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2017 DIGILAW 1274 (ORI)

Kishore Chandra Sai (deceased) after him Trirthabasi Sai v. District & Sessions Judge, Bolangir

2017-11-07

B.K.NAYAK, D.P.CHOUDHURY

body2017
JUDGMENT DR. D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. - Challenged has been made to the inaction of the opposite parties for not giving promotion to the original petitioner to the post of Sheristadar. 2. The factual matrix leading to the case of the original petitioner is that the petitioner and opposite party No. 4 entered as Lower Division Clerks in the Civil Court at Bolangir on 18.7.1952 and 20.06.1953 respectively. Both of them passed the Departmental Examination held in the year 1954 and officiated respectively as Bench Clerk to the Chief Judicial Magistrate and Head Comparing Clerk of the District Court from the year 1973. Opposite party No. 4 was temporarily promoted to officiate in the post of Sheristadar in the office of the Subordinate Judge, Titilagarh vide order dated 26.8.1976. 3. Be it stated that, one employee namely, Nirakar Patnaik who joined the service in 1952 was systematically promoted to the higher post because of his seniority, but the same system was not applicable in the case of the petitioner. However, the wife of the petitioner became ill having suffered from Tuberculosis in the year 1975 and the petitioner went on leave for which he could not undergo Accounts Training in 1975. The petitioner is stated to have passed the Accounts Training Examination on 31.1.1978. After having passed the Accounts Training he was given promotion to the post of Senior U.D.C. It is averred inter alia that on 12.8.1987 a gradation list was published, wherein the petitioner was shown at Sl. No. 4 in spite of having passed the Accounts Training. 4. Be it stated that one Ganeswar Mahakud being at sl. No. 10 of the Gradation list vide Annexure-2 was promoted illegally as Shereistadar to the Munsif-cum-Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bolangir on 16.3.1977. After the revised gradation list was communicated vide letter dated 12.8.1987 the petitioner made representation as his position was at Sl. No. 4 in spite of completion of Accounts Training. Although the persons at Sl. Nos. 1 to 3 have not undergone the Accounts Training, they remained above the petitioner. In that list opposite party No. 4 and said Ganeswar Mahakud remained at Sl. Nos. 5 and 6 respectively. 5. It is stated that in spite of seniority and merit of the petitioner, the opposite party no. 1 by order dated 22.2.1989 promoted opposite party no. 1 to 3 have not undergone the Accounts Training, they remained above the petitioner. In that list opposite party No. 4 and said Ganeswar Mahakud remained at Sl. Nos. 5 and 6 respectively. 5. It is stated that in spite of seniority and merit of the petitioner, the opposite party no. 1 by order dated 22.2.1989 promoted opposite party no. 4 to the post of Sheristadar of the District Court, Bolangir to the utter surprise of the petitioner. It is stated that opposite party no. 4 in spite of adverse remarks in his C.C.R. and having got a warning for the mistake committed during service was promoted superseding the petitioner. Not only this, but also one Sri S.P. Tripathy without having passed the Accounts Training also was promoted to the post of Sheristadar before opposite party no.4 was promoted. Be it stated that the petitioner having not got any relief from opposite party no. 1, made grievance in Appeal No. 7 of 1989 before High Court in the Administrative side, but the appeal was rejected without addressing the real cause of the petitioner. So the writ application has been filed by the original petitioner Kishore Chadra Sai for quashing of Annexures-5 and 6 annexed to the writ application with consequential pensionary benefits as the petitioner has retired in the meantime. 6. Counter affidavit has been filed by opposite parties 1 and 2 refuting all allegations made by the petitioner. It is the case of the contesting opposite parties that the petitioner and opposite party no. 4 have not passed Departmental Examination in the year 1954 as there is no record as such. Although opposite parties did not give promotion to the petitioner to the post of Bench Clerk to the C.J.M., Bolangir, opposite party no. 4 was given promotion in the year 1976 without prejudice to the claim of seniority of others. But at that time the petitioner has not challenged the same although he was senior to opposite party no. 4 Even after passing the Accounts Training in December, 1978 the petitioner did not prefer to challenge the order dated 26.8.1976 under which opposite party no. 4 was given promotion, and agitate the claim of seniority over opposite party No. 4. Long after 18 years the petitioner came to this Court to allege about such lapses. 4 Even after passing the Accounts Training in December, 1978 the petitioner did not prefer to challenge the order dated 26.8.1976 under which opposite party no. 4 was given promotion, and agitate the claim of seniority over opposite party No. 4. Long after 18 years the petitioner came to this Court to allege about such lapses. When Ganeswar Mahakud got promoted after having passed the Accounts Training in 1977, the petitioner had not challenged the said order. 7. It is further stated that due to the suitability opposite party No. 4 and Ganeswar Mahakud were promoted earlier to the petitioner because opposite party no. 4 became senior due to his earlier promotion. The allegation of the petitioner that opposite party no.4 has got adverse remarks is denied by the opposite parties because that remark was given in respect of one D. Moharana, Nazir of the Court. The allegation of the petitioner as to the promotion of Sri S.P. Tripathy to the post of Sheristadar without undergoing the Accounts Training is a lapse on the part of the opposite parties, but that illegal action cannot be a precedent to give promotion to the petitioner. 8. It is the case of opposite parties 1 and 2 that the petitioner did not choose to undergo the Accounts Training because of his own conduct as he was attending to his wife and children. So opposite party no. 4 got promotion as Junior U.D.C. earlier to the petitioner and for that the Appeal Committee was pleased to reject the appeal of the petitioner. Convenience or inconvenience cannot have precedence over the statutory rules and provisions. According to the concerned Recruitment Rules, Accounts Training is a condition precedent for promotion to the post of U.D.C. In the year 1976 since the petitioner had not passed the accounts training and opposite party no. 4 had cleared the same, the later was given promotion to the post of U.D.C. and as such, became senior to the petitioner and accordingly, he was promoted to the next higher post of Sheristadar of the District Court. SUBMISSIONS: 9. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submitted that at the initial stage of appointment the petitioner was senior to opposite party No. 4. He also drew attention of the Court to Annexure-1, where petitioner was placed at Sl. No. 4 and opposite party No. 4 was at Sl. No. 5. SUBMISSIONS: 9. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submitted that at the initial stage of appointment the petitioner was senior to opposite party No. 4. He also drew attention of the Court to Annexure-1, where petitioner was placed at Sl. No. 4 and opposite party No. 4 was at Sl. No. 5. Referring to such gradation list he submitted that the petitioner was senior to opposite party No. 4 but the latter was given promotion by passing the petitioner without prejudice to the claim of his seniors. Since the promotion was given subject to claim of the seniors and the petitioner had claimed his seniority, his seniority should be restored above opposite party No. 4. 10. Mr. Mishra further submitted that the petitioner with the knowledge of the office has got financial help to get his wife treated as she was suffering from Tuberculosis. According to him, on 12.08.1987 the gradation list of staff after revision was published where the petitioner was found at Sl. No. 4 and opposite party No. 4 was at Sl. No. 5. He submitted that in spite of such gradation list published in the year 1987 opposite party No. 4 was promoted to the post of Sheristadar on 22.2.1989 vide Annexure-5. He further submitted that the petitioner has filed writ application after his retirement and also he has expired during pendency of the writ application. So, the legal heirs of the original petitioner stepped in for claiming retiral benefits of the original petitioner. 11. Ms. S. Ratho, learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that the petitioner was originally senior to opposite party No. 4 and while working as such, both of them passed the Departmental Examination, but the petitioner did not prefer to undergo the Accounts Training which is mandatory as per rule for promote from Junior Clerk to Senior U.D.C. It is clearly mentioned in the official records that opposite party No. 4 and Ganeswar Mahakuid having undergone the Accounts Training in 1976, they were promoted to the post of U.D.C. and opposite party No. 4 was posted as Sheristadar of the Court of Sub-Judge, Bolangir. 12. 12. Learned Additional Government Advocate further submitted that when the promotion to the post of Sheristadar of the District Court was considered, opposite party No. 4 was found to be senior to the petitioner in the cadre of Senior U.D.C., for which he was promoted to the said post after considering the records of the petitioner and opposite party No. 4. Since merit-cum-seniority is the criteria for promotion to the post of Sheristadar of the District Court and opposite party No. 4 was found more suitable, he was given promotion to the post of Sheristadar of District Court, Bolangir in the year 1989. The petitioner having slept over his right just after passing of Accounts Training by not challenging for restoration of his seniority, his claim is defeated by delay and laches. Not only this, but also while the petitioner was also superseded being not promoted to the post of Sheristadar, he did not challenge the same at that time and claimed for restoration of his seniority only after some years of his retirement. The writ application is liable to be dismissed due to delay and laches. 13. POINT FOR DISUSSION: (I) The main point for consideration is as to whether the original petitioner is entitled to restoration of his seniority and Annexures-5 and 6 are liable to be quahed? DISCUSSIONS:- POINT NO.I 14. No doubt the petitioner was recruited on 18.7.1952, whereas opposite party no. 4 was appointed on 20.6.1953. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had undergone Accounts Training in 1978 whereas opposite party No. 4 has undergone accounts Training much before that, it is the admitted fact that opposite party No. 4 was promoted to the post of Senior U.D.C. earlier to the petitioner. It is admitted fact that the petitioner did not undergo Accounts Training at the relevant time due to illness of his wife. 15. Annexure-1 is the gradation list which after being finalized was published on 3.2.1976. In that list the name of the petitioner was placed at Sl. No. 6. Both were found to have been appointed to the post of Junior Clerk. Annexure-2 shows that on 26.8.1976 the office of the District Judge, Bolangir-Kalahandi at Bolangir issued an office order stating that the petitioner and one Nirakar Patnaik had not undergone Accounts Training as required under the Rules. Opposite Party no. No. 6. Both were found to have been appointed to the post of Junior Clerk. Annexure-2 shows that on 26.8.1976 the office of the District Judge, Bolangir-Kalahandi at Bolangir issued an office order stating that the petitioner and one Nirakar Patnaik had not undergone Accounts Training as required under the Rules. Opposite Party no. 4 has undergone the Accounts Training in compliance to the Rules and as such he was promoted to the post of Sheristadar from the post of U.D.C Cadre and posted as such in the Court of Sub-Judge, Titilagarh. The same order shows that such promotion was made without prejudice to the claim of his seniors. On the other hand, the claim could have been made by the petitioner within reasonable time after such promotion was given to the opposite party no.4. Even after passing the Accounts Training in 1978, the petitioner did not challenge the order passed vide Annexure-2. 16. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu; AIR 2014 Supreme Court 1141 Their Lordships at paragraph-16 have observed the following:- “xxxx Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. xxxx” 17. With due respect to the said decision, it is settled in law that if one employee overlooks his right to claim within reasonable time, he cannot challenge the same after long years for the simple reason that his silence for his claim becomes perpetuated and after long years it is difficult to operate that portion of scar to cure him. Moreover, in the administration if a right is not claimed at appropriate time, the same is lost by delay and laches and cannot be reopened to unsettle the settled rights of other during interregnum period. 18. Moreover, in the administration if a right is not claimed at appropriate time, the same is lost by delay and laches and cannot be reopened to unsettle the settled rights of other during interregnum period. 18. Rule, 12 of the Orissa District and Subordinate Courts’ Ministerial Services (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter called as “the Recruitment Rules”) governing the case of the petitioner and opposite party no.4 states that the employee who has undergone Accounts Training is entitled to be promoted to the post of Senior U.D.C. subject to his suitability. When the statutory rules prescribe a criteria for promotion and on the date of promotion the petitioner was found to have not undergone Accounts Training, his claim to the said post is barred by statue. Of course he has taken the plea that he could not be able to undergo Accounts Training because of ill health of his wife. Annexure-3 series show that he has taken financial help from the office for treatment of his wife, but none of the documents show that he was exempted from undergoing Accounts training for the said purpose. For whatever reason, an employee cannot be exempted from the requirement of undergoing Accounts training. When on 26.8.1976 the petitioner was found to have not undergone Accounts Training, opposite Party No. 1 has rightly promoted opposite party no.4 as he was qualified for such post. 19. The promotion of opposite party no.4 to the post of Sheristadar of the District Court vide Annexure-5 was challenged. Of course the petitioner has filed Annexure-4 to show that on 12.8.1987 a gradation list was published where he was at Sl. No. 4 and opposite party no. 4 was at Sl. No. 5. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner still held seniority over opposite party No. 4 on 12.8.1987 and by then he has already passed the Accounts Training, for which he is entitled to be promoted instead of opposite party No. 4. On meticulous examination of Annexure-4 it appears that it is a gradation list prepared for revision, but it is not a final gradation list. So, it cannot be considered to allow the claim of the petitioner. 20. Annexure-5 shows that on 22.2.1989 opposite party no. On meticulous examination of Annexure-4 it appears that it is a gradation list prepared for revision, but it is not a final gradation list. So, it cannot be considered to allow the claim of the petitioner. 20. Annexure-5 shows that on 22.2.1989 opposite party no. 1 considered the matter of promotion to the post of Sheristadar of the District Court and on that date he promoted opposite party No.4 to the said post. It is clear from Rules that the post of Sheristadar of the District Court is a single post. It is also clear that opposite party no. 4 was senior to the petitioner in the cadre of Senior U.D.C. The Rule also shows that ony the Senior U.D.C. can be promoted to the post of Sheristadar of the District Court. Therefore, the order of the learned District Judge, Bolangir dated 22.2.1989 giving promotion to opposite party no. 4 vide Annexure-5 cannot be said to be illegal or improper. 21. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had preferred representation to the Appeal Committee of this Court against the injustice caused to him vide Appeal No. 7 of 1989. Annexure-6 shows that the Appeal Committee has disposed of the same, but the order of the Appeal Committee is not annexed by the petitioner to the writ application except a forwarding letter of the then. Deputy Registrar of this Court to the learned District Judge. But it is admitted by the petitioner that the Appeal Committee rejected his claim. When Annexure-5 is found legal and proper as per our above observation, we do not find any illegality with order of the Appeal Committee. So, Annexure-6 cannot be said to be illegal. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that Annexure-5 and 6 are correct, proper and legal. The point for consideration is answered accordingly. CONCLUSION: 22. The writ application is filed after the retirement of the petitioner in 1996. The claim for restoration of his seniority to the post of U.D.C. relates to the year 1978. The claim for promotion to the post of Sheristadar relates to the year 1989 and the rejection of the appeal relates to the year 1994. So, the writ application being filed after long gap of years to restore the seniority is otherwise defeated by delay and lahces. 23. The claim for promotion to the post of Sheristadar relates to the year 1989 and the rejection of the appeal relates to the year 1994. So, the writ application being filed after long gap of years to restore the seniority is otherwise defeated by delay and lahces. 23. It is observed in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others v T.T. Murali Babu (supra) as follows: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ Court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional Court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated state should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the Court, yet the writ Court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the Court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to this duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect other. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect other. Such delay may have impact on other’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A Court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons – who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ Court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 24. With due regard to the above decision, it is clear that in case of delay and laches not only the duty is cast on the applicant but also the duty is cast on the Court not to entertain such writ application where delay has not been properly explained. The writ petition is liable to be rejected due to undue and unexplained delay and laches. 25. When Annexure-5 and 6 are legal and proper and writ petition has been filed with undue delay and latches, we are of the view that writ petition sans merit. As such, writ petition is liable to be dismissed and the Court do so. Petition dismissed.