be appointed as a Constable in the Police Department in the year 1999. In the year 2003, an FIR No.48/2003 came to be registered against the petitioner allegedly on the allegation that he had produced fake educational certificate at the time of appointment. Consequently, the petitioner came to be dismissed from service with immediate effect vide Order No.87 of 2003 dated 21.02.2003, impugned herein, issued by respondent No.2. Thereafter, criminal proceedings also came to be initiated against the petitioner in the Court of Law and ultimately he came to be acquitted of the offence by the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu vide its order dated 07.10.2010. Further, it is averred that accordingly the petitioner approached respondent No.2 for his re-instatement and also served a notice upon him, however, in reply thereto, respondent No.2 turned down the request of petitioner with the plea that his acquittal does not give him any right to be reinstated in service. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. Objections have been filed on behalf of respondents. It is averred that when the respondents received a complainant regarding submission of fake educational certificate, the matter was taken up with Chief Education Officer, Rajouri. Accordingly, it was reported that the certificate produced by the petitioner during his recruitment process was never issued by the Headmaster, High School Ujhan, Rajouri, which was also confirmed by the Chief Education Officer, Rajouri vide his Communication No.CEOR/2687 dated 01.11.2002, as such the petitioner came to be dismissed from service vide the impugned order. It is further averred that looking to the grave misconduct and the gravity of charge attributable to the petitioner; the respondents are well within their right not to reinstate the petitioner on the basis of a fake qualification certificate. 4. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and also perused the pleadings. 5. It is further averred that looking to the grave misconduct and the gravity of charge attributable to the petitioner; the respondents are well within their right not to reinstate the petitioner on the basis of a fake qualification certificate. 4. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and also perused the pleadings. 5. The sole ground taken by the petitioner in the present petition is that since, he has been acquitted by the trial court in a criminal case of producing fake qualification certificate at the time of his appointment, he is entitled to be reinstated into service from the date he came to be dismissed vide the order impugned. 6. The law, however, is settled that departmental action and criminal trial are two separate proceedings independent to each other, therefore, acquittal in a criminal trial does not ipso facto confer a right on an individual acquitted of a criminal case, to seek reinstatement in service. Otherwise too, it has come on record that the certificate-in-question was never issued by the Headmaster, High School Ujhan, Rajouri, which has also been confirmed by the Chief Education Officer, Rajouri vide his Communication No.CEOR/2687 dated 01.11.2002. 7. It would be appropriate to reproduce hereunder paragraph 10 of the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in case South Bengal State Transport Corpn. v. Swapan Kumar Mitra, 2006 AIR SCW 768. 'Similarly in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathamthitta and Ors. v. A. Gopalan ( 1997 (11) SCC 239 : ( AIR 1999 SC 1514 ) the view expressed in Nelason Motis v. Union of India and Ors. ( AIR 1992 SC 1981 ) (supra) was fully endorsed by this Court and similarly it was held that the nature and scope of proof in a criminal case is very different from that of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and order of acquittal in the former, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings. This Court has further held that in a criminal case charge has to be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceeding the standard of proof for proving the charge is mere preponderance of probabilities. This Court has further held that in a criminal case charge has to be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceeding the standard of proof for proving the charge is mere preponderance of probabilities. Such being the position of law now settled by various decisions of this Court, two of which have already been referred to earlier, we need not deal in detail with the question whether acquittal in a criminal case will lead to holding that the departmental proceedings should also be discontinued. That being the position, an order of removal from service emanating from a departmental proceeding can very well be passed even after acquittal of the delinquent employee in a criminal case. In any case, the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench did not base their decisions relying on the proposition that after acquittal in the criminal case departmental proceedings could not be continued and order of removal could not be passed.' 8. It would also be appropriate to reproduce hereunder what is held by a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.45/2013 decided on 11.03.2015 (2016 Lab IC 408 (J & K)) (in which I was also one of its members): '16. Acquittal of criminal charge and judgment of acquittal recorded by Trial Court does not ipso facto make selected candidate entitled to seek appointment against Government post and in particular Police Department, and does not debar appointing authority from verifying antecedents of selected candidate, moreso when offence alleged is not ' minor indiscretion' but grave and heinous offence involving moral turpitude. 17. We are aware that criminal charge against accused may fail on a number of grounds, like failure of prosecution to make witnesses cross witness box, witnesses turning hostile to prosecution, failure on part of Investigating Agency to adhere to rules and regulations, while conducting investigation and failure on part of experts, who help investigating agency, like FSL experts, doctors, to adhere to rulebook, while playing their role in investigation. Acquittal, in all such cases, would be on technical grounds but would not entirely absolve him of the guilt. It would be dangerous, therefore, to command an employer to appoint accused, acquitted of a criminal charge, against a post under the Government, depriving such employer of taking an independent view of the matter, in the interests of overall discipline in department and particularly in Police Department.' 9. It would be dangerous, therefore, to command an employer to appoint accused, acquitted of a criminal charge, against a post under the Government, depriving such employer of taking an independent view of the matter, in the interests of overall discipline in department and particularly in Police Department.' 9. A Division Bench of this Court in Ex. Engineer v. Khatija Begum, 2002 KLJ 20 , has also held on the same lines that acquittal in a criminal case would not be a bar for the appropriate authority to initiate departmental proceedings against a Government servant and that the appropriate authority is empowered to initiate disciplinary proceedings independently of the acquittal by a criminal court. 10. Therefore, in view of the above, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. However, since, the petitioner has been acquitted of the criminal charge in the aforementioned case, respondents are directed to conclude the departmental proceedings; if not already concluded, within a period of four months from today. It is made clear that petitioner’s retention in service shall be subject to the outcome of such departmental proceedings. Connected miscellaneous petitions, if any, accordingly stands disposed of.