ORDER : C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J. 1. The captioned Civil Revision Petition is filed against the judgment of the Wakf Tribunal, Ernakulam dated 10.6.2013 in W.O.S.No.18 of 2012. The revision petitioner herein was the plaintiff and the respondents herein were the defendants, therein and it was filed seeking the following reliefs:- “(a) To declare that registration of the plaintiff as Wakf No.7995/RA of the Kerala State Wakf Board as per communication of the second defendant dated, 28.12.2011 is null and void. (b) To declare that the plaintiff is a Trust and not a Wakf liable to be registered under the Wakf Act, 1995. (c) To restrain the defendants by a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from taking any further action or steps against the plaintiff treating them as a Wakf and not to compel the plaintiff to perform the obligation under the Wakf Act, 1995. (d) To grant the plaintiff such further and other incidental reliefs as the plaintiff may ask for and that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to grant.” 2. The revision petitioner-Trust had instituted the suit raising the following averments and in the following circumstances:- The Trust acquired 19.825 cents of property comprised in Survey No.101 of Punithura Village in Kanayannur Taluk by virtue of assignment deed Nos.861, 1688, 2526 and 1125, of 1992. Thereupon, it constructed a building in the said property and then, started using a portion of it as a mosque and the remaining portions as shops after obtaining permission from the Corporation of Kochi on 16.5.1995. Since it is not a wakf within the meaning of the Wakf Act no steps were taken under the said Act. While so, without affording the Trust an opportunity of being heard and thereby in violation of the salutary principles of natural justice the Wakf Board treated the mosque viz., Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli (for short the `mosque') managed by the revision petitioner-Trust as a wakf and required the Trust to register the mosque under the Kerala State Wakf Board. A letter dated 29.7.2009 was issued in that regard by the Board wherewithal the blank form required for such registration was appended. A reply was given to it intimating its stand that the mosque is not liable to be registered under the Wakf Act. A letter dated 29.7.2009 was issued in that regard by the Board wherewithal the blank form required for such registration was appended. A reply was given to it intimating its stand that the mosque is not liable to be registered under the Wakf Act. A communication dated 28.12.2011 was then received from the Wakf Board carrying the intimation that the mosque had been registered under the Wakf Act on its rolls with Reg.No.7995/R.A. It is in the said circumstances that the suit was instituted seeking the afore-extracted reliefs. Before the Tribunal, on the side of the revision petitioner its Chairman was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A4 were got marked. No evidence, either oral or documentary, was adduced by the respondents. The Tribunal had framed the following issues for consideration:- “(1) Whether the plaintiff is a Wakf liable to be registered under the Wakf Act, 1995 ? (2) Whether the registration of the plaintiff as Wakf 7995/RA is null and void ? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the prohibitory injunction prayed for ? (4) Reliefs and costs ? (5) Whether the suit is maintainable for want of notice u/s.89 of The Act ?” 2. The Tribunal had jointly considered issue Nos.1 to 3. After evaluating the evidence on record and the rival contentions the Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (Dead) by L.Rs. and others v. Mohd. Hanifa (Dead) by L.Rs. and others ( AIR 1976 SC 1569 ) held that the evidence on record, to be precise the evidence of PW1 that on every Friday Juma prayers are being conducted in the mosque with the attendance of about 500 people, is sufficient to conclude that it is a wakf by user. Consequently, it was held that the plaintiff therein/revision petitioner herein got no cause of action to institute a suit and therefore not entitled to get any of the aforesaid reliefs. Based on such conclusions and findings the said suit was dismissed. As noticed hereinbefore, it is challenging the said judgment that the captioned revision petition has been filed. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and also the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. Based on such conclusions and findings the said suit was dismissed. As noticed hereinbefore, it is challenging the said judgment that the captioned revision petition has been filed. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and also the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the judgment of the Tribunal is against the weight of evidence and that the Tribunal had failed to consider and appreciate the very concept of wakf while passing the judgment. Essentially, the contention is that when there is nothing on record to show that the mosque in question was specifically dedicated to the Almighty, the Wakf Board was not justified in unilaterally registering the mosque under the Kerala State Wakf Board. The suo motu registration of the mosque as wakf, in the absence of enabling power to do so, is liable to be set aside, it is contended. It is also contended that since the revision petitioner had not applied to the Wakf Board for registering the mosque as a wakf, there was absolutely no reason or justification for the Wakf Board to register the mosque with the Wakf Board. In short, the contention is that it is the perverse appreciation of the evidence on record that ultimately culminated in the order of dismissal of the suit. 5. Per contra, the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the impugned judgment is passed by the Tribunal on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record and applying the binding decision on the subject, rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The learned standing counsel drew our attention to the oral account of the Chairman of the revision petitioner-Trust while being examined as PW1, which was specifically referred to in the impugned judgment. It is submitted that going by his version, specifically referred to in the impugned judgment, while being examined he admitted the fact that on every Friday Juma prayer is being conducted in Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli and it is being attended by about 500 people. Furthermore, it is contended that in view of the said evidence tendered by the Chairman of the revision petitioner as PW1 the revision petitioner cannot be heard to contend that the Tribunal had wrongly applied the dictum of the decision in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case (supra). Furthermore, it is contended that in view of the said evidence tendered by the Chairman of the revision petitioner as PW1 the revision petitioner cannot be heard to contend that the Tribunal had wrongly applied the dictum of the decision in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case (supra). The very specific case of the respondents/the defendants is that the revision petitioner is not a wakf and it is the Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli which is a mosque by user that was registered as a wakf. It is also their contention that in such circumstances the revision petitioner-Trust is the Muthawalli of the said wakf. Furthermore, it is their contention that the Board hkad complied with all the necessary formalities contemplated under Section 40 of the Wakf Act before registering the mosque as a wakf under Section 41 of the Act. Thus, it is obvious that the respondents in unambiguous terms made it clear that the Board had not passed any order registering the revision petitioner-Trust as a wakf. In short, the contention is that the revision petitioner had failed to make out a case warranting invocation of the revisional power by this Court and the Tribunal had rightly considered all the relevant aspects of the matter. Therefore, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed, according to them. 6. In the light of the rival contentions as referred to hereinbefore, it is only appropriate to refer firstly, to the position of law regarding the scope of power to interfere with a judgment passed by the Wakf Tribunal, in invocation of the revisional power under the proviso to Section 83(9) of the Wakf Act. We do not think it necessary to embark upon a detailed enquiry into the revisional power of the High court under the proviso to Section 83(9) of the Wakf Act. The said provision itself would reveal that the High Court could exercise its revisional power to find out the correctness, legality and propriety of the impugned award/decision. The distinction between the appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction is to be borne in mind while considering the contentions raised by the revision petitioner. The said provision itself would reveal that the High Court could exercise its revisional power to find out the correctness, legality and propriety of the impugned award/decision. The distinction between the appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction is to be borne in mind while considering the contentions raised by the revision petitioner. In the decision in M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar ((1980) 4 SCC 259) while dealing with the revisional power under Rent Control Laws of certain States, including the State of Kerala, the Hon'ble Apex Court had articulated the distinction between the appellate jurisdiction and the revisional jurisdiction. Paragraph 2 of the said decision, in so far as it is relevant reads thus:- “'Appeal' and `revision' are expressions of common usage in Indian Statute and the distinction between the `appellate jurisdiction' and `revisional jurisdiction' is well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, and under same Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them act according to law, according to the procedure established by law and according to well defined principles of justice. Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood with reference to our statutes is always included in appellate jurisdiction but not vice versa.” 7. We are of the considered view that the aforesaid distinction articulated by the Apex Court as also the question whether it is necessary to remand a matter solely for the purpose of complying with the principles of natural justice have also to be borne in mind while considering the revision petition, on hand. We advert to the said question as the revision petitioner got a contention that the Wakf Board had violated the principles of natural justice. We advert to the said question as the revision petitioner got a contention that the Wakf Board had violated the principles of natural justice. The position that solely for the purpose of complying with the principles of natural justice a matter need not be remanded is well settled. The position of law is that if on remand of a matter the same decision alone could be reached, then it would be nothing but a futile exercise to remand the matter solely for complying with the principles of natural justice. 8. Natural justice is a principle of universal application requiring persons whose interests are to be affected by decisions, adjudicative or administrative, to receive a fair and unbiased hearing before the decisions are made and certainly, the principle is traceable to fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. (See the decision in Ex-Armymen's Protection Services Private Limited v. Union of India and others reported in (2014) 5 SCC 409 ). But, the host of cases brought before the court would reveal that this salutary principle has also certain limitations and exceptions. A contention that he had not been fairly heard before passing an order from a man who had absolutely no case of substance needs no interference as even a further hearing in case of interference with such an order would only be a futile formality and no court could do an act in vain. So also, no court can compel an authority to perform a futile formality and waste its invaluable time solely to satisfy the principle of natural justice, fully knowing that only no decision other than the one already taken could be taken even on a further hearing. 9. A Full Bench of this Court in which one among us (C.T.Ravikumar, J.) is a member considered such situation, in the decision in Sudheer v. Susheela reported in ( 2009 (4) KLT 29 ). 9. A Full Bench of this Court in which one among us (C.T.Ravikumar, J.) is a member considered such situation, in the decision in Sudheer v. Susheela reported in ( 2009 (4) KLT 29 ). In that decision it was also held:- “If a representation is filed by a contesting party and a decision is given adverting to his contentions, the decision must be held to be valid, even though there was no hearing by words of mouth.” What we are trying to emphasize is that as the very principles of natural justice have been evolved to secure justice it cannot be imported and interpreted, in a given case, to thwart it by undoing the justice duly done, by way of an objective decision. We will proceed to consider such questions with reference to the factual situation obtained in this case a little later. 10. In order to consider the applicability of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case (supra) in view of the indisputable and undisputed facts obtained in this case it is only apropos to refer to the nature of the evidence tendered by the Chairman of the revision petitioner-Trust while being examined as PW1, on behalf of the revision petitioner, before the Tribunal. The evidence tendered by him as PW1 is referred to in paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment. In this context one aspect is notable. We have carefully gone through the grounds raised in this revision petition. Evidently, a contention to the effect that the evidence of PW1 was wrongly adverted to, is conspicuously absent in the memorandum of civil revision petition. In fact, such a contention was not at all raised before us. At any rate, the revision petitioner did not adduce any further evidence to nullify the effect of the evidence of PW1. It can only be, therefore, taken that PW1 had correctly narrated the relevant factual position. While being examined, to be precise, during the cross examination, he would admit that the revision petitioner-Trust was not registered as a wakf and at the same time, he would further admit that on every Friday Juma prayers are being conducted in Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli and such prayers are being attended by about 500 people. There is no case for the revision petitioner that the state of affairs, as deposed by PW1 is contrary to the actual position. There is no case for the revision petitioner that the state of affairs, as deposed by PW1 is contrary to the actual position. At any rate, no other substantial evidence which would outweigh the oral evidence of PW1 is available on the side of the revision petitioner on that issue. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid nature of the oral account of PW1, the question to be examined is whether the presumption that the Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli constitutes a public wakf in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case, as drawn by the Tribunal is legally sustainable ? 11. For answering the aforesaid question it is worthwhile to extract paragraphs 39, 40 and 42 of the said decision as follows:- “39. Similarly Saksena in his "Muslim Law'', 4th Edn., at page 567 observes that under the Hanafi law a walf for a mosque will be completed only when the waqif separates the land and the building from the rest of his property, so that his ownership completely ceases in it, and either he delivers possession of the masjid to a mutawalli or to the Judge, or allows public prayers to be read in it. Similar observations are also found in Mulla' Principles of Mahomedan Law'', 17th Edn., at p. 184. 40. It would thus appear that in order to create a valid dedication of a public nature, the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) that the founder must declare his intention to dedicate a property for the purpose of a mosque. No particular form of declaration is necessary. The declaration can be presumed from the conduct of the founder either express or implied; (2) that the founder must divest himself completely from the ownership of the property, the divestment can be inferred from the fact that he had delivered possession to the Mutawalli or an Imam of the mosque. Even if there is no actual delivery of possession the mere fact that members of the Mahomedan public are permitted to offer prayers with azan and ikamat, the wakf is complete and irrevocable; and (3) that the founder must make some sort of a separate entrance to the mosque which may be used by the public to enter the mosque. Even if there is no actual delivery of possession the mere fact that members of the Mahomedan public are permitted to offer prayers with azan and ikamat, the wakf is complete and irrevocable; and (3) that the founder must make some sort of a separate entrance to the mosque which may be used by the public to enter the mosque. As regards the adjuncts the law is that where a mosque is built or dedicated for the public if any additions or alterations, either structural or otherwise, are made which are incidental to the offering of prayers or for other religious purposes, those constructions would be deemed to be accretions to the mosque and the entire thing will form one single unit so as to be a part of the mosque. 40-A. We would now refer to some authorities on the points discussed above. 40-B. In Jewun Dass Sahoo v. Shah Kubeer-odd-Deen, (1837) 2 Moo Ind App 390 (PC) the Judicial Committee explained the significance of the word 'dedication' and observed thus: "According to the two disciples, "Wakif'' signifies the appropriation of a particular article in such a manner as subjects it to the rules of divine property, whence the appropriator's right in it is extinguished, and it becomes a property of God, by the advantage of it resulting to his creatures. The two disciples therefore hold appropriation to be absolute, though differing in this, that Aboo Yoosaf holds the appropriation to be absolute from the moment of its execution, whereas Mahomed holds it to be absolute only on the delivery of it to a Mutwaly, (or procurator), and consequently, that it cannot be disposed of by gift or sale, and that inheritance also does not obtain with respect to it. x x x Bestow the actual land itself in charity in such a manner that it shall no longer be saleable or inheritable.'' 40-C. Similarly in Adam Sheik v. Isha Sheik. (1897) 1 Cal WN 76 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court pointed out that a mosque becomes consecrated for public worship either by delivery or on the declaration of the wakif that he has constituted it into a Musjid, or on the performance of prayers therein even by one person. (1897) 1 Cal WN 76 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court pointed out that a mosque becomes consecrated for public worship either by delivery or on the declaration of the wakif that he has constituted it into a Musjid, or on the performance of prayers therein even by one person. In this connection the court observed as follows: "According to all the authorities, a mosque becomes consecrated for public worship either by delivery to a Mutawalli (See Baillie's Digest page 616) or on the declaration of the wakf that he has constituted it into a musjid or on the performance of prayers therein (Ruddul. Mukhtar Vol-III, p. 571). The prayers of one individual alone would be sufficient so long as it is accompanied by Azan. In the Fatwa Kazi Khan the principle is thus stated:-the delivery of possession as regard a musjid is complete when only one person has prayed in it with Azan and ikamat. The view universally adopted is that prayers offered by one person in a mosque is sufficient to constitute it a public mosque devoted to the worship of God, for a mosque belongs to the Deity and there affixes to it a right of the Musulmans in general, and one person can be a proxy for the establishment of the right of the Creator and the public.'' "Therefore, if a person create a mosque and give permission to people to pray therein, it is an absolute wakf, and this opinion we adopt. (See also Fatwa Alamgiri, Vol. VI, and Baillie's Digest p. 616.) The special purpose of a mosque is that persons should perform their devotions therein; and according to the accepted doctrine even where there is no evidence of an express dedication in words, if it appears that one single individual, (other than the wakif) has offered his prayers at the place after the usual summons or call to the public, the consecration is complete.'' To the same effect is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Maher Husein v. Alimahomed, 36 Bom LR 526 = (AIR 1934 Bom 257) where the following observations were made: "There are special rules in the case of mosques -Wilson's Anglo-Mahommedan Law S-320; Ameer Ail's Muhammadan Law, Vol. I, p. 394' and Tyabji's Principles of Muhammadan Law, Section 514. I, p. 394' and Tyabji's Principles of Muhammadan Law, Section 514. When once a building has been set apart as a mosque it is enough to make it wakf if public prayers are once said there with the permission of the owner. x x x Dedication may be inferred from long user as wakf property. x x x In my opinion it must be presumed that the roza and the mosque have been duly dedicated and have become wakf by user, and the presumption may fairly be extended to the other buildings and the land enclosed within the compound wall which may be regarded as appurtenant to the roza.'' xxx xxx xxx 42. It is also well settled that where a mosque has been in existence for a long time and prayers have been offered therein, the Court will infer that it is not by leave and licence but that the dedication is complete and the property no longer belongs to the owner. In Miru v. Ramgopal, AIR 1935 All 891 the High Court of Allahabad observed as follows: "But where a building has stood on a piece of land for a long time and the worship has been performed in that building, then it would be a matter of inference for the Court which is the judge of facts, as to whether the right has been exercised in that building for such a sufficiently long time as to justify the presumption that the building itself had been allowed to be consecrated for the purposes of such rights being performed. Where there is a mosque or a temple, which has been in existence for a long time, and the terms of the original grant of the land cannot now be ascertained, there would be a fair presumption that the sites on which mosques or temples stand are dedicated property.'' To the same effect is the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Abdul Rahim Khan v. Fakir Mohd. Shah, AIR 1946 Nag 401. The same principles are legally deducible from the decisions in Masjid Shahid Ganj Mosque v. Shrimani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, 67 Ind App. 25/-( AIR 1940 PC 116 ) : Musaheb Khan v. Raj Kumar Bakshi, AIR 1938 Oudh 238 and Maula Baksh v. Amiruddin, ILR 1 Lah 317 = (AIR 1920 Lah 384).” 12. Shah, AIR 1946 Nag 401. The same principles are legally deducible from the decisions in Masjid Shahid Ganj Mosque v. Shrimani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, 67 Ind App. 25/-( AIR 1940 PC 116 ) : Musaheb Khan v. Raj Kumar Bakshi, AIR 1938 Oudh 238 and Maula Baksh v. Amiruddin, ILR 1 Lah 317 = (AIR 1920 Lah 384).” 12. The decision of a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Adam Sheik v. Isha Sheik ((1897) 1 Cal WN 76) had been referred to in the said decision in paragraph 40-C. In the said circumstances, a careful scrutiny of the decision in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case (supra) would reveal that there can be little doubt with respect to the position regarding the view universally adopted. It is held that the view universally adopted is that prayers offered by one person in a mosque is sufficient to constitute it a public mosque devoted to the worship of God, for a mosque belongs to the Deity and there affixes to it a right of the Musulmans in general, and one person can be a proxy for the establishment of the right of the Creator and the public. If a person creates a mosque and gives permission to people to pray therein, it is an absolute Wakf, it was further held. The special purpose of a mosque is that persons should perform their devotions therein; and according to the accepted doctrine even where there is no evidence of an express dedication in words, if it appears that one single individual, (other than the wakif) has offered his prayers at the place after the usual summons or call to the public, the consecration is complete. In the light of the aforesaid recital from the decision in Adam Sheik's case (supra) virtually, extracted with approval in the decision in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case (supra) and the oral testimony of PW1 viz., Chairman of the revision petitioner-Trust to the effect that on every Friday Juma prayers are being conducted in Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli and such prayers are being attended by about 500 people, it would be sufficient to presume that it is a Wakf by user in terms of the decision in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case (supra). Salie Labbai's case (supra). In such circumstances, we do not find any reason to uphold the contention of the revision petitioner that the decision of the Tribunal is against the weight of the evidence. The next question is even after arriving at such a conclusion that the finding of the Tribunal that the Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli is a wakf by user is legally sustainable whether the matter is required to be remanded based on the contention of the revision petitioner that the registration of the revision petitioner-Trust as wakf was made by Wakf Board in blatant violation of the principles of natural justice ? As rightly contended by the respondents the revision petitioner-Trust was not registered as wakf and in fact, it is the Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli managed by the revision petitioner that was registered as wakf under the Wakf Act. 13. We have already extracted the reliefs sought for in the original suit. The prayers to declare the registration of the revision petitioner/plaintiff as wakf as per the communication of the second respondent dated 28.12.2011 as null and void, to declare that the plaintiff is a Trust and not a wakf liable to be registered under the Wakf Act, 1995 and the further prayer to restrain the defendants therein/the respondents herein by a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from taking any further action or steps treating the plaintiff as a wakf and not to compel the plaintiff to perform the obligations under the Wakf Act are founded either on contentions cavil in nature or on a misconception of the factual and legal position. The position taken up by the respondents that it is the mosque managed by the revision petitioner-Trust that is registered as wakf and the revision petitioner-Trust would be its Mutawalli need not be doubted. Therefore, the question is whether the registration of the mosque managed by the revision petitioner as wakf needs interference, on the ground of an act done in violation of the principles of natural justice. 14. Section 36(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995 mandates for registration of every wakf, whether created before or after commencement of this Act, at the office of the Wakf Board. Going by Section 36(2) of the Act, an application for registration shall be made by the Mutawalli. 14. Section 36(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995 mandates for registration of every wakf, whether created before or after commencement of this Act, at the office of the Wakf Board. Going by Section 36(2) of the Act, an application for registration shall be made by the Mutawalli. The very averments of the revision petitioner would reveal that it fails to apply for registration of the wakf as required under Section 36(1) of the Act. True that, the contention of the revision petitioner is that only a portion of the building is being used as a mosque and the remaining portions are shops. The stand of the revision petitioner is that the mosque is not a wakf and therefore, it need not take any steps under the Wakf Act. We have already found that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case (supra) and also in view of the evidence on record the finding of the Tribunal that the mosque is a wakf by user is the correct declaration of law. In such circumstances, there can be no doubt that in terms of Section 36(1) of the Act, the mosque which is a wakf ought to have been registered with the Wakf Board. When the admitted position is that the mosque is managed by the revision petitioner-Trust the stand of the respondents that it is the Mutawalli of the mosque can only be the correct position in the eye of law. In such circumstances, it can be taken that the revision petitioner-Trust which is the Mutawalli of Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli which is a wakf had failed to apply for registration of the wakf as is required under Section 36(1) of the Act. A scanning of the Scheme of the Wakf Act would make it abundantly clear that if the Mutawalli fails to apply for registration of the wakf concerned, as required under Section 36(1) of the Act, then under Section 41 of the Act, the Board is obliged to require the Mutawalli to apply for registration of the wakf and/or the Wakf Board itself may cause the wakf to be registered. In the case on hand, the indisputable position is that the revision petitioner-Trust had not applied for registration of the mosque viz., Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli as required under Section 36(1) of the Act. In the case on hand, the indisputable position is that the revision petitioner-Trust had not applied for registration of the mosque viz., Masjidul Islam Juma-ath Palli as required under Section 36(1) of the Act. But, at the same time, a combined reading of Sections 36(1) and 41 of the Wakf Act, would reveal that the registration of wakf is a mandatory, statutory duty imposed on the Mutawalli and in case of his failure to do so, on the Wakf Board. Section 41 of the Wakf Act reads thus:- “41. Power to cause registration of waqf and to amend register.-The Board may direct a mutawalli to apply for the registration of a waqf, or to supply any information regarding a waqf or may itself cause the waqf to be registered or may at any time amend the register of auqaf.” 15. It is common case that the Wakf Board had directed the revision petitioner-Trust to apply for registration of the mosque. Going by the very contention of the revision petitioner, along with the letter dated 29.7.2009 requiring the revision petitioner to apply for registration of the mosque as wakf, a blank application form to enable it to apply for registration was also forwarded. Admittedly, in response to the letter dated 29.7.2009 the revision petitioner gave a reply taking up the stand that the mosque is not liable to be registered under the Wakf Act. Thus, it is obvious that in the case on hand, the revision petitioner who is the Mutawalli of the mosque in question had failed to apply for registration of the mosque on its own and even after a direction in that regard in terms of Section 41 of the Act, it had failed to apply for such registration. That apart, the stand taken by the revision petitioner in its reply was that it did not require to register under the Wakf Act. In such circumstances, in the light of the provisions under Section 41 of the Act, the first respondent had no other option but to cause its registration. In view of the factum of admission of letter dated 29.7.2009 the revision petitioner-Trust could not be heard to contend that the Wakf Board had not required the revision petitioner to apply for registration of the mosque under the Wakf Act. In view of the factum of admission of letter dated 29.7.2009 the revision petitioner-Trust could not be heard to contend that the Wakf Board had not required the revision petitioner to apply for registration of the mosque under the Wakf Act. The indisputable and undisputed position would reveal that even after such requirements rather, direction the revision petitioner was not willing to register the mosque in terms of Section 36(1) of the Act and it is in the said circumstances that the Wakf Board which is statutorily duty bound to cause registration of the wakf, invoked the power under Section 41 and registered the mosque. In terms of the provisions under Section 50(a) of the Wakf Act, a Mutawalli of a wakf is required to comply with the directions of the Wakf Board. In the light of Section 41 and under Section 36(1) of the Act, merely because the Mutawalli ignores to apply for registration of the wakf cannot be a reason for non-registration of that wakf and in such contingencies registration of the wakf by the Wakf Board can only be taken as discharge of the mandatory, statutory duty imposed on the Wakf Board. The contentions taken up in the revision petition would reveal that the revision petitioner had no intention to register the wakf and it was not applying for registration to avoid a liability, including the liability under Section 72 of the Act which is a necessary sequel of registration of a wakf. In view of the fact that letter dated 29.7.2009 was issued and in pursuance thereof a reply was given by the revision petitioner to the effect that the mosque did not require a registration it cannot be said that there was violation of the principles of natural justice. Hearing need not always be by words of mouth. Having been called upon to register the mosque by issuing a notice as provided under Section 41 of the Act the revision petitioner had not only failed to apply for registration but had intimated its stand that the mosque did not require registration. Hearing need not always be by words of mouth. Having been called upon to register the mosque by issuing a notice as provided under Section 41 of the Act the revision petitioner had not only failed to apply for registration but had intimated its stand that the mosque did not require registration. When that be the stand, taken up by the revision petitioner the refusal to accept such a stand in terms of the provisions under Section 41 of the Act by the Wakf Board and its consequential registration and the subsequent intimation regarding the registration cannot be said to be an illegal act in violation of the principles of natural justice, requiring an interference. Even otherwise, if it is taken that before registering it under the Wakf Act the Wakf Board ought to have issued a further opportunity to the revision petitioner it will now, be only a futile formality in view of the position of law obtained from Sections 36(1) and 41 of the Act, the decision of the Apex Court in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case (supra) and in view of the oral testimony of PW1, the Chairman of the revision petitioner that Juma prayers are being conducted on every Friday in the mosque and such prayers used to be attended by about 500 persons, there can be no doubt that even on further consideration the same decision alone could be reached, in the case on hand. In such circumstances, any interference on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justce, would be a futile formality. As noticed hereinbefore, as a matter of fact, in this case, in view of the provisions under Sections 36(1) and 41 of the Act and also taking into account the admitted fact of submission of reply by the revision petitioner to the letter dated 29.7.2009 it cannot be said that there was any violation of principles of natural justice. As noticed hereinbefore, the evidence of PW1, as discussed earlier, would reveal that the mosque is a public wakf and if so, it is to be registered mandatorily. 16. The question whether the property is a wakf property or whether the mosque was dedicated as a wakf is essentially a matter, in the first instance, be decided by the Wakf Tribunal going by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajasthan Wakf Board v. Devki Nandan Pathak & Ors. 16. The question whether the property is a wakf property or whether the mosque was dedicated as a wakf is essentially a matter, in the first instance, be decided by the Wakf Tribunal going by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajasthan Wakf Board v. Devki Nandan Pathak & Ors. (2017 (2) KLJ 717). It is to be noted that in W.O.S.No.18 of 2012 the judgment which is under challenge in this revision petition, the revision petitioner herein was the plaintiff. The revision petitioner raised all the contentions to establish that the mosque in question was not dedicated and it is not a wakf. After raising such contentions the revision petitioner adduced evidence before the Tribunal. The impugned judgment was passed after considering the evidence on record and after hearing the revision petitioner. In the said circumstances, there is absolutely no justification for the revision petitioner to attempt to resurrect the question of violation of principles of natural justice. In the light of the decision in Devki Nandan Pathak's case (supra) the question whether the property is a wakf property or not is a matter to be considered by the Wakf Tribunal. Evidently, in this case, as per the impugned judgment in W.O.S.No.18 of 2012 the question whether the mosque in question is a wakf or not has been decided by the Wakf Tribunal. The question is whether in invocation of the revisional power this Court could interfere with the conclusions and findings arrived at by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment. The nature of the evidence tendered by the Chairman of the revision petitioner-Trust while being examined as PW1 and the binding decision on the issue rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court would undoubtedly go to show that there is no impropriety, illegality or error crept in the impugned judgment which is liable to be corrected in invocation of the revisional power by this Court. The long and short of the discussion is that the revision petitioner has failed to bring out a case warranting invocation of the revisional powers. Hence, this revision petition has to fail and accordingly, it is dismissed.