JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. 1. Defendants are the appellants against a reversing judgment. 2. The plaintiff-respondent instituted T.S. No.64 of 2000 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sambalpur for declaration that she is the owner of the damaged Indra Vikas Patras (IVPs) having the face value of Rs.5000/- each totalling Rs.1,00,000/- and for a direction to the defendants to pay the maturity value with interest and costs. 3. The case of the plaintiff is that on 28.5.1994 she had purchased twenty numbers of IVPs amounting to Rs.50,000/- from Sambalpur Post Office having maturity value of Rs.1,00,000/-. The date of maturity was 28.11.1999. She had kept the IVPs in a wooden box. The same were destroyed by white ants. On 5.8.1998, she made a representation to defendant no.2 to replace the damaged IVPs by issuing duplicates. Since no action was taken, she instituted the suit after issuing notice under Sec. 80 CPC claiming right, title and interest over the IVPs. 4. Defendants filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. It is pleaded that there is no provision to replace the damaged IVPs. The defendants are not entitled to pay the maturity value of IVPs to the plaintiffs. 5. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck six issues. Parties led evidence. Learned trial court declared the title of the plaintiff over IVPs and directed the defendants to pay the maturity value. Assailing the judgment and decree of the learned trial court in not allowing the interest, the plaintiff appealed before the learned District Judge, which was subsequently transferred to the learned Addl. District Judge, Sambalpur and renumbered as RFA No.14/38 of 2005. Learned lower appellate court directed the defendants to pay simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of maturity of the IVPs i.e. from 28.11.1999 till payment. 6. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law; “1. Whether the defendants are liable to pay interest on the maturity value of Indira Vikash Patra from the date of its maturity ? 2. Whether the suit will fail in absence of notice under Section 80 CPC ? 7. Heard Mr. Anup Bose, learned ASG along with Ms. Sanjuktabala Das, learned CGC for the appellants and Mr. G.P. Dutta, learned counsel for the respondent. 8. Mr. Bose, learned Asst. 2. Whether the suit will fail in absence of notice under Section 80 CPC ? 7. Heard Mr. Anup Bose, learned ASG along with Ms. Sanjuktabala Das, learned CGC for the appellants and Mr. G.P. Dutta, learned counsel for the respondent. 8. Mr. Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General submitted that as per the provisions of the IVP Scheme, an IVP lost/stolen/mutilated/destroyed/defaced beyond recognition will not be replaced by issue of duplicate. The plaintiff was not in possession of IVPs. The mutilated pieces were beyond recognition. The same could not be replaced. The plaintiff filed a representation to the defendant no.2 requesting latter to issue duplicate IVPs vide Ext.2. By letter dated 22.3.2000, the defendants informed the plaintiff that IVPs could not be replaced. He further submitted that for lackadaisical attitude exhibited by the plaintiff, she is not entitled to any interest. No notice under Sec. 80 CPC has been issued before institution of the suit. He further contended that in identical matter, the Gujarat High Court in the case of Narendrabhai Shankarlal Joshi v. Post Master General, Gujarat Circle and another, AIR 2002 Gujarat 180, refused to grant interest. 9. Per contra, Mr. Dutta, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the plaintiff purchased twenty numbers of IVPs from Sambalpur Post Office having maturity value of Rs.1,00,000/-. Since IVPs were mutilated, she made a representation to the defendant no.2 vide Ext.2 requesting latter to replace the same. Defendant no.2 maintained a sphinx like silence. Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted the suit. Learned trial court decreed the suit in part with a direction to the defendants to pay the maturity value. Defendants did not challenge the judgment and decree; rather the plaintiff filed appeal. Thus defendants cannot challenge the judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court wherein interest was awarded. He further contended that principle of unjust enrichment applies in the facts scenario. The learned lower appellate court has rightly awarded interest. He relied on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India and others, (2011) 8 SCC 161 . 10. The plaintiff had purchased twenty numbers of IVPs from Sambalpur Post Office. The maturity value of the IVPs was Rs.1,00,000/-. Since the same were mutilated, she made a representation vide Ext.2 for replacement. 10. The plaintiff had purchased twenty numbers of IVPs from Sambalpur Post Office. The maturity value of the IVPs was Rs.1,00,000/-. Since the same were mutilated, she made a representation vide Ext.2 for replacement. Since IVPs were not replaced, she issued notice under Sec. 80 CPC claiming maturity value and interest. Learned trial court decreed the suit in part. The plaintiff assailed the judgment and decree. Learned lower appellate court allowed the appeal and directed the defendants to pay interest. In view of the same, the defendants cannot deny payment of the maturity value. 11. The only question survives as to whether plaintiff is entitled to interest ? 12. Sec. 72 of the Indian Contract Act deals with liability of person to whom money is paid, or thing delivered, by mistake or under coercion. It says that the principle of unjust enrichment requires; first, that the defendant has been ‘enriched’ by the receipt of a “benefit”, secondly, that this enrichment is “at the expense of the plaintiff”, and thirdly, that the retention of the enrichment be unjust. 13. Sec. 72 of the Indian Contract Act was the subject-matter of interpretation of the apex Court in the case of Mahabir Kishore and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 313 . The apex Court held thus; “11. The principle of unjust enrichment requires: first, that the defendant has been 'enriched' by the receipt of a "benefit"; secondly, that this enrichment is "at the expense of the plaintiff"; and thirdly, that the retention of the enrichment be unjust. This justifies restitution. Enrichment may take the form of direct advantage to the recipient’s wealth such as by the receipt of money or indirect one for instance where inevitable expense has been saved. 12. Another analysis of the obligation is of quasi contract. It was said: "if the defendant be under an obligation from the ties of natural justice to refund, the law implies a debt, and give this action rounded in the equity of the plaintiff's case, as it were, upon a contract (quasi ex-contracts) as the Roman law expresses it." As Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson, [1943] AC 32 : (1942) 2 All ER 122 pointed out, "the obligation is as efficacious as if it were upon a contract. Such remedies are quasi contract or restitution and theory of unjust enrichment has not been closed in English law." 14. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (supra), the apex Court held: “151. Unjust enrichment has been defined as: "Unjust enrichment.-A benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or recompense." See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edn. (Bryan A. Garner) at p. 1573. A claim for unjust enrichment arises where there has been an "unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience." 152. “Unjust enrichment” has been defined by the court as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.” 15. The ratio in the decisions cited supra apply proprio vigore to the facts of the case. 16. About 60 years back in the case of Firm Kaluram Sitaram vs. The Dominion of India, AIR 1954 BOMBAY 50, Chief Justice Chagla (as he then was) speaking for the Bench stressed that when the State deals with a citizen it should not ordinarily rely on technicalities, and if the State is satisfied that the case of the citizen is a just one, even though legal defences may be open to it, it must act, as has been said by eminent judges, as an honest person. The claim of the plaintiff was denuded on jejune grounds. 17. In the Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International by its Proprietor V. Venkatadri (dead) by L.Rs, AIR 1979 SC 1144 , the apex Court held that it is high time that Governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. 18. In the case of Narendrabhai Shankarlal Joshi (supra), doctrine of “unjust enrichment” was not the subject-matter of consideration. 18. In the case of Narendrabhai Shankarlal Joshi (supra), doctrine of “unjust enrichment” was not the subject-matter of consideration. The said decision is distinguishable. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 19. A priori, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.