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2017 DIGILAW 1265 (GAU)

Tasso Gurro v. State of Arunachal Pradesh

2017-09-08

SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO

body2017
ORDER : S. Serto, J. Heard Mr. Hage Lampu, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner. Also heard Ms. Anima Mize, learned Addl. Senior Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of State Respondents No. 1,2,3,4 & 5; as well as Mr. Kento Jini, learned standing counsel, appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 6. 2. These 2 (two) writ petitions are filed by the same petitioner; one, challenging the legality and validity of the judgment & order, dated 29.04.2016, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar Capital Complex, Itanagar, in Case No. Appeal-14/2013, and praying for setting aside and quashing of the same and the consequential orders, dated 11.07.2016, issued by the Superintendent of Police (HQ), and the authorization letter, issued by the Assistant Inspector General of Police (PHQ), and praying for a direction, directing the respondents to restore the possession of the land, in dispute, to him, and any other direction/order, as deemed fit and proper in the interest of justice and, the other; praying for issuance of appropriate writ or direction, directing the respondents to pay compensation to him, to the tune of Rs. 39,80,000/- for having demolished his residential building and compound wall, which were standing within the disputed land by the respondents. Since the two petitions are interconnected, they have been heard together and are being disposed of, by this common judgment & order. 3. The facts of the case, briefly, stated, are that, the petitioner having been in possession of a plot of land measuring 1242 sq. mtrs. of land (hereinafter referred to as List 'disputed land') situated near the Police Headquarter(for short 'PHQ') at Itanagar, applied for allotment of the same to the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, in a prescribed format in the year 2007. On receipt of the said application, the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, processed the same and deputed a supervisor Kanungo(SK) under his establishment for physical verification of the disputed land and feasibility of the allotment of the same to the petitioner. In short, all the formalities that need to be done, were completed. The petitioner's application was then forwarded to the Directorate of Land Management, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, for final approval of the State Government. After considering the matter, the State Government gave its approval for allotment of 500 sq. mtrs. In short, all the formalities that need to be done, were completed. The petitioner's application was then forwarded to the Directorate of Land Management, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, for final approval of the State Government. After considering the matter, the State Government gave its approval for allotment of 500 sq. mtrs. of land to the petitioner and the same was conveyed to the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, through the Director of Land Management, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, vide order, dated 28.08.2009, issued under Memo. No. LM-67/LA(PVT)/2008/848. In the meanwhile, hoping and expecting that his application for allotment of the land would be approved and necessary orders will be passed, the petitioner, herein, constructed a 3-storied RCC building for residential purpose in the disputed land. However, on 23.04.2010, the petitioner received an eviction notice issued by the Estate Officer, P.H.Q, Itanagar, directing him to vacate the disputed land within one month from the date of notice. The petitioner responded by a letter, dated 19.05.2010, stating that the land was gifted to him by one Sri Techi Kojum who inherited the same from his father and moreover, the State Government has given its approval for allotment of the same vide order, dated 28.08.2009. Again on 24.02.2012, the petitioner received an eviction notice issued by Respondent No. 4 (Assistant Inspector General of Police, P.H.Q, Itanagar) under Section 4 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 2003, requiring him to show-cause as to why he should not be evicted from the disputed land and the structures standing thereon, should not be demolished. The petitioner responded to the same, with his letter, dated 05.03.2012, stating the same, as before. Thereafter, the petitioner received eviction order, dated 11.07.2013, issued by the Respondent No. 5(Superintendent of Police (HQ), PHQ, Itanagar) under Section 5(i)(ii) of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Premises(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 2003. On receipt of the same, the petitioner approached this Court by way of filing WP(c)261 (AP)2013, challenging the same on the ground that the Respondent No. 5 has no power and jurisdiction to issue such eviction order. On 25.07.2013, this Court dismissed the said writ petition on the ground that there is a statutory provision for appeal under Section 12 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 2003. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. On 25.07.2013, this Court dismissed the said writ petition on the ground that there is a statutory provision for appeal under Section 12 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 2003. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. Following the dismissal of the petition, the petitioner approached the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, under Section 12 of the same Act, contending mainly that the authority which had issued the eviction order, has no jurisdiction and power to issue such order and that while the application of Respondent No. 4 submitted to the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, for cancellation of allotment of the disputed land issued in favour of the petitioner was still pending, issuance of such eviction order by the Respondent No. 5, violates the principles of natural justice. The Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, disposed of the said appeal of the petitioner vide his order, dated 29.04.2016, by dismissing the same and upholding the eviction order issued by the Respondent No.4. It was also directed that eviction should be carried-out within 10 days from the date of the order. On the very same day, the order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar. The Respondent No. 4 issued the authorization letter, authorizing the Chief Estate Officer, Itanagar Capital Complex, Itanagar, to evict the petitioner from the disputed land and also demolished the structures standing thereon. As per the authorization letter, the said Chief Estate Officer, on the very next day i.e. 30.04.2016, evicted the petitioner and his family members from the disputed land and demolished the 3-storied RCC building. Having been evicted from the disputed land, the petitioner approached the Respondent No. 3 (Director General of Police, PHQ, Itanagar), by submitting 2(two) Nos. of representations, dated 02.05.2016 and 18.08.2016, showing his willingness to surrender the disputed land and the building thereon, to the Police Department, on payment of cost of the residential building and compound wall to him, by the said Department. Apparently, since he did not get any reply, the petitioner submitted another representation, dated 26.08.2016, claiming compensation for unauthorized eviction and demolition of his residential building and compound wall. Apparently, since he did not get any reply, the petitioner submitted another representation, dated 26.08.2016, claiming compensation for unauthorized eviction and demolition of his residential building and compound wall. Since the same also did not get any response, the petitioner has approached this Court, challenging the impugned order, dated 29.04.2016, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, in Case No. Appeal-14/ 2013 and the consequential order, dated 11.07.2016, passed by the Superintendent of Police (HQ), PHQ, Itanagar, and the impugned authorization letter, dated 29.4.2016, issued by the Assistant Inspector General of Police, PHQ, Itanagar, and prayed for the reliefs, as stated above. The second writ petition being WP (C) 81 (AP) 2017, is nothing but a follow-up of the first writ petition being WP(C) 82(AP)2017, praying for issuance of appropriate writ or direction, directing the respondents to pay him, the sum of Rs. 39,80,000/-, which, according to him, is the cost of residential building and compound wall demolished in consequence of the orders challenged in WP(C) 82 (AP)2017. 4. The case of the petitioner, as submitted by Mr. Lampu, learned counsel, is that: (i) since the petitioner has been in occupation of the disputed land from 2006 and his application for allotment of the same, has been approved by the State Government on the recommendation of the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, himself, after completing all the official formalities by engaging the staff under his establishment, for the purpose, his eviction from the disputed land and demolition of his residential building and compound wall, that followed, is highly illegal and cannot be sustained in law. (ii) according to Section 4 read with Section 5 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 2003, eviction order can be issued only by an Estate Officer, who is appointed under Section 3 of the same Act and whose appointment is notified in the official Gazette. But in this case, the eviction order was issued by the Respondent No. 5(Superintendent of Police(HQ), PHQ) and Respondent No. 4(Assistant Inspector General of Police, PHQ), who are not the Estate Officers appointed under the Act of 2003, therefore, the whole proceeding of eviction was violative of the Act of 2003. As such, the Deputy Commissioner's order, dated 29.04.2016, impugned herein, which upheld the eviction orders, is also not as per the provisions of law provided under the Act. As such, the Deputy Commissioner's order, dated 29.04.2016, impugned herein, which upheld the eviction orders, is also not as per the provisions of law provided under the Act. Hence, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. (iii) the order appointing the Superintendent of Police as the Estate Officers was issued only after the eviction orders under challenge, were issued. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Respondents had carried-out the eviction, in question, as empowered under the law. (iv) Since no order cancelling the approval for allotment of land to the petitioner, has ever been issued by the State Government, the petitioner is not an illegal encroacher of the public premises, therefore, all the orders passed and all the actions taken thereafter, evicting him and demolishing his 3-storied residential building and compound wall, are illegal, arbitrary and mala fide, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to adequate compensation, the quantum of which has already been worked-out by an expert and annexed in WP (C)81 (AP)2017. Therefore, appropriate writ or direction, may be issued, directing the respondents to give the compensation deserved by the petitioner. In support of his contentions, Mr. Lampu, learned counsel for the petitioner, has cited the following 3(three) judgments, 1 (one) of the Apex Court and 2(two) of this Court, the relevant paragraphs, are quoted here in below for ready reference: 1. M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ (1979) 2 SCC 409 ] "2. The appellant is a limited company which is primarily engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of sugar and it has also a cold storage plant and a steel foundry. On 10th October, 1968 a news item appeared in the National Herald in which it was stated that the State of Uttar Pradesh had decided to give exemption from sales tax for a period of three years under section 4 A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act to all new industrial units in the State with a view to enabling them "to come on firm footing in developing stage". This news item was based upon a statement made by Shri M.P. Chatterjee the then Secretary in the Industries Department of the Government. This news item was based upon a statement made by Shri M.P. Chatterjee the then Secretary in the Industries Department of the Government. The appellant, on the basis of this announcement, addressed a letter dated 11th October, 1968 to the Director of Industries stating that in view of the sales tax holiday announced by the Government, the appellant intended to set up a Hydro-generation Plant for manufacture of Vanaspati and sought for confirmation that this industrial unit, which it proposed to set up would be entitled to sales tax holiday for a period of three years from the date it commenced production. The Director of Industries replied by his letter dated 14th October, 1968 confirming that "there will be no sales tax for three years on the finished product of your proposed Vanaspati factory from the date it gets power connection for commencing production." The appellant thereupon started taking steps to contact various financiers for financing the project and also initiated negotiations with manufacturers for purchase of machinery for setting up the Vanaspati factory. On 12th December, 1968 the appellant's representative met the 4th respondent who was at that time the Chief Secretary to the Government as also Advisor to the Governor and intimated to him that the appellant was setting up the Vanaspati factory solely on the basis of the assurance given on behalf of the Government that the appellant would be entitled to exemption from sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of commercial production at the factory and the 4th respondent reiterated the assurance that the appellant would be entitled to sales tax holiday in case the Vanaspati factory was put up by it. The appellant by its letter dated 13th December, 1968 placed on record what had transpired at the meeting on the previous day and requested the 4th respondent "to please confirm that we shall be allowed sales tax holiday for a period of three years on the sale of Vanaspati from the date we start production." On the same day the appellant entered into an agreement with M/s. De Smith (India) Pvt. Ltd., Bombay for supply of plant and machinery for the Vanaspati factory, providing clearly that the appellant would have the option to terminate the agreement, if within 10 weeks exemption from sales tax was not granted by the State Government. The 4th respondent replied on 22nd December, 1968 confirming that "the State Government will be willing to consider your request for grant of exemption from U.P. Sales Tax for a period of three years from the date of production" and asked the appellant to obtain the requisite application form and submit a formal application to the Secretary to the Government in the Industries Department and in the meanwhile to "go ahead with the arrangements for setting up the factory". The appellant had in the meantime submitted an application dated 21st December, 1968 for a formal order granting exemption from sales tax under section 4A of the Act. It appears that the letter of the 4th respondent dated 22nd December, 1968 was not regarded as sufficient by the financial institutions which were approached by the appellant for financing the project since it merely stated that the State Government would be willing to consider the request for grant of exemption and did not convey any decision of the State Government that the exemption would be granted. The appellant, therefore, addressed a letter dated 22nd January, 1969 to the 4th respondent pointing out that the financial institutions were of the view that the letter of the 4th respondent dated 22nd December, 1968" did not purport to commit the Government for the concession mentioned" and it was, therefore, necessary to obtain a formal order of exemption in terms of the application submitted by it. The 4th respondent, however, stated categorically in his letter in reply dated 23rd January, 1969 that the proposed Vanaspati Factory of the appellant "will be entitled to exemption from U.P. Sales Tax for a period of three years from the date of going into production and that this will apply to all Vanaspati sold during that period in Uttar Pradesh itself' and expressed his surprise that "a letter from the Chief Secretary to the State Government stating this fact in clear and unambiguous words should not carry conviction with the financial institutions." In view of this unequivocal assurance given by the 4th respondent, who not only occupied the post of Chief Secretary to the Government but was also Advisor to the Governor functioning under the President's rule, the appellant went ahead with the setting up of the Vanaspati Factory. The appellant by its letter dated 25th April, 1969 advised the 4th respondent that the U.P. Finance Corporation, being convinced by the clear and categorical assurance given by the 4th respondent that the Vanaspati Factory of the appellant would be entitled to exemption from sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production, had sanctioned financial assistance to the appellant and the appellant was going ahead with the project in frill speed to enable it to start production at the earliest. The appellant made considerable progress in the setting up of the Vanaspati Factory but it seems that by the middle of May 1969 the State Government started having second thoughts on the question of exemption and a letter dated 16 May, 1969 was addressed by the 5th respondent who was Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Industries Department, intimating that a meeting has been called by the Chief Minister on 23rd May, 1969 "to discuss the question of giving concession in Sales Tax on Vanaspati products" and requesting the appellant to attend the meeting. The appellant immediately by its letter dated 19th May, 1969 pointed out to the 5th respondent that so far as the appellant was concerned, the State Government had already granted exemption from Sales Tax by the letter of the Chief Secretary dated 23rd January, 1969 but still, the appellant would be glad to send its representative to attend the meeting as desired by the 5th respondent. The proposed meeting was, however, postponed and the appellant was intimated by the 5th respondent by its letter dated 23rd May, 1969 that the meeting would now be held on 3rd June, 1969. The appellant's representative attended the meeting on that day and reiterated that so far as the appellant was concerned, it had already been granted exemption from Sales Tax and the State Government stood committed to it. The appellant thereafter proceeded with the work of setting up the Vanaspati plant on the basis that in accordance with-the assurance given by the 4th respondent on behalf of the State Government, the appellant would be exempt from payment of Sales Tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production. 7. The appellant thereafter proceeded with the work of setting up the Vanaspati plant on the basis that in accordance with-the assurance given by the 4th respondent on behalf of the State Government, the appellant would be exempt from payment of Sales Tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production. 7. That takes us to the question whether the assurance given by the 4th respondent on behalf of the State Government that the appellant would be exempt from sales tax for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production could be enforced against the State Government by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Though the origin of the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be found in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. and Birmingham & District Land Co. v. London & North-Western Rail Co. authorities of old standing decided about a century ago by the House of Lords, it was only recently in 1947 that it was rediscovered by Mr. Justice Deaning, as he then was, in his celebrated judgment in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. This doctrine has been variously called 'promissory estoppel', 'equitable estoppel', 'quasi estoppel' and 'new estoppel'. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named 'promissory estoppel, it is, as we shall presently point out, neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. It is interesting to trace the evolution of this doctrine in England and to refer to some of the English decisions in order to appreciate the true scope and ambit of the doctrine particularly because it has been the subject of considerable recent development and is steadily expanding. The basis of this doctrine is the inter-position of equity. Equity has always, true to form, stepped into mitigate the rigours of strict law. The early cases did not speak of this doctrine as estoppel. They spoke of it as 'raising an equity'. The basis of this doctrine is the inter-position of equity. Equity has always, true to form, stepped into mitigate the rigours of strict law. The early cases did not speak of this doctrine as estoppel. They spoke of it as 'raising an equity'. Lord Cairns stated the doctrine in its earliest form-it has undergone considerable development since then-in the following words in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Company (supra): "It is the first principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed, that if parties who have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal results afterwards by their own act or with their own consent enter upon a course of negotiation which has the effect of leading one of the parties to suppose that the strict rights arising under the contract will not be enforced, or will be kept in suspense, or held in abeyance, the person who otherwise might have enforced those rights will not be allowed to enforce them where it would be inequitable having regard to the dealings which have thus taken place between the parties." 8. This principle of equity laid down by Lord Cairns made sporadic appearances in stray cases now and then but it was only in 1947 that it was disinterred and restated as a recognised doctrine by Mr. Justice Deaning, as he then was, in the High Trees' case (supra). The facts in that case were as follows: The plaintiffs leased to the defendants, a subsidiary of the plaintiffs, in 1937 a block of flats for 99 years at a rent of & 2500/- a year. Early in 1940 and because of the war, the defendants were unable to find subtenants for the flats and unable in consequence to pay the rent. The plaintiffs agreed at the request of the defendants to reduce the rent to &. 1250/- from the beginning of the term. By the beginning of 1945 the conditions had improved and tenants had been found for all the flats and the plaintiffs, therefore, claimed the full rent of the premises from the middle of that year. The claim was allowed because the court took the view that the period for which the full rent was claimed fell out side the representation, but Mr. The claim was allowed because the court took the view that the period for which the full rent was claimed fell out side the representation, but Mr. Justice Deaning, as he then was, considered Orbiter whether the plaintiffs could have recovered the covenanted rent for the whole period of the lease and observed that in equity the plaintiffs could not have been allowed to act inconsistently with their promise on which the defendants had acted. It was pressed upon the Court that according to the well settled law as laid down in Jorden v. Money, no estoppel could be raised against plaintiffs since the doctrine of estoppel by representation is applicable only to representations as to some state of facts alleged to be at the time actually in existence and not to promises defuturo which, if binding at all, must be binding only as contracts and here there was no representation of an existing state of facts by the plaintiffs but it was merely a promise or representation of intention to act in a particular manner in the future. Mr. Justice Deaning, however, pointed out: "The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made, and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts have said that the promise must be honoured." The principle formulated by Mr. Justice Deaning was, to quote his own words, "that a promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply". Now Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (supra) and Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London & North Western Rail Co. (supra), the two decisions from which Mr. Justice Deaning drew inspiration for evolving this new equitable principle, were clearly cases where the principle was applied as between parties who were already bound contractually one to the other. In Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (supra) and Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London & North Western Rail Co. (supra), the two decisions from which Mr. Justice Deaning drew inspiration for evolving this new equitable principle, were clearly cases where the principle was applied as between parties who were already bound contractually one to the other. In Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (supra) the plaintiff and the defendant were already bound in contract and the general principle stated by Lord Calms, L.C. was: "If parties who have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal results afterwards-enter upon a course of negotiations". Ten years later Bowen, L.J. also used the same terminology in Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London and North Western Rail Co. (supra) that: "If persons who have contractual rights against others induce by their conduct those against whom they have such rights to believe ". These two decisions might, therefore, seem to suggest that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is limited in its operation to cases where the parties are already contractually bound and one of the parties induces the other to believe that the strict rights under the contract would not be enforced. But we do not think any such limitation can justifiably be introduced to curtail the width and amplitude of this doctrine. We fail to see why it should be necessary to the applicability of this doctrine that there should be some contractual relationship between the parties. In fact Donaldson, J. pointed out in Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. v. Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd.: "Lord Cairns in his enunciation of the principle assumed a pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties, but this does not seem to me to be essential, provided that there is a pre-existing legal relationship which could in certain circumstances give rise to liabilities and penalties." But even this limitation suggested by Donaldson, J. that there should be a pre-existing legal relationship which could in certain circumstances give rise to liabilities and penalties is not warranted and it is significant that the statement of the doctrine by Mr. Justice Deaning in the High Trees' case does not contain any such limitation. Justice Deaning in the High Trees' case does not contain any such limitation. The learned Judge has consistently refused to introduce any such limitation in the doctrine and while sitting in the Court of Appeal, he said in so many terms, in Evenden v. Guildford City Association Football Club Ltd.: "Counsel for the appellant referred us, however, to the second edition of Spencer Bower's book on Estoppel by Representational 966) pp. 340-342] by Sir Alexander Turner, a judge of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. He suggests the promissory estoppel is limited to cases where parties are already bound contractually one to the other. I do not think it is so limited. It applies whenever a representation is made, whether of fact or law, present or future, which is intended to be binding, intended to induce a person to act on it and he does act on it." This observation of Lord Deaning clearly suggest that the parties need not be in any kind of legal relationship before the transaction from which the promissory estoppel takes its origin. The doctrine would seem to apply even where there is no pre-existing legal relationship between the parties, but the promise is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship which will arise in future. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. Vol. 16 p. 1018, Note 2 para 1514. Of course it must be pointed out in fairness to Lord Deaning that he made it clear in the High Trees' case that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot found a cause of action in itself, since it can never do away with the necessity of consideration in the formation of a contract, but he totally repudiated in Evenden's case the necessity of a preexisting relationship between the parties and pointed out in Crabb v. Arun District Council that equity will in a given case where justice and fairness demand, prevent a person from insisting on strict legal rights even where they arise, not under any contract, but on his own title deeds or under statue. The true principle of promissory estoppel, therefore seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. 9. It may be pointed out that in England the law has been well-settled for a long time, though there is some indication of a contrary trend to be found in recent juristic thinking in that country, that promissory estoppel cannot itself be the basis of an action. It cannot found a cause of action : it can only be a shield and not a sword. This narrow approach to a doctrine which is otherwise full of great potentialities is largely the result of an assumption, encouraged by it rather misleading nomenclature, that the doctrine is a branch of the law of estoppel. Since estoppel has always been traditionally a principle invoked by way of defence, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has also come to be identified as a measure of defence. The ghost of traditional estoppel continues to haunt this new doctrine and that is why we find that while boldly formulating and applying this new equity in the High Trees' case, Lord Deaning added a qualification that though in the circumstances set out, the promise would undoubtedly be held by the courts to be binding on the party making it, notwithstanding that under the old common law it might be difficult to find any consideration for it. "the courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for the breach of such a promise, but they have refused to allow the party making it to act inconsistently with it". "the courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for the breach of such a promise, but they have refused to allow the party making it to act inconsistently with it". Lord Deaning also pointed out in Combe v. Combe that "Much as I am inclined to favour the principles stated in the High Trees' case, it is important that it should not be stretched too far, lest it should be endangered. That principle does not create new causes of action where none existed before. It only prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights, when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties " So also said Buckley, J., in the more recent case of Beesly v. Hailwood Estates Ltd.: "The doctrine may afford a defence against the enforcement or otherwise of enforceable rights : it cannot create a cause of action." It is, however, necessary to make it clear that though this doctrine has been called in various judgments and text books as promissory estoppel and it has been variously described as 'equitable estoppel', 'quasi estoppel' and 'new estoppel', it is not really based on the principle of estoppel, but it is a doctrine evolved by equity in order to prevent injustice where a promise is made by a person knowing that it would be acted on by the person to whom it is made and in fact it is so acted on and it is inequitable to allow the party making the promise to go back upon it. Lord Deaning himself observed in the High Trees' case, expressly making a distinction between ordinary estoppel and promissory estoppel that cases like the one before him were" not cases of estoppel in the strict sense. They are really promises, promises intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon and in fact acted upon". Jenkins, C.J. also pointed out in Municipal Corporation of Bombay v. Secretary of State that the "doctrine is often treated as one of estoppel but I doubt whether this is correct, though it may be a convenient name to apply". The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not, therefore, be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not, therefore, be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence. 10. It may be noted that even Lord Deaning recognised in Crabb v. Arun District Council (supra) that "there are estoppels and estoppels. Some do give rise to a cause of action. Some don't" and added that "in the species of estoppel called 'proprietary estoppel', it does give rise to a cause of action" The learned Law Lord, after quoting what he had said in Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings, namely that the effect of estoppel on the true owner may be that: "his own title to the property, be it land or goods, has been held to be limited or extinguished, and new rights and interests have been created therein. And this operates by reason of his conduct-what he has led the other to believe-even though he never intended it." proceeded to observe that "the new rights and interests, so created by estoppel, in or over land, will be protected by the courts and in this way give rise to a cause of action". The Court of Appeal in this case allowed Crabb a declaration of "a right of access at point over the verge on to Mill Park Road and a right of way along that road to Hook Lane" on the basis of an equity arising out of the conduct of the Arun District Council. Of course, Spencer Bower and Turner, in their Treatise on The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation' have explained this decision on the basis that it is an instance of the application of the doctrine of estoppel by encouragement or acquiescence or what has now come to be known as proprietary estoppel which, according to the learned authors, forms an exception to the rule that estoppel cannot found a cause of action. But if we look at the judgments of Lord Deaning and Carman, L.J., it is apparent that they did not base their decision on any distinctive feature of proprietary estoppel but proceeded on the assumption that there was no distinction between promissory and proprietary estoppel so far as the problem before them was concerned. But if we look at the judgments of Lord Deaning and Carman, L.J., it is apparent that they did not base their decision on any distinctive feature of proprietary estoppel but proceeded on the assumption that there was no distinction between promissory and proprietary estoppel so far as the problem before them was concerned. Both the learned Law Lord and the learned Lord Justice applied the principle of promissory estoppel in giving relief to Crabb. Lord Deaning, referring to what Lord Cairns had said in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. a decision from which inspiration was drawn by him for evolving the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the High Tree's case, observed that" it is the first principle on which all courts of equity proceed that it will prevent person from insisting on his strict legal rights-whether arising under a contract, or on his title deeds, or by statute-when it would be inequitable for him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties". The decision in the High Trees' case was also referred to the learned Law Lord and so also other cases supporting the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Carman, L.J. also observed that in pursuing the inquiry as to whether there was an equity in favour of Crabb, he did not find helpful "the distinction between promissory and proprietary estoppel". He added that this "distinction may indeed be valuable to those who have to teach or expound the law, but I do not think that, in solving the particular problem raised by a particular case, putting the law into categories is of the slightest assistance". It does appear to us that this was a case decided on the principle of promissory estoppel. The representative of the Arun District Council clearly gave assurance to Crabb that they would give him access to the new road at point B to serve the southern portion of his land and the Arun District Council in fact constructed a gate at point B, and in the belief induced by this representation that he would have right of access to the new road at point B, Crabb agreed to sell the northern portion of his land without reserving for himself as owner of the southern portion any right of way over the northern portion for the purpose of access to the new road. This was the reason why the Court raised an equity in favour of Crabb and held that the equity would be satisfied by giving Crabb "the right of access at point B free of charge without paying anything for it". Arun District Council was held bound by its promise to provide Crabb access to the new road at point B and this promise was enforced against Arun District Council at the instance of Crabb. The case was one which fell within the category of promissory estoppel and it may be regarded as supporting the view that promissory estoppel can be the basis of a cause of action. It is possible that the case also came within the rule of proprietary estoppel enunciated by Lord Kings down in Ramsden v. Dyson: "The rule of law applicable to the case appears to me to be this : If a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land, or what amounts to the same thing, under an expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord that he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of such land, with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the land lord, and without objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a Court of equity will compel the landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation." and Spencer Bower and Turner may be right in observing that that was perhaps the reason why it was held that the promise made by Arun District Council gave rise to a cause of action in favour of Crabb. But, on what principle, one may ask, is the distinction to be sustained between promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel in the matter of enforcement by action. If proprietary estoppel can furnish a cause of action, why should promissory estoppel not. There is no qualitative difference between the two. Both are the off-springs of equity and if equity is flexible enough to permit proprietary estoppel to be used as a cause of action, there is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity. 24. This Court finally, after referring to the decision in the Ganges Manufacturing Co. v. Surujmull (supra). 24. This Court finally, after referring to the decision in the Ganges Manufacturing Co. v. Surujmull (supra). The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of State for India (supra) and Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay & Ors. (supra), summed up the position as follows: "Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the Judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen." The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promises and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promises, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a Republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law. Every one is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned: the former is equally bound as the latter. It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of "honesty and good faith" Why should the Government not be held to a high "standard of rectangular rectitude while dealing with its citizens"? Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of "honesty and good faith" Why should the Government not be held to a high "standard of rectangular rectitude while dealing with its citizens"? There was a time when the doctrine of executive necessity was regarded as sufficient justification for the Government to repudiate even its contractual obligations, but let it be said to the eternal glory of this Court, this doctrine was emphatically negatived in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case and the supremacy of the rule of law was established. It was laid down by this Court that the Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the Government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee would alter his position relying upon it. But if the Government makes such a promise and the promises acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual. The law cannot acquire legitimacy and gain social acceptance unless it accords with the moral values of the society and the constant endeavour of the Courts and the legislatures must, therefore, be to close the gap between law and morality and bring about as near an approximation between the two as possible. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a significant judicial contribution in that direction. But it is necessary to point out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts as have transpired, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, the Court would have to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and after this position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. The Government cannot, as Shah, J., pointed out in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case, claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise "on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency", nor can the Government claim to be the sole judge of its liability and repudiate it "on an ex-parte appraisement of the circumstances". If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the facts and circumstances on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether these facts and circumstances are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability: the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the Court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability: the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the Court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, the over-riding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law. The burden would be upon the Government to show that the public interest in the Government acting otherwise than in accordance with the promise is so overwhelming that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the Court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such over-riding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise "on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position" provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable. 27. We must also refer to the decision of this Court in M. Ramanatha Pillai v. The State of Kerala & Anr. because that was a decision strongly relied upon on behalf of the State for negativing the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel against the Government. This was a case where the appellant was appointed to a temporary post and on the post being abolished, the service of the appellant was terminated. The appellant challenged the validity of termination of service, inter alia, on the ground that the Government was precluded from abolishing the post and terminating the service on the principle of promissory estoppel. This was a case where the appellant was appointed to a temporary post and on the post being abolished, the service of the appellant was terminated. The appellant challenged the validity of termination of service, inter alia, on the ground that the Government was precluded from abolishing the post and terminating the service on the principle of promissory estoppel. This ground based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel was negatived and it was pointed out by the Court that the appellant knew that the post was temporary, suggesting clearly that the appellant could not possibly be led into the belief that the post would not be abolished. If the post was temporary to the knowledge of the appellant, it is obvious that the appellant knew that the post would be liable to be abolished at any time and if that be so, there could be no factual basis for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel for the purpose of precluding the Government from abolishing the post. This view taken by the Court was sufficient to dispose of the contention based on promissory estoppel and it was not necessary to say anything more about it, but the Court proceeded to cite a passage from American Jurisprudence, Vol. 28 (2d) at 783, paragraph 123 and observed that the High Court rightly held "that the courts exclude the operation of the doctrine of estoppel, when it is found that the authority against whom estoppel is pleaded has owed a duty to the public against whom the estoppel cannot fairly operate." It was this observation which was heavily relied upon on behalf of the State but we fail to see how it can assist the contention of the State. In the first place, this observation was clearly orbiter, since, as pointed out by us, there was on the facts of the present case no scope for the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In the first place, this observation was clearly orbiter, since, as pointed out by us, there was on the facts of the present case no scope for the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Secondly, this observation was based upon a quotation from the passage in paragraph 123 at page 783 of Volume 28 of American Jurisprudence (2 d), but unfortunately this quotation was incomplete and it overlooked, perhaps inadvertently, the following two important sentences at the commencement of the paragraph which clearly show that even in the United States the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applied against the State "when justified by the facts": "There is considerable dispute as to the application of estoppel with respect to the State. While it is said that equitable estoppel will be invoked against the State when justified by the facts, clearly the doctrine of estoppel should not be lightly invoked against the State". Even the truncated passage quoted by the Court recognised in the last sentence that though, as a general rule, the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not be applied against the State in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity, the Court would unhesitatingly allow the doctrine to be invoked in cases where it is necessary in order "to prevent fraud or manifest injustice". This passage leaves no doubt that the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applied against the State even in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. It is difficult to imagine that the Court citing this passage with approval could have possibly intended to lay down that in no case can the doctrine of promissory estoppel be invoked against the Government. Lastly, a proper reading of the observation of the Court clearly shows that what the Court intended to say was that where the Government owes a duty to the public to act differently, promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent the Government from doing so. This proposition is unexceptionable, because where the Government owes a duty to the public to act in a particular manner, and here obviously duty means a course of conduct enjoined by law, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. This proposition is unexceptionable, because where the Government owes a duty to the public to act in a particular manner, and here obviously duty means a course of conduct enjoined by law, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. 28. We may then refer to the decision of this Court in Assistant Custodian v. Brij Kishore Agarwala & Ors. It is not necessary to reproduce the facts of this case, because the only purpose for which this decision was relied upon on behalf of the State was to show that the view taken by the House of Lords in Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. (Supra) was preferred by this Court to that taken by Lord Deaning in Robertson v. Minister of Pension (supra). It is true that in this case the Court expressed the opinion "that the view taken by the House of Lords is the correct one and not the one taken by Lord Deaning" but we fail to see how that can possibly help the argument of the State. The House of Lords did not in Howell's case negative the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government. What it laid down was merely this, namely, that no representation or promise made by an officer can preclude the Government from enforcing a statutory' prohibition. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be availed to permit or condone a breach of the law. The ratio of the decision was succinctly put by Lord Normand when he said "....neither a minister nor any subordinate officer of the Crown can by any conduct or representation bar the Crown from enforcing a statutory prohibition or entitle the subject to maintain that there has been no breach of it". It may also be noted that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law. There can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. The Legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel." 2. Sh. Hrangdawla v. State of Mizoram & Ors. [2008 (Suppl) GLT 272] "2. There can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. The Legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel." 2. Sh. Hrangdawla v. State of Mizoram & Ors. [2008 (Suppl) GLT 272] "2. The petitioner purchased a plot of land locate at Hmarveng Kolsaib from one Sh. Kapzawna in the year 1992. After purchase of the land the petitioner constructed small house thereon and started living with his family members consisting of 4 children and the wife. The petitioner, after purchase of the land applied for a revenue pass from the appropriate authority completing with all the formalities required for the purpose and accordingly a House Pass No. K.396/2001 was issued in favour of the petitioner for the said plot of land. The house constructed was subsequently demolished and in place of the same an Assam Type house was constructed by the petitioner spending Rs. 50,000/-. But the said Assam type house was forcibly dismantled by the respondent No. 4 on 22.7.04 without permission from the petitioner for construction of a road starting from North Kolasib to Sairang and the land so belonged to him also was taken over forcibly by the respondent No.4 for the public purpose. It would be appropriate to stated at this stage that the revenue authority issued Land Settlement Certificate No. 501701/01/834 of 2005 i favour of the writ petitioner covering an area of 224.87 Sq. M and accordingly by virtue of this Land Settlement Certificate the petitioner became the owner and possessor of the building and the land. After demolition of his building so constructed by him and forcible taking of the land, the petitioner approached the appropriate authority for compensation. Since the respondents rendered the petitioner and his family homeless, it is further contended that the demolition and forcible taking over the land is an infringement of the fundamental right of the writ petitioner guaranteed under Article 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution. Forcible taking over the land and demolition of the house constructed by him without adhering to the procedure established by law as provided in the Land Acquisition Act is illegal. The petitioner, therefore, filed this writ petition under Article 300 A of the constitution for payment of compensation towards demolition of the building ad forcibly occupation of the land belonged to him. The petitioner, therefore, filed this writ petition under Article 300 A of the constitution for payment of compensation towards demolition of the building ad forcibly occupation of the land belonged to him. The petitioner further prays this court to issue direction to the appropriate authority to award compensation and damages for such acquisition of the land and demolition of the house. 7. There is no dispute in regard to the acquisition of the land and demolition of the house by the Village Council. There is also no dispute that while acquiring the land and demolishing the house, the provisions provided in the Land Acquisition Act had not been followed and adhered to. In the Land Acquisition Act, the manner of acquisition of land is provided and overriding of such provisions as incorporated in the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition so made can be termed as legal. 12. Apparently from the facts narrated by the petitioner we are unable to perceive any dispute question of fact in this particular case. According to Mr. N. Sailo, the land had been taken over and the building had been demolished by the respondent No. 4 and not by the other respondents. This court had already discussed herein before that all actions resorted to by village councils are attributable to the State. So in view of the that there cannot be any disputed question of fact and therefore, the case law so placed before this court and notice upon cannot have any bearing in our present case. The argument so put by Mr. N. Salio is found to have no substance. 13. Having considered all the facts and circumstances appearing and the law, this court is of the opinion that the petitioner has a remedy under Article 300 A of the constitution." 3. Khuraijam Indrajit Singh v. State of Manipur [1999(2) GLT 581] "8. It is not necessary for this court to go into the controversy on the exact manner in which the construction on the land was demolished because the fact remains that the petitioner now stands dispossessed from the land without the procedure of law as laid down in the aforesaid Sections of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1976, being followed and the State of Manipur is now in possession of the said land. In the case of Sohanlal v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 529 , the Supreme Court held that where the eviction of a displaced person in contravention of the express provisions of Section 3 of the Public premises (eviction) Act is illegal and the Union of India is in possession of the premises, a writ of mandamus can issue to an order in the nature of mandamus can be made against the Union of India to restore possession of the premises to him. Applying the aforesaid law to the facts of the preset case, since the petitioner has been dispossessed of the land without following, the procedure as laid down by the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1976, the petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandamus or for an order in the nature of mandamus for restoration of possession of the land. For this conclusion, I am also supported by the unreported Division Bench judgment of this Court in Civil Rule No. 172/ 82/Z58/83 (Shri M.K. Lakshmi Kanta Singh v. Shri Iringbam Tompok Singh) in which this Court has held in paragraph-10 of the judgment that the State cannot use police power to dispossess a person from any property without taking action under the provisions of law even where it is of the view that the property belongs to the State. Such restoration of land in favour of the petitioner, however, will not entitle the petitioner to construct again on the said land without obtaining sanction for construction of the building in accordance with the provisions of Section 124, 125, 126 and 127 and other relevant provisions of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994 which has come into force with effect from 24.5.94. 9. Coming now to the claim of the petitioner for compensation, although the petitioner has alleged in the writ petition that the building erected by him in the land in question was dismantled by the police team on 2.3.94 and 3.3.94, the said allegation has been expressly denied by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, namely the Director General, Manipur and the Superintendent of Police, Imphal District, Manipur and instead they have stated in their application numbered as Civil Misc Case No. 530/97 that it is the petitioner who voluntarily removed the unauthorised construction from the land in question. 3 and 4, namely the Director General, Manipur and the Superintendent of Police, Imphal District, Manipur and instead they have stated in their application numbered as Civil Misc Case No. 530/97 that it is the petitioner who voluntarily removed the unauthorised construction from the land in question. Thus there is a dispute on this basic question of fact as to whether the police team has dismantled the construction of the petitioner on the land in question. Further the petitioner in his writ petition has stated that the construction was a Lucca structure with CGI sheet roofing on iron truss and the cost of the said construction was Rs. 4 lakhs and that in addition a septic tank, water reservoir and latrine were also constructed at the cost of Rs. 50,000/- and all these structures have been dismantled by the respondents. But the respondents in their application numbered as Civil Misc Case No. 530/ 97 have denied the aforesaid statements of the petitioner and have instead stated that there was no such Lucca construction or septic tank or water reservoir or latrine but there-was only a katcha shed on the land in question. Hence the value of construction on the land which is relevant for determining the quantum of compensation is also disputed by the respondents. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot possibly award any compensation to the petitioner on such disputed questions of fact and it is only the civil court which can resolve 5. Ms. Mize, learned Addl. Senior Government Advocate appearing for State Respondents No. 1 to 5, and Mr. Jini, learned standing counsel for Respondent No. 6, submitted that though the State Government has approved allotment of the disputed land to the petitioner, formal allotment order which will finally actuate the allotment process, has not been issued by the Deputy Commissioner concerned, therefore, the petitioner is none better than an illegal encroacher on the Government land and since he is an illegal encroacher, he can neither, claim title over the disputed land, nor, claim compensation for demolition of the residential building and compound wall, which he had constructed on the disputed land. Rather, he should be made to pay for the expenditure incurred by the State Government for demolishing his unauthorized structures which he had raised on the Government land. 6. Rather, he should be made to pay for the expenditure incurred by the State Government for demolishing his unauthorized structures which he had raised on the Government land. 6. Taking into view the admitted facts and circumstances of the case, at hand, and submissions of the learned counsels representing the contending parties, this Court is of the opinion that though final order of land allotment has not been issued to the petitioner, he cannot be termed as an illegal encroacher on the Government land. Because: Firstly, he was allowed to enter the disputed land, and after proper survey/physical verification was conducted, the respondent Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, had forwarded/recommended the disputed land for approval of the State Government for allotment in his favour. The respondent Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, cannot throw the entire blame on the petitioner for the process undertaken by his Office which persuaded or prompted the State Government to approve the proposed allotment of the disputed land in the petitioner's favour. Secondly, issuance of formal land allotment order by the authority concerned after having gone through all the processes till the stage of approval, is nothing more than a formality. When the petitioner has been allowed to develop the land and reside on the disputed land to the extent of constructing his residential building and compound wall and all the infrastructures attached thereto and his application for allotment was going on in the right direction and the same was actually, approved by the State Government, the highest authority, it would, therefore, be unreasonable to say, at this stage, that the petitioner is an illegal encroacher on the Government land. Thirdly, may be that, the State Government has the authority to recall or cancel the approval given by itself for allotment, but, till the Government acted in that direction and cancel the same, just because the allotment process is short of actual issuance of the formal allotment order by the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, the petitioner cannot be termed as an illegal encroacher. Fourthly, even if the petitioner has to be evicted from the disputed land, it can only be done as per the law provided. Fourthly, even if the petitioner has to be evicted from the disputed land, it can only be done as per the law provided. Section 4 and 5 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 2003, provides that eviction order can be issued only by the Estate Officer, designated and authorized by the State Government under Section 3 of the same Act, which should also be published in the official Gazette. 7. From the facts submitted by Mr. Lampu, learned counsel for the petitioner, and the submissions of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of respondents, it appears that at the relevant point of time, the Superintendent of Police or the Assistant Inspector General of Police were not notified or designated by the State Government as Estate Officers as per the Act. Therefore, any order or any action passed by them for eviction of the petitioner from the disputed land, cannot be held valid in the eye of law. This goes to the very root of all the proceedings undertaken by the respondents and the impugned order, dated 29.04.2016, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, and all consequential orders, passed, thereafter. 8. In view of the above discussions and conclusions drawn, this Court could not have come to any other conclusion than declaring the entire process of evicting the petitioner from the disputed land, and the impugned order, dated 29.04.2016, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, and consequential orders, passed, thereafter, by other respondents and the acts undertaken thereto; illegal, arbitrary, and unconstitutional. Therefore, considering the matter in its entirety, and in the interest of justice, the impugned order, dated 29.04.2016, and consequential orders, passed, thereafter, by various respondents, are hereby quashed and set aside. 9. Needless to say but if the State Government wants to cancel the approval given for allotment to the petitioner, it may do so, only, in accordance with law. In case, the respondents choose not to do so, the possession of the disputed land, should be immediately restored to the petitioner. As regards the compensation amount, since the eviction order and other consequential orders, were illegally passed, that too, without power and jurisdiction, the State Government is bound to pay adequate compensation to the petitioner. However, the amount or quantum of such compensation, should be decided and arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, in consultation with the experts in the field. However, the amount or quantum of such compensation, should be decided and arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner, Itanagar, in consultation with the experts in the field. 10. With the above directions and observations, both these writ petitions stand disposed of. No costs.