JUDGMENT : ROHIT B. DEO, J. 1. Heard Shri B.M. Khan, learned Counsel for the appellant and Shri V.G. Wankhede, learned Counsel for respondent Corporation. 2. Only contention in this appeal which Shri Khan, learned Counsel for the appellant, urges is that the punishment of dismissal imposed for proved misconduct of contesting of election without permission of the employer is so shockingly disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Court. 3. Relevant facts are few and undisputed. The appellant, a humble helper with the respondent Corporation, was impelled to contest elections to the Municipal Council, Akot scheduled on 24.11.1991. He applied on 25.10.1991 for permission to contest the election. Such permission is contemplated under Regulation 48-B of the Bombay State Transport Employees Services Regulations, to which we shall advert at a later stage in the judgment. 4. The last date of withdrawal of nomination was 11.11.1991. However, on 22.11.1991, the employer Corporation conveyed the decision of refusal of permission to contest the election. Undeterred by the refusal of the permission, the appellant went ahead and contested the election. The political misadventure proved costly, as fate would ordain, the employee lost both, the election and the employment. 5. The appellant was served with charge-sheet dated 11.11.1993 inter alia alleging gross insubordination and wilful disobedience of a lawful order. The charge is founded on the premise that by contesting the elections to Akot Municipal Council, the appellant defied the provisions of Regulation 48-B and the Circular dated 28.11.1991. 6. The charge-sheet dated 11.11.1993 culminated in a departmental enquiry in which the appellant/employee was held guilty of the alleged misconduct. The competent Authority under the Discipline & Appeal Procedure, by an order dated 02.11.1994 imposed the punishment of stoppage of increments. The appellant accepted the quantum of punishment and chose not to avail the appellate remedy under the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. However, the Appellate Authority in purported exercise of powers under Clause 9 issued a show cause notice dated 17.04.1995 calling upon the appellant to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed. 7. Bare perusal of the show cause notice would reveal that the appellate authority after application of mind to the entire inquiry record virtually recorded a final finding holding that the punishment of stoppage of increments should be enhanced and that the appellant deserves to be dismissed from service. 7. Bare perusal of the show cause notice would reveal that the appellate authority after application of mind to the entire inquiry record virtually recorded a final finding holding that the punishment of stoppage of increments should be enhanced and that the appellant deserves to be dismissed from service. The employee was called upon to show cause as to why the decision reached should not be given effect to. The appellate Authority has recorded a finding that an employee who is inclined to take interest in social or political work would not be in a position to do justice to the employment with the Corporation. The text and tenor of the show cause notice would suggest that the show cause was only an empty formality and the appellate Authority was merely giving a lip service to the principles of natural justice and provisions of Clause 9 of the Discipline & Appeal Procedure. Be that as it may, the employee by reply dated 19.4.1995 pleaded that the penalty of dismissal would be extremely inhuman. 8. The appellant/employee challenged the show cause notice issued by the Appellate Authority before the Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No.180/1995, which came to be decided by judgment and order dated 22.05.1995. 9. The Labour Court was pleased to allow the complaint, inter alia holding that the respondent Corporation has not exercised managerial powers in good faith and that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate and harsh. The Labour Court recorded a finding in paragraph no.8 of the judgment, that two employees charged with similar misconduct have been imposed punishment of stoppage of in crements. This finding of the Labour Court that other employees charged with similar misconduct have been let off with relatively minor punishment, was not disputed by the respondent Corporation either before the Industrial Court or before the learned Single Judge. In fairness to Shri Wankhede, learned Counsel who appears for respondent Corporation, he does not dispute that other employees who were charged with similar misconduct have been imposed lesser punishment. 10. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Labour Court, the Corporation moved the Industrial Court in Revision (ULP) No. 41/98 which was allowed by judgment and order dated 16.2.2008. Armed with the order of the Industrial Court, the respondent Corporation promptly issued the dismissal order dated 20.2.2008. 10. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Labour Court, the Corporation moved the Industrial Court in Revision (ULP) No. 41/98 which was allowed by judgment and order dated 16.2.2008. Armed with the order of the Industrial Court, the respondent Corporation promptly issued the dismissal order dated 20.2.2008. The employee, on the premise that the order of dismissal is only consequential to the show cause notice which was under challenge before the Labour Court and Industrial Court, and that it would be an empty formality to challenge the consequential order of dismissal before the Labour Court, approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 1816/08. The said Writ Petition came to be rejected by the learned Single Judge by judgment and order dated 25.4.2008. 11. Mr. B.M. Khan, the learned Counsel for the appellant, would urge that the order of dismissal for the proven misconduct of having contested the election without the permission of the employer condemns the employee to economic death and is, therefore, so shockingly disproportionate as would shock the conscience of the Court. Mr. Khan would further urge that the Regulation 48-B does not impose a total prohibition on an employee from contesting the election. The said Regulation only mandates that the election should be contested with the permission of the employer, which Mr. Khan submitted cannot be withheld or refused at the whims and fancies of the employer-Corporation. Mr. Khan would further submit that the refusal of the permission on 22.11.1991 was highly belated and since the last date of the withdrawal of the nomination form was 11.11.1991, the employee went ahead and contested the election scheduled on 24.11.1991. Such conduct may be rash or casual but would certainly not be dishonest or tainted with moral turpitude. Mr. Khan would further contend that in the teeth of the fact that the Corporation employer imposed a lesser penalty on employees charged with similar misconduct, the decision of the Appellate Authority to enhance the punishment to dismissal is ipso facto unconscionable and falls foul of the guarantee to equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 12. Shri V.G. Wankhede, learned Counsel for the respondent, supports the view taken by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge. 12. Shri V.G. Wankhede, learned Counsel for the respondent, supports the view taken by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge. Shri Wankhede would contend that the appellate Authority having imposed a punishment, which is provided under the relevant Service Rules, this Court in Writ Petition should be slow to judicially review the same. Mr. Wankhede would urge that judicial review of a punitive order is a secondary review and it would be in the rarest of rare cases that the Writ Court would be interfering with the quantum of punishment. 13. We are not unmindful of the settled legal position that the scope of judicial review is extremely limited where the employer has imposed a punishment which could have been lawfully imposed. We are alive to the dictum of the Supreme Court in Om Kumar & others .vs. Union of India reported in (2001) 2 SCC 386 in which the Supreme Court has propounded that the test for exercise of judicial review would be the test of irrationality or the Wednesbury principle (Associated Provincial Pictures Limited .vs. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223). Their Lordships observed in paragraph 24 in Om Kumar's case as under :- “24. We agree that the question of the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the well known principles known as Wednesbury principles. (See Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223. This Court had occasion to lay down the narrow scope of the jurisdiction in several cases. The applicability of the principle of 'proportionality' in Administrative law was considered exhaustively in Union of India v. Ganayutham, [1997] 7 SCC 463 where the primary role of the administrator and the secondary role of the Courts in matters not involving fundamental freedoms, was explained”. We are further conscious of the law laid down in State of Meghalaya & others .vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak reported in (2008) 7 SCC 580 that it would not suffice for the High Court to conclude that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate and the High Court would have to spell out the reasons for reaching such a conclusion. The Supreme Court inter alia observes thus :- “14. The Supreme Court inter alia observes thus :- “14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons there for. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice.” 14. We are satisfied that the punishment of dismissal imposed on the appellant employee is so shockingly disproportionate as would shock the conscience of this Court. However, before we record our reasons for reaching the said conclusion, it may be apposite to refer to Regulation 48-B of the Bombay State Transport Employees Services Regulations, which is reproduced below :- “48(B) : No employee shall take active part in any politics or demonstration, or contest the election to any Cantonment Board, or Gram Panchayat, or Municipal Corporation, or Zilla Parishad, or Parliament or to an legislature, except with the permission of the Vice President and the General Manager of the Corporation.” The Regulation does not impose a blanket prohibition on an employee to contest the election. What is envisaged is that an employee should seek the permission of the Corporation. A similar provision in Section 42(2) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 is held to be unconstitutional by this Court in the case of Bombay University and College Teachers' Union .vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1990(2) BCR 324. We are, however, not required to examine the constitutional validity of Section 48-B since such a contention was neither raised before the learned Single Judge nor is urged in the present appeal. 15. We are, however, not required to examine the constitutional validity of Section 48-B since such a contention was neither raised before the learned Single Judge nor is urged in the present appeal. 15. Shri V.G. Wankhede, learned Counsel for the respondent/ Corporation, has invited our attention to Circular dated 25.11.1991 which evidences a decision of the Board of Directors of the Corporation to the effect that an employee would be required to tender resignation before contesting an election. The said decision of the Board of Directors may be vulnerable to the vice of inconsistency with Regulation 48-B which is a piece of delegated legislation. We, however, refrain from any further observation on the said aspect as the import and implication of the Circular dated 25.11.1991 is not relevant for deciding the appeal. 16. We may now proceed to record our reasons for holding that the punitive order of dismissal is so grossly disproportionate to the proved misconduct as to be termed unconscionable. The reasons are as under : I. It is not in dispute that for similar misconduct other employees have been imposed lesser punishment of stoppage of increments. The discrimination is not only arbitrary but would be an unfair labour practice under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act. We are further of the view that the misconduct of contesting the election despite rejection of the permission, would in the facts and circumstances of the case, be minor and technical. We may usefully make a reference to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Colourchem Limited vs. A.L. Alaspurkar & others reported in (1998) 3 SCC 192 : “The aforesaid observations in this decision fall in line with the observations in the earlier decision of this Court in Hind Construction (supra). Consequently it must be held that when looking to the nature of the charge of even major misconduct which is found proved if the punishment of dismissal or discharge as imposed is found to be grossly disproportionate in the light of the nature of the misconduct or the past record of the employee concerned involved in the misconduct or is such which no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances, inflicting of such punishment itself could be treated as legal victimisation. On the facts of the present case there is a clear finding reached by the Labour Court and as confirmed by the Industrial Court that the charges levelled against the respondent-delinquents which were held proved even though reflecting major misconducts, were not such in the light of their past service record as would merit imposition of punishment of dismissal. This factual finding would obviously attract the conclusion that by imposing such punishment the appellant-management had victimised the respondent-delinquent. Imposition of such shockingly disproportionate punishment by itself, therefore, has to be treated as legal victimisation apart from not being factual victimisation as on the latter aspect the Labour Court has held against the respondent-workmen and that finding has also remained well sustained on record. Thus it must be held that the management even though not guilty of factual victimisation was guilty of legal victimisation in the light of the proved facts which squarely attracted the ratio of the decisions of this Court in Hind Construction (supra) and Bharat Iron, Works (supra)” II. The proven misconduct is not tainted by moral turpitude. The employee may have acted rashly or negligently or casually in going ahead with his resolve to contest the election despite being conveyed the employer's refusal of permission which refusal was conveyed two days prior to the date of polling. The employee may be faulted in not withdrawing his nomination form on 11.11.1991, inasmuch as till then he had not received any response to his application dated 25.10.1991 seeking permission to contest the election. We are of the view that the rashness or casualness displayed by the appellant is neither dishonest nor is of such a nature as would undermine the discipline and morale of the other employees of the Corporation. III. The charge is of insubordination and wilful disobedience of lawful orders of the employer. The gravity or otherwise of “insubordination” cannot be placed in a straightjacket formula. Insubordination may be a grave misconduct in a disciplined force like a paramilitary organization. However, the appellant is a lowly paid employee of Class IV. cadre of the Corporation and we cannot countenance the view of the appellate Authority that the proved misconduct of insubordination is grave, much less grave enough to warrant dismissal. IV. Insubordination may be a grave misconduct in a disciplined force like a paramilitary organization. However, the appellant is a lowly paid employee of Class IV. cadre of the Corporation and we cannot countenance the view of the appellate Authority that the proved misconduct of insubordination is grave, much less grave enough to warrant dismissal. IV. We note from the show cause notice issued by the Appellate Authority under Clause 9 of the Discipline & Appeal Procedure and the order of punishment of dismissal impugned that the past service record is not considered. Clause 6-B of the Discipline & Appeal Procedure reads thus :- “Without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, any employee who is found guilty of any of the acts of misconduct laid down in Schedule “A” of this procedure may be liable to any one of the punishment indicated in clause 7(a) & (b). While awarding the punishment due regard will be given to the gravity of misconduct and also his past record.” The punitive order clearly militates against the mandate of Clause 6-B. 17. For the reasons spelt out supra, we hold that the order of punishment is so shockingly disproportionate to the proved misconduct as to shock judicial conscience. Mr. Wankhede would urge that having reached such a conclusion, the matter may be remitted to the Competent Authority or the Appellate Authority to decide upon the quantum of punishment. Relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and another .vs. Rajendra Singh reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 . Mr. Wankhede would contend that the constitutional Court would not ordinarily assume the role of the Disciplinary Authority and decide the quantum of punishment. Mr. Wankhede would further urge that this Court may not even suggest any punishment since such a course is held by the Supreme Court to be imposing fetters on the discretionary power of the employer. 18. We have given anxious consideration to the said submission. We are again mindful of the legal position that the Writ Court should ordinarily remit the issue to the Disciplinary Authority for imposing an appropriate punishment. 18. We have given anxious consideration to the said submission. We are again mindful of the legal position that the Writ Court should ordinarily remit the issue to the Disciplinary Authority for imposing an appropriate punishment. However, the Supreme Court has in a number of decisions, inter alia the three Judges judgment in B.C. Chaturvedi .vs. Union of India & others reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 held that the Writ Court would be justified in deciding the quantum of punishment in an anxiety to shorten the length of the litigation. The relevant observation in B.C. Chaturvedi's case read thus :- “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. It the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases. impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof”. 19. The incident took place in 1991 and the appellant is out of employment since 20.2.2008. In this view of the matter, we do not feel it appropriate to remit the issue of quantum of punishment to the Disciplinary Authority. 20. The appellant, a Class-IV employee is out of employment since 20.2.2008. The proven misconduct is of a minor and technical nature and the order of punishment is unconscionable. The period of unemployment for the last more than 9 years must have taken its toll on the appellant and his family. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the order of stoppage of increments as imposed by the Competent Authority is an adequate punishment, particularly in the light of the fact that the appellant has suffered enough for a minor and technical misconduct. 21. We, therefore, quash and set aside the judgment and order of the Industrial Court dated 16.2.2008 and the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 25.4.2008. 21. We, therefore, quash and set aside the judgment and order of the Industrial Court dated 16.2.2008 and the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 25.4.2008. The appellant shall be reinstated with continuity of service within four weeks. The appellant shall be paid 50% of the back wages from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement. The judgment of the Labour Court dated 7.4.1998 shall stand suitably modified. 22. With these directions, the appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.