Rahul Malik S/o Shri Tejpal Singh v. State of Rajasthan
2017-05-17
P.K.LOHRA
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Mr. P.K. Lohra, J. 1. Petitioner has preferred this revision petition under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. to challenge impugned order dated 6th of March, 2017, passed by Judge, Family Court, Sri Ganganagar (for short, ‘learned trial Court’) in Criminal Original Case No.386/2015. By the order impugned, learned trial Court has awarded maintenance to respondent No.2 to the tune of 5,000/- per month from the date of application. 2. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that respondent-wife laid an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. before learned trial Court stating therein that she entered into matrimony with petitioner on 18th of June, 1998 and out of the wedlock son, Gyandeep Malik, was born. It is also pleaded in the application that at present, her son is living with the petitioner. While attributing serious atrocities to the petitioner and his other members of family for demand of dowry, respondent has stated in the application that she was ousted from the matrimonial home. The application further unfurls that despite intervention by the community members, all efforts for re-conciliation failed and the unabated cruelty and demand for dowry by petitioner and his other members of family took a serious turn and she was ousted from matrimonial home on 24th of June, 2014. Respondent specifically pleaded in the application that she has no source of livelihood and is living in destitute, therefore, petitioner may be directed to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per month besides litigation expenses. For quantifying the amount of maintenance, respondent has estimated the monthly income of petitioner to the tune of Rs.1,58,000/-. 3. The application is contested by petitioner and reply is filed denying all the allegations. As per version of the petitioner, figures about his monthly income are projected with embellished version inasmuch as he is simply working as Homeguard and hardly earning approximately Rs.15,000/- per month. While refuting the allegation that respondent was ousted from the matrimonial home, the petitioner has averred in the return that she left matrimonial home at her own volition leaving behind even minor son. With these pleadings, petitioner has prayed for rejection of the application for maintenance. 4.
While refuting the allegation that respondent was ousted from the matrimonial home, the petitioner has averred in the return that she left matrimonial home at her own volition leaving behind even minor son. With these pleadings, petitioner has prayed for rejection of the application for maintenance. 4. Both the parties led their evidence and thereafter the learned trial Court, by the impugned order, partly allowed the application of the respondent and allowed her maintenance at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month from the date of application. Besides maintenance amount, learned trial Court has also awarded her Rs.5,000/- for litigation expenses. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that learned trial Court has committed manifest error of law and fact in quantifying the amount of maintenance. It is also argued by learned counsel that the learned trial Court has not examined the claim of respondent in right perspective, and therefore, impugned order warrants interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on following judgments: 1. Rizwan Mohammad v. Smt. Afsana & Anr. [2014(4) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 2129]. 2. Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury Nee Nandy. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned order. 7. Upon perusal of impugned order, it is abundantly clear that learned trial Court has made sincere endeavour to appreciate the afflictions of respondent in light of the provision contained under Section 125 Cr.P.C. which is measure of social justice enacted to protect women and children with the solemn object to prevent vagrancy and destitution. A very relevant fact is that matrimony between the rival parties is not in dispute. Furthermore, petitioner has not been able to prove that respondent is self-reliant and earning her livelihood. Therefore, in that background, learned trial Court, while acknowledging legal, moral & pious obligation of the petitioner as husband, has awarded maintenance to her. The judgments, on which learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance, are clearly distinguishable in the factual backdrop of the instant case. 8. There remains no quarrel that for quantifying amount of maintenance there cannot be a straight-jacket formula and the Court, while determining quantum of maintenance cannot lose sight of the present trend of inflation.
The judgments, on which learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance, are clearly distinguishable in the factual backdrop of the instant case. 8. There remains no quarrel that for quantifying amount of maintenance there cannot be a straight-jacket formula and the Court, while determining quantum of maintenance cannot lose sight of the present trend of inflation. The learned trial Court has, therefore, examined all the pros and cons while quantifying the amount of maintenance in the instant case and moderately assessed maintenance to the tune of Rs.5,000/- per month besides litigation expenses of even amount. I am at loss to say that by no stretch of imagination, the amount quantified and awarded by the learned trial Court can be treated as excessive or exorbitant. 9. Supreme Court, in case of Rajathi v. C.Ganesan [ 1999(6) SCC 326 ], has held that burden lies on the husband to prove that he has no sufficient means to discharge his obligation or he did not neglect or refused to maintain wife and the statement of wife that she was unable to maintain herself would be enough in this behalf. 10. The Court further held that in maintenance proceedings, trial Court is required to take prima facie view of the matter and need not to go into matrimonial dispute between parties in detail. 11. In view of foregoing discussion, I am unable to find any infirmity in the impugned order requiring interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, while recording my satisfaction about correctness, legality and propriety of the impugned order, I am not inclined to interfere in this revision petition. Resultantly, instant revision petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed summarily.