JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. The present petitioner who has been arrayed as an accused in the GR Case No.295/17 and by impugned order dated 18.4.2017 charge has been framed against him, U/S 353/120B/448/323/127 IPC read with Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Damage to the Public Property Act, by way of this petition U/S 482 CrPC has challenged the impugned order of framing charge as well as the entire proceeding pertaining to the said GR Case No.295/17. 2. Member Foreigners Tribunal Goalpara Sri Ajay Kumar Phukan lodged an FIR before O/C Goalpara Police Station alleging inter alia that on 15.2.2017 at about 2.20 PM in a pre-planned manner, group of 20/25 advocates under the leadership of Shajahan Ali and Jewel, Advocates of Goalpara Bar Association Illegally entered in his chamber and abused him in filthy language without any rhyme and reason. Furthermore, Advocate Nazrul Islam assaulted him with an intention to kill him and other Advocates scattered the valuable articles and important records of the office and also broken down chairs, tables, mobile phones etc. 3. On the basis of aforesaid FIR Goalpara P.S.Case No.58/2017 U/S 120 B/147/148/353/307 IPC read with Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to the Public Property Act was registered and investigation was carried on. Statement of as many as 18 witnesses was recorded U/S 161 CrPC and statement of some of witnesses was also recorded by Magistrate U/S 164 CrPC, as well as TIP was also held. At the conclusion of the investigation charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner along with seven others while discharges other two accused persons. 4. All the accused persons entered their appearance before the trial Court and after furnishing them necessary copies of documents and after hearing the learned counsel for both the parties charges have been framed against all the accused persons including the petitioner U/S 120 B /147/148/353/323 IPC read with Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to the Public Property Act. rejecting the prayer for discharge by order dated 18.4.2017. 5. rejecting the prayer for discharge by order dated 18.4.2017. 5. Challenge has been made to the impugned order of framing charge as well as the entire proceeding on the ground that there is no incriminating material against the accused petitioner but the investigating officer in most arbitrary manner has included the name of the petitioner in the charge-sheet without ascertaining the actual identity of the petitioner as there are another members of the bar namely Anisur in the Bar Association. Further it contends that the petitioner is neither named in the FIR nor he has been identified in the TIP and even he has not been implicated in the statement given by some of the witnesses U/S 164 CrPC while however, some of the witnesses have named him in their statement U/S 161 CrPC. 6. Mr. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner has put forward his argument vehemently challenging the prosecution case that save and except certain statement of witnesses U/S 161 CrPC, which is not again supported by the statement given U/S 164 CrPC, there is no any incriminating material against the accused petitioner. That being so, framing of charge against the accused petitioner is bad in law. Further it contends that there being no any evidence about the overt act by the accused petitioner towards the occurrence, his mere presence at the place of occurrence is not enough to fasten him with any criminal liability. It urges that the distinguishing feature in this case is that the other two accused who were not identified in TIP has not been charge-sheeted by the IO, whereas the present petitioner has been charge-sheeted even though he was not identified in TIP. The learned counsel for the petitioner also made a deliberation at length as to the criteria to be considered while framing charge U/S 239 and 240CrPC of CrPC (being warrant procedure case) and has contended that in the instant case for the purpose of framing charge U/S 240 CrPC, there is no proper evidence, as against the accused petitioner so as to adequately punish him. The learned counsel has referred to the decision of (1979) 4 SCC 11 Col. Mohan Singh –vs- State of Rajasthan, wherein it has been held that for the purpose of framing charge prima facie evidence of factual ingredients of an offence required to be proved. The learned counsel has referred to the decision of (1979) 4 SCC 11 Col. Mohan Singh –vs- State of Rajasthan, wherein it has been held that for the purpose of framing charge prima facie evidence of factual ingredients of an offence required to be proved. Further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of inconsistency of the evidence on record as submitted above, it can be assumed that further proceeding in the case will be nothing but abuse of process of law hence the proceeding is liable to be quashed as against the present petitioner. 7. Learned Addl. P.P. Ms. S. Jahan, has however opposed such contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner submitting that there is no illegality in framing the charge nor any justifiable ground has been made out to quash the proceeding. Relying to the decision to (1996) 4 SCC 659 State of Maharashtra etc. –vs- Sumnath Thapa, (2010) 10 SCC 744 Competition Commission of India –vs- Steel Authority of India and 2012 (13) SCC 476 Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat & ors –vs- State of U.P.and another it has been contended by learned Addl. P.P. that for the purpose of framing charge the Court is required to satisfy itself about the existence of prima facie case for proceeding of trial and not to hold a mini trial to decide the fate of the case 8. I have carefully gone through the rival contention of both the parties, the materials on record and the connected case diary as well as the relevant case law referred above. 9. In case of Sumnath Thapa (supra) it has been held that there are three pairs of sections which deals with framing of charge and discharge being relatable to either a session trial or trial of warrant case or a summons case, ultimately coverage to a single conclusion namely that a prima facie case must be made before charge can be framed and reference has been also made to R.S. Naik –vs- A Antulay (1986) 2 SCC 716 . In Antulay’s case it was opined, after noting the difference in the language of the three pairs of sections, that despite the difference there is no scope to doubt that at the stage at which Court is required to consider the question of framing charge, the test of prima case has to be applied. In Antulay’s case it was opined, after noting the difference in the language of the three pairs of sections, that despite the difference there is no scope to doubt that at the stage at which Court is required to consider the question of framing charge, the test of prima case has to be applied. If there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a Court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exist and so can frame the charge against him. Further, reference has been made to the case of State of Karnataka –vs- L. Muniswamy 1977 (3) SCR 113 (three judge bench decision) wherein it has been held that at the stage of framing charge the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of offence by the accused. In Black Laws Dictionary the word ‘presume’ has been defined to mean ‘to believe or accept upon probable evidence’ in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary it has been mentioned that in law ‘presume’ to take as prove until evidence contrary is forthcoming………… The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of materials on record a Court could come to the conclusion that the commission of offence is probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exist. To put it differently if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence Court can frame the charge, though, for conviction the conclusion is required that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing charge probative value of materials on record cannot be gone into, the materials got recorded by prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. 10. In Sheoraj Singh (supra) it has been held that the Court trying the case can direct discharge only for reasons to be recorded by it and only if it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. 10. In Sheoraj Singh (supra) it has been held that the Court trying the case can direct discharge only for reasons to be recorded by it and only if it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. Section 240 of the Code provides for framing of a charge if upon consideration of police report and documents sent therewith and making such examination, if any of the accused as the Magistrate things necessary, the Magistrate is the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence under Chapter XIX which such Magistrate is competent to try and which can be adequately punished by him. Further it has been held that at the stage of framing charge the Court is not expected to go deep into the probative value materials on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage even strong suspicion founded on material which leads to the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of commission of that offence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence as if to determine whether the materials produced are sufficient to convict the accused. While in course of argument deliberation was made on the wording of Section 240 CrPC (which relates to the warrant procedure case) and it was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that while framing charge U/S 240 of the Code about forming of opinion as regards presumption of commission of offence the Court has also had to form an opinion that the accused could also be adequately punished by him. Accordingly it was submitted that both these aspects is to be satisfied prior to framing of charge and referring to the mattes on record (that has been discussed above) it is contended that there was no material before the Court to form such opinion that the accused can be adequately convicted by the Court. Refuting such contention the learned counsel for the State has submitted that the word ‘and’ used in the later part of the section 240 of the Code has been used in different connotation altogether. Refuting such contention the learned counsel for the State has submitted that the word ‘and’ used in the later part of the section 240 of the Code has been used in different connotation altogether. In this context reference has been made to the decision of Competition Commission (supra) and the relevant portion is reproduced below: “It is a settled principle of law that the words “or” and “and” may be read as vice-verse but not normally. As pointed out by Lords Halsbury the reading of “or” as “and” is not to be resorted to unless some other parts of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done. The substitution of conjunction however has been sometime made without sufficient reasons.” In this context the relevant provision of Section 240 CrPC can be reproduced below: “Framing of Charge-(1) If upon such consideration, examination if any and hearing the Magistrate is the opinion that the Magistrate has ground to presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. 11. In the Code of Criminal Procedure by S.C. Sarkar Vol-II the word “could adequately punished has been explained as hereunder”- “If the Magistrate thinks that the accused cannot be adequately punished, if the case is triable by exclusively by the Court of sessions he should commit the case to the Court of Sessions U/S 323 following the procedure U/S 209 and if the case is not exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions it should be submitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate U/S 322 CrPC.” The provision indicates the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to try the case but not to decide as to whether accused can be convicted by him, if the charge is framed. The contention raised by the petitioner side is answered accordingly. 12. The contention raised by the petitioner side is answered accordingly. 12. Turning to the point of framing charge as has been discussed above, law is settled that at the time of framing charge, the trial Court shall not enter into a roving enquiry, all that is required to be seen, as to whether a prima facie case is made out or not and if any prima facie case is made out the trial Court will be within its ambit of power to frame the charge as against the accused person. In (2014) 12 SCC 556 Homi Rajhans –vs- State of Maharashtra the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that there is no need to traverse all factual details at the time of framing charge and the Court is not to scrutinize all the allegations for the purpose of deciding whether such allegations are likely to upheld in the trial. 13. In the instant case at the time of framing charge there are statements of some witnesses U/S 161 CrPC before the Court to suggest the complicity of the accused persons and in the given circumstances identification of accused by each and every witness may not be possible. As it reveals the informant who was presiding officer of the Foreigners Tribunal was in his chamber at the relevant point of time and he was suddenly attacked and assaulted by a group of 20/25 Advocates and his office chamber was ransacked and in such eventuality it may not be possible to count and identify each of the assailants but however some other witnesses who were also present nearby the chamber identified some of the accused persons including the petitioner and their statement is very much on record. Their evidence is to be tested in the course of trial and at the stage of framing of charge the Court is not in a position to evaluate the evidence as to the authenticity and falsity of such witnesses until tested in cross-examination. In view of the parameter that has been mandated by the legal pronouncement to be considered by a trial Court at the time of framing charge (as discussed above), in the instant case trial Court is found within its ambit while framing charge against the accused petitioner. In view of the parameter that has been mandated by the legal pronouncement to be considered by a trial Court at the time of framing charge (as discussed above), in the instant case trial Court is found within its ambit while framing charge against the accused petitioner. The ground of non-identification in TIP, non mention of name of accused U/S 164 CrPC, though may be a relevant ground but in view of statement of some of witnesses U/S 161 CrPC, without testing the same in the trial, the proceeding cannot be quashed. The order of framing charge call for no interference. 14. Law regarding quashing of proceeding U/S 482 CrPC is very much settled by the catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The power under the proviso should be sparingly invoked with circumspection, it should be exercised to see that the process of law is not abused or misused. The settled principle of law is that at the stage of quashing the complaint /FIR the High Court is not to embark upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or the genuineness of the allegations made therein. The inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely (i) to give effect under the Code (ii) to prevent abuse of process of court and (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The rule of inherent power has its source in the maxim “quando alique, concebit conceditur id sine quo resipsa esse non protest”, which means that when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which thing itself cannot exist. While exercising the power under the Section the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. The inherent jurisdiction under this court can be exercised exdebito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone court exists. It is not fair on the part of High Court to interfere with judicial exercise of the discretion vested in the power of lower courts on the mere allegation of accused. Such an exercise is to be based on sound principle but should not be used to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Such an inherent power can be invoked when special circumstances are made out to interfere in the legal proceeding. 15. Such an exercise is to be based on sound principle but should not be used to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Such an inherent power can be invoked when special circumstances are made out to interfere in the legal proceeding. 15. Regarding invoking the inherent power U/S 482 CrPC, the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and ors. –vs- Bhajanlal (AIR 1992 SC 694), observed as follows: “8.1 In the exercise of the extra ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. (a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. [305D-H; 306A-E] 8.2. In the instant case, the allegations made in the complaint, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence “ 16. In Umesh Kumar v. Andhra Pradesh, 2013 (10) SCC 591 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the following manner. [305D-H; 306A-E] 8.2. In the instant case, the allegations made in the complaint, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence “ 16. In Umesh Kumar v. Andhra Pradesh, 2013 (10) SCC 591 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the following manner. “The scope of section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is well defined and the inherent power could be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court and to otherwise, to secure the ends of justice. However, in exercise of such power, it is not permissible to appreciate the evidence as it can only evaluate material documents on record to the extent of prima facie satisfaction of existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused and the Court cannot look into the materials, the acceptability of which will essentially be a matter of trial. Any document filed along with the petition levelled as evidence, without being tested and proved, cannot be examined”. 17. Further, the Supreme Court in N Soundaram v. P.K. Pounraj reported in (2014) 10 SCC 616 held that the power under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent abuse of process of court and to secure ends of justice and the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution and the High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so and it is only if, taking the allegations and complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings. 18. 18. The Supreme Court in HMT Watches Ltd v. M.A. Abida reported in (2015) 11 SCC 776 held that though the High Court has enormous power under Section 482 but such power needs to be exercised cautiously and defence of accused, even though appearing plausible, cannot be considered for exercise of inherent powers, however, documents with unimpeachable character can be considered to decide about continuation of criminal proceedings or whether complaint had been filed only to harass accused and if complaint was with ulterior motive then power under Section 482 can be exercised to prevent abuse of process and where complaint filed was genuine then the High Court cannot travel beyond prescribed limits and made it clear that sometimes on same set of facts, civil and criminal proceedings are maintainable. 19. In view of the legal proposition and as per discussion and the findings in respect of this case I don't find it a fit case to invoke the provisions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to set aside the charges against the accused petitioner or to quash the proceeding. 20. With the observations and finding above, petition stands dismissed. Return the LCR.