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2017 DIGILAW 1291 (KER)

Sangitadas v. M. V. Amber

2017-10-12

A.M.BABU, K.HARILAL

body2017
JUDGMENT K. Harilal. J. Facts 1. The appellants in the above appeals are the legal heirs of the deceased fishermen, by names Rahul Kumar Das and Matilal Choudhari, who died in a mishap caused by the first respondent ship, within the maritime waters of India. They were employees of a fishing boat, by name, 'Karmel Matha'. According to the appellants, on 11.6.2017 at 02.00 hrs., while the deceased were on board and engaged in fishing operation, within the coastal area of Kerala at Kochi, the first respondent vessel recklessly rammed into the said boat and as a result, the boat capsized and thereby caused the death of the said fishermen. The deceased fishermen were the natives of Assam and they came to Kerala, to eke out their livelihood. Their families were totally depending upon them for their livelihood. 2. In both the admiralty suits, damages caused to the appellants were calculated in monetary terms, for wrongful death caused, pre-death pain and sufferings, loss of estate, loss of love and affection, loss of support, the related damages to the family, loss of dependency, emotional trauma and value of dependency, as Rupees eighteen crores fifteen lakhs. The said damage has to be recovered from respondents 1 to 4 herein as per different maritime conventions, protocols, rules, laws, practices and procedures, for the unlawful death caused in the high seas, invoking admiralty jurisdiction of this Court, according to the appellants. Interlocutory Applications 3. The appellants in CMCP No.57/2017 filed I.A.No.1282/2017 and appellants in CMCP 58/2017 filed I.A.No. 1283/2017 in the respective admiralty suits for arresting the first respondent vessel, together with hull, tackle, engines, machineries, bolts, apparels and other paraphernalia under admiralty jurisdiction and it was allowed by the learned single Judge of this Court. Consequently, the sixth respondent was directed to arrest the first respondent vessel and report the matter to the court, forthwith, vide order dt. 17.7.2017. 4. Subsequently, the respondents 1 and 2 filed I.A.Nos.1396/2017 and 1395/2017 in the above admiralty suits, praying to determine the reduced quantum of security to be furnished as deemed reasonable by this Court, in the above admiralty suits and permit them to deposit the same, as security for the claim of the appellants, and to secure the release of the first respondent vessel. On 25.7.2017, when the said petitions came up for admission, without providing an opportunity to file objection, the Single Bench of this Court allowed both the LAs on the same day, according to the appellants. Impugned Order 5. Consequently, the first and second respondents herein were directed to furnish bank guarantee or demand draft of a Nationalised Bank, for a sum of Rupees one crore, in favour of the Registrar General, High Court of Kerala, directly or through their agency, as security. Further, the direction to arrest and detain the first respondent vessel is withdrawn on deposit of the above bank guarantee/demand draft and the Registrar General is directed to communicate the matter to the authorised officer, MMD, Kochi. It was also clarified in the order that the order of arrest and detention of vessel will continue till furnishing of the bank guarantee or demand draft. Grounds of the Appeal 6. According to the appellants, once the claim of the appellants is allowed as such, the court will not be in a position to execute the decree, as security, which is asked to be furnished for the release of the vessel, is very less, considering the plaint claim of Rupees 18.15 crores. Therefore, it is essential that at least the plaint claim has to be secured by this Court by directing the respondents 1 and 2, to deposit the whole claim amount or to furnish bank guarantee for the said amount. Once ship is sailed away from the Indian maritime waters, it would be impossible, to procure the presence of the vessel or any interested persons in the vessel, to satisfy the decree, if it is awarded in favour of the appellants, as prayed for. Thus, the appellants have filed this appeal, challenging the inadequacy of the quantum of amount, fixed as security, for the realization of the suit claim. Arguments 7. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondents. 8. The sum and substance of the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the quantum of amount fixed, as security, for depositing and furnishing bank guarantee, is inadequate and unreasonable, when the plaint claim is Rupees 18.15 crores. Arguments 7. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondents. 8. The sum and substance of the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the quantum of amount fixed, as security, for depositing and furnishing bank guarantee, is inadequate and unreasonable, when the plaint claim is Rupees 18.15 crores. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, unless the entire plaint amount is deposited, or bank guarantee is furnished for the entire plaint amount, the plaint amount cannot be secured, if the suit is decreed, as prayed for. In short, the Single Bench went wrong in fixing the quantum of security amount, by reducing the said amount to an amount much lesser than the plaint amount. In support of the aforesaid argument, learned counsel for the appellants cited the decisions in M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, 1987 (1) SCC 395 and Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Kapitan Kud, 1996 (7) SCC 127 . 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 advanced arguments, to justify the quantum of amount fixed by the learned single Judge, to deposit or furnish bank guarantee, for releasing the vessel. According to them, the claim of the appellants is exaggerated and vexatious to the international standards, while deciding quantum of compensation in similar matters. Further, it is contended that even if the monthly earning of the deceased is admitted as such, in no way an amount of Rupees 18 crore and 15 lakh can be awarded as compensation, tor his loss or damages. The plaint claim is not supported by any material, so as to make out a prima facia case for the same. The Single Bench is justified in reducing the quantum of security amount, to the satisfaction of the court, invoking the discretionary jurisdiction and power conferred to the Court, under Section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), the learned counsel contended. In support of the said argument, the learned counsel cited the decisions laid down by the Queen's Bench Division (Admiralty Court) [1977 Volume 11 Lloyd's Law Reports - Page 115], the decision laid down by the High Court of Calcutta in A.S.No.1/2017 [ 2015 (2) ALLMR 823 ] and National Aviation Co. India Ltd. v. Manubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel, 2009 SCC Online Gujarat 9760. India Ltd. v. Manubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel, 2009 SCC Online Gujarat 9760. Hence, the appeals deserve dismissal, according to the learned counsel for the respondents. Points to be considered 10. In view of the arguments advanced at the bar, the points to be considered are, (1) What is the source of power of the admiralty court to determine security amount to release an arrested ship; (2) How does the admiralty court determine security amount; (3) Whether the admiralty court has discretionary jurisdiction and power, to fix an amount other than or lesser than the plaint amount, for depositing the same as security or furnishing bank guarantee, to release an arrested vessel. (3) Is the amount fixed by the Single Bench of this Court just and reasonable, in view of the pleadings and other materials produced along with the suit. Point No. l 11. The aforesaid admiralty suits are seen filed under Sections 443 and 444 of the Act and Section 26 and Order 7 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The suits are filed, claiming an amount of Rupees 18 crores 15 lakhs each as compensation from the respondents. The Single Bench of this Court directed the respondents to deposit or furnish security for an amount of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-(Rupees one crore) only. 12. The jurisdiction and power to arrest the ship and fix the quantum of security amount to release her are envisaged under Section 443 (1) of the Act, which is extracted below: 443. The Single Bench of this Court directed the respondents to deposit or furnish security for an amount of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-(Rupees one crore) only. 12. The jurisdiction and power to arrest the ship and fix the quantum of security amount to release her are envisaged under Section 443 (1) of the Act, which is extracted below: 443. Power to detain foreign ship that has occasioned damage.(1) Whenever any damage has in any part of the world been caused to property belonging to the Government or to any citizen of India or a company by a ship other than an Indian ship and at any time thereafter that ship is found within Indian jurisdiction, the High Court may, upon the application of any person who alleges that the damage was caused by the misconduct or want of skill of the master or any member of the crew of the ship, issue an order directed to any proper officer or other officer named in the order requiring him to detain die ship until such time as the owner, master or consignee thereof has satisfied any claim in respect of the damage or has given security to the satisfaction of the High Court to pay all costs and damages that, may he awarded in any legal proceedings that may be instituted in respect of the damage, and any officer to whom the orders directed shall detain the ship accordingly. 13. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, we have taken note of the expression "damage has been caused to the property belonging to the Government or to any citizen or a company". It is pointed out that Section 443 is applicable to a case in which ship was arrested for realising the damage caused to the property of a citizen and here, the damage is allegedly resulted from loss of life and not property. But we do not venture to give or follow a grammatical interpretation to the said expression, in view of the declaration, interpreting the said provision made by the Supreme Court in M.V. Elisabeth and others v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth Vaso-De-Gama, Goa, 1993 Supp.(2) SCC 433. 14. But we do not venture to give or follow a grammatical interpretation to the said expression, in view of the declaration, interpreting the said provision made by the Supreme Court in M.V. Elisabeth and others v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth Vaso-De-Gama, Goa, 1993 Supp.(2) SCC 433. 14. In the above decision the Supreme Court held as follows: "In the absence of any statute in India comparable to the English statutes on admiralty jurisdiction, there is no reason why the words 'damage caused by a ship' appearing in Section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 should be so narrowly construed as to limit them to physical damage and exclude any other damage arising by reason of the operation of the vessel in connection with the carriage of goods. The expression is wide enough to include all maritime questions or claims. If goods or other property are lost or damaged, whether by physical contact or otherwise, by reason of unauthorised acts or negligent conduct on the part of the shipowner or his agents or servants, wherever the case of action has arisen, or wherever the ship is registered, or wherever the owner has his residence or domicile or place of business, such a ship, at the request of the person aggrieved, is liable to be detained when found within Indian jurisdiction by recourse to S.443 and S.444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 read with the appropriate rules of practice and procedure of the High Court. These procedural provisions are but tools for enforcement of substantive rights which are rooted in general principles of law, apart from statutes, and for the enforcement of which a party aggrieved has a right to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of a superior Court" 15. Thus, the Supreme Court has declared that "damage caused by a ship" appearing in Section 443 of the Act should be given a wide construction and the said expression is wide enough to include all maritime questions or claims. According to Section 352 of the Act, 'claim' means a personal claim or property claim and according to Section 352(f) of the Act, 'personal claim' means a claim resulting from loss of life or personal injury. Human life is more valuable than any property. According to Section 352 of the Act, 'claim' means a personal claim or property claim and according to Section 352(f) of the Act, 'personal claim' means a claim resulting from loss of life or personal injury. Human life is more valuable than any property. So we do not find any reason to exclude damage caused by loss of life from "all maritime claim envisaged in the above decision. Thus, we find that the claim resulting from loss of life would also tall within the sweep of "all maritime claim" contemplated in the above decision. 16. That apart, Brussel Convention of 1952 had unified the rules relating to arrest of sea-going ships and Article 1 of the said rule defines the expression "maritime claim". A claim resulting from loss of life is also included in the said definition of 'maritime claim' as clause (b) of Article 1. On a combined reading of Section 443 of the Act and the rules relating to arrest unified by the Brussel Convention, in the light of M.V.Elisabeth's case (supra) we find that Section 443 is a source of power, under which admiralty court can exercise discretionary jurisdiction in arresting the ship and fixing the security amount to its satisfaction. 7. ln the above context, it is pertinent to note that the legality or propriety of the arrest of the ship is not Challenged, either before the Single Bench of this Court or be lore us and this Court is concerned with the sustainability of the order, fixing the security amount to release the vessel only. We further find that whatever be the cause of arrest, whether it is for realizing damage caused to the property or loss of life, once ship is arrested and brought under the custody of the court, Section 443 is the only enabling provision in the Act, under which an arrested ship can be released. In the matter of determining the quantum of security for releasing the arrested ship, the sustainability of arrest does not require consideration. Code of Civil Procedure 18. Let US examine other source of power also. We further find that in M.V.Free Neptune v. DLF Southern Towns Private Ltd., 2011 (1) KLT 904 , this Court made a declaration that Code of Civil Procedure is the procedural law applicable to admiralty courts. Code of Civil Procedure 18. Let US examine other source of power also. We further find that in M.V.Free Neptune v. DLF Southern Towns Private Ltd., 2011 (1) KLT 904 , this Court made a declaration that Code of Civil Procedure is the procedural law applicable to admiralty courts. In this decision this Court considered the question, what is the procedure to be followed in exercising admiralty jurisdiction. This Court answered the question as given below: "This Court did not so far frame any Rules regulating the procedure for adjudicating the disputes arising under the admiralty jurisdiction. Therefore, we deem it appropriate to declare that henceforth any person approaching this Court invoking the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court shall institute a suit in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Such suit shall be tried by this Court following the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure. We also declare that the Rules framed by the Madras High Court in so far as they are not inconsistent with any other provision of law for the time being in force and with appropriate modifications shall apply to the conduct of such suits until this Court modifies the said Rules or the Legislature intervenes in this regard. We make such a declaration not only because we owe an obligation under law to device a procedure for the regulation of the proceedings before this Court as was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Elisabeth's case (supra) at para 64: 'Where substantive law demands justice for the party aggrieved, and the statute has ' not provided the remedy it is the duty of the Court to devise procedure by drawing analogy from other systems of law and practice'" 19. In view of the above decision, we further find that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereat the civil courts are clothed with wide discretionary jurisdiction, would come into play in fixing the quantum of security, after considering the relevant factors and conflicting interest of both parties. The applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure as procedural law to admiralty court is seen again re-inforced in M.V.Al Quamar v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd. and others, 2000 (8) SCC 278 . International conventions on release of arrested ships 20. The applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure as procedural law to admiralty court is seen again re-inforced in M.V.Al Quamar v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd. and others, 2000 (8) SCC 278 . International conventions on release of arrested ships 20. Let us examine the international conventions, which unified the rules relating to the jurisdiction and power vested with the admiralty courts, for arresting the ship and fixing the security amount, to release the arrested ship. We have already found that according to Article 1 (b) of the rules relating to arrest of ships, unified by Brussel Convention, 1952, 'maritime claim' means and includes damage caused by loss of life. Article 5 of the said rule, which deals with the release of ships reads as follows: "In default of agreement between the parties as to the sufficiency of the bail or other security, the court or other appropriate judicial authority shall determine the nature and amount thereof. The request to release the ship against such security shall not he construed as an acknowledgment of liability or as a waiver of the benefit of the legal limitations of liability of the owner of the ship." 21. Similarly, United Nations/International Maritime Organization Diplomatic Conference on Arrest of Ships had framed the Final Act in this respect and Article 4(2) of the said Act, which deals with the release of arrested ship, reads as follows: "In the absence of agreement between the parties as to the sufficiency and form of security, the court shall determine its nature and the amount thereof not exceeding the value of the arrested ship. " The Supreme Court on International Maritime Conventions 22. In the above context, the observation made by the Supreme Court as regards the applicability of the rules, unified and passed by the international conventions to the admiralty courts, assumes relevance and significance. The Supreme Court in M.V.Elisabeth's case (supra) held as follows: "India has also not adopted the International Convention relating to the Arrest of Sea going Ships, Brussels, 1952. Nor has India adopted the Brussels Conventions of 1952 on civil arid penal jurisdiction in matters of collision; nor the Brussels Conventions of 1926 and 1967 relating to maritime liens and mortgages. India seems to be lagging behind many other countries in ratifying and adopting the beneficial provisions of various conventions intended to facilitate international trade. Nor has India adopted the Brussels Conventions of 1952 on civil arid penal jurisdiction in matters of collision; nor the Brussels Conventions of 1926 and 1967 relating to maritime liens and mortgages. India seems to be lagging behind many other countries in ratifying and adopting the beneficial provisions of various conventions intended to facilitate international trade. Although these conventions have not been adopted by legislation, the principles incorporated in the conventions are themselves derived from the common law of nations as embodying the felt necessities of international trade and are as such part of the common law of India and applicable for the enforcement of maritime claims against foreign ships. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx No Indian statute defines a maritime claim. The Supreme Court Act, 1981 of England has catalogued maritime claims with reference to the unified rides adopted by the Brussels Convention of1952 on the Arrest of Seagoing Ships. Although India has not adopted the various Brussels Conventions, the provisions of these Conventions are the result of international unification and development of the maritime laws of the world, and can, therefore, be regarded as the international common law or transnational law rooted in and evolved out of the general principles of national laws, which, in the absence of specific statutory provisions, can be adopted and adapted by courts to supplement and complement national statutes on the subject. In the absence of a general maritime code, these principles aid the Courts in filling up the lacunae in the Merchant Shipping Act and other enactments concerning shipping. 'Procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities."(S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, SCC p. 210, para 17) 23. 'Procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities."(S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, SCC p. 210, para 17) 23. Further in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.V Sea Success and another, 2004 (9) SCC 512 the Supreme Court re-inforced the binding force of international conventions on arrest and release of ships as given below: "M.V.Elisabeth is an authority for the proposition that the changing global scenario should be kept in mind having regard to the fact that there does not exist any primary act touching the subject and in absence of any domestic legislation to the contrary, if the 1952 Arrest Convention had been applied, although India was not a signatory thereto, there is obviously no reason as to why the 1999 Arrest Convention should not be applied.'' 24. In view of the aforesaid decision, we find that the rules relating to arrest and release of ship evolved in international conventions are binding to admiralty courts while determining the quantum of security to release the arrested ship. Findings 25. In the above analysis, we find that the discretionary power of the admiralty courts to reduce the quantum of security to a lesser amount than the plaint amount stands well-founded on the strong pillars of discretionary jurisdiction and power under Section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, rules relating to arrest and release of ships evolved in International Conventions, 1952 and 1999 and the decision laid down by the Supreme Court in M.V.Elisabeth's case (supra). Point No. 2 and 3 26. What are the relevant factors to be borne in mind and weighed in the determination of the quantum of security? How does the admiralty court determine the security amount? Coming to the second point, the object of insisting deposit or bank guarantee as security has to be borne in mind. The arrest of a ship is regarded as a mere procedure to obtain security to satisfy the judgment that may be passed against the defendants, the persons interested in the vessel. A successful plaintiff in an action in rem has a right to recover damages from the property of the defendant. The arrest of a ship is regarded as a mere procedure to obtain security to satisfy the judgment that may be passed against the defendants, the persons interested in the vessel. A successful plaintiff in an action in rem has a right to recover damages from the property of the defendant. In admiralty, the vessel has a juridical personality, having not only right, but also liabilities also and these are distinct from the owners of the ship. The proceedings for arrest of the ship is a proceedings in rem. The proceedings in rem is an action in law, which is normally brought against the offending things, which, in admiralty jurisdiction, is normally the ship. The action of arrest may constitute an inducement to the owner of the ship to submit to the jurisdiction of the court to secure the release of the ship from arrest, by providing appropriate security for the satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff. As soon as such submission takes place, the owner surrenders to the process and makes himself liable to be proceeded against "in personam" even if ship is released on furnishing security, the admiralty action in person would continue. Thus, arrest of a ship serves twin purpose; (1) assumption of jurisdiction, (2) obtaining of security. 27. It is well discernible from Section 443 of the Act that the High Court has jurisdictional power to detain the ship until such time as the owner, master or consignee thereof has satisfied any claim in respect of the damage or has given security to the satisfaction of the High court to pay all costs and damages that may be awarded in any legal proceedings. Obviously, it is clear that, to release the ship against which an order of arrest is passed, the owner or captain or consignee must satisfy the claim or furnish security to the satisfaction of the High Court and the said satisfaction must be manifested in an objective decision, which would enable the claimant to realise the damage that may be granted to him after trial from the security furnished by the owner or master of the ship. The plaintiff, who had allegedly sustained damage can file an admiralty suit claiming any amount from the owner of the ship and the quantum of claim is neither fettered nor bridled and it is unlimited. The plaintiff, who had allegedly sustained damage can file an admiralty suit claiming any amount from the owner of the ship and the quantum of claim is neither fettered nor bridled and it is unlimited. Can the owner of the ship be directed to furnish security for a vexatious, unrealistic and inflated fancy amount, which has no proximity with the actual loss, in view of the pleadings and document') produced along with the suit? 28. The arrest and detention of a merchant ship until furnishing of security is a crucial situation, wherein the plaintiffs would get superior bargaining position, as prolonged detention of the ship would cause financial loss to the owner of the ship. So, the plaintiffs and defendants in an admiralty suit are not in an equal bargaining position. It is for the Court to maintain a balance by preventing abuse of process of court, by the plaintiffs, who stand in a superior position. In this process, the High Court must balance and moderate competing consideration of having the ship rel eased as soon as possible, ensuring that the claim is secured. Therefore, the test of satisfaction in the matter of furnishing security at this stage must be based on a reasonably arguable best case of the plaintiffs, including the entitlement of the quantum of amount claimed in the plaint, in view of the averments in the plaint and the documents produced along with the plaint. The desire to obtain an excessive security having no proximity with a reasonably arguable best case, including entitlement of a reasonable amount as damage, is oppressive and arbitrary. 29. We are of the opinion that by the incorporation of the expression "security to the satisfaction of the High Court" in Section 443 of the Act, the High Court is empowered with the discretionary jurisdiction and power to arrive at a satisfaction as regards the quantum of amount for which security is to be furnished. At this stage, the High Court must prima facie be satisfied of not only the entitlement of damages, but also the quantum of amount that may be granted as damage, on the basis of the averments in the plaint and the documents produced along with the plaint. Certainly, such an assessment and satisfaction thereon will not stand in the way of final determination of the quantum of damage, after final hearing. 30. Certainly, such an assessment and satisfaction thereon will not stand in the way of final determination of the quantum of damage, after final hearing. 30. We further find that even though the plaintiff in an admiralty suit for damages can file a suit for any amount, as he desires, he cannot insist that the owner or captain of the ship must furnish security for his entire claim amount, whatever may be the quantum of amount, as it is a matter left with the satisfaction of the High Court. The owner of the ship cannot be asked to furnish excessive security for an unrealistic and inflated fancy amount, having no proximity with the actual loss and in such situation, the sufficiency of security would fall within the realm of 'satisfaction' of the High Court, contemplated under Section 443 of the Act. 31. Let us examine the principles developed by judicial precedents, in the determination of the security amount to release an arrested ship. The decision of admiralty Division Bench of English Court reported in 1971(1) Lloyd's Law Report 37, which is referred as Moschanthy's case, is the basic decision on which both English Courts and our Supreme Court placed reliance subsequently. In this decision, the Admiralty Division Bench held that the Admiralty Court has always power, to control the amount of security demanded by the plaintiffs and that control should be exercised, on the principle that the plaintiffs are only entitled to demand such an amount, as security, as would cover their reasonably best arguable case, that is to say, cover the amount of the claim, the amount of any interest that might be recoverable and the amount of any cost. 32. The aforesaid decision was relied on in the decision of the Queens Bench Division held in [1977 Volume II Lloyd's Law Reports - Page 115]. The principle reiterated in the above decision can be summarized as follows: The power of the court to control security was derived from inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent any abuse of the process of court or the exercise of court procedure in an oppressive way. The principle reiterated in the above decision can be summarized as follows: The power of the court to control security was derived from inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent any abuse of the process of court or the exercise of court procedure in an oppressive way. The power to arrest a ship is a very drastic power and the power to insist that she shall remain under arrest, unless security of certain amount is given, is equally a drastic power, and if it is exercised oppressively, then the court should interfere to prevent the conduct of that kind. At the same time, the court must make sure that the plaintiffs are not left without sufficient security to cover their reasonably best arguable case. 33. The Supreme Court in Kapitan's Kud case (supra) has also followed Moschanthy's case and further placed reliance on the nature and extent of jurisdiction of Admiralty Court, envisaged in Halsbury's Laws of England. Halsbury's Laws of England Vol.I. Fourth Edn. at Page 436 on admiralty jurisdiction, Para 386 states that- "the usual step following an acknowledgment of service in an action in rem is for the owner of the property arrested to procure its release by giving security for the plaintiffs claim. This may be done either by paying the amount of the plaintiffs claim into court, or by providing bail in a sufficient amount, or by furnishing a guarantee acceptable to the plaintiff. The third method is nowadays the most common in practice." Para 3 89 provides that the "amount should be sufficient to cover the plaintiffs claim, together with interest and costs on the basis of his reasonably arguable best case." 34. With the above view of the matter, in the said decision, the Apex Court has exercised discretionary jurisdiction, under Section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, directing the respondents, to deposit a sum of Rupees ten crores, when the claim was for Rupees twenty-eight crores. Findings 35. In the above analysis, we find that the High Court, in exercise of admiralty jurisdiction under Section 443 of the Act. Findings 35. In the above analysis, we find that the High Court, in exercise of admiralty jurisdiction under Section 443 of the Act. has jurisdiction and power, to pass an order, requiring the defendants to furnish security tor an amount other or lesser than the plaint claim, to the satisfaction of the High Court, on the basis of a reasonably arguable best case of the plaintiffs and the same shall be done in view of the pleadings in the plaint and documents produced along with the suit. But such a satisfaction will not stand in the way of granting higher amount as damage after final hearing of the suit. Point No.3 36. The next point to be considered is, is the single Bench of this Court justified in directing the respondents, to furnish security for Rupees one crore, when the plaint claim is Rupees eighteen crores and fifteen lakhs. For deciding the said question, the pleadings in the plaint and a statement of accounts annexed thereunder are the only available material on record. No document was produced before the Single Bench or before us, so as to make a prima facie arguable best case for the entitlement of Rupees eighteen crores fifteen lakhs as compensation. 37. Let us examine the only available pleadings in the plaint. The pleadings are reiterated in the Statement of Accounts also. The entitlement of Rupees 18 crores and 15 lakhs in both cases rests on the Statement of Accounts, annexed to the plaint, which is extracted as such below: Statement of Accounts For wrongful death caused and pre death pain and suffering: 5 crores Loss of consortium, loss of estate, loss of love and affection, loss of support, loss of parental care and support, damages to the family, loss of dependency, loss of estate, emotional damages and value of dependency: Rs. 10 crores Prospective future losses: 75,000 x 35 x 12 = Rs. 3,15,00,000/- (The income of the deceased after deducting all expenses is reasonably calculated as 75,000/- per month, considering the future prospects in his job. He was aged 25 years only and she would have been working for at least 35 more years) Total amount claimed: Rs. 18,15,00,0007- (Eighteen crores and fifteen lakhs rupees only) 38. According to the pleadings, the quantum of compensation rests on the claim that the deceased fishermen were earning Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand) per month. He was aged 25 years only and she would have been working for at least 35 more years) Total amount claimed: Rs. 18,15,00,0007- (Eighteen crores and fifteen lakhs rupees only) 38. According to the pleadings, the quantum of compensation rests on the claim that the deceased fishermen were earning Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand) per month. The said amount is prima facie highly exorbitant and inflated, according to the respondents. In order to substantiate the said contention, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents cited the decisions in Rajesh and others v. Rajbir Singh and others, 2013 (9) SCC 54 : 2013 (3) KLJ 177, Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, 2009 (6) SCC 121 , The Secretary v. Joseph, 2009 SCC Online Kerala 1187, Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Muhammad, 2016 SCC Online Kerala 5473 and Tamil Nadu Transport Corporation v. R.Veera Sakthi, 2016 SCC Online Mad. 15769, wherein the fishermen claimed an amount, ranging from Rs.2,500/- (Rupees two thousand five hundred) to Rs.10,0007- (Rupees ten thousand) only as their monthly earnings and in all those cases, the court fixed an amount between Rs.2,500/-(Rupees two thousand five hundred) to Rs.7,000/-(Rupees seven thousand), as monthly notional income of a fisherman in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. In the absence of any supporting material, to establish that they had been earning a monthly income of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand), we find some force in the argument, challenging the monthly earnings of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand), advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents. 39. We further find that even if the death was caused by a ship, the scope and extent of liability, to pay compensation, would broadly fall within different heads under tortious liability and the respondents are liable to pay a just and fair compensation to the appellants, if they succeed in the suit. At this juncture, the court must remember the meaning given to the expression "just and fair compensation" by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case (supra), though it was rendered under the Motor Vehicles Act. In the said decision, the Supreme Court held that just compensation is adequate compensation, which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered, as a result of the wrong committed by the defendants. In the said decision, the Supreme Court held that just compensation is adequate compensation, which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered, as a result of the wrong committed by the defendants. In short, compensation cannot be a means, to generate profit, at the cost of the deceased and death can never be a bonanza. 40. The learned counsel for the appellant cited the decision laid down by the Supreme Court in M.C.Mehta and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 1086 and submits that in view of the aforesaid decision, the damages to the victims of an accident caused by a ship in maritime waters requires to be measured in correlation with the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. 41. We are unable to agree with the said submission at this stage. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court considered the entitlement of damages caused by an enterprise engaged in a hazardous and inherently dangerous activity, which resulted in leakage of toxic gas, in a public interest litigation under writ jurisdiction. In this decision, the Supreme Court in Paragraph 32 specifically made clear that compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding paragraph must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise, because such compensation "must have a deterrent effect. We are of the view that merchant shipping activity in maritime waters is not an activity falling under the hazardous and dangerous activities specifically referred to in the said judgment and it would fall under tortious liability and parameters for measuring damages under the tortious liability alone can be made applicable to in the instant case. 42. The appellants foiled to bring to the notice of this Court any law or international treaty or maritime convention, which would enable them to claim a higher amount more than just and fair compensation, on the reason that the death was caused by a ship. No other yardstick, to measure the loss sustained by the dependents of a deceased in an accident caused by a ship, was brought to our notice, while arguing the case. Counter security 43. No other yardstick, to measure the loss sustained by the dependents of a deceased in an accident caused by a ship, was brought to our notice, while arguing the case. Counter security 43. We further find that the discretionary jurisdiction of the admiralty court is so wide, so as to direct the plaintiffs to furnish counter guarantee, to the guarantee given by the defendants, to cover the cost of litigation and other incidental expenses, in the event of failure of the plaintiffs in the admiralty suit. The aforesaid view is fortified by the decision of this Court in M.V.Free Neptune's case (supra) wherein, this Court directed the plaintiffs to furnish counter guarantee, to cover the cost of litigation and other incidental expenses in the event of failure of the plaintiffs in the suit. In the instant case, the plaintiffs are the dependents of the deceased fishermen, who suffer from financial hardship and find it difficult to pull on day-to-day life. So it is not just and proper to direct them to furnish counter guarantee. in such circumstances, the defendants cannot be burdened with a hypothetical and fancy security amount, having no reality at all and we are inclined to adopt a balanced view. Findings 44. At any view point, we are unable to believe that the plaintiffs have a prima facie reasonable best me, to claim an amount of Rupees 18 crores 15 lakhs. We do not find any proximity between the pleadings and the amount claimed as compensation. In the above view, the learned single Judge is justified in ordering to furnish security for an amount of Rupees one crore. The security amount quantified by the learned single Judge is an amount, within which a just and fair compensation is reasonably expected. 45. We make it clear that the consideration of the facts of the case, at the interlocutory stage, will have no bearing at the final hearing of the suit and the learned Judge will be at liberty to decide the facts afresh, on evidence to be adduced before him, without being influenced in any way, by any observation made in this judgment. The Miscellaneous First Appeals are dismissed. All the pending interlocutory applications will stand closed.