ORDER : C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J. 1. In the captioned revision petition filed under Section 83(9) of the Wakf Act, 1995, the revision petitioner mounts challenge against the judgment dated 03.01.2014 in W.O.A.No.5/2010 of the Wakf Tribunal, Ernakulam whereby the Tribunal had declined to interfere with the order dated 24.12.2009 in proceedings No.E4-387/09/A passed by the Chief Executive Officer of the Kerala Wakf Board. The facts in a nutshell that culminated in the aforesaid order and the impugned judgment, are as follows:- 2. The revision petitioner, as also the 3rd respondent are members of the Padamugal Muslim Jama-ath, which is admittedly a Wakf registered with the Kerala State Wakf Board. Its properties are also registered with the Board and 3rd incorporated in its Register. The respondent filed an application, alleging unauthorised alienation of several valuable properties belonging to the said Wakf as also encroachment of several of its properties by a third party, before the 1st respondent. On its receipt, invoking the power under Section 54 of the Wakf Act, 1995, the 1st respondent issued notice to the revision petitioner herein, who allegedly encroached upon an extent of 7 cents, in Survey No.92/3(re. Sy. No.310/9) of Vazhakkala Village, of the Wakf. The revision petitioner entered appearance and filed a counter affidavit. Evidently, he took up the following contentions before the Executive Officer even while admitting the dedication of the aforesaid property by late Haji Pareed Pillai, his grandfather, as per Wakf Deed No.2048/1118:-Even after the dedication, the Wakif retained the possession of the properties as a cultivating tenant. Later, the father of the revision petitioner became the tenant of the Jama-ath and on his death, the petitioner became the cultivating tenant as regards the property in question. The scheduled property was surrounded by properties belonging to the revision petitioner having an extent of 41 cents in Survey No.93/2 of the same village. There was no access to the said scheduled property. In the year 1987, the Jama-ath had started construction of a new mosque. Its general body took a decision to sell its properties, then under lease, including the property in question leased out to the revision petitioner, in a bid to raise funds therefor. The Jama-ath insisted the revision petitioner to purchase the land and he purchased the land by paying a sale consideration of Rs.8,750/-. Its general body took a decision to sell its properties, then under lease, including the property in question leased out to the revision petitioner, in a bid to raise funds therefor. The Jama-ath insisted the revision petitioner to purchase the land and he purchased the land by paying a sale consideration of Rs.8,750/-. Though the Jama-ath received the said amount, it did not execute the sale deed till date. In the meanwhile, after effecting payment of the sale consideration, the property in question, then lying as Nilam, was reclaimed and from the aforesaid extent, one cent was given for the purpose of construction of a road to Thrikkakara Gama Panchayath. In short, from out of the scheduled property an extent of six cents is still remaining in the possession of the revision petitioner. He has taken various other legal contentions including the jurisdiction of the first respondent to entertain the aforesaid application under Section 54 of the Wakf Act, which culminated in proceedings No.E4-387/09/A dated 24.12.2009. Obviously, the 1st respondent passed the said order dated 24.12.2009 treating the revision petitioner as an encroacher and ordered him to remove the encroachment and also to hand over the possession of the property within the time limit specified therein. In case of his failure to do so, the matter would be referred to the Jurisdictional Sub Divisional Magistrate, for removing the revision petitioner with Police assistance as provided under Section 55 of the Wakf Act, 1995, going by the said order. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner herein approached the Wakf Tribunal, by filing W.O.A.No.5/2010. As per the judgment dated 03.01.2014, the Tribunal upheld the order of the Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board dated 24.12.2009 and dismissed the Original Application. It is in the said circumstances that the captioned revision petition has been filed. 3. We have heard Sri. T.H.Abdul Azeez, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, Sri.T.P.Sajid, the learned Standing Counsel for 1st respondent, Sri.Shinu J.Pillai, 2nd the learned counsel appearing for the respondent and 3rd Sri.T.U.Ziyad, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 4. Virtually the revision petitioner had reiterated the various contentions, which were un-successfully raised initially, before the 1st respondent and then, before the Wakf Tribunal. 4. Virtually the revision petitioner had reiterated the various contentions, which were un-successfully raised initially, before the 1st respondent and then, before the Wakf Tribunal. One of the contentions now, raised by the revision petitioner is that his grandfather, who was the Wakif even after dedicating the property in question had retained it as a cultivating tenant and later, his father became its tenant and after his father's death he became its cultivating tenant. Therefore, according to him, he was having a right to purchase the same in terms of Section 72(b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. But, he would concede that he had never approached the Land Tribunal to assert the said right. 5. We will refer to the specific pleadings of the revision petitioner for the purpose of deciding the question whether he is justified in raising the right to purchase under Section 72(b) if at all it was available, in view of the circumstances and admitted factual position obtained in this case. It is his precise case that after paying the sale consideration of Rs.8,750/-to the Jama-ath, he reclaimed the property in question and it is presently part and parcel of his courtyard. When that be the precise case of the petitioner, it is evident that the land in question had lost its original nature as tillable land viz., the nature of Nilam owing to its reclamation. In the context of the contention, it is relevant to refer to the definition of a 'cultivating tenant' under Section 2(8) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, which reads thus:- “cultivating tenant” means, a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.” We also deem it appropriate to refer to Section 2(7) of the Act, which defines the term 'Cultivate', as hereunder:- “cultivate” with its grammatical variations means cultivate either solely by one's own labour or with the help of the members of his family or hired labourers or both, or personally direct or supervise cultivation by such members or hired labourers have not agreed to pay or to take any fixed proportion of the produce of the land they cultivating it [and in the case of a member of the Armed Forces or a seaman, “cultivation” includes cultivation on his behalf by any other person” 6. The very case of the revision petitioner before the Tribunal as can be seen from the impugned judgment as also the averments in the revision petition would reveal that he had reclaimed the property in question which according to him, was Nilam. In paragraph 2 of the memorandum of civil revision petition he has stated thus:- “2. The revision petitioner's predecessor in interest was a cultivating tenant in 7 cents of Nilam, which was a Wakf. The second respondent Jama-ath sold the said Nilam to the revision petitioner in 1987 and thereafter he reclaimed the said Nilam. Thrikkakara Grama Panchayath acquired a portion of the said property and the remaining extent is in the possession and enjoyment of the revision petitioner. The reclaimed portion now is a part and parcel of the courtyard of the revision petitioner's residential building and was constructed a workshop in the corner of the said property.” (emphasis added) It is evident from the above extracted recital in paragraph 2 that he had already reclaimed it which was a Nilam. That apart, he had also constructed a workshop in the corner of the property. In such circumstances, he cannot be heard to contend that he is entitled to cultivate on the said land and he is a cultivating tenant and he is having a right to purchase the same under Section 72(b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. 7. The petitioner is also having another specific case. According to him, in the year 1987, he purchased the said property, by paying the sale consideration of Rs.8,750/-and thereby, he became the absolute owner of the said property. 8. Regarding the purchase of the property in the year 1987, the contention of the petitioner is that it was an oral sale and no document whatsoever was executed in connection with the aforesaid transaction of immovable property. According to him, even after the receipt of an amount of Rs.8,750/-as sale consideration, the Jama-ath had not executed the sale deed, so far. In short, his contention is that by effecting such an oral sale and giving the sale consideration of Rs.8,750/-, he became its absolute owner. As noticed herein before, his case is that it is after such purchase that he reclaimed it and constructed a workshop thereon. We will, now consider the tenability of this contention. In short, his contention is that by effecting such an oral sale and giving the sale consideration of Rs.8,750/-, he became its absolute owner. As noticed herein before, his case is that it is after such purchase that he reclaimed it and constructed a workshop thereon. We will, now consider the tenability of this contention. Firstly, the revision petitioner did not have a case that he had purchased the property in the year 1987 and for the said transaction the Jama-ath had obtained previous sanction from the Wakf Board. At the time of alleged transaction in the year 1987, the repealed Act viz., Wakf Act 1954 was in force. The said Act stood repealed only by virtue of the provisions under Section 112 of the Wakf Act, 1995. Going by Section 36A of Wakf Act 1954, there was a statutory interdiction for the transfer of immovable property of the Wakf, without the previous sanction of the Board. The said provision reads thus:- “notwithstanding anything contained in the Wakf deed, no transfer of any immovable property of a Wakf by way of -i) sale, gift, mortgage or exchange; or ii) lease for a period exceeding 3 years in the case of agricultural land, or for the period exceeding one year, in the case of non-agricultural land or building, shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Board. In the impugned order passed by the Wakf Tribunal, the validity of the alleged transfer of the property was considered in the light of Section 51(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995. The Wakf Act, 1995 came into force only with effect from 22.11.1995 and enforceable with effect from 01.01.1996. The corresponding provision to Section 51(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995 in the Wakf Act, 1954 was Section 36A, which we have extracted hereinbefore. It is to be noted that both under Section 36 A of the repealed Act and under Section 51(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995, there is a statutory interdiction to the transfer of immovable property of the Wakf without prior sanction of the Board. In short, even under the Wakf Act, 1954 which was in force at the time of the alleged transaction, no valid transaction of an immovable property belonging to a Wakf registered with the Wakf Board was possible without the previous sanction of the Wakf Board. In short, even under the Wakf Act, 1954 which was in force at the time of the alleged transaction, no valid transaction of an immovable property belonging to a Wakf registered with the Wakf Board was possible without the previous sanction of the Wakf Board. After evaluating the evidence on record and appreciating the rival contentions, the Tribunal had arrived at a finding that the transfer of the property in question was effected without prior sanction of the Board and therefore, it is void in terms of the provisions under Section 51(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995. In fact, the first respondent had also arrived at a finding that the claim of the petitioner that he purchased the property has no value at all as no prior permission was obtained from the Wakf Board for effecting such a sale. In the light of the indisputable position that the transfer of the property in question was effected allegedly during the year 1987 while the repealed Act was in force, and taking into account the statutory interdiction under Section 36A thereunder, we see no reason at all to hold that the Tribunal had gone wrong in holding that the alleged transaction cannot be recognized as a legal transaction. In short, we do not find any reason at all to interfere with impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal upholding order dated 24.12.2009 passed by the Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board. 9. We are fortified in our view on another ground, as well. The very case of the revision petitioner is that it was an oral sale and the sale consideration of Rs.8,750/-was given and it was received by the Jama-ath. True that, the factum of receipt of Rs.8,750/-towards sale consideration is not at all disputed by the Jama-ath. But the question is, whether in the eye of law, it could be said that there occurred a transfer of the said property by way of sale, recognizable in law. While considering the contention of the petitioner in that regard, it is only worthwhile to refer to Section 9 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads thus:- “9. But the question is, whether in the eye of law, it could be said that there occurred a transfer of the said property by way of sale, recognizable in law. While considering the contention of the petitioner in that regard, it is only worthwhile to refer to Section 9 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads thus:- “9. Oral Transfer - A Transfer of property may be made without writing in every case in which a writing is not expressly required by law.” However, under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908 it is mandatory to have a registered document as regards, the said transaction, if at all there was actually such a transaction. Section 17(1)(b) reads thus:- “17.Documents of which registration is compulsory- (1) (a) xxxxxxxxxx (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property” 10. The afore-extracted provisions for creating, declaring, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of an immovable property, the value of which is rupees one hundred or upwards would make it clear that registration was compulsory for transfer of the property in question. Thus, on a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions in the Registration Act 1908, and in the Transfer of Property Act it is evident that for the purpose of completing or effecting sale of the property in question, the value of which, even going by the case of the revision petitioner, was more than Rupees one hundred, the transfer should have been reduced in writing and registered. In the contextual situation it is also apropos to refer to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It reads thus:- “54. “Sale” defined-“Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made -Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.-A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” 11. Going by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the transfer of the property in question could have have been made only by way of a registered instrument. There is absolutely no case for the revision petitioner that the said property was transferred in his favour by a registered instrument, whereas, his case is that it was an oral sale. 12. In Meghmala And Others v. Narasimha Reddy and others reported in [ (2010) 8 SCC 383 ], the Honourable Apex Court held that an agreement to sell would not create any right of title in favour of the intending buyer. In the light of the aforesaid decision as also the provisions referred herein before and also taking into account the precise case of the petitioner that what was effected in the year 1987 is only an oral sale, the so called transfer cannot have any statutory sanction. In the eye of law, there was no sale of the property in question and the revision petitioner cannot be heard to claim that he is the absolute owner of the property in question having title over it. The contention of the revision petitioner is that since he had given the sale consideration to the Jamaath and they received it, the Jama-ath or any members of the Jama-ath cannot dispute his title over the property. We are afraid that the said contention cannot be sustained in the light of the provisions extracted hereinbefore relating to the transfer of a Wakf property. It can only be held that the revision petitioner and the Jam-ath had entered into an action which is clearly in violation of the law. We are afraid that the said contention cannot be sustained in the light of the provisions extracted hereinbefore relating to the transfer of a Wakf property. It can only be held that the revision petitioner and the Jam-ath had entered into an action which is clearly in violation of the law. The question is, 'can a person who has violated the law or done something wrong in the eye of law, be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong or violation of law?'. There can be no doubt that a person cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong or violation of law. When faced with such a situation, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that in equity, the revision petitioner may be given the liberty to approach the Wakf Board for getting sanction. The settled position of law is that when equity and law are in conflict, the latter must prevail. That apart, what is provided under the Act for effecting transfer of a property of the Wakf is prior sanction. It cannot be presumed that such a provision had been incorporated in the Act, without any purpose to be served. The creation of Wakf is nothing but dedication to the Almighty. When once it is dedicated to the Almighty, it cannot be alienated without sanction of law. It is to ensure this principle that such a provision had been incorporated. Such restriction which was there under the repealed Act has been incorporated in the present Act, as well. 13. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner, in a bid to sustain his challenge against the impugned orders, relied on the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in T.Kaliamurthi & Anr. v. Five Gori Thaikal Wakf & Ors. reported in AIR 2009 SC 840 . In Kaliamurthi's case, the Apex Court considered the scope of section 107 of the Act. Section 107 of the Act deals with the application of Limitation Act, 1908 (Act 36 of 1963). Section 107 of the Act reads thus:- “107. v. Five Gori Thaikal Wakf & Ors. reported in AIR 2009 SC 840 . In Kaliamurthi's case, the Apex Court considered the scope of section 107 of the Act. Section 107 of the Act deals with the application of Limitation Act, 1908 (Act 36 of 1963). Section 107 of the Act reads thus:- “107. Act 36 of 1963 not to apply for recovery of wakf properties.-Nothing contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to any suit for possession of immovable property comprised in any wakf or for possession of any interest in such property.” The Apex Court held that an extinguished right or barred claim could not be revived under section 107 of the Act. Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the decision in T.Kaliamurthi's case read thus:- 22. Section 107 lays down that nothing contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to any suit for possession of immovable property comprised in any Wakf or for possession of any interest in such property. Thus it can be said that this section virtually repeals the Limitation Act, 1963 so far as the Wakf properties are concerned. Therefore, it can be concluded without any hesitation in mind that there is now no bar of limitation for recovery of possession of any immovable property comprised in a Wakf or any interest therein. In this background, let us now see whether this section has any retrospective effect. It is well settled that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation until its language is such that would require such conclusion. The exception to this rule is enactments dealing with procedure. This would mean that the law of limitation, being a procedural law, is retrospective in operation in the sense that it will also apply to proceedings pending at the time of the enactment as also to proceedings commenced thereafter, notwithstanding that the cause of action may have arisen before the new provisions came into force. However, it must be noted that there is an important exception to this rule also. Where the right of suit is barred under the law of limitation in force before the new provision came into operation and a vested right has accrued to another, the new provision cannot revive the barred right or take away the accrued vested right. However, it must be noted that there is an important exception to this rule also. Where the right of suit is barred under the law of limitation in force before the new provision came into operation and a vested right has accrued to another, the new provision cannot revive the barred right or take away the accrued vested right. At this juncture, we may again note Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, as reproduced herein earlier. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act clearly provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect, or affects the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any enactment so repealed. 23. From the above, it is clear that the right of action, which is barred by limitation at the time when the new Act comes into force, cannot be revived by the change in the law subsequently. In Ram Murthi and Ors. vs. Puran Singh s/o Attra Singh and Anr. [AIR 1963 Punjab 393], it has been held that Section 107 renders the Limitation Act, 1963 inapplicable to suits for possession of immovable properties comprised in any Wakf or any interest therein but the right of a person to institute such a suit which is already barred at the commencement of this Act cannot revive. It was further held that his title is extinguished and a good title is acquired by the person in possession and that where the title of the true owner is extinguished in favour of the wrongdoer, it is not revived by that person again getting into possession. There is no remitter to the old title. In the light of the enunciation of law by the Apex Court in T. Kaliamurthi's case discernible from paragraphs 22 and 23, it is evident that what could not be revived is a barred claim at the time when new Act came into force. As noticed hereinbefore, going by the said decision, what could not be taken away is a vested right accrued by another merely taking into account the change in law. In such circumstances, the question is whether the petitioner had any accrued right. As noticed hereinbefore, going by the said decision, what could not be taken away is a vested right accrued by another merely taking into account the change in law. In such circumstances, the question is whether the petitioner had any accrued right. The revision petitioner himself admitted the fact that his grandfather had dedicated the property in question. Thus, indisputably it is a wakf property. Creation of a wakf is nothing but dedication to Almighty. When once it is dedicated to Almighty, except in the manner sanctioned by law, such a property cannot be alienated. In the new Act viz., Wakf Act 1995, such a rider is there in section 51(1). In such circumstances, there cannot be an alienation of a Wakf property otherwise than in accordance with law. That apart, he claimed ownership over the said dedicated property based on an oral sale. The contention of the revision petitioner, as noticed hereinbefore, is that he had given Rs.8,750/-as sale consideration to the Jama-ath and it was received by them and they had not executed the sale deed. It is nobody's case that such an oral sale was effected after obtaining previous sanction from the Wakf Board in accordance with the aforesaid provision. It is to be noted that such statutory prohibition was there in the Wakf Act, 1954 also. Even if it is taken that sanction was given, then also, in view of the fact that the alleged sale consideration was Rs.8750/-and the reason assigned before in the light of the provisions under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act and sections 9 and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the contention of the petitioner that he became the owner of the property based on an oral sale cannot be sustained. In short, the petitioner cannot be heard to contend that he had accrued a right and therefore, resorting to section 107, the property could not be recovered from him. T.Kaliamurthi's case would reveal that the decision is applicable only in respect of a right which is accrued legally i.e., to say based on an act done legally. It cannot be relied upon to legalise an illegal act relying on the said decision. The long and short of this discussion is that the revisional power available to this Court under the proviso to Section 83(9) of the Act, cannot be invoked in the case on hand. It cannot be relied upon to legalise an illegal act relying on the said decision. The long and short of this discussion is that the revisional power available to this Court under the proviso to Section 83(9) of the Act, cannot be invoked in the case on hand. In the result, this revision petition has to fail and is accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.