JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR UPADHYAY, J. The instant Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court Rules has been filed by Samastipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank and others against the judgment of the writ court dated 4.11.2015 passed in CWJC No. 6898 of 1999. 2. The respondent No. 1 filed CWJC No. 6898 of 1999 on 26.7.1999 for quashing of the order of punishment of dismissal from service dated 25.3.1998 passed by the disciplinary authority and the order of the appellate authority dated 20.4.1998 upholding the decision of the disciplinary authority. 3. The writ petition was admitted for hearing vide order dated 19.4.2000. From the order-sheet of the writ court it appears that the counter affidavit in the writ petition, though claimed to have been filed by the Bank in the year 1999 itself, was not available on the record, the writ court as such directed the Appellant-Bank to place a copy of the counter affidavit on record. The writ court also noted in the order dated 9.4.2015 the submission of counsel for the writ petitioner that the writ petitioner was not allowed to join without any order of suspension being passed against him and he was also denied salary for the period. The Court also noted the submission of the writ petitioner that due to lack of payment of salary/subsistence allowance/advance for sustenance he was unable to attend the disciplinary proceeding. The Court also noted the submission that under the Bank’s Employees Service Regulation employee cannot be kept in a mode of deemed suspension. The writ court also noted that the writ petitioner has neither been allowed to join nor the order of suspension was passed nor subsistence allowance was paid even the advance prayed for sustenance was denied. 4. Unfortunately the counter affidavit was not placed on record. The writ court vide order dated 4.5.2015 directed the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank to produce the original record of the case of the proceeding of the writ petitioner. The subsequent order dated 19.5.2015 is further indicative of the fact that the writ court granted last indulgence to the Bank to produce the original record of the case of the proceeding of the writ petitioner. The subsequent order dated 19.5.2015 is further indicative of the fact that the writ court granted last indulgence to the Bank to produce the original record of the case of the proceeding of the writ petitioner. Under the compelling circumstances the writ court directed the Chairman of the Bihar Gramin Bank to be present in Court along with the original record on 25.6.2015. On 1.7.2015 the Chairman of the Bank was personally present in the Court before the writ court and on that day the Bank took the stand that the original record of the connected departmental proceeding relating to imposition of punishment of dismissal of service of the writ petitioner could not be traced out and as such the Chairman is not in a position to produce the same. 5. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the writ court heard the parties in the absence of the original record and vide judgment dated 4.11.2015 the writ court allowed the writ application after considering the regulation of the Samastipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank Staff Service Regulation and the pleading of the parties. In this case the Enquiry Officer submitted report in ex parte proceeding in the absence of the writ petitioner who was neither placed under suspension nor given any place of posting as a result thereof he was denied payment of salary in the absence of posting and subsistence allowance in the absence of order of suspension. The writ court has considered the hard fact that the writ petitioner was not allowed to join his duty nor he was placed under suspension. The writ court also noted the fact that the writ petitioner time and again represented the disciplinary authority and the Enquiry Officer for ensuring his posting and payment of salary or paying subsistence allowance if the writ petitioner was under suspension, although the Bank Regulation does not contemplate provision for deemed suspension. The writ court considering various judgment of the Apex Court viz. Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki Vs. Presiding Officer & Anr.: (1986) 3 SCC 131 : Capt. M.Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr: 1999 Lab. I.C. 1565, the State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. K.K. Sharma: (2002) 9 SCC 474 and Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava Vs. The writ court considering various judgment of the Apex Court viz. Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki Vs. Presiding Officer & Anr.: (1986) 3 SCC 131 : Capt. M.Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr: 1999 Lab. I.C. 1565, the State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. K.K. Sharma: (2002) 9 SCC 474 and Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh: (1973) 1 SCC 656 held that the ex parte departmental proceeding was conducted against the writ petitioner without paying him any salary or subsistence allowance and as such it is violative of the principles of natural justice and accordingly, allowed the writ petition and directed the Bank to reinstate the writ petitioner in service if he has not attained the age of superannuation. The writ court for the ends of justice held out that the writ petitioner shall be paid 50% salary and allowance which he would have been entitled had he been in service. The writ court also allowed the disciplinary authority to proceed afresh from the stage of submission of written statement yet, the respondent-Bank is the appellant in the present Letters Patent Appeal. 6. Mr. Rajendra Narayan, Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-Bank has assailed the judgment of the writ court on the ground that the writ court has committed error in holding that the writ petitioner was not paid salary or subsistence allowance and as such the departmental proceeding was vitiated as violative of the rules of natural justice. 7. In the Letters Patent Appeal the appellant-Bank has filed supplementary affidavit in order to establish that the Bank has issued several letters and issued direction to the writ petitioner respondent No. 1 in this appeal to approach the competent authority regarding his grievance but he never chose to give his joining before the competent authority nor he approached the competent authority with regard to his claim for advance payment which was the basis of his showing handicap in attending the departmental proceeding. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Narayan when confronted with the various letters of the writ petitioner which was acknowledged by the Bank wherein the writ petitioner addressed the disciplinary authority with a copy to the Enquiry Officer to pay him advance for fooding arrangement as the letter contained in Annexures-11 and 12 dated 20.9.1997 and 21.9.1997 which is very specific on the point that he approached the Bank for acceptance of joining on 20.9.1997, but he was not allowed to join and his request for advance in order to sustain was not addressed and as such he has categorically mentioned in the letter contained in Annexures-11 and 12 that in the aforesaid circumstances, he is unable to attend the departmental proceeding, he specifically requested in the letter dated 21.9.1997 that he may be permitted to join the post, this letter dated 21.9.1997 is followed by another letter dated 29.9.1997 wherein the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 herein once again reiterated his request for allowing to join the post and to provide him advance to enable him to participate in the departmental proceeding. The aforesaid letters of the writ petitioner were duly acknowledged by the Bank as is evident from the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank. 9. From Annexure-1 series it appears that on 25.9.1996 specific direction was made to the Branch Manager, Samastipur Gramin Bank not to make any payment to the writ petitioner. The letter dated 23rd September, 1997 is in response to the letter of request of the writ petitioner dated 20.9.1997 which acknowledges the receipt of the letter dated 20.9.1997, for ready reference the letter dated 23.9.1997 and the subsequent letter dated 24th September, 1997 are reproduced herewith. The letter dated 23rd September, 1997 is in response to the letter of request of the writ petitioner dated 20.9.1997 which acknowledges the receipt of the letter dated 20.9.1997, for ready reference the letter dated 23.9.1997 and the subsequent letter dated 24th September, 1997 are reproduced herewith. leLrhiqj {ks=h; xzkeh.k cSad ¼Hkkjrh; LVsV cSad }kjk izk;ksftr½ iz/kku dk;kZy; % leLrhiqj rkjokrkZ % xzkecSad nwjHkk"k % 22674 la[;k uaEcj---------lh,l@tSu@8025@1345@97&98 fnukad & 23oha flrEcj] 1997] bZŒ Jh mek 'kadj izlkn] duh; izcU/ku Js.kh&1 eksŒ iks[kfj;k] iksLV&lkfgcxat ftyk&lkfgcxat ¼816109½ egksn;] vkidk vH;kosnu fnukad 20-09-1997 1- 'kh"kkZfdar fo"k; ij vkidks v/kksgLrk{kjh }kjk fnukad 20oha flrEcj] 1997] dks lq>ko fn;k x;k Fkk fd viuk ;ksxnku vki cSad ds l{ke inkf/kdkjh dks nsa rFkk ;fn vko';drk gks rks vfxze gsrq Hkh l{ke inkf/kdkjh dks viuk vkosnu izLrqr djsaA 2- bl lUnHkZ esa] vkids 'kh"kkZfdar vH;kosnu ij vuq'kklfud izkf/kdkjh dk Hkh er gS fd vkidks vius ;ksxnku o vfxze gsrq cSad ds l{ke inkf/kdkjh ls lEidZ djuk pkfg,A fo'oklHkktu ,lMh@& izcU/ku ¼v/;{kh; lfpoky;½ leLrhiqj {ks=h; xzkeh.k cSad ¼Hkkjrh; LVsV cSad }kjk izk;ksftr½ iz/kku dk;kZy; % leLrhiqj rkjokrkZ % xzkecSad nwjHkk"k % 22674 la[;k uaEcj---------lh,l@tSu@8024@4334@97&98 fnukad & 24oha flrEcj] 1997] bZŒ Jh mek 'kadj izlkn] duh; izcU/ku Js.kh&1 eksŒ iks[kfj;k] iksLV&lkfgcxat ftyk&lkfgcxat ¼816109½ egksn;] vkidk vH;kosnu fnukad 21-09-1997 vkids i= fnukad 21oha flrEcj] 1997] ds lUnHkZ esa vuq'kklfud izkf/kdkjh dk lq>ko gS fd vki viuk ;ksxnku o vfxze gsrq vH;kosnu] ;fn bldh vko';drk gS] cSad ds l{ke inkf/kdkjh dks izLrqr dj ldrs gSaA fo'oklHkktu ,lMh@& izcU/kd ¼v/;{kh; lfpoky;½ From the aforesaid two letters it is quite clear that the disciplinary authority was in know of the handicap of the writ petitioner in not attending the departmental proceeding due to financial constraints. 10. Mr. Rajendra Naryan, has argued that the writ petitioner has not approached the competent authority for the purpose of allowing him advance in order to participate in the departmental proceeding but has not disputed the fact that the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority were cognizant of the representation of the writ petitioner wherein the petitioner has in most unambiguous terms expressed his inability to participate in the departmental proceeding due to the financial constraints. 11. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the considered view that the Bank’s action in neither allowing the joining nor paying advance or subsistence allowance and proceeding ex parte cannot be justified. 12. The next submission of Mr. 11. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the considered view that the Bank’s action in neither allowing the joining nor paying advance or subsistence allowance and proceeding ex parte cannot be justified. 12. The next submission of Mr. Narayan is that subsistence allowance is payable only in the case of suspension as per the judgment on which the writ court has relied in the peculiar facts of this case. He submitted that cases referred to by the writ court are the cases where the delinquent employee was under suspension and denied subsistence allowance, since the writ petitioner was never placed under suspension hence he cannot claim payment of subsistence allowance. 13. Mr. Suman Kumar Jha, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-respondent No. 1 herein submitted that undisputedly the writ petitioner was not allowed to join despite repeated requests duly acknowledged by the appellant-Bank. There is no charge framed for non-joining the place of posting as the place where the writ petitioner was earlier working was filled by another person and thus the writ petitioner has intimated this fact to the Enquiry Officer as well as the disciplinary authority which is evident from the letter dated 20.9.1997 and 21.9.1997. He also submitted that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case when the writ petitioner was not under suspension he was entitled to posting which was not done and even if he was under suspension/deemed suspension he was entitled to subsistence allowance. Referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of V.P. Gidroniya Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & anr. : (1970) 1 SCC 362 , he submitted that the Apex Court has categorized suspension into three categories and referring to the case of the writ petitioner he submitted that even assuming that the case of the writ petitioner is of deemed suspension, the respondents-appellants herein are under obligation to provide subsistence allowance. Paras 6, 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment reads as follows:- “6. Three kinds of suspension are known to law. A public servant may be suspended as a mode of punishment or he may be suspended during the pendency of an enquiry against him if the order appointing him or statutory provisions governing his service provide for such suspensions. Paras 6, 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment reads as follows:- “6. Three kinds of suspension are known to law. A public servant may be suspended as a mode of punishment or he may be suspended during the pendency of an enquiry against him if the order appointing him or statutory provisions governing his service provide for such suspensions. Lastly he may merely be forbidden from discharging his duties during the pendency of an enquiry against him, which act is also called suspension. The right to suspend as a measure of punishment as well as the right to suspend the contract of service during the pendency of an enquiry are both regulated by the contract of employment or the provisions regulating the conditions of service. But the last category of suspension referred to earlier is the right of the master to forbid his servant from doing the work which he had to do under the terms of the contract of service or the provisions governing his conditions of service, at the same time keeping in force the master's obligations under the contract. In other words the master may ask his servant to refrain from rendering his service but he must fulfill his part of the contract. 7. The legal position as regards a master's right to place his servants under suspension is now well settled by the decisions of this Court. In The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and ors. v. Hotel Workers Union: (1960) 1 SCR 476 , the question whether a master could suspend his servant during the pendency of an enquiry came up for consideration by this Court. Therein this Court observed that it was well settled that under the ordinary law of master and servant the power to suspend the servant without pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of service between the master and the servant but must arise either from an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provision governing such contract. It was further observed therein that ordinarily in the absence of such a power either in express terms in the contract or under the rules framed under some statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work he will have to pay the wages during the so called period of suspension. Where, however, there is power, to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and the servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. 8. The same view was reiterated by this Court in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem and anr.[1961] 1 S.C.R. 750. The rule laid down in the above decisions was followed by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. Union of India: (1964) 5 SCR 431 . The law on the subject was exhaustively reviewed in Balvantray Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra (1968) 2 SCR 577 . Therein the legal position was stated thus: The general principle is that an employer can suspend an employee of his pending an enquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such a suspension will relate to the payment of his wages during the period of such suspension. It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid an employee to work, is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such a power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute would mean that an employer would have no power to suspend an employee of his and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay the employee's wages during the period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against. the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which, it could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer, merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey.” 14. The very concept of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension is to ensure that the delinquent employee is not subjected to unfair dealings in the departmental enquiry. If the non-payment of subsistence allowance vitiate the departmental proceeding, by same analogy non-payment of salary to the delinquent employee also vitiate the departmental proceedings. In the instant case the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was neither put under suspension nor allotted any place of posting and not only denied salary but despite repeated requests to provide advance for his sustenance so that he may participate in the departmental proceeding, the Bank adopted evasive approach which is evident from reply of the Bank dated 22.9.1997 and 23.9.1997 quoted hereinabove. 1 was neither put under suspension nor allotted any place of posting and not only denied salary but despite repeated requests to provide advance for his sustenance so that he may participate in the departmental proceeding, the Bank adopted evasive approach which is evident from reply of the Bank dated 22.9.1997 and 23.9.1997 quoted hereinabove. In fact, the Apex Court while considering payment of subsistence allowance in the case of State Of Maharashtra vs. Chandrabhan: AIR 1983 SC 803 , held out that the subsistence allowance should be substantially sufficient for sustenance and as such the amount paid as subsistence allowance was held to be inadequate for subsistence and accordingly held out that the departmental proceeding is vitiated. The principle laid down in the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court is clearly applicable in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case as the writ petitioner suffered prejudice on account of non-payment of either subsistence allowance or salary or the advance in order to participate in the departmental proceeding. The relevant paragraph of the Apex Court judgment in Chandra Bhan case (supra) is as under : “This Court has observed in Khem Chand v. Union of India as follow : "An order of suspension of a government servant does not put an end to his service under the government. He continues to be a member of the service in spite of the order of suspension. The real effect of the order of suspension is that though he continues to be a member of the government service he is not permitted to work, and further, during the period of his suspension he is paid only some allowance-generally called "subsistence allowance"-which is normally less than his salary instead of the pay and allowance he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended. There is no doubt that the order of suspension affects a government servant injuriously. There is no basis for thinking, however, that because of the order of suspension, he ceases to be a member of the service". There is no doubt that the order of suspension affects a government servant injuriously. There is no basis for thinking, however, that because of the order of suspension, he ceases to be a member of the service". The learned Judges of the Division Bench have found in the judgment under appeal that the object and purpose of the main Rule 151 is to provide for subsistence allowance pending suspension of the civil servant and that the subsistence allowance mentioned in the main Rule and the second proviso means a bare minimum which can reasonably be provided for a civil servant who is kept under suspension and without work and therefore not entitled to full wages. If the civil servant under suspension, pending a departmental enquiry or a criminal trial started against him, is entitled to subsistence allowance at the normal rate which is a bare minimum required for the maintenance of the civil servant and his family, he should undoubtedly get it even pending his appeal filed against his conviction by the Trial Court, and his right to get the normal subsistence allowance pending consideration of his appeal against his conviction should not depend upon the chance of his being released on bail and not being lodged in prison on conviction by the Trial Court. Whether he is lodged in prison or released on bail on his conviction pending consideration of her appeal, his family requires the bare minimum by way of subsistence allowance. Subsistence allowance provided for in the second proviso at the nominal rate of Re. 1 per month is illusory and meaningless. The contention of the appellant that even the nominal sum of Re. 1 per month is subsistence allowance for a civil servant under suspension is as unreasonable as the contention of the appellant that what should be the subsistence allowance for a civil servant under suspension is for the authority empowered to frame rules under Article 309 of the Constitution to consider and that the civil servant who has entered service is bound by the second proviso. The sum of Re. 1 per month can never sustain a civil servant for even a day much less for a month. The sum of Re. 1 per month can never sustain a civil servant for even a day much less for a month. This Court has observed in Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh as follows :- "The High Court has found the following facts: The hearing of the case started before the Enquiry Officer at Jagdalpur in February 1965. The case was heard on February 10, 11 and March 13, 1965. It appears that a part of the evidence for the Government was recorded on those dates. On March 20, 1965, the appellant received Rs. 312/- as subsistence allowance for the months of November and December, 1964 and January, 1965. Further evidence for the Government was recorded on April 3, 6 and 15, 1965. A second payment of Rs. 213/- as subsistence allowance was made to the appellant on May 13, 1965. As already stated, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Government on May 28, 1965. These facts plainly show that a part of the evidence had already been recorded before the first payment of subsistence allowance was made to the appellant. Nevertheless, the High Court has held that he was not unable to appear before the Enquiry Officer on account of the non-payment of his subsistence allowance. With respect, we find if difficult to share the view taken by the High Court. There is nothing on the record to show that he has any other source of income except pay. As he did not receive subsistence allowance till March 20, 1965 he could not, in our opinion, attend the enquiry. The first payment of subsistence allowance was made to him on March 20, 1965 after a part of the evidence had already been recorded on February, 9, 10 and 11, 1965. The enquiry proceedings during those days are vitiated accordingly. The report of the Enquiry Officer based on that evidence is infected with the same defect. Accordingly, the order of the Government dismissing him from service cannot stand. It was passed in violation of the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution, for the appellant did not receive a reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the enquiry proceedings". The report of the Enquiry Officer based on that evidence is infected with the same defect. Accordingly, the order of the Government dismissing him from service cannot stand. It was passed in violation of the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution, for the appellant did not receive a reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the enquiry proceedings". Krishan Iyer, J, has observed in Madhav Hayawandanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra as follows :- Every step that makes the right of appeal fruitful is obligatory and every action on inaction which stultifies it is unfair and, ergo, unconstitutional". “Any departmental enquiry made without payment of subsistence allowance contrary to the provision for its for its payment, is violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as has been held by this Court in the above decision. Similarly, any criminal trial of a civil servant under suspension without payment of the normal subsistence allowance payable to him under the rule would be violative of that Article. Payment of subsistence allowance at the normal rate pending the appeal filed against the conviction of a civil servant under suspension is a step that makes the right of appeal fruitful and it is therefor obligatory. Reduction of the normal subsistence allowances to the nominal sum of Re. 1 per month on conviction of a civil servant under suspension in a criminal case pending his appeal filed against that conviction, whether the civil servant is on bail or has been lodged in prison on conviction pending consideration of his appeal, is an action which stultifies the right of appeal and is consequently unfair and unconstitutional. Just as it would be impossible for a civil servant under suspension who has no other means of subsistence to defend himself effectively in the Trial Court with the normal subsistence allowance-there is nothing on record in these cases to show that the civil servants concerned in these cases have any other means of subsistence-it would be impossible for such civil servant under suspension to prosecute his appeal against his conviction fruitfully without payment of the normal subsistence allowance pending his appeal. Therefore, Baban's contention in the Writ Petition that the subsistence allowance is required to support the civil servant and his family not only during the trial of the criminal case started against him but also during the pendency of the appeal filed in the High Court or this Court against his conviction is correct. If any Provision in any rule framed under Article 309 of the Constitution is illusory or unreasonable, it is certainly open to the civil servant concerned to seek the aid of the Court for declaring that provision to be void. In these circumstances, I hold that the second proviso is unreasonable and void and that a civil servant under suspension is entitled to the normal subsistence allowance even after his conviction by the Trial Court pending consideration of his appeal filed against his conviction until the appeal is disposed of finally one way or the other, whether he is on bail or lodged in prison on conviction by the Trial Court. In this view, I dismiss the Civil Appeal and allow the Writ Petition. The parties will bear their respective costs in the Civil Appeal. The respondent shall pay the petitioner’s costs in the Writ Petition.” 15. We have also gone through the records of the writ court and we find that the action of the Bank right from the very inception was prejudicial to the interest of the writ petitioner. From the pleading it is apparent that the Bank had chosen to appoint the Enquiry Officer who was an Officer of the same rank of the writ petitioner and the writ petitioner had filed representation for change of the Enquiry Officer but that was not acceded to. The materials on the record are indicative of the fact that the writ petitioner was not put under suspension nor he was allowed to join. From the record it is also apparent that on various dates the Court granted indulgences to the Bank to produce the original records but they never approached the Court with their stand that the original records are not available, this stand of missing original record was taken only when the Chairman of Bank was directed to appear in the writ court with the original record. There is nothing on the record to indicate that at any point of time the Bank fixed the accountability on the custodian of the original record for disappearance of the original record of the departmental proceeding of the writ petitioner. Even during the course of hearing Mr. Rajendra Narayan fairly conceded that the Bank has neither fixed accountability on the custodian of the record for the disappearance of the original record of the proceedings nor any criminal case has been lodged in connection with disappearance of the original record relating to the proceedings. 16. Surprisingly enough Mr. Rajendra Narayan has produced original service file of the writ petitioner which further creates serious doubt about the manner of disappearance of the record of the departmental proceeding which was ex parte one behind the back of the writ petitioner. The cumulative effect of disappearance of the original record, no specific order of suspension at the same time even after repeated request for payment of advance and order for posting, the Bank adopted most unfair and hostile attitude by directing the writ petitioner to approach the competent authority for the purpose of joining and claiming advance, this conduct of the Bank goes to show that the Bank has acted in most arbitrary and unreasonable manner and the writ petitioner was dismissed from service in complete disregard to the principles of natural justice and fair play. 17. Thus, we do not find any error in the judgment of the writ court. Accordingly, the judgment of the writ court is affirmed and the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.