ORDER : Ravikumar, J. This revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 12.9.2014 in W.O.S.No.24 of 2010 passed by the Wakf Tribunal, Ernakulam. It carries a question of seminal importance. The revision petitioner herein was the plaintiff and the respondents herein were the defendants, in the said suit for prohibitory injunction. A succinct narration of the rival contentions and case, is required to highlight the question involved. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that he is the elected President of the Dhikir Khana situated in the plaint schedule property in Muthalamada Amsom of Chittur Taluk. The common case of the revision petitioner as also the respondents is that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to one Chella Rowther who is the father of the power of attorney holder of the revision petitioner and the Dhikir Khana was established in memory of the spirit of Mohiyaddeen Abdul Khader Jailanee. In the year 1981, the aforesaid Chella Rowther had gifted the plaint schedule property to Abdul Rahiman Musaliyar who was then the President of the Dhikkir Khana. Due to the ill health of Abdul Rahiman Musaliyar, the institution was to be closed for some time and later, in the year 2000, the said Abdul Rahiman Musaliyar had passed away. Subsequently, on 4.4.2001, the revision petitioner was elected as the president of the Dhikir Khana in a general body meeting convened on that day and since then he has been running the establishment through his power of attorney holder. The respondents herein contested the suit. As noticed hereinbefore, with respect to the dedication of the property to Dhikir Khana, there is no dispute. So also, the defendants did not dispute the fact that in the capacity of its president it was being managed by Abdul Rahiman Musaliyar. However, according to them, after the death of Abdul Rahiman Musaliyar, a general body of Kambrathachalla Jama-ath was conducted on 6.5.1983 and one K.V. Noor Mohammed Rawther was elected as the President of the Jamaath. It is also their case that though the Dhikir Khana started its functioning on 25.1.1987, it was transferred to Anamari 16 Jamaath. However, according to them, after the death of Abdul Rahiman Musaliyar, a general body of Kambrathachalla Jama-ath was conducted on 6.5.1983 and one K.V. Noor Mohammed Rawther was elected as the President of the Jamaath. It is also their case that though the Dhikir Khana started its functioning on 25.1.1987, it was transferred to Anamari 16 Jamaath. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the written statement filed before the Wakf Tribunal, it was specifically stated that on 6.5.1983, the management of the Dhikkir Khana got vested with Anamari 16 Jama-ath and it was handed over to Kambrathachalla Jamaath in the year 1996. Furthermore, it is stated that thereupon, the committee had spent huge amounts for repairing the building and that the administration of the Dhikkir Khana has been exclusively in the hands of Kambrathachalla Jamaath since 2.10.2001. In short, according to them, the plaint schedule property has been under the exclusive possession of the Kambrathachalla Jamaath even during the lifetime of Abdul Musaliyar and being the party in possession of the property, there was absolutely no question of their trespassing into the said property. In such circumstances, according to them, the plaintiff is not entitled to get the prohibitory injunction as sought for. 3. Defendant No.4, the Chief Executive Officer, who is the third respondent herein, in his written statement filed before the Tribunal stated that as per the records, no such wakf was registered with the Wakf Board and therefore, the Wakf Board is not aware of the claim of the plaintiff. Based on the rival pleadings, the Tribunal formulated the following issues for consideration:- 1. Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to try the suit? 2. Whether the plaint schedule is a Waqf property? 3. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the injunction prayed for? 4. Before the Tribunal, the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff was examined as PW1 and fifth defendant/4th respondent herein was examined as DW1. Exts.A1 to A10 were marked on the side of the revision petitioner/plaintiff and Exts.B1 to B18 were marked on the side of the defendants/respondents. Ext.C1 is the commission report and Ext.C2 series are the photographs. Obviously, the Tribunal considered issues 1 and 2 jointly and answered both issues in the affirmative. Issues 3 and 4 were jointly considered by the Tribunal. Ext.C1 is the commission report and Ext.C2 series are the photographs. Obviously, the Tribunal considered issues 1 and 2 jointly and answered both issues in the affirmative. Issues 3 and 4 were jointly considered by the Tribunal. Issue No.3 was whether the suit was barred by res judicata? In fact, it is the indisputable position that O.S.No.593/2001 filed by the revision petitioner herein before the Munsiff Court, Chittoor seeking permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondent therein was returned. It is only thereafter that WOS No.24/2010 which culminated in the impugned judgment was filed. At the same time, it is to be noted that prior to returning the plaint, the Munsiff Court, Chittoor passed an order in I.A.3202/2001 in O.S.593/2001. Essentially, that was an order vacating the ex parte order of injunction granted in favour of the revision petitioner herein. The said I.A was dismissed with costs to the counter petitioners/respondents herein. As against the said order of dismissal, C.M.A.8/2004 was filed before the District Court Palakkad. Admittedly, the said C.M.A was dismissed. That order has become final and thereby the earlier order passed in I.A.3202/2001 has become final. As noticed hereinbefore, WOS No.24/2010 was filed subsequent to the return of the plaint before the Wakf Tribunal. The plaint was returned by the Munsiff Court, Chittoor holding that it is not having jurisdiction to try the suit in the light of the provisions under section 85 of the Wakf Act. When that be the position, the question is whether the order vacating the interim injunction initially passed in favour of the plaintiff holding that he had failed to prove the possession, could have been treated as one creating res judicata. In other words, whether Ext.B1 order ought to have been taken into consideration while disposing WOS.24/2010. The factum of dismissal of C.M.A.No.8/2004 preferred against Ext.B1 order was taken into account by the Wakf Tribunal. No volume of argument is required to hold that Ext.B1 as also the order passed in C.M.A No.8/2004 ought not to have been taken into consideration as the subsequent return of the plaint itself would reveal that Munsiff Court, Chittoor was not having jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Therefore, Ext.B1 order was passed without jurisdiction and in other words, passed by the incompetent court and therefore, is a nullity. In such circumstances, it is non-est in the eye of law. Therefore, Ext.B1 order was passed without jurisdiction and in other words, passed by the incompetent court and therefore, is a nullity. In such circumstances, it is non-est in the eye of law. When that be so, principles of res judicata would not apply and therefore, neither Ext.B1 nor the order passed in C.M.A No.8/2004 ought to have been taken for the purpose of deciding the question of possession in WOS.24/2010. Our view is fortified by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Chandrabhai K. Bhoir and others v. Krishna Arjun Bhoir and others ( AIR 2009 SC 1645 ). It was held therein thus:- “Thus, the said issue, in our opinion, did not attain finality. In any view of the matter, an order passed without jurisdiction would be a nullity. It will be a coram non judice. It is non est in the eye of law. Principles of res judicata would not apply to such cases. (See -Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. L.V.A. Dixitulu 1979 (2) SCC 34 , Union of India v. Pramod Gupta 2005 (12) SCC 1 and National Institute of Technology and Others v. Niraj Kumar Singh 2007(2) SCC 481 ). 5. In this case, evidently, the plaint was returned essentially citing the reason of lack of jurisdiction. True that before returning the plaint, an interim injunction was granted as per order in I.A. No.3202 of 2001 in O.S.No.593 of 2001. Later, as per Ext.B1 dated 11.12.2001, it was vacated. It was against the said order that C.M.A.No.8 of 2004 was filed. As noticed herein before, the C.M.A. was dismissed for default and it was not subsequently restored into file and thereby the order in I.A. No.3202 of 2001 had attained finality. The effects and impacts of such orders pale into insignificance consequent to the return of the plaint citing the reason of lack of jurisdiction. In such circumstances, in the light of the decision in Chandrabhai K. Bhoir's case (supra) and also in view of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decisions in the said order ought not have operated as res judicata. In such circumstances, the Tribunal had clearly erred in relying on such orders for the purpose of entering into a finding against the plaintiff. In such circumstances, the Tribunal had clearly erred in relying on such orders for the purpose of entering into a finding against the plaintiff. However, that by itself would not decide the fate of this revision petition and necessarily, the question whether the order dismissing the suit on the other grounds could be sustained, is also a matter to be looked into. 6. As noticed hereinbefore, the revision petitioner, who is the plaintiff therein, filed the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction. The allegation is that the defendants are trespassing into the property and therefore, they should be restrained. In such circumstances, it was incumbent on the part of the revision petitioner/plaintiff to establish that he was in the possession of the plaint schedule property. From the documents referred hereinbefore, the question is whether the evidence adduced by the revision petitioner was sufficient to establish his possession over the plaint schedule property. Exts.A5 to A10 were mainly relied on by the revision petitioner to establish his possession. They are Notices or receipts issued by the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB), Ext.A5 is the notice issued from the KSEB informing the revision petitioner that the power supply would be disconnected. Ext.A6 series are the receipts issued by the KSEB. Ext.A7 is an invoice issued from KSEB, whereas Exts.A8 to A10 are receipts issued by the KSEB. Merely because such receipts or notices were issued by the KSEB to the petitioner, they could be taken as evidence establishing the possession of the property in question. We have no hesitation to hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that they would not establish the revision petitioner's possession of the plaint schedule property. On a careful consideration of evidence on record, we are of the considered view that though it was incumbent on the part of the revision petitioner to establish his possession over the plaint schedule property, he had utterly failed in doing so. When that be the position, the finding of the Tribunal that the revision petitioner/plaintiff had failed to establish his possession over the plaint schedule property cannot be said to be an error or illegality warranting interference. In such circumstances, we do not propose to go into the question whether the respondents/defendants had succeeded in establishing their possession over the plaint schedule property. In such circumstances, we do not propose to go into the question whether the respondents/defendants had succeeded in establishing their possession over the plaint schedule property. When the revision petitioner who approached the Tribunal had failed to establish his possession over the property in a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, the respondent/revision petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for. In this context, it is also relevant to note that the revision petitioner/plaintiff had not entered the box to give evidence. For all these reasons, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. No grounds have been brought out by the revision petitioner compelling us to invoke the revisional jurisdiction available to this Court in view of the proviso to Section 83(9) of the Wakf Act. This C.R.P. is devoid of merits and accordingly, it is dismissed.