JUDGMENT : Saumitra Dayal Singh, J. These two writ petitions arise from a single award of the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad in Adjudication Case No. 2 of 2008 dated 20.10.2015. 2. In Writ Petition No. 26784 of 2016, the petitioner - management of U.P. State Yarn Company Limited has challenged the aforesaid award. By that award the Industrial Tribunal has held - the layoff declared by the petitioner was without prior permission of the Government of U.P. and therefore, illegal. Further, the Labour Court granted relief of payment of balance of wages to the workman for the period 13.11.1998 to 31.12.1998 and payment of full outstanding wages for the period 01.01.1999 to 15.10.2000. 3. Upon challenge made in the aforesaid writ petition, an interim order was passed providing for stay of the award subject to payment of layoff compensation. Admittedly, the said order was not complied. Accordingly, the stay order stood vacated. Therefore, proceedings under Section 6-H(1) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') were initiated by the workman. It is in this context, on non-satisfaction of the award dated 20.10.2015, the Workers Union has filed an application under Section 14-A of the Act, seeking penalty for breach of term of the aforesaid award. 4. Since no orders have been passed on that application, the workers union has filed a Writ Petition No. 9692 of 2017, seeking directions in respect of application filed under Section 14-A of the Act. 5. Briefly, the facts of the case are the U.P. Yarn Co. Limited as its name suggests is a company whose share holding is fully owned by the Government of U.P. It has four mills all of which have closed down. The present dispute relates to the Meja unit of U.P. State Yarn Company Ltd., at Allahabad. The said mill is said to have been closed permanently on 16.10.2000. Leading, up to the closure, it has been stated by the company that it stopped production from 13.11.1998. At that time it had, in all, about 1400 workmen falling in different status and category. 6. It is claimed by the management of the company, on 24.11.1998, it filed an application under Section 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Commissioner, Kanpur for grant of statutory prior permission for declaration of layoff, citing acute financial crises, continuous heavy losses, strikes, labour troubles for many years. 6. It is claimed by the management of the company, on 24.11.1998, it filed an application under Section 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Commissioner, Kanpur for grant of statutory prior permission for declaration of layoff, citing acute financial crises, continuous heavy losses, strikes, labour troubles for many years. It was also stated that the electric connection of the mill had been disconnected by the U.P. State Electricity Board and that faced with such eventuality the mill could run only up to 12.11.1998 with use of D.G. sets. It was also stated that the mill did not have proper supply of raw material. 7. Thus the management sought to layoff 404 permanent workers out of 494 w.e.f. 13.11.1998. The said application is said to have been received in the office of the Labour Commissioner dated 25.11.1998 along with prescribed form 18-A filed under Rule 41-A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957. 8. Admittedly, the Government of U.P. did not pass any order on the aforesaid application and it is said to have remained pending for more than sixty days. Therefore, the management would claim that prior-approval be deemed to have arisen in view of the provisions of Section 25 M (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 9. Simultaneously, it has also been claimed by the company that its net worth got eroded and it became 'sick' within the meaning of that term under the provisions of Sick Industrial Company (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and that a reference in that regard came to be registered before the BIFR. Admittedly, no rehabilitation scheme could be framed till 01.12.2016 when proceedings before the BIFR got abated, by operation of law. Fresh reference before the National Company Law Tribunal has yet not been filed. As such the effect of the company's net worth having eroded, as claimed by the company is of no consequence, at present. 10. The Company further claims most, of the workman have, in the meanwhile, accepted the voluntary retirement scheme offered by it and as such the dispute raised on behalf of the workmen in these petitions is purely academic. Again, this stand even if accepted, is of no consequence in the present proceedings. Even if correct, the effect of the voluntary retirement may be examined in recovery proceedings, at appropriate stage, in appropriate case. 11. Again, this stand even if accepted, is of no consequence in the present proceedings. Even if correct, the effect of the voluntary retirement may be examined in recovery proceedings, at appropriate stage, in appropriate case. 11. It is the reference made by the Government of U.P. under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, that forms the subject matter of disputes between the parties. The said reference came to be registered as Adjudication Case No. 2 of 2008, wherein the award dated 20.10.2015 was framed that is the subject matter of challenge in Writ Petition No. 26784 of 2016. The reference reads : ^^D;k lsok ;kstd }kjk izfr"Bku ds Jfedksa dks fnuakd 13-11- 1998 ls 31 -12-1998 rd ^^ys vkWQ** dh vof/k dk 'ks"k osru u fn;k tkuk ,ao tuojh 1999 ls 15-10-2000 rd dh cSBd ¼ys vkWQ½ dh vof/k dk iw.kZ osru dk Hkqxrku u fd;k tkuk mfpr ,ao oS/kkfud gS\ ;fn ugha rks lEcaf/kr Jfedx.k D;k fgrykHk@mi'keu ikus ds vf/kdkjh gSa ,oa vU; fdu fooj.kksa lfgrA** 12. It is upon this reference, the Labour Court has framed the award dated 21.10.2015 and declared the layoff itself to be invalid. Consequently, it issued direction for payment of entire wages for the period of lay-off. 13. Heard Sri Manu Khare, learned counsel for the management and Sri Bhupendra Nath Singh with Sri Devendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the workmen union, in both petitions. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the award of the Labour Court is wholly without jurisdiction inasmuch as the Labour Court has travelled beyond the terms reference and adjudicated on the validity of the lay-off whereas the dispute referred for adjudication was only quantification of the amount to be paid to the workmen during the period of lay-off. 15. In this regard, he would submit, the Industrial Tribunal a statutory body, its jurisdiction arose only upon reference made to it. The same is confined to the terms of reference alone. The terms of reference are clear. The dispute as referred to the Industrial Tribunal arose only because the lay-off had arisen but the demand of payment of lay-off compensation had not been met by the management. Therefore, the state government referred for adjudication the limited dispute of legality of non-payment of lay-off compensation. 16. The terms of reference are clear. The dispute as referred to the Industrial Tribunal arose only because the lay-off had arisen but the demand of payment of lay-off compensation had not been met by the management. Therefore, the state government referred for adjudication the limited dispute of legality of non-payment of lay-off compensation. 16. In support of his submission, he relies upon three decisions in the cases of Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. and Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 762 ; Mukund Ltd v. Mukund Staff and Officers' Association (2004) 10 SCC 460 and State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Om Prakash Sharma (2006) 5 SCC 123 . 17. Then, according to him, petitioner having filed the application for permission to lay-off on 25.11.1998 w.e.f. 13.11.1998 and no order having been passed thereon within statutory period of sixty days, a permission arose in favour of the employer, by deeming fiction created by Section 25M(5) of the Central Act. Therefore, there did not exist any doubt or dispute as to validity of the lay-off. 18. Taking his argument further, he submits, the government was aware of the all facts pertaining to declaration of lay-off and therefore it formed an opinion that the only dispute requiring adjudication was of legality of non-payment of lay-off compensation. Had declaration of layoff itself been in issue, the reference could not have been worded as it has been. Also, in that case question of payment of lay-off compensation could never have been the question referred for adjudication. it would have been the alternate question only. However, since no other dispute was referred for adjudication, it is clear that the factum of lay-off was not in dispute. In this regard, the workers union has not produced any document to establish that it ever raised a demand against declaration of lay-off in the conciliation proceedings. 19. Alternatively, he would further submit, it is not disputed that there has been no production at the mill - at Meja, Allahabad, with effect from 13.11.1998 as has been declared in the application for permission for lay-off. Therefore, according to him, there does not arise any case for payment of wages during the period when the mill was closed. 19. Alternatively, he would further submit, it is not disputed that there has been no production at the mill - at Meja, Allahabad, with effect from 13.11.1998 as has been declared in the application for permission for lay-off. Therefore, according to him, there does not arise any case for payment of wages during the period when the mill was closed. In support of his contention he relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Management of Narendra and Company Private Limited v. The Workmen of Narendra and Company (2016) 3 SCC 340 paragraphs 6. 20. In reply, Sri B.N. Singh along with Devendra Pratap Singh learned counsel appearing for the respondent workers union, have vehemently opposed the submissions so made on behalf of the employer and they submit that the Labour Court acted within its jurisdiction while deciding the adjudication case, in the manner it has. 21. According to them, in the first place the reference is worded such as to include within its ambit the issue of validity of the lay-off as well. In this regard they would further submit that the management did not lead any evidence to establish the validity of the lay-off. Therefore, the Labour Court has rightly inferred that there was no prior-permission for declaration of lay-off and has held accordingly. In this regard Sri B.N. Singh, learned counsel for the workmen further submits that once the Industrial Tribunal had reached the conclusion that the lay-off was invalid, then, by virtue of Section 25M(8) read with Section 25M(1), the workmen were entitled to full wages. Therefore, in his submission the Labour Court has rightly awarded this relief. In this regard Sri B.N. Singh relies on three judgments in the cases of Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and Ors. AIR 1979 SC 170 ; British India Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Punjab and Anr. reported in 1965 LLJ pg 331 (Punjab) and The Management of Hackbridge Hewittic and Easun Ltd. Madras v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal and Anr. reported in 1979 LIC 307 (Madras). 22. He further submitted that the burden to prove a valid lay-off was on the management. The management having failed to discharge the burden, they have been rightly held liable for wages under Section 25M(8) of the Central Act. 23. reported in 1979 LIC 307 (Madras). 22. He further submitted that the burden to prove a valid lay-off was on the management. The management having failed to discharge the burden, they have been rightly held liable for wages under Section 25M(8) of the Central Act. 23. Then, it was submitted if the management was so aggrieved by the terms of reference then, it should have objected to the same and got additional issues framed by the Industrial Tribunal. On the contrary, the management acted in a casual manner and did not either object to the terms of reference and did not get framed, any additional issue. Therefore, they cannot now complain that the Industrial Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction. 24. Lastly, it has been submitted by Sri B.N. Singh that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is one of equity and it should be exercised in the interest of justice and the test should be whether interference would result in harm to the society. Relying on this principle he submits even if the award of the Industrial Tribunal is contrary to law, yet, in view of the fact that it only requires the Company to discharge its obligation to pay wages to the workmen, the writ Court should not interfere with that award. In support of his submission he relies on judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and others v. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Om Prakash v. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission (1990) 2 U.P. L.B.E.C. 1983. 25. In view of the submissions so advanced the first question that requires to be examined is whether the terms of reference made to the Industrial Tribunal included within their ambit the question of validity of layoff. Second, if the said question was not referred by the State Government for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal then, whether the issue of validity of the layoff could be examined by the Tribunal as an incidental issue. 26. A bare reading of the reference unequivocally indicates, in the opinion of the State Government there existed a dispute between the workers union and the employer for the period 13.11.1998 to 31.12.1998 and January, 1999 to 15.10.2000. To this extent there parties are in agreement. 26. A bare reading of the reference unequivocally indicates, in the opinion of the State Government there existed a dispute between the workers union and the employer for the period 13.11.1998 to 31.12.1998 and January, 1999 to 15.10.2000. To this extent there parties are in agreement. However, they require the court to examine the nature of the dispute (for those periods) referred for adjudication. In respect of first period, the reference states the dispute to be layoff "ki awadhi ka shesh vetan na diya jana". In this regard, it is not disputed that 50% of layoff compensation payable for that period had been paid by the management. It is in this background that the dispute arose in respect of payment of balance 50% of compensation. This being so it appears that at the relevant time the factum of layoff was undisputed and acknowledged by the workers union as well. Had it not been the case and had any dispute existed between the parties with regard to declaration of lay-off, there would have been no occasion for the workers union to claim payment of balance amount of layoff compensation. Similarly, for the period January 1999 to 15.10.2000 the dispute identified and referred by the State Government for adjudication has been mentioned as full payment of wages for the period of layoff. Read together it appears that the dispute as referred was only with regard to non-payment of dues of the workman for the period of layoff - for the first period (specified in the reference order), the dispute referred is in respect of payment of the balance amount and for the second period, in respect of the entire amount. 27. Merely, because the phrase "balance wages" and "full wages" have been used in the reference order, the same cannot be read in isolation to infer the correct scope of the reference. The said phrase have to be read in the context in which they have been used in the reference order which is for the period of layoff, that had already been declared. From a reading of the reference order, in entirety, it comes out that the State Government was aware of layoff having been declared. The said phrase have to be read in the context in which they have been used in the reference order which is for the period of layoff, that had already been declared. From a reading of the reference order, in entirety, it comes out that the State Government was aware of layoff having been declared. It is also undisputed that no other reference was existing when the present reference came to be made and that the declaration of layoff was never challenged or questioned by the workman independent of the present adjudication proceedings. In this regard it may be noted that in the adjudication case proceedings vide an application dated 12.12.2014 annexed to the writ petition as part of Annexure-9 it was stated on behalf of the workman that they have not been paid the layoff compensation to which they are entitled. 28. Even otherwise, from a plain reading of the reference it is clear that the only dispute identified by the State Government and referred for adjudication case was in respect of non-payment of balance amount of layoff compensation. The State Government being cognizant of layoff having been declared by the management, it would have then, necessarily framed the question of the validity of layoff, if that were the dispute canvassed by the union before it. In fact, the reference order indicates otherwise. It appears that the workers union, at the relevant time was only voicing its concerned about non payment of layoff compensation to the workman and therefore, the reference came to be worded in the manner it has been done. 29. Though the workers union is opposed to the writ petition, in the counter affidavit they have not disclosed any fact and have not brought on record any evidence that may suggest that at the relevant time there was any dispute as to the legality of the layoff. It is in this regard, the application of the workers union moved before the Industrial Tribunal dated 12.12.2014 is very relevant wherein it had only and specifically voiced its concern about non-payment of layoff compensation. It is in this regard, the application of the workers union moved before the Industrial Tribunal dated 12.12.2014 is very relevant wherein it had only and specifically voiced its concern about non-payment of layoff compensation. Therefore, merely because the words "balance wages" and "full wages" have been used in the reference order, the same cannot be read beyond the context in which those words have been used and reading of the reference order in entirety in the surrounding facts and circumstances leads to the inference - the State Government had only referred the dispute of non-payment of balance amount and full amount of layoff compensation for two periods specified therein and no other dispute was referred. 30. Next, it needs to be examined whether the issue of validity of declaration of layoff was an incidental issue that could have been examined by the Industrial Tribunal. 31. In this regard the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workman reported in AIR 1967 SC 469 has held as to the scope of incidental dispute in the context of Industrial Tribunal as under : "The word 'incidental' means according to Webster's New World Dictionary: 'happening or likely to happen as a result of or in connection with something more important; being an incident; casual; hence, secondary or minor, but usually associated:' 'Something incidental to a dispute' must therefore mean something happening as a result of or in connection with the dispute or associated with the dispute. The dispute is the fundamental thing while something incidental thereto is an adjunct to it. Something incidental, therefore, cannot cut at the root of the main thing to which it is an adjunct [to it]." 32. It is further noticed that the three Judges Bench in the case of The Jaipur Udyog Ltd. v. The Cement Work Karamchari Sangh, Sahu Nagar reported in (1972) 1 SCC 1691 the dispute referred for adjudication was the termination of services of a workman on the ground of superannuation. The Tribunal proceeded to decide the issue of the correct age of superannuation. 33. In that background, it was contended before the Supreme Court, the proper age of superannuation applicable to the company was so intimately connected with or relevant to the dispute that it should be held that the same was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide. The Tribunal proceeded to decide the issue of the correct age of superannuation. 33. In that background, it was contended before the Supreme Court, the proper age of superannuation applicable to the company was so intimately connected with or relevant to the dispute that it should be held that the same was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide. The Supreme Court held the findings of the Tribunal that the company could not fix the lower age limit of superannuation for workman at the quarries went beyond the scope of reference which had to be gathered from the circumstances preceding the order making the reference. 34. In this case also, nothing has been shown by the workers union to suggest that at any stage preceding the reference, it had raised a demand that the lay-off was invalid. 35. In the facts of the case the issue of validity of layoff is completely independent of the dispute referred to adjudication. It is not adjunct to it. If it was allowed to be canvassed, it would cut at the root of the main issue of payment of balance amount and full amount payable during the layoff. Whereas the issue referred was with regard to the nonpayment of layoff compensation, the validity of layoff would not only be independent of the reference but it would be such, as would result in rendering reference made, redundant. It is so because if the layoff were held to be invalid, there would arise no situation in which the workman could claim non-payment of layoff compensation and the matter would then be one of payment of wages simpliciter. The dispute as referred presupposes existence of layoff and therefore, the dispute arose of non payment of that amount which the workman claimed entitled to because of the layoff having been declared. The question of validity of the layoff was neither necessary nor it flows out from the main issue referred for adjudication. Such issue is then independent of the main issue as referred. 36. Thus, I am of the opinion that the issue of validity of layoff was neither directly referred by the State Government for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal nor is that issue incidental to the decision of the dispute referred being non payment of layoff compensation. 37. This then takes us to the next issue of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. Thus, I am of the opinion that the issue of validity of layoff was neither directly referred by the State Government for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal nor is that issue incidental to the decision of the dispute referred being non payment of layoff compensation. 37. This then takes us to the next issue of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. In the case of Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. and another reported in (1979) 3 SCC 762 two references were found to have been made of the Industrial Court to the following effect : "Whether the proposed closure by the management of the Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd., Jabalpur, of their pottery factory at Jabalpur, with effect from July 1, 1967, is proper and justified? and To what retrenchment compensation are the employees entitled, if it is decided that the proposed closure is proper and justified?" 38. Upon such references, the management contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the question as regard the propriety of the justification of the management to close down the business. 39. The High Court, on the question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal read the reference orders and held, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to the points specifically referred for its adjudication and two matters incidental thereto and that the Tribunal could not go beyond the terms of reference. Therefore the High Court concluded that the Tribunal could not adjudicate whether as a fact there was closure, the only issues referred for adjudication being propriety and justification of closure. Upon further appeal the Supreme Court held: "The very terms of the references show that the point of dispute between the parties was not the fact of the closure of its business by the respondent but the propriety and justification of the respondent's decision to close down the business. That is why the references were expressed to say whether the proposed closure of the business was proper and justified. In other words, by the references, the Tribunals were not called upon by the Government to adjudicate upon the question as to whether there was in fact a closure of business or whether under the pretence of closing the business the workers were locked out by the management. In other words, by the references, the Tribunals were not called upon by the Government to adjudicate upon the question as to whether there was in fact a closure of business or whether under the pretence of closing the business the workers were locked out by the management. The references being limited to the narrow question as to whether the closure was proper and justified, the Tribunals by the very terms of the references, had no jurisdiction to go behind the fact of closure and inquire into the question whether the business was in fact closed down by the management." 40. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Mukund Ltd. v. Mukund Staff and Officers' Association; (2004) 10 SCC 460 held that the reference made being only with respect of workman employed by the appellant company (in that case) the Industrial Tribunal could not adjudicate matters not within the purview of the dispute actually referred to it. The case of non-workman was therefore, held to be falling outside the scope of reference made to the Tribunal. 41. To the similar effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Oshiar Prasad and others v. Employers in Relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, Jharkhand reported in (2015) 4 SCC 71 , wherein the principle laid down in the Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat case (supra) was applied and it was held that the Industrial Dispute is limited to the points specifically referred for adjudication and the matter incidental thereto and that the Tribunal can not go beyond the terms of the reference made to the Tribunal. 42. A three judge bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371 , held that the Industrial Tribunal is creation of his statute and it gets jurisdiction on the basis of reference. 43. In Mahendra L. Jain and others v. Indore Development Authority and others reported in (2005) 1 SCC 639 it was held, the Labour Court having derived its jurisdiction from the reference made by the State Government, it was bound to act within four corners thereof. It could not enlarge the scope of the reference nor it could deviate there from. In Mahendra L. Jain and others v. Indore Development Authority and others reported in (2005) 1 SCC 639 it was held, the Labour Court having derived its jurisdiction from the reference made by the State Government, it was bound to act within four corners thereof. It could not enlarge the scope of the reference nor it could deviate there from. A demand that was not raised at the time of raising the dispute could not be gone into by the Labour Court not being the subject matter thereof. 44. In Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand and others reported in (2014) 1 SCC 536 challenge was raised to the reference order, reference having been made "whether not to take back Shri K. Chandrashekhar Rao and 73 other workmen (list enclosed) of M/s TISCO Ltd., Jamshedpur in service by their own TISCO management after their transfer to M/s Lafarge India Ltd., is justified? If not what relief are they entitled to?" The management protested that the workmen concern were no longer in their employment, and therefore, could not raise any grievance. It was however, contended that the reference pre-supposed that the respondent workmen are employees of the appellant company. While, the Supreme Court affirmed the existence of an industrial dispute however, the reference was set aside to be drawn up afresh to bring out the real essence of the dispute i.e. whether the appellant was under an obligation to take back the workmen in service. The Supreme Court accepted the argument. In doing so, Supreme Court held the reference was restricted and if allowed to stand would not allow the Tribunal to adjudicate the issue whether the management, in that case, was obliged to take back all the workmen for the reason of reference having been made only to the effect whether the decision not to take back the workmen in service was justified. 45. Thus, applying the aforesaid principle, in my opinion, the Industrial Tribunal was bound and limited in exercise of its jurisdiction to the terms of reference made to it and it could not have gone into the issue of validity of layoff. 46. The judgements relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent workers union are inapplicable and distinguishable. In Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and Ors. 46. The judgements relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent workers union are inapplicable and distinguishable. In Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and Ors. AIR 1979 SC 170 the reference made to the Tribunal was whether the retrenchment of two workmen was justified. A question then arose whether termination as claimed by the management would be covered under the terms of reference (made in respect of retrenchment). The Union having espoused the cause of two specified workmen and the reference being with regard to termination of their services by way retrenchment of those workmen. It was held that the language and form of demand made would include termination whether by way of retrenchment or otherwise. However, such is not the present case. Here, while the original demand appears to be for payment of lay-off compensation, the subsequent demand, appears to be for declaration of the lay-off as invalid. 47. In the case of British India Corporation, Ltd. (supra) was again a completely different case inasmuch as in that case the question was whether failure to mention the date of dismissal of the workman in the reference order could affect the validity of the reference order. It was held that mere non-mention of date of dismissal would not affect the validity of the order. The said judgment is, therefore, on the face wholly distinguishable. The validity of the dismissal having been referred, it could not have been a case of enlargement of the reference specially because in that case, the date of dismissal was contained in 'A' form filed under Rule 3 of the Relevant Rules and thus the said date was found to be part of the record. 48. In the case of management of The Management of Hackbridge Hewittic and Easun Ltd. Madras v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal and Anr. reported in 1979 LIC 307 (Madras) is again wholly distinguishable. The question referred in that case was widely worded being whether the stoppage of work in factory is a case of closure or lock out and to what relief the workman would be entitled. Upon such reference a question arose whether the bona fide or otherwise of the closure could be gone into. In that background it was held that the reference was therefore, competent even if the Tribunal had given findings that there was no factual closure. Upon such reference a question arose whether the bona fide or otherwise of the closure could be gone into. In that background it was held that the reference was therefore, competent even if the Tribunal had given findings that there was no factual closure. In that case, a reference is required to be examined whether stoppage involved in closure. 49. Next it is to be seen whether in view of the fact that it is undisputed that Meja Mill stopped production from November 1998, any claim for payment of full wages could even otherwise arise. Though, this issue is again not a dispute referred, yet, a brief discussion on this, is necessary to deal with the objections raised by the workers union to the effect that the award of the Industrial Tribunal, even if it not in accordance with law, the same may not be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution. 50. Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company reported in (2016) 3 SCC 340 has held as below: "6. When the matter came up before this Court on 8.7.2013, the Court directed the appellant to file an affidavit indicating the actual year of closure of the industry so as to determine the question as to from what date retrenchment compensation should be paid to the workmen. Accordingly, affidavit dated 11.7.2013 was filed wherein it is clearly stated that the industry became non-functional by the beginning of January 1995 and remained defunct thereafter. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent workmen also, there is nothing to establish that the industry was functioning thereafter. 7. Hence, the order for payment of back wages beyond January, 1995 is vacated, and in all the other aspects, the order passed by the Division Bench is retained. In case, the workmen have not been paid the benefits which they are entitled to, the same shall be paid within a period of three months from today, failing which, the respondent workmen shall be entitled to interest @ 10 percent per annum." 51. Thus, prima facie the claim of full wages could otherwise not be granted in view of the production activity having come to a close. Thus, prima facie the claim of full wages could otherwise not be granted in view of the production activity having come to a close. Coming to the issue that the writ petition filed by the company is liable to be dismissed, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the workers union on the judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra and others v. Prabhu; (1994) 2 SCC 481 . That was a case of removal of a member of the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary Education on the allegation that earlier while he was a lecturer in the Polytechnic college, mass-copying had occurred while he was a supervisor at the concerned examination centre resulting in cancellation of results and debarring of students at those centres. Subsequently, his appointment as a member of the Board was questioned and the Government cancelled his membership to the Board. This was challenged in the writ petition before the High Court. The cancellation of membership was held to be ultra vires Section 15(2) of the Maharashtra Act. Upon challenge, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the State Government and held, even if the order of the Government was vitiated either because of a proper show cause notice or it could not have proceeded against the respondent in that case for past activities, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the High Court should have refused to interfere in exercise of its equity jurisdiction. 52. In the instant case, there is no such infirmity or allegation in the action taken by the company. In fact, as has been discussed above, even it to the stage proceedings in the adjudication case the workman appear to have been aggrieved only by the act of non-payment of layoff compensation and they do not appear to have been aggrieved by the action of the lay-off itself. 53. In the case of Om Prakash v. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission, Allenganj, Allahabad and others (1990) 2 U.P.L.B.E.C 983, a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the writ petition by observing that a writ petition may be dismissed even though the decision impugned therein may be without jurisdiction, if substantial justice is done between the parties. Such is not the case here. Such is not the case here. The terms of reference being clear and limited to determine amount of layoff compensation, it cannot be said substantial justice has been done by holding these was no lay-off. 54. In this regard it may be seen that the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Om Prakash Sharma (2006) 5 SCC 123 , after taking note of the judgment of the case Mukund Ltd. (supra) observed that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court emanated by the order of the reference. "14. In the instant case, the award of the Labour Court suffers from an illegality, which appears on the face of the record. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court emanated from the order of the reference. It could not have passed an order going beyond the terms of the reference. While passing he award, if the Labour Court exceeds its jurisdiction, the award must be held to be suffering from a jurisdictional error. It was capable of being corrected by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. The High Court, therefore, clearly fell in error in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction. The award and the judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The award is set aside to the extent of the order of reinstatement with back wages. The writ petition filed by the appellant in the High court is, thus, allowed." 55. That was a case where again the terms of reference were confined to examine whether there was any illegality in appointment of one Vijay Kumar in place of respondent in that case, in violation of 25- H of the Act. The dispute that was sought to be raised and had been answered by the Tribunal was with regard to non-compliance of Rules 77 of the Industrial Dispute Rules providing for maintaining the seniority list of workmen. It was in this regard that the observation and finding above noted were recorded by the Supreme Court. 56. The dispute that was sought to be raised and had been answered by the Tribunal was with regard to non-compliance of Rules 77 of the Industrial Dispute Rules providing for maintaining the seniority list of workmen. It was in this regard that the observation and finding above noted were recorded by the Supreme Court. 56. Thus, the law appears to be, if an award has been passed beyond the terms of reference, the same would be exceeding the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, as may be the case and the same may, therefore be corrected by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 57. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court applies to the fact of the present case as well. Here also, the Tribunal has travelled outside the terms of reference and has recorded findings on the validity of lay-off when it had only been called upon to decide whether full layoff compensation had been paid to the workmen. Thus, the Industrial Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error and therefore this Court can correct such mistake. 58. In view of the above, writ petition No. 26784 of 2016 is allowed. The award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 20.10.2015 is set aside and is remitted to the Tribunal to now decide the reference afresh, so as to determine whether the entire amount of lay-off compensation has been paid to the workmen for the period 13.11.1998 to 31.12.1998. If not, to quantify the amount, which has not been so paid. Also, the Tribunal will now re-examine and decide whether the entire amount of lay-off compensation has been paid to the workmen for the period 01.01.1999 to 15.10.2000. If not, then to quantify the amount which has not been so paid. 59. Since, the matter is old the aforesaid reference may be decided as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this judgment is served on the Tribunal, which the petitioner undertakes to file before the said authority within a period of two weeks from today. 60. Also, consequentially, writ petition No. 9692 of 2017 is dismissed at this stage. It is only upon fresh award being framed by the Industrial Tribunal that the amount would be quantified and would become payable. Therefore the question of penalty for alleged non-compliance of the award does not arise.