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2017 DIGILAW 1261 (MAD)

Venkata Rao v. G. Nirmala

2017-04-26

N.SATHISH KUMAR

body2017
JUDGMENT : Aggrieved over the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the suit for specific performance, the present appeal came to be filed by the defendant. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to, as per their ranking before the trial Court. 3. The brief facts of the case of the plaintiff are as follows: (i) The defendant was originally allotted a flat No.17, second block “C” type by the Central Government on 24.2.1995. The defendant, being the brother-in-law of the plaintiff, offered to sell the above said property to the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs.5,06,000/- and also entered into an agreement on 19.1.1996 and received the entire sale consideration on the same date. One of the conditions stipulated in the agreement is that the defendant shall apply for and obtain No Objection Certificate from the concerned authorities and also Income Tax Clearance certificate. Apart from the sale agreement, the defendant has also executed Power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff s husband on 19.1.1996. Besides, the defendant also availed loan from HDFC and instructed the plaintiff to pay the instalments due to the HDFC bank. The plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration and also the loan obtained by the defendant. The plaintiff has also been entered into possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. But the defendant, with an intention to deceit the plaintiff, did not take any steps to obtain No Objection Certificate and Income Tax Clearance Certificate under Section 230-A of the said Act. The defendant also failed to hand over the original title deeds as per clause stipulated in the agreement. (ii) It is the contention of the plaintiff that the agreement dated 19.1.1996 is a contingent one and it will be completed after obtaining necessary No Objection Certificate from the appropriate authority, which is necessary, since the allottee is not entitled to alienate the suit property within 10 years from the date of sale i.e. 24.2.1995 to 24.2.2005. As the defendant has not obtained No Objection Certificate from the authorities concerned to alienate the suit property, the sale could not be completed on or before 24.2.2005. After the expiry of 10 years period, there is no legal impediment in alienating the suit property by the defendant. As the defendant has not obtained No Objection Certificate from the authorities concerned to alienate the suit property, the sale could not be completed on or before 24.2.2005. After the expiry of 10 years period, there is no legal impediment in alienating the suit property by the defendant. Hence, the suit agreement is not barred by limitation. However, the defendant failed to execute the sale deed even after 10 years. Therefore, the plaintiff issued a legal notice on 12.2.2007. Hence, the suit. 4. The brief averments made in the written statement filed by the defendant are as follows: (i) Admitting the relationship, it is the contention of the defendant that he borrowed a sum of Rs.4,04,800/- from the plaintiff as a loan for making the first four instalment of payments to Central Government Employees Welfare Housing Organisation (CGEWHO) from which, he has purchased the suit property. He has also availed loan for a sum of Rs.1,67,157/- from HDFC bank to clear the loan. In the above loan, the plaintiff s husband, by name, Gokul Shankar, stood as guarantor. The plaintiff and her husband prepared the agreement of Sale and General Power of Attorney, without making any prior consultation with the defendant and hence, the said documents are sham and nominal and they were not intended to be acted upon. Since the defendant was residing at Trivandrum, the plaintiff and her husband stated that it is necessary for them to have such documents and on good faith, the said documents were executed. However, the same is not intended to sell. (ii) It is contended that the plaintiff made subsequent payment to the HDFC bank directly without the consent of the defendant and that the plaintiff's husband has also obtained original title deed of the defendant's property from CGEWHO, New Delhi, directly. The plaintiff sent a legal notice on 31.12.1996 which was replied on 29.1.1997 by the defendant. Hence, the suit, as filed is barred by limitation. Since the Sale Deed and Power of Attorney were obtained by playing fraud and undue influence, the same were not intended to be acted upon. Hence, the defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court formulated as many as five issues for consideration. They are: 1. Whether the sale deed dated 19.01.1996 between the plaintiff and the defendant is true and genuine one? 2. Hence, the defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court formulated as many as five issues for consideration. They are: 1. Whether the sale deed dated 19.01.1996 between the plaintiff and the defendant is true and genuine one? 2. Whether the plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration to the defendant? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a sale deed from the defendant for Rs.5,06,000/-? 5. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled? 6. On the side of the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s husband was examined as PW1 and Exs.A1 to A7 were marked. On the side of the defendant, defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and Exs. B1 to B8 were marked. 7. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both sides, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit for specific performance. As against which, the present appeal came to be filed. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submitted that the suit is barred by limitation. It is submitted that though 30 days time has been specifically stipulated in the agreement dated 19.01.1996, the suit has been filed in the year 2008. It is also submitted that time is the essence of the contract. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the plaintiff has not come to Court with clean hands. She has suppressed the material facts of issuing notice in the year 1996 itself. Exs. B1 to B8 would clearly show that cause of action arose in the year 1996 itself. Therefore, the suit filed in the year 2008 is not maintainable. 9. It is the submission of the learned counsel that clause 10 of the agreement cannot be pressed into service to save the limitation, since, absolutely, there is no bar for selling the properties. The plaintiff, who is having original title deeds with her also having power of attorney in her husband's name, failed to take any steps to get the sale deed registered in her favour. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned counsel that the suit itself is barred by limitation and hence, the relief of specific performance cannot be granted to the plaintiff, who, admittedly, suppressed the material facts. 10. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned counsel that the suit itself is barred by limitation and hence, the relief of specific performance cannot be granted to the plaintiff, who, admittedly, suppressed the material facts. 10. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that as per clause 8 of the agreement, the vendee shall prepare the draft sale deed. But the plaintiff has not taken any interest to perform her part of the contract. Hence, it is submitted that the learned trial Judge, without taking into consideration the above aspects, simply decreed the suit. Therefore, the learned counsel prayed for allowing the appeal. 11. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgments reported in (1998) 8 SCC 587 (SHAKUNTALA V. NARAYAN GUNDOJI CHAVAN AND OTHERS); 2015 8 SCC 695 (PADMAKUMARI AND OTHERS V. DASAYYAN AND OTHERS); 1997-2-LW 820 (VASANTHA V. M.SENGUTTUVAN) and 1996 (1) SCC 639 (MOHAN LAL V. MIRZA ABDUL GAFFAR AND ANOTHER). 12. On the contrary, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that on the date of agreement itself, the entire sale consideration has been paid by the plaintiff. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the possession has also been taken over by the plaintiff. Clause 10 of the agreement clearly shows that the suit property, which was purchased by the defendant from CGEWHO, shall not be alienated for a period of 10 years without obtaining permission from the authorities concerned and the said ten years period expired only in the year 2005. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned Senior counsel that the suit filed within three years from the expiry of the aforesaid 10 years period is well within the period of limitation. 13. It is the further contention of the learned Senior counsel that apart from paying the sale consideration, the plaintiff has also cleared the loan availed by the defendant in HDFC Bank. All these facts clearly show that taking advantage of the legal impediment and also the receipt of entire sale consideration, only in order to defeat the plaintiff, the defendant has protracted the issue. Hence, it is the contention of the learned Senior counsel that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. It is submitted that the plaintiff is in possession of the original sale deed. Hence, it is the contention of the learned Senior counsel that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. It is submitted that the plaintiff is in possession of the original sale deed. It is further submitted that apart from the sale consideration, she has also cleared the loan amount availed by the defendant. All these facts would clearly show that readiness and willingness has been clearly established by the plaintiff. The defendant's conduct is also assumes significance. Having taken undue advantage, he is now trying to evade the contract and hence, the trial Court has rightly decreed the suit. Therefore, the learned Senior counsel prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 14. In support of his arguments, the learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgments reported in AIR 1998 Punjab and Haryana 254 (Lt. Colonel Jaswant singh vs. Daljit Singh); AIR 2006 (KARNATAKA 4) (Subbireddy v. K.N. Srinivasa Murthy); AIR 2002 HP 175 (Ishari Lal v. Solma); AIR 2000 Kerala 408 (John Thomas v. Joseph Thomas and others); AIR 2001 P&H 257 (Harnam Singh v. Mangat Singh and another); AIR 2009 (NOC) 1679 (Ambadas Khanderao Hagvane and Others v. Shaikh Razaq Shaik Yahkjub and another); AIR 1976 J&K 9 (Mohamad Syed Baba v. M/s. Universal Tibers Traders); AIR 1968 SC 1358 (Jambu Rao Satappa Kocheri v. Neminath Appayya Hanamannayar) and AIR 1984 Guj.145 (1) (Shah Jitendra Nanalal Ahmedabad v. Patel Lallubhai Ishverbhai). 15. In the light of the above submissions, now the points that arise for consideration in this appeal are: 1. Whether the suit filed for specific performance is barred by limitation? 2. Is there any suppression of material facts by the plaintiff? 3. To what relief? Points 1 to 3: 16. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant, being the brother-in-law of the plaintiff, had entered into an agreement on 19.01.1996 for sale of the suit property for a total sale consideration of Rs.5,06,000/- and also agreed to obtain No Objection Certificate from the Central Government for such sale. The plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration on the date of agreement and also took possession of the property. Besides, the plaintiff has also cleared the loan availed by the defendant in HDFC Bank. The plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration on the date of agreement and also took possession of the property. Besides, the plaintiff has also cleared the loan availed by the defendant in HDFC Bank. It is the main contention of the plaintiff that the defendant failed to obtain No Objection Certificate and also income tax clearance certificate and also failed to hand over the original title deeds as agreed in the agreement. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the suit property was allotted to the defendant by the Central Government and as per one of the conditions stipulated in the said scheme, the allottee is not entitled to alienate the suit property for a period 10 years from the date of sale i.e. 24..02.1995.vc According to the plaintiff, the aforesaid 10 year period expired only on 24.2.2005. Therefore, the suit, which has been filed within the period of three years from the aforesaid date i.e. 24.2.2005 is well within the period of limitation. It is the main contention of the learned Senior counsel for the plaintiff that even after the expiry of the aforesaid period of 10 years, the defendant has failed to execute the sale deed. Hence, the plaintiff issued a legal notice on 12.2.2007 and filed the instant suit. 17. Though the defendant denied the agreement, the signing of the agreement and also execution of the Power of Attorney in favour of plaintiff's husband has not been denied by him. He has pleaded that those documents were obtained without any prior discussion from the defendant. According to the defendant, the plaintiff, in order to grab the property, has cleared the loan availed by him. It is the main contention of the learned counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff has already sent a legal notice on 31.12.1996, which has been properly replied by the defendant, on 29.1.1997. Therefore, according to the defendant, the suit filed in the year 2008 is barred by limitation. 18. Though the defendant had taken a plea that the instant agreement is not intended for sale of property, having agreed and signed in the document, now he cannot take a contrary stand than the written terms of the contract. Further there was no materials, whatsoever, placed before the Court to countenance the contention that Ex.A1 was not intended for sale. Therefore, the above contention of the defendant cannot be countenanced. Further there was no materials, whatsoever, placed before the Court to countenance the contention that Ex.A1 was not intended for sale. Therefore, the above contention of the defendant cannot be countenanced. When Ex.A2, sale agreement dated 19.01.1996, is carefully perused, it is seen that the parties have entered into such agreement to purchase the property for a total consideration of Rs.5,06,000/-. It is also seen that on the date of agreement, the entire sale consideration was paid to the defendant. As per clause (4), the time agreed between the parties to complete the sale is 30 days from the date on which the vendor receives original title deeds relating to the schedule mentioned property from Central Government employees Welfare Housing Organisation. The parties also agreed that the time mentioned in the contract is the essence of the contract. 19. In this regard, when the pleadings of the plaint is carefully read, it is seen that the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the defendant did not come forward to hand over the original title deeds, as per clause agreed in the agreement. The pleadings made in the pliant appears to be falsified from the evidence of P.W.1, who is none other the husband of the plaintiff. P.W.1, in his cross examination, has admitted that on the date of agreement itself, the original title deeds were handed over to the plaintiff. This fact is further fortified by the plaintiff's contention in the legal notice, Ex.B1, which was issued in the year 1996. Ex.B1, legal notice dated 21.12.1996, issued by the plaintiff to the defendant shows that original title deeds have been received from the Bank in the year 1996 itself. Though in the legal notice of the year 1996, it is pleaded by the plaintiff that only the defendant is having the original title deeds, the same cannot be accepted, as Ex.A1, title deeds of the suit property was filed only by the plaintiff. This fact clearly show that original title deeds was, in fact, handed over to the plaintiff in the year 1996. Therefore, the contention of the plaintiff in the plaint that still original title deeds have not been handed over to the plaintiff is absolutely false one. 20. This fact clearly show that original title deeds was, in fact, handed over to the plaintiff in the year 1996. Therefore, the contention of the plaintiff in the plaint that still original title deeds have not been handed over to the plaintiff is absolutely false one. 20. It is to be noted that the plaintiff has pleaded as if she has sent a legal notice only on 12.2.2007, i.e. after the expiry of the 10 years period, which is said to be a bar for sale of the suit property. In the said legal notice dated 12.2.2007 itself, the plaintiff has pleaded that original sale deed was handed over to her even on the date of agreement itself. Whereas she has taken a contrary stand in the plaint and also in the earlier legal notice issued under Ex.B1 in the year 1996. Further, the issuance of legal notice dated 31.12.1996 is totally suppressed in the plaint. For the aforesaid legal notice, reply was sent by the defendant denying the agreement of sale and he has also pleaded the circumstances under which the agreement was signed by him. In the said reply, the defendant has specifically stated that he received only loan from the plaintiff and he is not in a position to sell the property. The defendant, in fact, denied the existence of the agreement itself for which, the rejoinder has been issued by the plaintiff on 24.06.1997. Thereafter on 18.11.1997, again the plaintiff issued a final notice to the defendant for execution of sale deed within one week from the date of receipt of the said notice. 21. Having issued final notice in the year 1997 and also being aware of the fact that the defendant had refused to honour the so called obligation, the plaintiff has kept quiet till 2008, without taking any steps. All these previous notices and reply notices have been conveniently suppressed by the plaintiff in his entire pleadings. The entire pleadings show as if the plaintiff has issued notice only on 12.2.2007 for the first time, that too, after the expiry of 10 years period, which is said to be a bar for sale of the suit property. 22. All these previous notices and reply notices have been conveniently suppressed by the plaintiff in his entire pleadings. The entire pleadings show as if the plaintiff has issued notice only on 12.2.2007 for the first time, that too, after the expiry of 10 years period, which is said to be a bar for sale of the suit property. 22. Ex.A1, original sale deed clearly shows that the Central Government Employees Welfare Housing Organisation, which is autonomous body under the Ministry of Urban Development, has allotted the suit property to the defendant and he has purchased the said property. Clause 10 of the sale deed clearly indicate that the suit property shall not be sold for a period of 10 years without written permission from the original vendor, i.e. CGEWHO. Except mentioning the same, there is no specific bar for sale of the suit property. As per the aforesaid clause, if the vendee intends to sell the property within 10 years period, he has to obtain formal written permission from the vendor. Therefore, now the plaintiff cannot contend that the defendant has no right to sell the suit property for a period of 10 years. 23. That apart, clause 8 of the agreement shows that the sale shall be completed within 30 days from the date on which the vendor received the original title deeds. Further, the vendor shall also apply and obtain No Objection Certificate, if any required, from the appropriate authorities. Admittedly, as per the stipulations contained in the sale deed, there is no bar for sale of the suit property. Only permission alone is required to be obtained from the competent authorities. Having agreed to complete the sale within 30 days, and also having paid the entire sale consideration and also taken possession of the properties the plaintiff has not taken any steps to obtain written permission. Of course, it is an obligation on the part of the defendant to get such permission. Whereas in this case, the plaintiff, besides sale deed also obtained power of Attorney from the defendant. Therefore, nothing prevented the plaintiff to get the property registered in her name, when there is no bar for such sale. Therefore, the contention of the plaintiff that the limitation starts only from the expiry of 10 years period, i.e. from 24.2.2005 cannot be countenanced at all. 24. Therefore, nothing prevented the plaintiff to get the property registered in her name, when there is no bar for such sale. Therefore, the contention of the plaintiff that the limitation starts only from the expiry of 10 years period, i.e. from 24.2.2005 cannot be countenanced at all. 24. It is to be noted that though there is a clause agreed between the parties that the defendant shall apply for income tax clearance certificate, in Clause 8 of the agreement, it is mentioned that that only on approving the title by the purchaser's counsel, the purchaser shall give draft sale deed to the vendor to enable him to obtain “No Objection Certificate” and “Income tax clearance certificate” for conveying the suit property to the purchaser. The evidence of P.W.1 would clearly show that they have not prepared any draft sale and handover the same to the defendant to enable him to get the income tax clearance. Therefore, it is clear that the obligation cast on the plaintiff has also not been performed by her. 25. That being so, now the plaintiff, taking advantage of some condition imposed in the agreement, cannot contend that the suit is well within the period of limitation. Admittedly, the plaintiff is in possession of the original title deeds and she has also paid the entire sale consideration and also took possession of the property on the date of the agreement itself i.e. in the year 1996. Though 30 days time is specifically agreed between the parties to complete the sale from the date of receipt of original title deeds, the plaintiff, having received such document on the date of agreement itself and also obtained Power of attorney in favour of her husband, has not taken steps to complete the transaction. Besides, she was also aware of the fact that the defendant has refused to execute the contract in the year 1997 itself. Exs. B1 to B4 documents have totally been suppressed by the plaintiff in the plaint. When the defendant expressed his unwillingness to register the property in the year 1997 itself, article 54 of Limitation Act comes into picture, and the limitation for filing the suit is three years even though there is no limitation agreed between the parties. Whereas, in this case, the parties had agreed to complete the sale transaction within 30 days. 26. When the defendant expressed his unwillingness to register the property in the year 1997 itself, article 54 of Limitation Act comes into picture, and the limitation for filing the suit is three years even though there is no limitation agreed between the parties. Whereas, in this case, the parties had agreed to complete the sale transaction within 30 days. 26. As discussed above, in the legal notice it is stated by the plaintiff that she has received title deeds on the date of agreement itself whereas in the plaint, it is pleaded that the defendant failed to hand over the original title deeds. All these facts would show that the suit filed in the year 2008 is barred by limitation. The suit ought to have been filed within three years from the date of refusal by the defendant. Even assuming that time is not the essence of the contract, in this case, the plaintiff has filed the suit only in the year 2008. Besides, she has suppressed the material facts of issuing notice, reply notice and also the final notice. As stated, the contention of the plaintiff that the original title deed has not been handover to her is also found to be false from her own document. When the plaintiff has come before the court seeking equitable relief, she must come with clean hands. There should not be any suppression of material facts on her part. But the entire pleadings as well as the documents filed by both sides, clearly proved the fact that the plaintiff has not come to Court with clean hands. In fact she has suppressed the material facts and the suit is filed beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, question of granting specific performance in favour of the plaintiff does not arise at all. 27. In this regard, it is useful to refer the judgment in the case of SHAKUNTALA V. NARAYAN GUNDOJI CHAVAN AND OTHERS (cited supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: 7. .. .. .. It is clear that such a notice will amount to refusal on the part of the vendor to perform the contract covered by the compromise. But the High Court stated in para 7 that the lower appellate Court committed a mistake n this behalf because the plaintiff had paid Rs.1000 advance after 17.6.1977 and it was received by the defendant. It is clear that such a notice will amount to refusal on the part of the vendor to perform the contract covered by the compromise. But the High Court stated in para 7 that the lower appellate Court committed a mistake n this behalf because the plaintiff had paid Rs.1000 advance after 17.6.1977 and it was received by the defendant. Learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff tried to submit before us that once the defendant accepted Rs.1000 subsequent to the notice dated 17.6.1977, it must be held that the vendor was standing by his refusal to perform the contract as stated in notice dated 17.6.1977. 8. We, however, find on a perusal of the plaint, the said amount of Rs.1000/- as mentioned by the High Court was not paid by the plaintiff to the defendant subsequent to the notice dated 17.6.1977. In fact, the averment in the plaint itself shows a para 5 that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of compromise and to pay Rs.1000 in advance at the time of making application to the Deputy Commissioner, Belgum. The above statement in the aforesaid paragraph of the plaint is a clear indication that no such amount of Rs.1000 was paid nor received by the defendant subsequent to notice dated 17.6.1977. 9. If that be the case the limitation necessarily started from 17.6.1977, the date of refusal to perform his part of the contract and the suit was by time. .. .. .. .. ..” The above judgment is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case as in the case on hand, as discussed above, even assuming that time is not the essence of contract, the plaintiff has filed the suit only in the year 2008, whereas legal notice was issued admitting the receipt of title deeds on 31.12.1996 and the same has also been suppressed by the plaintiff in the plaint. Further, as already discussed, the plaintiff, having received original documents on the date of agreement itself and also obtained Power of attorney in favour of her husband, has not taken steps to complete the transaction. 28. Similarly, in PADMAKUMARI AND OTHERS v. DASAYYAN AND OTEHRS (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that failure of plaintiff to perform his part of contract within the time stipulated in the agreement disentitled the plaintiff to obtain decree of specific performance. 29. 28. Similarly, in PADMAKUMARI AND OTHERS v. DASAYYAN AND OTEHRS (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that failure of plaintiff to perform his part of contract within the time stipulated in the agreement disentitled the plaintiff to obtain decree of specific performance. 29. In VASANTHA V. M.SENGUTTUVAN (cited supra) this Court, by relying on the catena of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it would also be incumbent upon the transferee to plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. He who comes to equity must do equity. It has been further held that the doctrine of readiness and willingness is an emphatic way of expression to establish that the transferee always abides by the terms of the agreement and is willing to perform his part of the contract. 30. In the instant case, having issued final notice in the year 1997 the plaintiff has kept quiet till 2008, without taking any steps. All these previous notices and reply notices have also been conveniently suppressed by the plaintiff in his entire pleadings. That apart, the obligation cast on the plaintiff has also not been performed by her. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiff also failed to establish readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract. 31. Though it is admitted by the defendant that the plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration and also cleared the loan amount payable to the HDFC bank, that itself cannot be a ground to grant equitable relief to the plaintiff, when she has suppressed the material facts before the Court. When Exs.A1, B6 and B7 were carefully analysed, it is seen that there was some misunderstanding between the parties with regard to the amount due to the defendant and the same could not be solved inspite of mediation. All these facts would clearly show that there were some financial transactions between the parties and that may be the reason for the plaintiff keeping quiet in all these days without taking steps to get the sale deed registered in her favour. The inordinate delay as well as suppression of material facts would disentitle the plaintiff from getting the equitable relief from the Court of law. The inordinate delay as well as suppression of material facts would disentitle the plaintiff from getting the equitable relief from the Court of law. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the judgment and decree of the learned trial judge decreeing the suit for specific performance is liable to be interfered with. 32. Insofar as the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff are concerned, there is no dispute with regard to the proposition laid down in different contexts. In all the judgments principles are one and the same. But in the instant case, the plaintiff has suppressed the material facts of issuing notice, reply notice and also the final notice. Further the contention of the plaintiff that the original title deed has not been handover to her is also found to be false from her own document. It is well settled that the person seeking equitable relief must come with clean hands. But on a perusal of the entire records it is clear that the plaintiff has not come to Court with clean hands. Therefore, the conduct of the plaintiff itself would disentitle her the grant of specific performance. 33. However, taking into consideration of the admitted fact that the plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs.5,06,000/- as per the agreement and also cleared the loan amount due and payable to HDFC by the defendant to the tune of Rs.1,67,157/-, by invoking Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC, this Court, in order to meet the ends of justice, directs the defendant to refund the aforesaid amount with interest at the rate of 7.5% p.a. from the date of respective payments till the date of realisation. These points are answered accordingly. 34. In the result, the appeal is allowed The appellant/defendant is directed to refund the total amount of Rs.6,73,157/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of respective payments till the date of realisation. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous petition is closed.