ORDER : This is a petition filed by the petitioner/accused under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being aggrieved by the order dated 22.08.2017 passed by the Court of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bagalkot in Guledagudda P.S. Crime No.44/2017. In this revision petition, the petitioner/accused has sought for setting aside the said order and consequently, prayed that the application dated 04.08.2017 be al lowed and the petitioner/accused may be released on bail for the offence punishable under Sections 376, 354A, 511 of IPC read with Sections 8, 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, in the interest of justice and equity. 2. Brief facts of the case, as pleaded in the petition, are that the complainant is one Manjula, wife of Rangappa Kamatar. On 02.05.2017, she went to the respondent-police station and lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that she is resident of Kottekalla, and is residing along with her family consisting of her husband and two children viz., Kallappa 10 years and Kanchana aged six years. The daughter of the complainant is admitted to Anganawadi in the said village. The house of the petitioner is situated in front of her house and as such the daughter of complainant used to go and play in the house of the petitioner. On 29.04.2017, at abut 11.00 a.m., when the complainant and her mother-in-law were near her home, the daughter of the complainant was playing in front of their home and the petitioner is alleged to have called Kanchana to get him vimal packet from the shop and accordingly Kanchana took ten rupees from him and went to shop and brought vimal packet to the petitioner and thereafter the petitioner is alleged to have called Kanchana into his house for playing, and at 11.10 a.m. her daughter went inside the house of petitioner. At 11.30 a.m., in order to serve lunch for her daughter, complainant went to the house of the petitioner and called her, but there was no response from inside; eventually, she went inside the house of the petitioner and the bedroom door was open and she saw therein that the petitioner was naked and her daughter was also lying naked on the floor and the petitioner was making physical advances on her daughter’s body. The complainant, on seeing the same, screamed and, at that time, the petitioner is alleged to have dressed himself and ran away from the house and thereafter Saraswati, the mother-in-law of the complainant, Ninbawwa, Kallappa gathered and they all together enquired her daughter and she revealed that the petitioner had undressed her and made her to sleep with him. Thus, with these al legations the complaint came to be filed against the present petitioner which came to be registered in Crime No. 44/2017 for the aforesaid of fences. 3. When the investigation of the case was not completed within 90 days from the date of arrest of the petitioner and remanding him to judicial custody, on the 94th day, the petitioner herein filed a bail application under the provision of Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, along with an advancement application of the case before the concerned Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge made an endorsement on the said application mentioning ‘put-up’ and then on the application under Section 167(2)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. there is signature of the learned Sessions Judge. It goes to show that the Public Prosecutor prayed time for filing objections and hence, it was ordered to be posted on 17.08.2017 that was the date which was given earlier. 4. On 17.08.2017, regular date, the matter was taken up for hearing. However, on 16.08.2017 itself, charge-sheet was placed before the Court. Thereafter, on 22.08.2017, the learned Sessions Judge ultimately passed an order on the bail application rejecting the same. Being aggrieved by the same, the revision petitioner/accused is before this Court. He has challenged the legality and correctness of the order of the learned District and Sessions Judge, the order dated 22nd day of August 2017 on the grounds as mentioned in paragraphs 7 to 16 of this criminal revision petition. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/accused and so also the learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondent-State. 6. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/accused and so also the learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondent-State. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner made the submission that the accused was arrested on 02.05.2017 and he was remanded to judicial custody, and the 90 days from there, if calculated, will be the 31st July 2017, but the charge-sheet was not filed within 90 days, and therefore, on the 94th day from the date of his arrest i.e., on 04.08.2017, the petitioner filed the bail application under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C., along with an advancement application. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned District and Sessions Judge ought to have considered the bail application on the very day and immediately the court should have passed the order releasing the petitioner/accused on bail invoking Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. The learned counsel submitted that as the Public Prosecutor prayed time to file objections to the said application, the learned Sessions Judge posted it to the regular date i.e., 17.08.2017. 7. Hence he made submission that once the charge sheet is not filed within 90 days, the accused person is having indefeasible right which cannot be taken away by any means. Hence it is his submission, the order of the learned Sessions Judge posting the matter to 17.8.2017 and in the meanwhile on 16.8.2017 the charge sheet came to be filed, hearing the matter on 17.8.2017 and rejecting the bail application holding that the charge sheet is already placed before the Court, learned counsel made submission that the Court at paragraph No.12 of its order referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Sadhwi Praghya Singh and quoting the paragraph ultimately rejected the bail application. Hence he made the submission that this view taken by the learned Sessions Judge is not correct in the eye of law. Even he also made submission that the principles enunciated in the case of Sadhwi Praghya Singh is also subsequently overruled by the Full Bench decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court holding that it has also relied upon another division bench decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2014)9 SCC 457 case of Union of India vs. Nirala Yadav. Even he also made submission that the principles enunciated in the case of Sadhwi Praghya Singh is also subsequently overruled by the Full Bench decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court holding that it has also relied upon another division bench decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2014)9 SCC 457 case of Union of India vs. Nirala Yadav. Hence he submitted to al low the revision petition, set aside the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge and to allow the application granting bail to the revision petitioner-accused. 8. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader made submission that in this case though the application under section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. came to the filed on 94th day i.e., on 4.8.2017 the accused person has not at all insisted the Court to hear the said application on the very day and submitting to the Court that the accused person is ready to furnish surety on that day itself. Therefore the learned High Court Government Pleader made submission, when the accused person has not insisted for hearing the said application on that day only, it amounts that he waived his statutory right allowing the Court to post the mater on 17.8.2017. Hence he submitted that in this regard the learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed in the bail order referring to the decision of the constitutional bench in respect of Sanjay Dutt’s case, so also referring to the principle enunciated in Sadhwi Praghya Singh’s case. Hence he made the submission, there is no illegality committed by the Court below nor any perverse and capricious view is taken. Hence he submitted, there is no merit in the revision petition and the same has to be rejected. 9. I have perused the grounds urged in the petition. The order impugned in this revision petition passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, on the bail application filed under section 167(2)1(a)(i) of Cr.P.C., so also I have perused the grounds urged in the petition. It is an undisputed fact, according to both the sides, the revision petitioner was arrested on 2.5.2017 and he was remanded to judicial custody. The Investigating Officer ought to have completed the investigation within 90 days and ought to have filed the charge sheet within 90 days. The 90 days falls on 31.7.2017. It is an undisputed fact, according to both the sides, the revision petitioner was arrested on 2.5.2017 and he was remanded to judicial custody. The Investigating Officer ought to have completed the investigation within 90 days and ought to have filed the charge sheet within 90 days. The 90 days falls on 31.7.2017. Admittedly even according to the prosecution, on 31.7.2017 also the charge sheet was not filed, then on 4.8.2017 the revision petitioner accused moved an application under section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. accompanied by an advancement application, requesting the Court to advance the matter. The learned Sessions Judge made an endorsement on the said application as ‘put up’, which was dated 4.8.2017 itself. The further endorsement on the application itself goes to show that the Public Prosecutor sought time for filing the objection statement and the matter was posted to 17.8.2017 i.e., the regular date which was already given. The materials also go to show that on 16.8.2017 the charge sheet came to be filed and on the regular date i.e., on 17.8.2017 the matter was heard and the order came to be passed on 22.8.2017. By the said order the learned Sessions Judge rejected the application. Referring to the order of the learned Sessions Judge in paragraph No.12 the learned Sessions Judge observed as under: 12. As could be seen from the order sheet accused was remanded to judicial custody on 2.5.2017 and when the alleged of fences are triable by the Court of Sessions/Special Court, police ought to have filed charge sheet on 31.7.2017 which was the last day or to say in other words which was the 90th day for filing the charge sheet. However the same was not filed on the said day. In the meanwhile advocate for accused filed advancement application along with bail application under section 167 of Cr.P.C. on 4.8.2017. However he did not press for argument on the same day of filing the advancement application. Hence the said application was ordered to be put up on the regular date of appearance of the accused from judicial custody i.e., on 17.8.2017. Accordingly the bail application was heard on 17.8.2017 by which time already charge sheet was filed by the police. However he did not press for argument on the same day of filing the advancement application. Hence the said application was ordered to be put up on the regular date of appearance of the accused from judicial custody i.e., on 17.8.2017. Accordingly the bail application was heard on 17.8.2017 by which time already charge sheet was filed by the police. Therefore once the charge sheet is filed before disposal of the said bail application, according to well settled proposition of law the accused loses his right to be enlarged on statutory bail and the mater has to be decided only on merits. This opinion of the Court finds strength from the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Sadhwi Praghya Singh in which case the Hon’ble Apex Court by relying upon the Constitutional Bench decision of the said Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt held as under: “that right to default bail is not absolute or indefeasible right. In other words even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that charge sheet was not filed within 90 days, but before consideration of the same and before being released on bail if charge sheet is filed the said right to be released on bail would be lost. After filing of the charge sheet if the accused is to be released on bail it can be only on merits”. 10. That right to be released is not absolute or indefeasible right, in other words even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that charge sheet was not filed within 90 days, but before consideration of the same, and before being released on bail, if the charge sheet is filed, the said right to be released on bail would be lost. After filing of the charge sheet if the accused is to be released on bail, it can be only on merits. 11. In paragraph No.13 of the said order, the Court further observed, “therefore in the light of the said proposition of law the application filed by the accused becomes redundant and therefore does not merit for consideration”. With this observation the said application came to be rejected by the concerned Court. 12. 11. In paragraph No.13 of the said order, the Court further observed, “therefore in the light of the said proposition of law the application filed by the accused becomes redundant and therefore does not merit for consideration”. With this observation the said application came to be rejected by the concerned Court. 12. Looking to the very observation made by the Court in paragraph No.12 of its order, there is no mention that the Court specifically asked the learned counsel for the accused who moved the bail application, whether the accused is prepared to furnish surety on the very same day, so also there is no mention in the order of the Court below in respect of asking either the accused or the counsel appearing for the accused. There is a observation that they are not prepared to furnish security on the very day and seeking time at their end. Materials go to show that it is because of the time sought by the public prosecutor for filing objection statement to the said application, it was posted to 17.8.2017. Therefore the observation made by the Court below as the matter was not insisted to be heard on the very day and when it was posted to the regular date, in the meanwhile charge sheet is filed, the accused has lost his right is not the correct observation made by the concerned Sessions Judge. So far as the principle enunciated in the decision of Sadhwi Praghya Singh’s case, which is relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge, I am referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner herein reported in (2014) 9 SCC 457 rendered in the case of Union of India through Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Nirala Yadav alias Raja Ram Yadav alias Deepak Yadav. Looking to the said decision and the observations made in this subsequent decision, the relevant paragraph of the said decision in para No.45, 46 and 47 of the said decision their lordships have held as under: 45. The opinion expressed in paragraph 54 and 58 in Pragyna Singh Thakur which we have emphasized, as it seems to us, runs counter to the principles stated in Uday Mohanlal Acharya which has been followed in Hassan Ali Khan and Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi. The decision in Sayed Mohd. The opinion expressed in paragraph 54 and 58 in Pragyna Singh Thakur which we have emphasized, as it seems to us, runs counter to the principles stated in Uday Mohanlal Acharya which has been followed in Hassan Ali Khan and Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi. The decision in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi case has been rendered by a three-Judge Bench. We may hasten to state, though in Pragyna Singh Thakur case the learned Judges have referred to Uday Mohanlal Acharya case but have stated the principle that even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that the charge-sheet was not filed within 90 days, but before the consideration of the same and before being released on bail, if charge-sheet is filed the said right to be enlarged on bail is lost. This opinion is contrary to the earlier larger Bench decisions and also runs counter to the subsequent three18 Judge Bench decision in Mustaq Ahmed Mohammed Isak case. We are disposed to think so, as the two-Judge Bench has used the words “before consideration of the same and before being released on bail”, the said principle specifically strikes a discordant note with the proposition stated in the decisions rendered by the larger Benches. 46. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to refer to the dissenting opinion by B.N. Agarwal, J. in Uday Mohanlal Acharya case. The learned Judge dissented with the majority as far as interpretation of the expression “if not already availed of” by stating so: “29. My learned brother has referred to the expression ‘if not already availed of’ referred to in the judgment in Sanjay Dutt case for arriving at Conclusion 6. According to me, the expression ‘availed of’ does not mean mere filing of application for bail expressing therein willingness of the accused to furnish the bail bond. What will happen if on the 61st day an application for bail is filed for being released on bail on the ground of default by not filing the challan by the 60th day and on the 61st day the challan is also filed by the time the Magistrate is called upon to apply his mind to the challan as well as the petition for grant of bail? In view of the several decisions referred to above and the requirements prescribed by clause (a)(ii) of the proviso read with Explanation I to Section 167(2) of the Code, as no bail bond has been furnished, such an application for bail has to be dismissed because the stage of proviso to Section 167(2) is over, as such right is extinguished the moment the challan is filed. 30. In this background, the expression ‘availed of’ does not mean mere filing of the application for bail expressing thereunder willingness to furnish bail bond, but the stage for actual furnishing of bail bond must reach. If the challan is filed before that, then there is no question of enforcing the right, howsoever valuable or indefeasible it may be, after filing of the challan because thereafter the right under default clause cannot be exercised.” On a careful reading of the aforesaid two paragraphs, we think, the two-Judge Bench in Pragyna Singh Thakur case has somewhat in a similar matter stated the same. As long as the majority view occupies the field it is a binding precedent. That apart, it has been followed by a three-Judge Bench in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi case. Keeping in view the principle stated in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi case which is based on three-Judge Bench decision in Uday Mohanlal Acharya case, we are obliged to conclude and hold that the principle laid down in paras 54 and 58 of Pragyna Singh Thakur case (which have been emphasized by us: see paras 42 and 43 above) does not state the correct principle of law. It can clearly be stated that in view of the subsequent decision of a larger Bench that cannot be treated to be good law. Our view finds support from the decision in Union of India v. Arviva Industries India Ltd. 47. Coming to the facts of the instant case, we find that prior to the date of expiry of 90 days which is the initial period for filing the charge-sheet, the prosecution neither had filed the charge-sheet nor had it filed an application for extension. Had an application for extension been filed, then the matter would have been totally different. After the respondent-accused filed the application, the prosecution submitted an application seeking extension of time for filing of the chargesheet. Mr. Had an application for extension been filed, then the matter would have been totally different. After the respondent-accused filed the application, the prosecution submitted an application seeking extension of time for filing of the chargesheet. Mr. P.K. Dey, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the same is permissible in view of the decision in Bipin Shantilal Panchal but on a studied scrutiny of the same we find that the said decision only dealt with whether extension could be sought from time to time till the completion of period as provided in the statute i.e., 180 days. It did not address the issue what could be the effect of not filing an application for extension prior to expiry of the period because in the factual matrix it was not necessary to do so. In the instant case, the day the accused filed the application for benefit of the default provision as engrafted under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of Cr.P.C. the Court required the accused to file a rejoinder-affidavit by the time the initial period provided under the statute had expired. There was no question of any contest as if the application for extension had been filed prior to the expiry of time. The adjournment by the learned Magistrate was misconceived. He was obliged on that day to deal with the application filed by the accused as required under Section 167(2) CrPC. We have no hesitation in saying that such procrastination frustrates the legislative mandate. A Court cannot act to extinguish the right of an accused if the law so confers on him. Law has to prevail. The prosecution cannot avail such subterfuges to frustrate or destroy the legal right of the accused. Such an act is not permissible. If we permit ourselves to say so, the prosecution exhibited sheer negligence in not filing the application within the time which it was entitled to do so in law but made all adroit attempts to redeem the cause by its conduct. 13. I am also referring to another full bench decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2013) 2 SCC(Cri) 488 in the case of Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and others. Looking to the relevant para No.25 which also reads as under: 25. 13. I am also referring to another full bench decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2013) 2 SCC(Cri) 488 in the case of Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and others. Looking to the relevant para No.25 which also reads as under: 25. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the relevant provisions of law and the decision cited, we are unable to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of the State by the learned Additional Solicitor General Mr. Raval. There is no denying the fact that on 17.7.2012, when CR No.86 of 2012 was al lowed by the Additional Sessions Judge and the custody of the appellant was held to be illegal and an application under Section 167(2) CrPC was made on behalf of the appellant for grant of statutory bail which was listed for hearing. Instead of hearing the application, the Chief Metropoli tan Magistrate adjourned the same till the next day when the Public Prosecutor filed an application for extension of the period of custody and investigation and on 20.7.2012 extended the time of investigation and the custody of the appellant for a further period of 90 days with retrospective effect from 2.6.2012. Not only is the retrospectivity of the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate untenable, it could not also defeat the statutory right which had accrued to the appellant on the expiry of 90 days from the date when the appellant was taken into custody. Such right, as has been commented upon by this Court in Sanjay Dutt and the other cases cited by the learned Additional Solicitor General, could only be distinguished (sic extinguished) once the charge-sheet had been filed in the case and no application has been made prior thereto for grant of statutory bail. It is well established that if an accused does not exercise his right to grant of statutory bail before the charge-sheet is filed, he loses his right to such benefit once such charge-sheet is filed and can, thereafter, only apply for regular bail. 14. So also the another decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner-accused in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2009/2017 dated 16.8.2017. 14. So also the another decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner-accused in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2009/2017 dated 16.8.2017. Looking to the principles enunciated in all these three decisions, the Hon’ble Apex Court made the legal position very clear that once the charge sheet is not filed within the period prescribed, there will be indefeasible right accruing to the accused person on which he is entitled to be released on bail. In the case on hand, the learned Sessions Judge ought to have taken the application for hearing on 4.8.2017 itself and ought to have passed the order in the said application; adjourning the matter to regular date 17.8.2017 is misconceived in this case. Once the Court posted the matter on 17.8.2017 and holding that on that day when the case was taken up for consideration, the charge sheet was already filed and hence the accused cannot have such a right to be released on statutory bail is not the correct view taken by the learned Sessions Judge in the matter. Therefore rejection of the application on these grounds is not in accordance with the law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the subsequent decisions. Therefore the petitioner-accused has made out a case. Accordingly the revision petition is allowed. 15. The order passed by the learned Sessions Judge rejecting the bail application is hereby set aside and the application filed by the revision petitioner-accused under Section 167(2)1(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. is hereby al lowed and he is ordered to be released on bail of the said offences subject to the following conditions. i. Petitioner has to execute personal bond for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- and furnish one solvent surety for the like sum to the satisfaction of concerned Court. ii. Petitioner shall not tamper with any of the prosecution witnesses directly or indirectly. iii. Petitioner shall appear before the concerned Court regularly.