ORDER Sandeep Sharma, J. —Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr. P. C., is directed against the judgment dated 02.06.2015, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Shimla, District Shimla, HP, in Criminal Appeal No. RBT-230-S/10 of 2014, affirming the judgment and order of conviction dated 21.7.2014/27.10.2014, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No, (2), Shimla, H. P., in Case No. 966-3 of 2014/11, whereby the accused-petitioner (''the accused'' for short) has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short ''the Act'') and to pay compensation of Rs. 75,000/- to the complainant. 2. Briefly stated facts as emerge from the record are that the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. (2), Shimla, H. P., against the present petitioner stating therein that since parties (the accused and the complainant) were known to each other, the accused requested the complainant to arrange Rs. 60,000/- for his personal and business requirement. Accordingly, the complainant on the aforesaid request advanced him an amount of Rs. 60,000/- in September, 2010. The accused with a view to discharge his liability issued a post dated cheque bearing No. 318635 dated 10.1.2011, (Ext. CW1/A) amounting to Rs. 60,000/-, of his account maintained in Punjab National Bank, Kunihar. However, fact remains that on presentation, cheque in question was dishonoured vide memo dated 17.1.2011 (Ext. CW1/B) for want of sufficient funds in the account of the accused. 3. After receipt of the aforesaid memo, the complainant got legal notice (Ext. CW1/C) issued on 22.1.2011 to the accused through registered post as well as UPC on 24.1.2011 calling upon him to make the payment good but since no payment was made within the stipulated period, he was compelled to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, Learned Courts below on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, held the accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as per the description already given above. 4. 4. The accused being aggrieved with the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court, filed an appeal under Section 374 of Cr. P. C., before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Shimla, District Shimla, HP, who vide judgment dated 02.06.2015, dismissed the appeal preferred by the accused, as a result of which judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial court came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, the present petitioner approached this Court seeking his acquittal after setting aside the judgment of conviction recorded by the courts below. 5. Mr. Raman Prashar, Advocate, representing the petitioner, vehemently argued that the judgments of conviction and sentence recorded by the courts below, are not sustainable as the same are not based upon the correct appreciation of evidence available on record and, as such, same deserve to be quashed and set aside. While referring to the impugned judgments passed by the courts below. Mr. Prashar strenuously argued that bare perusal of the judgments suggests that courts below failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, which has led to recording of erroneous findings to the detriment of the petitioner and as such, same cannot be allowed to sustain. Mr. Prashar further contended that order of learned trial Court is not in conformity with the law because admittedly, the complaint was filed before the expiry of statutory period of fifteen days from the receipt of notice by the accused and as such, the complaint filed by the complainant ought to have been dismissed by the court below being premature. He also stated that bare perusal of the evidence suggests that the courts below overlooked the evidence of material witnesses and failed to return contingent and satisfactory finding qua that effect. While inviting attention of this Court to the statement given by the witnesses, Mr. Prashar, contended that courts below ignored the deposition made by the defendant who categorically stated that the complainant had not returned cheque and that was lying with his Advocate. He also stated that learned court placed undue reliance upon the report of handwriting expert, who in his opinion gave no detailed reasons for the findings given by him and as such, same could not be taken into account by the courts below while recording conviction of the petitioner accused. He also stated that learned court placed undue reliance upon the report of handwriting expert, who in his opinion gave no detailed reasons for the findings given by him and as such, same could not be taken into account by the courts below while recording conviction of the petitioner accused. He further stated that opinion of handwriting expert was not conclusive but it could be corroborative. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Prashar prayed for acquittal of the petitioner accused after setting aside the judgment of conviction recorded by the courts below. 6. Per contra, Mr. Ravinder Jaswal, Advocate and P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General, representing respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2-State, respectively, supported the impugned judgments passed by the courts below. Mr. Jaswal vehemently argued that bare perusal of the impugned judgments suggests that same are based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence available on record and courts below have very meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter. Mr. Negi, reminded this Court of its limited powers while exercising its revisionary powers under Section 397 of the Cr. P. C., to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, when it stands duly proved on record that the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon''ble Apex Court in case '' State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri'' (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452 : ( AIR 1999 SC 981 ) wherein it has been held as under:- ''In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.'' 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties as well carefully gone through the record. 8. True, it is that this Court has very limited powers under Section 397, Cr.P.C. while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction but in the instant case, where accused person has been convicted and sentenced, it would be apt and in the interest of justice to critically examine the statements of the prosecution witnesses solely with a view to ascertain that the judgments passed by learned courts below are not perverse and same are based on correct appreciation of the evidence on record. 9. As far as scope of power of this Court while exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 is concerned, the Hon''ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241 : ( AIR 1997 SC 987 ) has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- 8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order.'' 10. This Court with a view to ascertain the genuineness and correctness of the submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner carefully perused the entire record, perusal whereof nowhere suggests that there is any illegality and infirmity in the judgments passed by the courts below, rather same appear to be based on correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record. The complainant Prem Singh (CW1) categorically deposed before the Court that he knew the accused for last 15 years and in the year September, 2011, the accused had taken Rs. 60,000/- from him and for the purposes of repayment, issued a cheque Ext. CW1/A. CW1 also stated that on presentation, cheque is question was dishonoured vide memo Ext. CW1.B, He also proved on record demand notice Ext. CW1/C, got issued to the accused through his counsel by registered post and UPC. The complainant also proved on record the aforesaid receipts (Ext. CW1/D and Ext. CW1/E). It has also come in his statement that the accused had received notice vide receipt Ext. CW1/F, which was duly replied by him vide Ext. CW1/G. In his cross examination, CW1 specifically denied the suggestion put to him that he had only taken Rs. 20,000/- and in lieu of this, he had repaid Rs. 60,000/- qua which receipt was also issued. Similarly, he admitted that cheque was not filled by the accused but he categorically denied that the accused returned the amount taken by him and he filed false complaint against the accused, whereas accused in his statement recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C., admitted having borrowed Rs, 20,000/- only and claimed that his blank cheque was taken as security. He also stated that he had paid Rs. He also stated that he had paid Rs. 60,000/- including interest in instalments vide receipt dated 27.7.2011 and his blank cheque was misused. 11. The accused in his defence examined two witnesses namely Sh. Padam Chauhan, DW1 and Sh. Om Parkash DW2. Sh. Padam Chauhan, DW1 stated before the Court that in July 2011, the accused had given Rs. 60,000/- to the complainant vide receipt Ext. DW1/A, which bears his signatures at Mark-B. He also stated that receipt was scribed by the brother of the accused and Mark-A bears signature of the complainant. He also stated that when cheque was demanded by the accused, the complainant stated that cheque is with the Advocate and he shall return the same within 7-8 days, however, in cross examination, this witness stated that he is not aware as to whether the accused had taken money from the complainant. He also denied the suggestion put to him that the Ext. DW1/A was prepared wrongly. 12. Sh. Om Parkash DW2, who happened to be younger brother of the accused, stated that one year back, accused called him in the shop with an amount of Rs. 30,000/- and he visited the shop of the accused with Rs. 30.000/-. He also stated that at the instance of the complainant, Ext. DW1/A was written and he had paid Rs. 30,000/-to the accused and accused had paid amount of Rs. 60,000/- to the complainant. He also stated that at the time of scribing of the Ext. DW1/A, the accused, complainant and the witness Padam Chand were present. He also stated that when the accused demanded his cheque, the complainant told him that the same is with the advocate and shall return the same within 4-5 days. He also in his cross examination stated that he cannot say that when the accused received notice of complainant. 13. It emerge from the record of the court below that writing Ext. DW1/A was sent to the handwriting expert on the request of the accused for comparison of signature in '' Q1 along with other admitted specimen signatures/handwriting and report of the expert was received in the matter as per which Q1 on Ext. DW1/A was not written by the person, who admitted signatures A1 to A7 and specimen writing S1 to S44. DW1/A was not written by the person, who admitted signatures A1 to A7 and specimen writing S1 to S44. The accused also filed objection to the report of expert stating therein that the expert, nowhere stated that handwriting can vary, if the posture of a person is different. 14. In the instant case, as clearly emerge from the record, the complainant successfully proved on record the basic ingredients of proving the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act against the accused. The complainant while appearing as CW1 categorically proved on record that he had advanced an amount of Rs. 60,000/= to the accused, in lieu whereof cheque amounting to Rs. 60,000/- was issued by the accused. Ext. CW1/B clearly suggests that cheque in question was presented for encashment but same was dishonoured. Similarly by proving Ext. CW1/C, CW/D and CW/E , the complainant successfully proved on record that after dishonouring of the cheque, he got legal notice issued calling upon the accused to make the payment good within the stipulated period. Ext. CW1/F as well as Ext. CW1/G clearly suggest that notice as referred above, was duly received by the accused. Cross examination conducted on the complainant, nowhere suggests that the defence was able to shatter the testimony of the complainant, who in no certain terms, stated before the Court that he had advanced amount of Rs. 60,000/- to the accused on return basis. He also denied that the accused had only taken Rs. 20,000/-, in lieu whereof, he had paid Rs. 60,000/-, qua which receipt was issued. 15. True it is, in cross examination, the complainant admitted that the cheque was not filled by the accused but same cannot be sufficient to hold that the cheque was not issued by the accused in lieu of amount taken by him from the complainant until the counter is proved. As per Section 118 of the Act, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Similarly, Section 139 provides that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of whole or part of any debt or liability. As per Section 118 of the Act, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Similarly, Section 139 provides that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of whole or part of any debt or liability. As per provisions of Section 20 of the Act, it is open for the person to sign and deliver blank and incomplete instrument and it is equally open for the holder to fill up blank instrument and specify amount therein. Hence, there is no force in the defence taken by the accused that he had given a blank cheque to the complainant as a security. Similarly, there is no dispute that accused can rebut the presumptions as referred supra, by preponderance of the probabilities and is not required to rebut the presumptions beyond reasonable doubt. But in the instant case, as has emerged from the record, the accused failed to take consistent defence, if any, qua the issuance of cheque by him. In his statement recorded under Section 313, Cr. P. C., the accused, on one hand stated that he only took Rs. 20,000/- from the complainant and has already returned Rs. 60,000/- with interest. In his cross examination, he stated that he issued cheque Ext. CW1/A for security. He also stated that he has repaid Rs. 60,000/- with interest. If statement made by accused under Section 313 is read juxtaposing his statement, especially, cross examination before the Court, it can be safely concluded that the accused had issued cheque Ext. CW1/A. Hence, there cannot be any dispute with regard to the issuance of cheque by him in favour of the complainant. Accused with a view to prove that he paid Rs. 60,000/- to the complainant also produced DW1 Padam Chauhan, who claimed that he signed on Ext. DW1/A. Similarly, Om Parkash DW2, who claimed that he scribed the receipt Ext. DW1/A happened to be the brother of the accused , DW2 in his deposition made before this Court stated that he gave Rs. 30,000/- to the accused, who gave Rs. 60,000/- to the complainant. Even aforesaid defence witnesses adduced on record by the accused proves on record that an amount of Rs. DW1/A happened to be the brother of the accused , DW2 in his deposition made before this Court stated that he gave Rs. 30,000/- to the accused, who gave Rs. 60,000/- to the complainant. Even aforesaid defence witnesses adduced on record by the accused proves on record that an amount of Rs. 60,000/- was taken by the accused from the complainant, who unequivocally stated that he advanced an amount of Rs. 60,000/- to the accused. Since, there is ample evidence on record as has been discussed above, that accused had taken Rs. 60,000/- from the complainant, there is strong presumption of truth attached to the version put forth by the complainant that accused in order to discharge his liability issued cheque amount of Rs. 60,000/- Ext. CW1/A, perusal whereof, clearly suggests that accused issued cheque dated 1.10.2011 amounting to Rs. 60,000/- in favour of the complainant which was ultimately dishonoured on 17.1.2011. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that after dishonouring of the cheque, the complainant took all measures to get the amount recovered as required under Section 138 of the Act and as such, there is sufficient compliance on the part of the complainant as far as Section 138 of the Act is concerned, Similarly, this court sees that pursuant to the demand notice issued by the complaint, accused sent reply i.e. Ext. CW1/G wherein he admitted having taken Rs. 60,000/-from the complainant, but in aforesaid communication, he claimed that he already repaid entire amount but interestingly, no receipt was executed. Perusal of contents of the reply, clearly falsify the defence taken by the accused under Section 313, Cr. P. C. as well as statement before the Court that he had only taken Rs. 20,000/- from the complainant. In reply to the demand notice, accused claimed that he had returned entire amount, whereas defence witnesses stated before the Court that amount was paid vide Ext. DW1 by the accused to the complainant in lieu of amount i.e. Rs. 20,000/- taken by him. It may be noticed that Ext. DW1/A is dated 28.7.2011, which suggests that amount was paid in the presence of witnesses. Perusal of Ext. DW1/A, which is dated 28.7,2000 falsify the earlier stand taken by the accused wherein he in his reply dated 11.1.2011 to the demand notice categorically stated that entire amount of Rs. 60,000/- stands paid to the complainant. DW1/A is dated 28.7.2011, which suggests that amount was paid in the presence of witnesses. Perusal of Ext. DW1/A, which is dated 28.7,2000 falsify the earlier stand taken by the accused wherein he in his reply dated 11.1.2011 to the demand notice categorically stated that entire amount of Rs. 60,000/- stands paid to the complainant. If accused had already paid the amount prior to sending his reply dated 11.1.2007 to the legal notice Ext. CW1/G, where was the occasion for him to repay the entire amount as reflected in Ext. DW12/A. Hence, this court sees all reasons to draw adverse inference against the petitioner accused, who apparently in his desperation to defeat the genuine claim of the complainant took contradictory defenses/pleas as well as placed on record contrary documentary evidence. As per the report of the handwriting expert, signature on Ext. DW1/A, were not found to be same as per admitted specimen signatures and writing and as such, version put forth by DW2 i.e. brother of the accused was rightly not taken into consideration by the courts below being interested witness. Perusal of demand notice Ext. CW1/C, nowhere suggests that it was not issued within the stipulated period. Perusal of Ext. CW1/D i.e. postal receipt clearly suggests that same was posted on 24.1.2011, whereas Ext.CW1/E and Ext. CWF clearly suggests that same was received and replied by the accused vide letter Ext. CW1/G as, such, there is nothing on record to suggest that the complaint was filed before the expiry of the stipulated date. 16. After bestowing my thoughtful consideration, I see no reason to differ with the well reasoned finding returned by the courts below which are based upon the proper appreciation of the evidence available on record. Accordingly, present petition is dismissed and judgments passed by the Courts below are upheld. Petitioner accused is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by learned trial Court. Needless to say that order dated 17.9.2015, passed by this Court, whereby sentence imposed by the Court below was suspended, shall stand vacated automatically.