JUDGMENT : UJJAL BHUYAN, J. Heard Mr. R.P. Kakoti, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. Sutradhar, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. D. Saikia, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. B. Gogoi, learned counsel for respondent No. 1. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.7.2017, passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition being WP(C) No. 2229/2015 filed by respondent No. 1 by quashing the suspension order of respondent No. 1 dated 17.12.2014 and directing his reinstatement in service. 3. Be it stated that respondent No. 1 is a Professor of Chemical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Guwahati. He was arrested on 16.12.2014 in connection with All Women Police Station Case No. 130/2014 registered under section 376(2)(b)/506 of the Indian Penal Code. Following his arrest and continued detention for a period exceeding 48 hours, respondent No. 1 was placed under suspension vide order dated 17.12.2014. 4. Respondent No. 1 was released on bail on 16.3.2015. Following his release on bail, respondent No. 1 submitted a representation dated 19.3.2015 before the Director, IIT, Guwahati requesting revocation of his suspension order and for release of his subsistence allowance. 5. Suspension of respondent No. 1 was reviewed by the Review Committee on 1.4.2015, wherein it was decided to continue with the suspension. Respondent No. 1 was accordingly informed on 7.4.2015. 6. It may be mentioned that a show-cause notice under rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 read with article 311 of the Constitution of India was issued to respondent No. 1 by the Director of IIT, Guwahati which was served on 15.6.2015. Subsequently, vide letter dated 5.8.2016, Director of IIT, Guwahati withdrew the said show-cause notice for technical reasons. 7. Review Committee in its subsequent meeting held on 19.10.2015 decided to continue with the suspension order. 8. Aggrieved with the refusal of the IIT, Guwahati, to revoke the suspension order and assailing the legality and validity of the same, respondent No. 1 preferred the related WP(C) No. 2229/2015. 9. The writ petition was contested by IIT, Guwahati by filing counter affidavit which was replied to by respondent No. 1 by filing rejoinder. 10. 8. Aggrieved with the refusal of the IIT, Guwahati, to revoke the suspension order and assailing the legality and validity of the same, respondent No. 1 preferred the related WP(C) No. 2229/2015. 9. The writ petition was contested by IIT, Guwahati by filing counter affidavit which was replied to by respondent No. 1 by filing rejoinder. 10. After hearing the matter, learned Single Judge passed the judgment and order dated 28.7.2017 by holding that the order of suspension dated 17.12.2014 had lapsed and had become invalid when review was undertaken on 19.10.2015 and directing reinstatement of respondent No. 1 in service. 11. Hence, this appeal by IIT, Guwahati and by the Dean of Faculty Affairs. 12. Mr. Kakoti, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, submits that accusation against respondent No. 1 is very serious. He is being accused of committing the heinous offence of rape on an employee of IIT, Guwahati. The incident itself had created a lot of resentment in the campus and if the respondent No. 1 is allowed to resume his work of teaching it may have an adverse impact in the campus. Assailing the finding of the learned Single Judge, Mr. Kakoti, learned senior counsel, has taken us to the provisions of rule 10(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (‘1965 Rules’). He submits that learned Single Judge had gone by the provisions of sub-rule (7) of rule 10 without examining the effect of the proviso thereto. His submission is that as per the proviso, in case of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2), once an order of suspension is extended by the first review within ninety days of suspension, further review is no longer required. Finding of the learned Single Judge that the second review was carried out after the expiry of the period of 90 days of the first review which invalidated the order of suspension would not be a correct appreciation of the legal position. That apart, suspension not being a punishment, a delinquent facing serious criminal charge cannot seek as a matter of right his reinstatement notwithstanding the efflux of time in the meanwhile. That apart, suspension not being a punishment, a delinquent facing serious criminal charge cannot seek as a matter of right his reinstatement notwithstanding the efflux of time in the meanwhile. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola, (1997) 4 SCC 1 ; (2) Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar, (2003) 6 SCC 516 ; (3) Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 94 . 13. He, therefore, submits that impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is legally unsustainable and should be set aside. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Saikia, learned senior counsel representing respondent No. 1 has supported the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. He submits that first of all, the accusation against respondent No. 1 is totally concocted. Alleged incident occurred on 1.12.2014 whereas the First Information was lodged on 11.12.2014, after a delay of more than 10 days which itself reflects that it was an afterthought. Respondent No. 1 has been made a scapegoat due to the machinations of his ambitious colleagues. He submits that the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge to the provisions of rule 10 of the 1965 Rules is correct and calls for no interference. He further submits that respondent No. 1 is residing with his family members in the IIT, Guwahati campus in the residential quarters. Therefore, there cannot be any apprehension in the mind of the IIT authorities about any unrest in the campus in the event of respondent No. 1 resuming duty. In support of his submission, Mr. Saikia has placed reliance in the case of Union of India v. Dipak Mali, (2010) 2 SCC 222 . His further submission is that learned Single Judge infact was not correct in saying that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhury v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. As a matter of fact, the principles laid down in Ajay Kumar Choudhury (supra), are very much attracted to the facts of the present case. As a matter of fact, the principles laid down in Ajay Kumar Choudhury (supra), are very much attracted to the facts of the present case. Lastly, he submits that even if the Division Bench takes a view different from that of the learned Single Judge, that by itself would not make the order of the learned Single Judge erroneous. In this connection, he has referred to a recent decision of this court in State v. Dr. Malek Uddin in WA No. 152/2017 decided on 9.6.2017. 15. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the court. 16. We have noticed above that facts are not in dispute. However, we would like to reiterate certain factual aspects of the litigation which may have a bearing on the outcome. Following his arrest on 16.12.2014, respondent No. 1 was placed under suspension on 17.12.2014. He was granted bail on 16.3.2015. He submitted his representation on 19.3.2015 before the Director of IIT, Guwahati seeking revocation of suspension. Review Committee in its meeting held on 1.4.2015 decided to continue with the suspension which was communicated to respondent No. 1 on 7.4.2015. Subsequent review was carried out by the Review Committee on 19.10.2015, whereby it was decided to continue with the suspension. 17. Before adverting to the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, it would be apposite to refer to the provisions of rule 10 of the 1965 Rules. Rule 10 deals with suspension. While sub-rule (1) deals with suspension in the context of a disciplinary proceeding, sub-rule (2) is a deeming provision whereby a Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority w.e.f., from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody; whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding 48 hours. Subrule (6) of rule 10 provides that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the competent authority before expiry of 90 days from the effective date of suspension on the recommendation of the Review Committee and pass necessary order either extending the suspension or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension and extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time. 18. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension and extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time. 18. Sub-rule (7) says that an order of suspension made or deemed to have made under sub-rule (1) or (2) shall not be valid after a period of 90 days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of 90 days. As per proviso to sub-rule (7), no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of 90 days of suspension and the 90 days period in such cases will count from the date of release of the Government servant from custody. Sub-rules (6) and (7) of rule 10 are extracted hereunder: “(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension [before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension] on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred an eighty days at a time. (7) An order or suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rule (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days: Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days' period in such case will count from the date of Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later.” 19. After referring to the aforesaid provisions, learned Single Judge referred to the office memorandum dated 7.1.2004, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension (Department of Personnel and Training), relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder: “The undersigned is directed to say that rule 10 (Suspension) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is being amended to provide that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the competent authority on recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose. It is also being provided in the Rules that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been under sub-rule (1) or (2) of rule 10 shall not be valid after 90 days unless it is extended after review for a further period before the expiry of 90 days. It is further being provided that extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time. (Copy of the Notification is enclosed). 2. It is, therefore, necessary to constitute Review Committee(s) to review the suspension cases. The composition of Review Committee(s) may be as follows: ********* 3. The Review Committee(s) may take a view regarding revocation/continuation of the suspension keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and also taking into account that unduly long suspension, while putting the employee concerned to undue hardship, involve payment of subsistence allowance without the employee performing any useful service to the Government. Without prejudice to the foregoing, if the officer has been under suspension for one year without any charges being filed in a court of law or no charge-memo has been issued in a departmental enquiry, he shall ordinarily be reinstated in service without prejudice to the case against him. However, in case the officer is in police/judicial custody or is accused of a serious crime or a matter involving national security, the Review Committee may recommend the continuation of the suspension of the official concerned.” 20. After holding sub-rules (6) and (7) of rule 10 of the 1965 Rules to be mandatory in character, learned Single Judge found that second review was carried out on 19.10.2015, whereas the extended period of suspension had expired on 19.9.2015. After holding sub-rules (6) and (7) of rule 10 of the 1965 Rules to be mandatory in character, learned Single Judge found that second review was carried out on 19.10.2015, whereas the extended period of suspension had expired on 19.9.2015. Since it was not reviewed and further extension was not granted within the extended period of suspension, learned Single Judge held that there was violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules which vitiated continuance of the suspension order rendering the same invalid. It was held as under: “23. The provisions of sub-rules (6) and (7) of rule 10 of the 1965 Rules are mandatory and, therefore, the authority as envisaged therein has to mandatorily undertake an exercise of review of the order of suspension within the time-frame, as indicated therein, irrespective of the fact whether the suspension is on account of pendency of a disciplinary proceeding or of a criminal case, failing which the order of suspension shall be rendered invalid. 24. In the instant case, as noticed earlier, the petitioner was arrested on 16.12.2014. The admitted position is that the first review had taken place on 1.4.2015 and the result of review was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 7.4.2015. Order of suspension of the petitioner dated 17.12.2014 recited that the petitioner was suspended with immediate effect. Going by the dates, in the first blush, it would appear that the first review had taken place beyond the period of 90 days. But a closer scrutiny of proviso to sub-rule (7) of rule 10 of the 1965 Rules would demonstrate that the period of 90 days in case of a deemed suspension will count from the date the Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to the appointing authority, whichever is later. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had remained in custody till 16.3.2015 and the petitioner had brought to the notice of the authorities about his release on bail by letter dated 19.3.2015. Therefore, the first review was made well within the period of 90 days. 25. In view of the provisions of rule 10 of 1965 Rules, extension of suspension cannot have exceed 180 days at a time. Therefore, the first review was made well within the period of 90 days. 25. In view of the provisions of rule 10 of 1965 Rules, extension of suspension cannot have exceed 180 days at a time. In the first review conducted on 1.4.2015, which was communicated to the petitioner vide order dated 7.4.2015, decision was taken to recommend extension of the suspension period for another 90 days from the date of expiry. Even if the effective date of suspension is taken to be 19.3.2015, the period of 90 days expired on 19.6.2015. As the suspension period was extended for another 90 days by the review conducted on 1.4.2015, the extended period expired on 19.9.2015. Admittedly, next review of the order of suspension was made on 19.10.2015, which was beyond the extended period of suspension. 26. In view of the above discussion, when the review of the order of suspension was not carried out within the time prescribed under sub rules (6) and (7) of rule 10 of the 1965 Rules, there is no escape from the conclusion that the order of suspension lapsed and had become invalid when review was undertaken on 19.10.2015. Subsequent extension could not have revived the order of suspension, which had already become invalid after expiry of 90 days of extension.” 21. After holding so, learned Single Judge directed reinstatement of respondent No. 1 in service. 22. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by Mr. Kakoti, learned senior counsel but we are afraid we can accept his submissions. We concur with the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge. We say this because a careful and conjoint reading of subrules (6) and (7) of rule 10 of the 1965 Rules would make it abundantly clear that an order of suspension whether made in connection with a disciplinary proceeding or under the deeming provisions of sub-rule (2), shall be reviewed by the competent authority before expiry of 90 days from the effective date of suspension (which has been clarified as the date of release from custody or the date of intimation of release to the appointing authority, whichever is later) and thereafter, pass necessary order either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent review shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension, clarifying that extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time. Subsequent review shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension, clarifying that extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time. 23. Sub-rule (7) says that an order of suspension whether made or deemed to have been made, shall not be valid after a period of 90 days unless it is extended after review for a further period before expiry of 90 days. As per the proviso, no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of 90 days of suspension which period is to be counted from the date of his release from detention or the date of intimation of release to the appointing authority, whichever is later. No doubt, at the first blush, the proviso appears to be in conflict with the intent of sub-rule (7). It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that provisions of a statute are to be read together, and not to be read and interpreted in isolation. If we read sub-rules (6) and (7) together what comes to the fore is that an order of suspension shall be reviewed by the competent authority before expiry of 90 days period and that subsequent review shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Sub-rule (6) is very clear and there is no ambiguity in it. The order of suspension referred to sub-rule (6) covers both suspension under sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2) of rule 10. Moreover, sub-rule (6) is couched in mandatory language. Use of the word “shall” at two places of this provision indicates that the provision is imperative. It is an accepted principle of interpretation of statutes that ordinarily the use of the word “shall” indicates that the provision is mandatory unless contrary intention is discernible. If sub-rule (6) is read de hors sub-rule (7), it is clear that the reviewing authority is mandated to review an order of suspension before expiry of 90 days after release from detention or after intimation whichever is later and subsequent review shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. 24. The parent provision of sub-rule (7) is in tune that what is stated in sub-rule (6). 24. The parent provision of sub-rule (7) is in tune that what is stated in sub-rule (6). Rather, it is in continuation of what is mandated under sub-rule (6) by making it expressly clear in mandatory language that an order of suspension including an order of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2) shall not be valid after a period of 90 days unless it is extended after review for a further period before expiry of 90 days. Though the proviso seeks to curve out an exception by saying that in case of a deemed suspension, no review of suspension would be necessary if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of 90 days of suspension, to our understanding and as already discussed above, the proviso cannot be construed to over-rule the provisions contained in the parent rule. That is not the role assigned to a proviso; proviso cannot subsume the principal rule. It is true that the normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. In other words, the presumption is that but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. However, having said that, the general rule in construing an enactment containing a proviso is to construe them together without making either of them redundant or otiose. Accordingly, the proviso must be considered in relation to the main provision to which it stands as a proviso [Please see Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 14th edn.]. Therefore, if the language of the parent enactment is clear and unambiguous, and contains a particular provision leaving no room for any doubt, a proviso cannot be read to exclude such provision forming part of the subject-matter of the parent enactment. 25. Therefore, the mandatory requirement of sub-rule (7) cannot be made redundant or otiose by the proviso. This position infact is accepted by the Central Government in the office memorandum dated 7.1.2004, as extracted above, which clearly explains that an order of suspension made or deemed under sub-rules (1) or (2) of rule 10 shall not be valid after 90 days unless it is extended after review for a further period before the expiry of 90 days. This position infact is accepted by the Central Government in the office memorandum dated 7.1.2004, as extracted above, which clearly explains that an order of suspension made or deemed under sub-rules (1) or (2) of rule 10 shall not be valid after 90 days unless it is extended after review for a further period before the expiry of 90 days. Therefore, learned Single Judge having found that the subsequent review carried out on 19.10.2015 was after expiry of the extended period on 19.9.2015, held that the suspension was invalidated by sub-rules (6) and (7). 26. Having said that we also feel that the interpretation sought to be given by Mr. Kakoti would lead to an absolute position contrary to the understanding of the Central Government itself, as extracted above. As explained by the Supreme Court in Ajay Kr. Choudhury(supra), suspension by its very nature is essentially transitory or temporary; it cannot be for an indeterminate period. Therefore, it would be incumbent upon the competent authority to carry out periodical review of suspension, either to revoke it or to extend it. If the interpretation sought to be given is accepted, it would lead to a situation where once the first review is carried out and the criminal proceeding continues, the authority would be denuded of its discretion to review continuation or otherwise of the period of suspension. It would mean that till the criminal trial continues, respondent No. 1 would have to suffer suspension. There cannot be any such absolute proposition of law to say that a Government servant facing criminal trial would have to continue under suspension till the criminal trial concludes. 27. Decisions cited by Mr. Kakoti rest on completely different factual foundation and are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the case of Allahabab Bank (supra), Supreme Court held that mere fact that 10 years had elapsed since filing of charge sheet would not be a ground for revocation of suspension. There can be no dispute to the said proposition of law. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Just as pendency of a criminal case for 10 years would be no ground for revocation of suspension, conversely, pendency of a criminal case also would be no ground to denude the authority of its discretion to review continuance or otherwise of a suspension. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Just as pendency of a criminal case for 10 years would be no ground for revocation of suspension, conversely, pendency of a criminal case also would be no ground to denude the authority of its discretion to review continuance or otherwise of a suspension. In the case of Rajiv Kumar (supra) the Supreme Court had examined the contours of deemed suspension and held that since it creates a legal fiction, issuance of an order of suspension may not be necessary as the Government servant suffering detention beyond 48 hours would stand suspended by operation of the legal fiction. 28. The last case relied upon by Mr. Kakoti, i.e., Gurpal Singh (supra) was a case where a judicial officer was charged with committing murder. During the period of trial, he was under suspension which was continued even during the appellate stage when the State filed appeal against acquittal. After the appeal was dismissed, the High Court had initiated departmental proceeding whereafter it sought to further continue with the suspension order. It was at that stage that the Supreme Court intervened and held that continuance of such suspension would not be just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 29. As noticed above, the facts and circumstances of each of the cases stand on a different footing. Insofar the present case is concerned, we have concurred with the views of the learned Single Judge that the provisions of rules 10(6) and (7) are mandatory in nature and non-compliance thereof would vitiate the order of suspension. 30. We also note that learned Single Judge was conscious of the concerns expressed by the IIT, Guwahati authorities by clarifying that upon reinstatement, it would be open to the IIT, Guwahati to utilize the service of respondent No. 1 in such manner as it may deem fit. 31. We leave it to the discretion of IIT, Guwahati how best to utilize the service of respondent No. 1 on his re-instatement. 32. Appeal is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.