JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR UPADHYAY, J. 1. The instant Letters Patent appeal has been filed by the Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar, Patna against the judgment and order dated 17.5.2011 passed in CWJC No. 1781 of 2011 filed by one Chinta Devi @ China devi for quashing the letter contained in File No. E.L.S. 14/2008-11739 dated 20.11.2009 (Annexure-13 of the writ application) whereby the Assistant Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar-cum-Under Secretary, Government of Bihar held out that the compensation amount to the husband of the writ petitioner is not payable in view of the provisions of the agreement entered into with the National Insurance company. The writ petitioner, accordingly, prayed for follow up direction to the respondents to pay compensation amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- as per the Insurance Policy to the writ petitioner as her husband died while performing election duty on 26.5.2000 at booth No., 67, Primary School, Mathura Sultanpur, P.S. Bidupur in the district of Vaishali. 2. The writ court after hearing the parties and relying upon the judgment in the case of Smt. Lilwanti Devi Vs. The state of Bihar & Ors.: 1998 (2) PLJR 692 held that the widow is entitled to payment of compensation but in view of the supplementary counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 9, the Chief Electoral Officer whereby he has admitted the liability the Writ Court directed the respondent No. 8, the District Magistrate and Respondent No.9, Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar together to ensure that the insurance amount as contained in the supplementary policy is paid to the writ petitioner for the death of her husband on election duty. In fact, the writ petitioner was paid the insurance amount of Rs. 10 lacs during the pendency of the present Letters Patent Appeal. 3. The appellant, who was respondent no. 9, has filed the present Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the writ court dated 17.5.2011 on the ground that the liability to pay insurance amount lies with the Insurance Company as the death of the husband of the writ petitioner occurred during the currency of the insurance policy and during the course of election duty on 26.5.2000. The appellant has not disputed the entitlement of the writ petitioner for payment of insurance amount of Rs. The appellant has not disputed the entitlement of the writ petitioner for payment of insurance amount of Rs. 10 lacs on account of death of her husband during the election duty but the only issue raised in the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court Rules is that the writ court has committed error in directing the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 of the writ petition, namely, the District Magistrate, Vaishali and the Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar together to ensure payment of entire amount instead of directing the Insurance Company and erroneously relied upon the judgment in the case of Kamlawati Devi Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.: 2002 (3) PLJR 450. 4. We have heard counsel appearing on behalf of the Election Commission as well as the counsel appearing on behalf of the State and Shri Ashok Priyadarshi, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company. 5. Mr. Priyadarshi placing reliance in the case of Lilwanti Devi (supra) submitted that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the insurance amount as the Insurance claim was not made instantly. However, he has not disputed the fact that the insurance policy was taken by the State Government during the election in 2000 from 9.2.2000 to 8.3.2000 which was subsequently extended from 24.5.2000 to 23.6.2000. He has also not disputed the fact that the death of the husband of the writ petitioner occurred during the course of election duty on 26.5.2000, i.e. during the currency of the insurance coverage. The only point he has raised for shifting the liability to pay the insurance amount on the State Election Officer on the ground that the insurance claim was not made instantly and as such, though the husband of the writ petitioner was covered under the insurance policy and the insurance policy was effective upto 23.6.2000 but the liability to pay the insurance amount by the Insurance Company ceased and submitted that the writ court has committed no illegality in relying upon the judgment in the case of Lilwanti Devi (supra) and fixing accountability on the State Election Commission and the District Magistrate, Vaishali for payment of the insurance amount. 6. In the case relied upon by the learned Single Judge and the Insurance Company i.e., Lilwanti Devi (supra) the foundational fact was quite different. 7. 6. In the case relied upon by the learned Single Judge and the Insurance Company i.e., Lilwanti Devi (supra) the foundational fact was quite different. 7. In Lilwanti Devi’s case (supra) the writ court held out that the policy covering the date of personnel accident has expired and as such, no direction can be given for payment after expiry of the time, whereas the fact of the instant case is entirely different. In the instant case it is undisputed rather admitted fact that the insurance policy was in existence on the date when the husband of the writ petitioner died during the course of election duty. Mr. Priyadarshi has not disputed either the factum of death during the course of election or the factum of coverage of insurance up to 23.6.2000. in view of the admitted factual position of existence or continuance of the Insurance policy upto 24.5.2000 to 23.6.2000 and the death during the said period of policy makes the case of Lilwanti Devi (supra) inapplicable in the present fact scenario. The reliance placed by Mr. Priyadarshi is totally inapplicable in the instant case. 8. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Siddharth Prasad and Mr. Shashi Shekhar Prasad placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Sushila Devi Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.: 2005(1) BLJR 677 wherein the judgment reported in 1998 (2) PLJR 692 (Lilwanti Devi Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) was distinguished on fact and considering the factual and legal position it has been held out that the Insurance Company is liable to pay the entire amount and cannot deny the same on account of delay. Paras 12 to 21 of the judgment are relevant for deciding the instant case which are quoted below: 12. On behalf of the petitioner the alternative claim made against the police authorities was not given up in the slightest degree but the counsel for the petitioner contended that notwithstanding the delay by the police authorities in giving information it was still the liability of the Insurance Company to make payment of the insured amount. In support of the contention, learned counsel relied upon a Supreme Court decision in Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti Devi and Anr., : (1999) 8 SCC 229 . Mr. In support of the contention, learned counsel relied upon a Supreme Court decision in Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti Devi and Anr., : (1999) 8 SCC 229 . Mr. Ajay Behari, SC X appearing for the police authorities also took the same stand, based upon the decision in the case of Basanti Devi. The counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that the Supreme Court's decision in Basanti Devi was followed by this court first by a learned single judge and then in appeal by a Division Bench for holding the insurer and not the employer as responsible for payment of the insured amount in Rajiv Kumar Bhaskar v. The Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. : 2001 (4) PLJR 180 and (then in appeal) in the Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Kumar Bhaskar : 2001 (4) PLJR 581 . 13. In the light of the decisions relied upon by the parties, it is to be examined whether the insurer is still to be held liable to make payment of the insured amount, notwithstanding the delay in giving information with regard to the death of the insured or whether the insurer can legitimately repudiate the claim and in that event liability to make payment of an amount equal to the insured amount may fastened upon the authorities responsible for the delay in giving information to the insurer. 14. Mr. Priyadarshi submitted that the case of Smt. Lilawanti Devi arose in similar circumstances and the order of the learned single judge in that case was conclusive of the issue. The order passed in Smt. Lilawanti Devi is very brief and I find that it does not address all the issues arising in the case. Moreover, it appears that the case of Smt. Lilawanti Devi was fundamentally different from the facts of this case. From the order passed in the case it appears that the husband of Lilawanti Devi died on 25.3.1993, as a result of sustaining injuries in an encounter with criminals. It is seen above that the insurance policy was initially for the period 1.3.1992 to 28.2.1993 and then it was renewed from 22.4.1993 to 21.4.1994. There was, thus, a gap from 1.3.1993 to 21.4.1993 when there was no insurance cover and the death of the husband of Lilawanti Devi had taken place during that gap. It is seen above that the insurance policy was initially for the period 1.3.1992 to 28.2.1993 and then it was renewed from 22.4.1993 to 21.4.1994. There was, thus, a gap from 1.3.1993 to 21.4.1993 when there was no insurance cover and the death of the husband of Lilawanti Devi had taken place during that gap. It was under that circumstances that the order observed as follows : "This Court is of view that it cannot direct the Insurance Company to make payment after expiry of the policy. In that view of the matter, this court directs the appropriate respondents authority of the State Government to examine the claim of the petitioner in respect of insurance amount. The petitioner is directed to make a representation along with the relevant records to the respondent No. 6. If respondent No. 6 finds that the petitioner has been deprived of from the insurance claim as a result of laches on the part of the officers of the State Government, he will make order for payment of insurance amount to the petitioner. ....." 15. In this case, the death of Hare Ram San indisputably took place when the insurance policy was alive and subsisting and, therefore, there is no question of his claim arising after the expiry of the policy. The order passed in Smt. Lilawanti Devi, therefore, has no application to the facts of this case. 16. The other decision relied upon by Mr. Priyadarshi in National Insurance Co. Ltd. has also no application to the facts of this case. That decision examined the effect of the stipulation in the insurance policy that unless an action was instituted within the specified period after the repudiation of the claim by the insurer, all benefits under the policy would cease and would be deemed to have been abandoned. That relates to para 4 of condition No. 8 of the present policy while the present case relates to the alleged violation of condition No. 1. 17. Coming now to the decision in Basanti Devi, relied upon by the petitioner and the State; in that decision an employee of the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (DESU) took an insurance policy from LIC under its Salary Savings Scheme. He paid premium for two months. 17. Coming now to the decision in Basanti Devi, relied upon by the petitioner and the State; in that decision an employee of the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (DESU) took an insurance policy from LIC under its Salary Savings Scheme. He paid premium for two months. The scheme provided that the premium for the following months would be paid, not by him directly, but by DESU by making deductions from his monthly salary. The premium for the 3rd month was paid as per the scheme by DESU by making deduction from his salary. For the next two months, though deductions were made from his salary, the DESU did not remit the premium amounts to the Insurance Company. At that stage, the employee died. The claim for the insured amount made by his widow was rejected by the Insurance Company on the ground that the policy had lapsed for nonpayment of premium. The claimant took the matter to the State Commission, constituted under the Consumer Protection Act. The Commission upheld and accepted the plea of LIC but held DESU responsible for making payment to the widow of the deceased employee on the ground that it was responsible of the lapse of the policy. In appeal, the National Commission affirmed the order passed by the State Commission. The Supreme Court, however, took the view that in the scheme of things DESU was in the position of an agent of LIC and hence, the liability to make payment of the insured amount still lay with the insurer. 18. In that decision, the Supreme Court examined in detail the nature of the policy as appearing from the brouchure on the scheme. The court also noticed specimen of the letter addressed by the insurer to the employer and the specimen of the letter that the employer was to write in reply to the insurer. It is significant to note that in the letter meant to be written by the employer in reply to the letter from the LIC it was specifically stated as follows : "In all transactions made by us pertaining to this Scheme and any policies issued by you thereunder, we shall act as the agent of our employees and not as your agent for any purpose." 19. Notwithstanding the above declaration, the Supreme Court held that the employer was an agent of the LIC as defined under Section 182 of the Contract Act though not within the meaning of the Regulations framed under the Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The finding that the employer was an agent of the insurer is based primarily on the consideration that once the policy was taken by the employee, the employer assumed the responsibility of deducting the premium amount from his monthly salary and remitting it to the Corporation. The employer, this, got the implied authority to collect the premium amount on behalf of the Corporation. The relevant passage from paras 11 & 12 of the decision is as follows : "......... .DESU is certainly not an insurance agent within the meaning of the aforesaid Insurance Act and the regulations but DESU is certainly an agent as defined in Section 182 of the Contract Act. The mode of collection of premium has been indicated in the Scheme itself and the employer has been assigned the role of collecting premium and remitting the same to LIC. As far as the employee as such is concerned, the employer will be an agent of LIC. It is a matter of common knowledge that insurance companies employ agents. When there is no insurance agent as defined in the regulations and the Insurance Act, the general principles of the law of agency as contained in the Contract Act are to be applied." Agent in Section 182 means a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with third persons and the person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented, is called the principal. Under Section 185 no consideration is necessary to create an agency. As far as Bhim Singh is concerned, there was no obligation cast on him to pay premium direct to LIC. Under the agreement between LIC and DESU, premium was payable to DESU who was to deduct every month from the salary of Bhim Singh and to transmit the same to LIC. DESU had, therefore, implied authority to collect premium from Bhim Singh on behalf of LIC. There was, thus, valid payment of premium by Bhim Singh. The authority of DESU to collect premium on behalf of LIC is implied. DESU had, therefore, implied authority to collect premium from Bhim Singh on behalf of LIC. There was, thus, valid payment of premium by Bhim Singh. The authority of DESU to collect premium on behalf of LIC is implied. In any case, DESU had ostensible authority to collect premium from Bhim Singh on behalf of LIC. So far as Bhim Singh is concerned DESU was an agent of LIC to collect premium on its behalf." 20. This court followed the decision in Basanti Devi in the case of Rajiv Kumar Bhaskar v. The Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors., and held LIC liable to make payment even though according to the Corporation the policy of the deceased employee had lapsed due to non-payment of the premium amount for several months. In the case of Rajiv Kumar Bhaskar, the deceased was a teacher in one of the colleges of Magadh University. The payment of monthly salary to him was in default for several months. A distinction was, therefore, sought to be made out that in the case of Basanti Devi before the Supreme Court, though deductions were made from the salary of the employee, the employer defaulted in remitting the deducted amounts of premium to the Corporation and, therefore, the concerned employee had no means to know that his monthly premium was not deposited in time but in the case of Rajiv Kumar Bhaskar, no salary was paid to him at all for several months and hence, it was well known to him that the monthly premium of his policy was not being sent to the Corporation and in that situation the liability for payment of a lapsed policy would not lie with the Corporation. This Court rejected the submission holding that as long as the employer was in the position of an agent of the insurer, the liability to make payment would continue with the insurer, the principal. 21. The reasons for which the employer was held to be in the position of an agent are fully present in the case in hand. I am not unconscious that the case of Basanti Devi arose from a life Insurance Policy under the Salary Savings Scheme floated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India and the present case arises from Group Personal Accident Policy of the Oriental Insurance Co. I am not unconscious that the case of Basanti Devi arose from a life Insurance Policy under the Salary Savings Scheme floated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India and the present case arises from Group Personal Accident Policy of the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. But the basic reason and the ground on which the finding in Basanti Devi is based remain the same. In Basanti Devi, under the Salary Savings Scheme the employer assumed the responsibility of deducting the premium amount from the monthly salary of the employee and remitting it to the Insurance Company. In the present case, the amount of net premium was raised by making deductions from the salaries of police personnel and was paid to the Insurance Company directly by the headquarter. In Basanti Devi, the employee had taken out the policy and he had paid the premium for the initial two months. In the present case, the individual at no stage came into any contact with the insurer. Even the policy on behalf of the individual police personnel was taken under the signature of the Director General and Inspector General of Police or his nominee. An individual employee had no option in the matter and it was not open to him to opt out of the policy. Under the rules, he was prohibited from making any correspondence directly with the Insurance Company and the claim and all matter appertaining thereto were to be routed through the police head-quarter. The payment of the insured amount was also received not by the individual claimant directly but by the police head-quarter and it was disbursed to the individual through the head-quarter. It is, thus, evident that the reasons for holding the police headquarter as the agent of the Insurance Company are available in the present case with greater force than in the case of Basanti Devi.” 9. Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi as second limb of argument has submitted that in view of the letter dated 10.2.2000 of the Chief Election Officer, Bihar the Insurance Company is not liable to make payment of the entire amount as information with regard to the death of the husband of the writ petitioner was not furnished within time. 10. Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi as second limb of argument has submitted that in view of the letter dated 10.2.2000 of the Chief Election Officer, Bihar the Insurance Company is not liable to make payment of the entire amount as information with regard to the death of the husband of the writ petitioner was not furnished within time. 10. We have gone through the contents of letter dated 10.2.2000 which was placed by the Insurance Company as Annexure-B to the counter affidavit, for ready reference the letter dated 10.2.2000 is reproduced herein-below: ^^fcgkj ljdkj eaf=eaMy ¼fuokZpu½ foHkkx QSDl & 7] exYl jksM] iVuk 800015 fnukad & 10-02-2000 izs"kd] Jh ,ŒdsŒ clq] eq[; fuokZpu inkf/kdkjh] fcgkj lg&ljdkj ds lfpoA lsok esa] lHkh ftyk fuokZpu inkf/kdkjh lHkh fuokZph inkf/kdkjh] fo/kkulHkk fuokZpu {ks= fo/kkulHkk vke pquko & 2000 fo"k; %& fo/kkulHkk vke pquko & 2000 ds fuokZpu ds fy, fu;qDr dfeZ;ksa ¼fofHkUUk lqj{kk cy lfgr½ ds fy, lkewfgd O;fDrxr nq?kZVuk chek ;kstukA egk'k;] jkT; ljdkj }kjk fd;s x;s fu.kZ; ds vuqlkj fo"k;kUrxZr xzqi chek ;kstuk ds egRoiw.kZ igyw fuEu izdkj ls gS %& 1- fuokZpu ls lacaf/kr dk;ksZ ds fy, fu;qDr lHkh O;fDr bl xqzi chek ;kstuk ls vkPNkfnr gksxsa ftuesa jkT; dfeZ;ksa ds lkFk dsUnzh; lqj{kk cy ds toku ,oa inkf/kdkjh] gkse xkMZ ds toku ,oa inkf/kdkjh] dsUnz ljdkj ds deZpkjh] dsUnz ljdkj ds miØe ds deZpkjh] lHkh izdkj ds deZpkjh ,oa inkf/kdkjh rFkk xSj ljdkjh O;fDr Hkh 'kkfey gSaA 2- ;g ;kstuk fnukad 9 Qjojh] 2000 ds vijkg~u ls ykxw dj nh x;h gS rFkk 8 ekpZ rd pkSchlks ?kaVs ykxw jgsxhA bl vof/k esa fdlh izdkj dh nq?kZVuk ds dkj.k fuokZpu dk;Z ds fy, fu;qDr O;fDr dh e`R;q gksus dh fLFkfr esa muds ifjtuksa dks nl yk[k :i;s dh jkf'k bU';ksjsal dEiuh }kjk Hkqxrku dh tk;sxhA ?kk;y O;fDr dks bl chek dk ykHk miyC/k ugha gksxkA pwWfd 'kkjhfjd viaxrk ds fy, chek ugha fd;k tk jgk gSA vr% fuokZpu esa ?kk;y dkfeZdksa ds fy, ljdkjh vFkok futh vLirkyksa esa miyC/k loZJs"B fpfdRlk djk;h tk;sxhA blds vfrfjDr viaxrk dh fLFkfr esa mUgsa jkT; ljdkj }kjk leqfpr vuqxzg vuqnku Hkh fn;k tk;sxkA ijUrq xaHkhj :i ls ?kk;y voLFkk esa gh rhl fnuksa ds vUnj e`R;q gks tkrh gS rks muds Hkh ifjtuksa dks ;kstuk dk ykHk feysxkA dsUnzh; lqj{kk cy ds lnL;ksa ds ifjtuksa dks mi;qZDr ifjfLFkfr esa 2-50 yk[k dh jkf'k chek dEifu;ksa ds }kjk Hkqxrku dh tk;sxhA 3- izfrfu;qDr deZpkfj;ksa@inkf/kdkfj;ksa dh e`R;q dh fLFkfr esa e`r deZpkfj;ksa@inkf/kdkfj;ksa ds mRrjkf/kdkjh dk uke vafdr fd;k tk; vU;Fkk ftyk fuokZpu inkf/kdkjh ds inuke ls cSad MªkV Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA 4- chfer jkf'k dk nkok izkIr djus ds fy, fuEufyf[kr dkxtkrksa dh vko';drk gksxh %& ¼d½ nkok gsrq vkosnu i= ¼[k½ iksLV ekVZe fjiksVZ@e`R;q izek.k i=A ¼x½ Fkkuk esa ntZ izkFkfedh ¼?k½ l{ke inkf/kdkjh }kjk fuxZr ,oa ftyk fuokZpu inkf/kdkjh }kjk vxzlkfjr izek.k i= ftlls ml O;fDr ds fuokZpu dk;Z gsrq izfrfu;qfDr dh lEiqf"V dh tk ldsaA fuokZpu dk;Z esa yxs O;fDr;ksa dh nq?kZVuk ds dkj.k e`R;q dh lwpuk vius utnhd ds fdlh Hkh jk"Vªh;d`r chek dEifu;ksa ds dk;kZy; esa nsuh gksxhA lwpuk izkIr gksrs gh mDr dEiuh ds deZpkjh lacaf/kr ftyk inkf/kdkjh ls lEidZ dj nkok vkosnu i= Hkjokus esa lg;ksx gsrq miyC/k jgsaxsaA nq?kZVuk ds QyLo:i e`R;q dh lwpuk us'kuy bU';ksjasl dEiuh fyfeVsM {ks=h; dk;kZy;] lksu Hkou] chj pUn iVsy ekxZ] iVuk dks nwjHkk"k la[;k & 220979] 223103 rFkk QSDl uaEcj & 220973 ij Hkh nh tk ldrh gSA vkidh lqfo/kk ds fy, bl i= ds lkFk us'kuy bU';ksjsal dEiuh ds {ks=h; dk;kZy; dk irk] nwjHkk"k la[;k dh lwph layXu gSA vuqjks/k gS fd bl ;kstuk ls fuokZpu dk;Z gsrq izfrfu;qDr] lHkh dfeZ;ksa dks voxr djkus dh d`ik dh tk;A fo'oklHkktu] ¼,ŒdsŒ clq½ eq[; fuokZpu inkf/kdkjh] fcgkj lg&ljdkj ds lfpoA** 11. From perusal of Annexure-B, the letter dated 10.2.2000 no reasonable man can read any specific time limit for raising the insurance claim and the claim of the Insurance Company that its liability to pay insured amount stands ceased in the event of non-raising of claim within the time limit as the letter does not specify any time limit for raising the claim. 12. We have given our anxious consideration to the judgment of the writ court and also letter as contained in annexure-B on which heavy reliance is placed by counsel for the Insurance Company, we are of the considered view that Insurance Company was obliged to make payment of the entire amount after death of any person employed in connection with election duty if death occurred during the currency or course of election and the insurance policy covers the period of election. 13. At the cost of repetition we state that the death of the husband of the writ petitioner occurred during the course of election and the insurance policy was in existence at the time when the husband of the writ petitioner died and as such, it is pure and exclusive liability of the Insurance Company to pay the entire amount and the said liability of paying the insured amount cannot be disowned by the Insurance Company on the pretext of not raising the said claim at once. It is to be borne in mind that the Insurance Company as insurer is under obligation to honour the promise of paying the insured amount if the accident took place during the currency of the insurance policy and such liability of the Insurance Company cannot be disowned on the ground of delay in raising the claim. 14. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and direct the Insurance Company to pay and reimburse the entire amount already paid to the writ petitioner by the appellant in compliance of the direction of the writ court within a period of one month. 15. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.