ORDER Yadav, J. -- 1. This order shall lead to final disposal of writ petition No.4080/2016(PIL) and 5503/2016. Whereas Writ Petition No. 4080/2016 is a Public Interest Litigation whereby the petitioner, an Assistant Engineer working with Public Works Department, State of Madhya Pradesh, along with a practicing Advocate seeks following directions : “(i) Issuing an appropriate writ or direction thereby directing the Lokayukt and Up-Lokayukt to take care of the impact and give effect to the provisions of section 9(2) of M.P. Lokayukt Evam Up-Lokayukt Adhiniyam, 1981 against the complainant in the cases in which the FR (Closure Report) is filed or cognizance has not been taken by the Court on the charge sheet filed before the Court or accused has been discharged or the accused has been acquitted by the trial Court or appellate Court and in departmental inquires in which the accused is found innocent, furtherance they may be directed to invoke the aforesaid provisions of section 9(2) of Adhiniyam for the complaints received since January, 2005 to till date and in future also, as per the outcome of the complaint. (ii) The Lokayukt and Up-Lokayukt may also be directed to initiate the proceedings as per the intention of the Legislature within a period of three months and accordingly submit the progress report in consolidated manner before this Hon'ble Court within the aforesaid period. (iii) The Lokayukt and Up-Lokayukt may further be directed to mention the aforesaid exercise and initiation of the proceedings in the annual report to be submitted under section 12(4) before the Governor of the State and in future also they may be directed to continue the same.” 2. That Writ Petition No. 5503/2016 filed by the petitioner in his personal capacity is directed against the order dated 15.4.2015, whereby representation preferred by the petitioner invoking sub-section (2) of section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Lokayukta and U.P. Lokayukta Adhiniyam 1981 has been rejected. 3. A close look of the pleadings in both the petitions, i.e. the Public Interest Litigation and the writ petition reveals that they emanate from the grievance nurtured by the petitioner with the dismissal of his representation preferred by him under sub-section (2) of section 9 of Adhiniyam 1981. Though true it is that even a Government servant can be a whistle blower [(2015)1 SCC 151]. Though true it is that even a Government servant can be a whistle blower [(2015)1 SCC 151]. However, in the present case, the petitioner is nurturing his personal agenda, which cannot be permitted to be carried forward at the instance of the petitioner. However, the issue raised in the petition deserves to be adverted at, because of larger public interest. 4. The contention that lacs of Government employees are subjected to complaints and the enquiry by the Lokayukta; however, no action is taken by the Lokayukta against such complainants whose complaints are find merit-less. Though the proposition is attractive in the first blush; however, on a further examination, it is noticed that sub-section (2) of section 9 of 1981 Act aims for the action against every person who wilfully or maliciously makes any false complaint under the Act of 1981. It stipulates : “(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10 or any other provision of the Act every person who wilfully or maliciously makes any false complaint under this Act shall, on conviction be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both and the Court may order that out of the amount of fine, such sum as it may deem fit be paid by way of compensation to the person against whom such complaint was made.” 5. What is wilful, malicious or false complaint? 6. An act is said to be wilful if it is intentional, conscious and deliberate. In State of Orissa v. Md. Illiyas, (2006)1 SCC 275 , it is held by Their Lordship : “9. At this juncture it is desirable to consider the true import of the word “wilful”. An act is said to be “wilful” if it is intentional, conscious and deliberate. (See : Rakapalli Raja Rama Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao, [( 1989(4) SCC 255 )]. 10. The expression “Wilful” excludes casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability. It is to be noted that a wilful act does not encompass accidental, involuntary, or negligence. It must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. The expression “wilful” means an act done with a bad purpose, with an evil motive. 11. It is to be noted that a wilful act does not encompass accidental, involuntary, or negligence. It must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. The expression “wilful” means an act done with a bad purpose, with an evil motive. 11. "Wilful" is a word of familiar use in every branch of law, and although in some branches of law it may have a special meaning, it generally, as used in Courts of law, implies nothing blameable, but merely that the person of whose action or default the expression is used is a free agent, and that what has been done arises from the spontaneous action of his will. It amounts to nothing more than this, that he knows what he is doing, and intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent. (Per Bowen L.J. in Young and Harston's Contract Re.(1885)31 Ch D 168). It does not necessarily, connote blame, although the word is more commonly used of bad conduct than of good. (See Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills (1933) 2 K.B. 669). Whatever is intentional is wilful. (per Day J. in Gayford v. Chouler (1898)1 Q.B.316). As observed by Russel C.J. in R. v. Senior (1899)1 Q.B. 283, "wilfully" means deliberately and intentionally.” 7. In Krushnalal Buxi v. Sudarshan Pani and others, [1995 Supp(4) SCC 238,] it is observed by Their Lordships : “.......The word 'wilful' is a word of many meanings with its construction often influenced by its contest. Wilful act may be construed as one done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely with supine indifference or without justifiable excuse so distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, needlessly or inadvertently. A wilful act differs essentially from a negligent act. The former is positive and the latter is negative.........” 8. Thus, if an act is casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional it cannot be construed as wilful act. 9. Similarly an act is said to be malicious when done with an evil design; wilful; indulging in malice, harbouring ill-will, or enmity malevolent, malignant in heart; committed wantonly, wilfully, or without cause, or done not only wilfully and intentionally, but out of cruelty, hostility of revenge; done in wilful neglect of a known obligation (The Major Law Lexicon, 4th Edition 2010). The Division Bench of Nagpur High Court in Krishnrao v. Radhakishan, 1956 Nagpur 264 (AIR V 43 C 84 Nov.) relying upon the decision of Privy Council AIR 1946 Nag 46 (AIR V 33) observed : “(7) Coming now to the question of damages for malicious prosecution, it is now well-settled that in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff has to prove : (i) that he was prosecuted by the defendant; (ii) that the proceedings terminated in favour of the plaintiff if from their nature they were so capable of terminating; (iii) that the prosecution was instituted against him without reasonable and probable cause; and (iv) that it was due to malicious intention of the defendant and not with the intention of carrying the law into effect. vide 'Sheikh Mehtab v. Balaji', 1946 Nag 46 (AIR V 33) (B) and 'Laxmichand v. The Dominion of India', 1955 Nag 265 (S) AIR V 42) (C). The prosecution which started on the report of the defendant was against plaintiffs 2 and 3 alone, but not against plaintiff No. 1. The latter has therefore no cause of action to claim damages for malicious prosecution. (8) We must then consider the claim of plaintiff No. 3 for damages for malicious prosecution. The first question is whether plaintiff No. 3 has proved that he was prosecuted by the defendant. In 'Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh', 30 All 525 (533-534) (PC) (D) their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down : “It will be convenient to refer at once to the decision of the Madras High Court ('ubi supra)* which the learned Judicial Commissioner appears to have followed with some reluctance. The judgment is in these terms : 'The only person who can be sued in an action for malicious prosecution is the person who prosecutes. In this case, though the first defendant may have instituted criminal proceedings before the police, he certainly did not prosecute the plaintiff. He merely gave information to the police, and the police, after investigation, appear to have thought fit to prosecute the plaintiff. The defendant is not responsible for their act, and no action lies against him for malicious prosecution'. “The principle here laid down is sound enough if properly understood, and its application to the particular case was no doubt justified; but in the opinion of their Lordships, it is not universal application. The defendant is not responsible for their act, and no action lies against him for malicious prosecution'. “The principle here laid down is sound enough if properly understood, and its application to the particular case was no doubt justified; but in the opinion of their Lordships, it is not universal application. In India the police have special powers in regard to the investigation of criminal charges, and it depends very much on the result of their investigation whether or not further proceedings are taken against the person accused. If, therefore, a complaint does not go beyond giving what he believes to be correct information to the police, and the police without further interference on his part (except giving such honest assistance as they may require), think fit to prosecute, it would be improper to make him responsible in damages for the failure of the prosecution. But if the charge is false to the knowledge of the complainant; if he misleads the police by bringing suborned witnesses to support it; if he influences the police to assist him in sending an innocent man for trial before the magistrate – it would be equally improper to allow him to escape liability because the prosecution has not, technically been conducted by him. The question in all cases of this kind must be – Who was the prosecutor? - and the answer must depend upon the whole circumstances of the case. The mere setting of the law in motion is not the criterion; the conduct of the complainant before and after making the charge, must also be taken into consideration.” It is quite plain here that the defendant has not gone beyond giving an account of his honest suspicion about the plaintiffs to the police, who launched the prosecution without any further interference on his part........” 10. The question is whether an honest act of an informer which lead to an inquiry by the Lokayukta resulting in the closure of the case can be said to have wilfully and maliciously led to the inquiry or even a prosecution which may end in acquittal as would invite an action under section 9(2) of 1981 Act. Be it noted that section 14 of 1981 Act guarantees secrecy about any information. It stipulates : “14. Be it noted that section 14 of 1981 Act guarantees secrecy about any information. It stipulates : “14. Secrecy of information.- (1) Any information, obtained by the Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt or members of their staff in the course of, or for the purposes of any investigation under this Act, and any evidence recorded or collected in connection with such information shall, be treated as confidential and notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (No.1 of 1872), no Court shall be entitled to compel the Lokayukt or an Up-Lokayukt or any public servant to give evidence relating to such information or produce the evidence so recorded or collected. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to the disclosure of any information or particulars, - (a) for purposes of the enquiry or in any report to be made thereon or for any action or proceedings to be taken on such report; or (b) for purposes of any proceedings for an offence under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (No.19 of 1923), or any offence of giving or fabricating false evidence under the Indian Penal Code or for purposes of any proceedings under section 15: or (c) for such other purposes as may be prescribed. (3) An Officer or other authority prescribed in this behalf may give notice in writing to the Lokayukt or an Up-Lokayukt, as the case may be, with respect to any document or information specified in the notice or any class of documents so specified that in the opinion of the State Government the disclosure of the documents or information or documents or information of that class would be contrary to public interest and where such a notice is given, nothing in this Act, shall be construed as authorising or requiring the Lokayukt, the Up-Lokayukt or any member of their staff to communicate to any person any document or information specified in the notice or any document or information of a class so specified.” 11. Thus, unless established, all complaints which lack materials or on an inquiry thereon sufficient material is not available to launch a prosecution is not available will not amount to a wilful, malicious and false complaint. 12. It cannot be accepted as a thumb rule that all complaints that ends into filing of the case or in acquittal can be dubbed as wilful and malicious. 12. It cannot be accepted as a thumb rule that all complaints that ends into filing of the case or in acquittal can be dubbed as wilful and malicious. In none of the cases referred to by the petitioner, it is shown that the complainant(s) in each of the case has/have proceeded beyond giving an information as would entail their act to be wilful and malicious. 13. In view whereof the relief as sought for by the petitioner for a declaration that Lokayukt and Up-Lokayukt who in all the cases in which closure report is filed or cognizance has not been taken by the Court on the charge sheet filed before the Court or accused has been discharged or acquitted in a criminal prosecution and the departmental enquiry be prosecuted by invoking, sub-section (2) of section 9 of Adhiniyam, 1981, cannot be acceded to unless it is established that a complaint on the basis whereof the enquiry has been caused by Lokayukt was wilful and infested with malice. In case, if the relief as prayed for by the petitioner is acceded to the same will run counter to the stipulations contained under section 14 and will have cascading effect that a genuine complainant lodging complaint leading the authority to cause an enquiry and investigation thereof will not come forward with the complaint against the functionaries who are covered under the 1981 Act. 14. In view whereof, since no relief can be granted to the petition. Petition fails and is dismissed. Writ Petition No.5503/2016 1. This petition is directed against the order dated 15.4.2015 which has been passed in furtherance to the direction dated 27.10.2014 passed in Writ Petition No.6450/2014. The said writ petition was for direction to the Lokayukt to consider the representation preferred by the petitioner seeking prosecution of unknown complainant for lodging false complaint against the petitioner. Petition was disposed of with a direction to the Lokayukt to consider the application preferred by the petitioner and pass a speaking order thereon. The said writ petition was for direction to the Lokayukt to consider the representation preferred by the petitioner seeking prosecution of unknown complainant for lodging false complaint against the petitioner. Petition was disposed of with a direction to the Lokayukt to consider the application preferred by the petitioner and pass a speaking order thereon. Lokayukt consider the application preferred by the petitioner and rejected the same on the following findings : ^^pwafd mijksDr f'kdk;r ds laca/k esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;kfpdkdrkZ ds vH;kosnu ij fu;ekuqlkj fopkj.k djds Lihfdax vkMZj tkjh djus ds funsZ'k fn, gSA vr% ;kfpdkdrkZ ds vH;kosnu ij iqu% u, fljs ls ijh{k.k fd;k x;kA lexz ijh{k.kksijkar ik;k x;k fd rRdkyhu iqfyl v/kh{kd] fo'ks"k iqfyl LFkkiuk] Xokfy;j Jh /kesZUnz flag HknkSfj;k ,oa Jh vfuy dqekj vxzoky }kjk vijk/k Øekad 22@2011 dsa laca/k esa rRle; dh xbZ dk;Zokfg;kW ln~HkkoukiwoZd ,oa fof/kd izko/kkuksa ds vuq:Ik gh dh xbZ gS o blesa l{ke ekuuh; U;k;ky; ls fof/kor oS/kkfud vuqefr izkIr djds gh ryk'kh dh dk;Zokgh dh xbZ FkhA vr% e/;izns'k yksdk;qDr@mi&yksdkqDr vf/kfu;e 1982 dh /kkjk 15 ds varxZr bu vf/kdkfj;ks }kjk lnHkkoukiwoZd dh xbZ bl dk;Zokgh gsrq mUgsa laj{k.k izkIr gS o ;kfpdkdrkZ }kjk e/;izns'k yksdk;qDr ,oa mi&yksdkqDr vf/kfu;e 1981 dh /kkjk 9¼2½ ds rgr tks ;kpuk dh gS og /kkjk 9¼2½ dh ifjf/k esa ugh vkus ls xzkg; ;ksX; ugha gSA^^ 2. The impugned order when is tested on the anvil of stipulations contained in sections 14 and section 15 of the Act of 1981 which mandates that all the information received by Lokayukt should be kept secret and that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Lokayukt or the Up-Lokayukt or against any officer, employee, agency or person referred to in section 13 in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under the Act, cannot be faulted with. 3. Consequently, petition being devoid of substance, fails and is dismissed. There shall be no costs.