JUDGMENT : DR. D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. 1. Challenge has been made to the order of Member, Board of Revenue under Annexure-3 directing for recording of land and building in favour of opposite party No.1-State by setting aside the settlement made in favour of the petitioner. FACTS 2. The factual matrix leading to the case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a public religious institution represented through its Executive Officer. It is averred inter alia that the O.E.A. Collector settled the case land pertaining to Plot No.2336 under Khata No.1810 of village Bhubaneswar measuring area of Ac.0.405 decimals on 31.7.1980 in O.E.A. Case No.167 of 1977 vide Annexure-1. The opposite party No.5 showing him as lessee in respect of the case land filed appeal under Section 9 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (hereinafter called “the O.E.A. Act) but he lost that appeal. Against that order the opposite party No.5 filed O.E.A. Revision Case No.13 of 1994 which went against him. So, he approached this Court in O.J.C. No.7572 of 1994 wherein the Court passed order on 11.11.1995 directing to file O.E.A. appeal and Opposite Party No.5 again filed O.E.A. Appeal No.25 of 1995 before the Collector, Khurda stating therein that he being a tenant continued in possession and as such became a tenant under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act and the O.E.A. Collector without following the statutory provision has settled the entire case land in favour of the petitioner. In that appeal the petitioner had contested by stating that a piece of case land was let out to Narasingha Rao and Ram Chandra Das on monthly rent and the appellant is none other than the son-in-law of Narasingha Rao and he trespassed into the case land of Lord Lingaraj-petitioner having no legal right thereon. 3. The Appellate Authority after considering all the submissions and after examination of record found that the opposite party No.5 was not a tenant as no permission under Section 19 of the O.H.R.E. Act had been obtained in favour of the appellant and finally held him as trespasser and unauthorized occupant. So, the appeal preferred by the opposite party No.5 was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. The opposite party No.5 being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority preferred O.E.A. Revision No.88 of 2000 before the Member, Board of Revenue under Section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act. So, the appeal preferred by the opposite party No.5 was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. The opposite party No.5 being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority preferred O.E.A. Revision No.88 of 2000 before the Member, Board of Revenue under Section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act. The revisional court after disbelieving the case of the revision petitioner, who is opposite party No.5 here, about his tenancy held that the petitioner (opposite party No.5) has absolutely no right in the case land with building thereon. At the same time the revisional Authority made out a third case by observing that the case land along with the building thereon having vested with the State free from all encumbrances be recorded with the General Administration Department of the Government of Orissa without any note of possession or any kind of encumbrance and, accordingly, set aside the orders of both the appellate authority and the O.E.A. Collector. He directed for correction of R.O.R. in favour of the General Administration Department. 4. Be it stated that the revisional authority illegally exercised the jurisdiction vested under Section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act because he has gone beyond the propriety of the revisional authority by disposing of the case in a manner which is not the case of either of the party. Since there is a settlement in favour of Lord Lingaraj under Section 6, 7 and 8-A of the O.E.A. Act and the revisional authority came to hold that Opposite Party No.5 was not the tenant under law, he ought to have honoured the settlement of the case land in favour of the present petitioner instead of the General Administration Department of the State of Odisha. 5. It is also stated that the power under Section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act being one of a remedial provision is not available to be exercised to unsettle the things settled. So, the present writ application is filed challenging the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue in directing the case land along with the building to be recorded in favour of the opposite party No.1 with further prayer to uphold the settlement of the case land in favour of the petitioner. 6. So, the present writ application is filed challenging the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue in directing the case land along with the building to be recorded in favour of the opposite party No.1 with further prayer to uphold the settlement of the case land in favour of the petitioner. 6. Per contra, the opposite party No.1 filed counter affidavit stating that the case land was a part of intermediary trust estate of the petitioner and it was recorded in favour of Lord Balunkeswar Dev with kisam “Mandir and hata” under Khewat No.1 of Lord Lingaraj Mohaprabhu-petitioner. The trust estate of Lord Lingaraj Mohaprabhu vested in the State vide Government in Revenue Department Notification dated 18.3.1974 under sub-Section (1) of Section 3-A of the O.E.A. Act, 1951. After vesting the Government in G.A. Department became the lawful owner and title holder of the case land from the date of vesting and the OEA Collector had no authority to settle it with petition under Section 6 and 7 of the O.E.A. Act. As the land was vested with the State, it is for the State to settle any building or land in favour of any intermediary trust under Section 7-A of the Act only on satisfaction that it was necessary for carrying out the purpose of the trust subject to condition that said building is not held by any tenant. 7. It is stated in the counter of opposite party No.1 that the building in question being known as “Tala Bangala” was let out on rent basis from July 1972 to Narasingha Rao and Rama Chandra Das for which their claim for settlement of the case land under Section 7-A is also not admissible under law. On the other hand, the opposite party supported the order passed in O.E.A. Revision Case No.88 of 2000 stating that the order of settlement in favour of the petitioner passed in O.E.A. Case No.167 of 1977 and the order of the Appellate Court dated 19.5.2000 in O.E.A. Appeal No.25 of 1995 are illegal, improper and without jurisdiction. 8. The opposite party No.1 challenges the settlement of the case land in favour of the petitioner on the ground that the public proclamation inviting objection appears to have not been published properly by beat of drums and placards which is a mandate of law. 8. The opposite party No.1 challenges the settlement of the case land in favour of the petitioner on the ground that the public proclamation inviting objection appears to have not been published properly by beat of drums and placards which is a mandate of law. Moreover, no notice under Section 69 (1) of the Odisha Hindu Religious Endowment Act, 1951 (hereinafter called “the OHRE Act”) was given although it was mandatory to issue such notice. The opposite party No.1 also challenges the claim of opposite party No.5 on the ground that the permission of the Endowment Commissioner to execute lease deed dated 13.12.1969 is a fraudulent one because the Endowment Commissioner invoking Section 25 of the OHRE Act had registered a case bearing No.86 of 1991 for eviction of opposite party No.5 from the case land. Be it stated that the Ownership Certificate issued by the petitioner in favour of opposite party No.5 is a misnomer in the eye of law because opposite party No.5 being lessee cannot claim ownership over the leasehold property except right of enjoyment of property as per terms of lease as the case property being recorded in favour of Lord Balunkeswar Dev, i.e., another deity managed by a trust board, the petitioner has no authority under Section 6 (h)(i) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to transfer of any leasehold right thereon even if the Endowment Commissioner is presumed to have issued such permission on 10.10.1969 to lease out the case property. The opposite party No.5 has also failed to produce any registered lease deed in its favour except few receipts for which the opposite party No.3 has rightly disallowed the claim of opposite party No.5. 9. Moreover, it is stated that opposite party No.2-Member, Board of Revenue has inherent power under Section 38B of the O.E.A. Act to examine the legality and propriety of the decision of the subordinate court even if the order of settlement passed long back in the year 1980. Thus, the order of the Member, Board of Revenue should not be interfered with by this Court. SUBMISSIONS: 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue under Section 38B is illegal and improper. Thus, the order of the Member, Board of Revenue should not be interfered with by this Court. SUBMISSIONS: 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue under Section 38B is illegal and improper. The opposite party No.2 has erred in law by making out the third case which is neither the case of the petitioner nor the case of opposite party No.5. The Revisional Court should have honoured the settlement made by the O.E.A. Collector in 1977. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner-deity being a perpetual minor is represented by the Executive Officer and as such has filed petition for settlement in 1977 and after following due process and procedure, the Tahasildar settled the case land in favour of the petitioner. Opposite party No.5 was not a tenant and he having filed the appeal has failed to succeed. The provisions of Sections 6, 7 and 8-A of the O.E.A. Act conjointly mentioned that a tenant of holding or house or homestead land cannot be deemed to be tenant under Section 8 (1) of the Act and as such the claim of opposite party No.5 cannot be countenanced. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that opposite party No.5 has no document of lease because Narasingha Rao and Rama Chandra Das were the only tenant upon the building in question and petitioner has inducted them after obtaining permission from the Endowment Commissioner in 1969. He submitted that there is no lease deed executed for which question of permanent lease in favour of said tenant would arise, and that issuance of the Ownership Certificate, if any, is of no help. Thus, he submits that the opposite party No.5 has no claim over the suit property and rightly the Member, Board of Revenue has rejected his claim. 13. At the same time, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there being no illegality or impropriety in settling the land in favour of the petitioner-deity by the Tahasildar and the same being also upheld in the appeal, the opposite party No.2 ought to have restrained it from cancelling such settlement of the land. According to him, under Section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act, the legality of the order or impropriety of the order of settlement can be only verified by the revisional authority but cannot unsettle the settled records. According to him, under Section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act, the legality of the order or impropriety of the order of settlement can be only verified by the revisional authority but cannot unsettle the settled records. The order of the revisional authority does not disclose about any illegality with settlement except stating that the case land is already vested in 1974 with the State Government free from all encumbrances. But it has forgotten the limitation of power conferred under Section 38-B of the Act and has exceeded its jurisdiction by rejecting the claim of the petitioner and directing for the land in favour of the opposite party No.1. 14. Learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that the order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue is legal and proper because under Section 38-B the jurisdiction of Member, Board of Revenue is wide enough to find out the legality of the order passed in settling the land under Sections 6, 7 and 8A of the O.E.A. Act. In the instant case, there is no evidence of service of notice to the general public for which rightly the learned Member, Board of Revenue has come to a conclusion that the procedure for settling the land in favour of the petitioner has not been followed by the O.E.A. Collector and same has not been also properly scrutinized by the Appellate Authority. 15. Learned Additional Government Advocate further submitted that since 18.3.1974 the land has vested with the State Government and the O.E.A. Collector has no jurisdiction to settle the land with the petitioner deity in the O.E.A. case filed in 1977. Apart from this, the order of the learned revisional authority is also correct to observe that the opposite party No.5 being a stranger, is a trespasser upon the case property because the Rao family was only inducted as tenant in respect of “Talabangala” situated on the case land and the opposite party No.5 is the son-in-law of Narasingha Rao but he is not the tenant under the deity before vesting so as to avail the benefit under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act. 16. 16. Learned Additional Government Advocate contended that since the Member, Board of Revenue has rightly observed that neither the petitioner is entitled to settlement of the land in its favour, nor the opposite party No.5 is a tenant upon the case land, he rightly directed the case land to be recorded in favour of General Administration Department of the State Government. In a nutshell he supports the impugned order of the revisional authority. 17. Mr. Nath, learned counsel for the Endowment Commissioner submitted that no permission was granted by the Endowment Commissioner for lease in favour of opposite party No.5. Instead, the Endowment Commissioner directed for eviction of the petitioner from the case land by invoking Section 25 of the OHRE Act. He also submitted that the Ownership Certificate issued in favour of opposite party No.5 is a sham one and assuming that it was issued, Opposite Party No.5 cannot become owner of the property on that basis. Mr. Nath rather supports the settlement of the case land in favour of the petitioner-deity and confirmation of the same in Appeal. 18. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION: (I) Whether the settlement of case property with the petitioner-deity is legal and proper? (II) Whether the impugned order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue is liable to be quashed? DISCUSSION: POINT NO.(I) 19. It is not in dispute that the petitioner-deity was intermediary in respect of the case property. It is admitted fact that the case property is known as “Talabangala” where a building stood. It is also not in dispute that Narasingha Rao and Ram Chandra Das were inducted as tenants by the petitioner-deity over the case property. On going through Annexure-1 it appears that the O.E.A. Case No.167 of 1977 was initiated at the instance of the Executive Officer, Lingaraj Temple on behalf of Sri Lingaraj Mahaprabhu. The order sheet of the case record shows that proclamation was issued inviting public objection by 7.1.1978. But the record again was put up long after three years, i.e., on 16.3.1980 when fresh objection was invited. But on subsequent dates Istahar was found to have been duly published in the locality but no objection was received. In accordance with the report of the R.I. that the case property is recorded as Mandirahata/Nijdakhal as per G.O. No.21856 dated 24.3.1976, the claim was allowed and the case property was settled with the deity by the O.E.A. Collector. But on subsequent dates Istahar was found to have been duly published in the locality but no objection was received. In accordance with the report of the R.I. that the case property is recorded as Mandirahata/Nijdakhal as per G.O. No.21856 dated 24.3.1976, the claim was allowed and the case property was settled with the deity by the O.E.A. Collector. Annexure-2 shows that an appeal under Section 9 of the O.E.A. Act was preferred by opposite party No.5. After hearing both sides the Appellate Authority did not find any merit in the appeal and dismissed the same upholding the settlement of case property in favour of petitioner-deity passed by the O.E.A. Collector. 20. From that order it is revealed that one Narasingha Rao was residing in that bungalow over the case property on rental basis up to July, 1972, but the present opposite party No.5 was never in possession of the same for which his claim was declined. Also from that order it appears that no valid permission was obtained under Section 19 of the OHRE Act to lease out the property to opposite party No.5, who was found to be in unauthorized occupation thereon and as such the tenancy right of opposite party No.5 over the case property was denied. These facts are not controverted in the earlier order of Member, Board of Revenue passed in O.E.A. Revision Case No.13 of 1994. Against such order, it appears that the opposite party No.5 has approached this Court in O.J.C. No.7572 of 1994 and in that order the Court directed the opposite party No.5 to file fresh appeal for which appeal was filed again vide O.E.A. Appeal No.25 of 1995. 21. The following order was passed in O.J.C. No.7572 of 1994 which is placed for better appreciation: O.J.C. No.7572 of 1994 “11.1.95 Heard Shri D.S. Misra for petitioner and learned Addl. Govt. Advocate for opp. parties 1, 3 and 4. The order passed by the Addl. District Magistrate, Khurda on 23.5.94 in O.E.A. Appeal No.1/94 (Annexure-1) which has been confirmed by the Member, Board of Revenue by the order dated 2.9.94 in O.E.A. Revision Case No.13 of 1994 (Annexure-2) is assailed by the petitioner in the writ application. On perusal of the order of the Addl. The order passed by the Addl. District Magistrate, Khurda on 23.5.94 in O.E.A. Appeal No.1/94 (Annexure-1) which has been confirmed by the Member, Board of Revenue by the order dated 2.9.94 in O.E.A. Revision Case No.13 of 1994 (Annexure-2) is assailed by the petitioner in the writ application. On perusal of the order of the Addl. District Magistrate, it appears that while granting leave to the petitioner to file another petition before the Collector, Khurda he has made certain observations relating to merit of the case. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Addl. District Magistrate, should have avoided in making any observation relating to merit of the case. However, since the petitioner has been permitted to file an appeal before the Collector who is undisputedly the competent authority to entertain the same, we are not inclined to quash the order of the Addl. District Magistrate. We make it clear that if the petitioner files an appeal before the Collector, Khurda, the said authority will consider the same on merit without being influenced by the observations made in the order of the Additional District Magistrate dated 23.5.94 in O.E.A. Appeal No.1 of 1994. The writ application is disposed of on the aforesaid terms.” From the aforesaid order, it is clear that the writ was filed against the O.E.A. Revision Case No.13 of 1994 confirming the order passed by the A.D.M., Khurda in O.E.A. Appeal No.1 of 1994. On perusal of the order passed in O.E.A. Appeal No.1 of 1994 and O.E.A. Revision Case No.13 of 1994 it is clear that they have confirmed the settlement of the case property in favour of the deity passed in O.E.A. Case No.167 of 1977 passed by the Tahasildar in favour of the petitioner-deity. This Court has not quashed the order of the A.D.M. but gave a chance to the present Opposite party No.5 to prefer appeal before the Collector, Khurda and accordingly O.E.A. Appeal No.25 of 1995 was filed by the opposite party No.5 against the petitioner-deity. This Court has not quashed the order of the A.D.M. but gave a chance to the present Opposite party No.5 to prefer appeal before the Collector, Khurda and accordingly O.E.A. Appeal No.25 of 1995 was filed by the opposite party No.5 against the petitioner-deity. On the other hand, the order of settlement of case property in favour of the deity has been tested in O.E.A. Appeal No.1 of 1994, O.E.A. Revision Case No.13 of 1994 and O.E.A. Appeal No.25 of 1995 and in every place the vesting of case property with the petitioner-deity has been upheld and the plea of the opposite party No.5 about his tenancy was consistently disbelieved and finally his claim under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act was denied. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the fact that the case property was settled with the petitioner-deity, the same cannot be reopened by the Member, Board of Revenue under Section 38-B of the Act. Learned Additional Government Advocate refuting the contention of the petitioner submitted that no proclamation as required under law was issued by the O.E.A. Collector inviting objection for which the entire settlement is vitiated. Apart from this, he took the plea that there being no application for settlement by the petitioner-deity intermediary by the time of vesting, the case property stood vested with the State on 18.3.1974 under Section 3-A of the O.E.A. Act, 1951 being free from all encumbrances. He further submitted that the impugned order shows that the case property was not in khas possession of the petitioner ex-intermediary and it could have been settled only under Section 7-A of the O.E.A. Act and the O.E.A. Collector has no authority to settle the building thereon for which he has acted beyond his jurisdiction. At the same time in the impugned order the Member has found the present opposite party No.5 to be a trespasser but not a tenant as defined under Section 23 of the Orissa Tenancy Act. 23. The impugned order of the Member, Board of Revenue does not spell out on what basis he could gather that the deity was not in possession of the case property on the date of vesting when it is clear from the order of the settlement that the petitioner was in khas possession of the Mandirahata case land. 23. The impugned order of the Member, Board of Revenue does not spell out on what basis he could gather that the deity was not in possession of the case property on the date of vesting when it is clear from the order of the settlement that the petitioner was in khas possession of the Mandirahata case land. Moreover, the order of the Appellate Authority passed in O.E.A. Appeal No.25 of 1995 that the tenant on the case property continued up to the year 1972 whereas the case land stood vested on 18.3.1974. The order of the Member, Board of Revenue is not based on established facts and acceptable reasons. 24. The order of settlement never shows that the land was settled under Section 7 but it is only found that on 31.7.1980 the claim petition by the petitioner-deity for settlement of case land was allowed. When there is no section of law mentioned, it is obviously observed that the building having been stood on the plot in question, settled under Section 7-A of the O.E.A. Act. So, the impugned order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue has no any correct reasoning and being passed with the facts not on record cannot be allowed to be sustained in law. 25. The order of settlement was passed on 31.3.1980 and the First Appeal was filed in 1994 against which revision was filed in 1994. The order of this Court in O.J.C. No.7572 of 1994 was passed on 11.1.1995. In pursuance of the order of this Court the appeal was filed again before the Collector, Khurda and ultimately it was transferred to A.D.M., Khurda who passed the order vide Appeal No.25 of 1995 on 19.5.2000. Against that order revision was filed vide O.E.A. Revision Case No.88 of 2000 and the revisional authority passed the order on 17.11.2007 against which the present writ application is filed. Now from the marathon run of the case record disclosed that the settlement of the case property in favour of the deity has been disturbed only in 2007. It is the only claim of the opposite party No.5 who actually carried the appeal and revision including the writ before this Court asking for his tenancy under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act but never the revenue Department has challenged the settlement of land under the provisions of the O.E.A. Act with the petitioner-deity. It is the only claim of the opposite party No.5 who actually carried the appeal and revision including the writ before this Court asking for his tenancy under Section 8 (1) of the O.E.A. Act but never the revenue Department has challenged the settlement of land under the provisions of the O.E.A. Act with the petitioner-deity. For the first time the Member, Board of Revenue vide Annexure-3 passed order in 2007 setting aside the order of settlement which was passed in 1980 and directed to record case land in favour of G.A. Department without giving proper opportunity to the petitioner. Now the question arises whether the Member, Board of Revenue made out a third case which was never raised before him either by the petitioner or by the opposite party No.5. 26. On perusal of the impugned order, it appears that opposite party No.5 preferred the revision against the order of the Appellate Court passed in O.E.A. Appeal No.25 of 1995 under which the settlement of the land was confirmed in favour of the petitioner-deity and the claim of tenancy by Opposite Party No.5 was negatived. The relevant findings in the impugned order vide Annexure-3 is extracted below:- “16. Though the petitioner claims that the land with building was leased to him with effect from 31.12.1969, no lease document has been produced. Any such lease document also needs to be registered under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. There is no evidence on record that the said lease document was registered. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of Orissa and another -versus-Brundaban Sharma and Another [reported in 1995 Supp (3) Supreme Court cases 249] that if an OEA Collector concludes that a “lease, transfer or settlement” made prior to vesting of an ex-Estate (even if it is prior to 01.01.1946) is not to be set aside, he should obtain prior confirmation from the Board of Revenue under section 5(i) of the OEA act. There is nothing brought on record to show that such confirmation was obtained in this case. In view of this, the present petitioner has absolutely no right over the suit land with house. He is merely an unauthorized occupant. 17. In settling the suit land, with the building standing on it, vide his orders dated 31.07.1980 in OEA Case No.167/77(T), the OEA Collector-cum-Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar had acted beyond his jurisdiction. In view of this, the present petitioner has absolutely no right over the suit land with house. He is merely an unauthorized occupant. 17. In settling the suit land, with the building standing on it, vide his orders dated 31.07.1980 in OEA Case No.167/77(T), the OEA Collector-cum-Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar had acted beyond his jurisdiction. By upholding the orders in appeal, the Collector, Khurda has erred in law. Therefore, the orders of Collector, Khurda dated 19.05.2000 and those of the OEA Collector-cum-Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar dated 31.07.1980, both are set aside. The land with building had already vested on 18.03.1974 with the State free from all the encumbrances. Therefore, it should be recorded in the name of General Administration Department of Government of Orissa with no note of possession or any kind of encumbrance. The latest published R-O-R should be corrected, accordingly.” 27. From the aforesaid findings, it appears that the opposite party No.2 did not accept the contention of the opposite party No.5 who was the petitioner before the Member, Board of Revenue. Before the Revisional Authority the petitioner-deity was the sole opposite party. Having negatived the claim of present Opposite Party No.5, it was not open to the Member to consider the propriety of the settlement made in favour of the petitioner which was never impugned by the State. Before the Revisional Authority the petitioner-deity was the sole opposite party. Having negatived the claim of present Opposite Party No.5, it was not open to the Member to consider the propriety of the settlement made in favour of the petitioner which was never impugned by the State. Directing for recording of land with the G.A. Department on ground that the entire case property has been vested with the State free from all encumbrances on 8.3.1974, the revisional authority has made out a third case without giving opportunity to the opposite party of being heard on such question, which is legally unsustainable in view of the provision of Section 38-B of the Act, which is reproduced below for better appreciation: “38-B. Revision – (1) The (Board of Revenue) may, on its own motion or on a report from the Collector, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which any authority subordinate to the (Board of Revenue) has made any decision or passed an order under this Act (not being a decision against which an appeal has been preferred to the High Court or the District Judge under (Sec.22) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness legality or propriety of such decision or order and if in any case it appears to the (Board of Revenue) that any such decision or order ought to be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted, it may pass order accordingly. (2) The Board or Revenue shall not- [(i) ***] (i) revise any decision or order under this Section without giving the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard in the matter.” 28. The aforesaid provision make it clear that Board Revenue either on its own motion or on a report from the Collector should call for the record of any proceeding to satisfy himself as to the regularity of such proceeding or to the correctness, legality or propriety of such decision or proceeding or order, and if it is found that such decision or order sought to be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted he should pass the order accordingly. Here the revision was initiated at the instance of opposite party No.5 but not on suo motu by the Board of Revenue or at the instance of the Collector or the State. Here the revision was initiated at the instance of opposite party No.5 but not on suo motu by the Board of Revenue or at the instance of the Collector or the State. So, the legality or the propriety of the order to be examined by the Board of Revenue was within a narrow compass, i.e., with regard to only the refusal of the authority under the Act to record the name of the petitioner (opposite party No.5) as a tenant. The said claim having been rejected, the Member should not have disturbed the order of the settlement made in favour of the petitioner by making out a third case in favour of the G. A. Department. 29. It is true that the Member, Board of Revenue has got dual function in one hand as highest authority of revenue to take custody of the Government land and on the other hand he has also a quasi-judicial authority to decide the legality of the order passed by any authority subordinate to it. In the instant case, while the Member, Board of Revenue chose to record the case land in favour of the State Government should have given opportunity to the present petitioner to adduce evidence and hear argument. Thus, we are of the view that the learned Member, Board of Revenue has no authority to decide the third case while passing the impugned order. Even assuming that by making out a third case, the opposite party No.2 took cognizance of fact suo motu, he should have given reasonable opportunity to opposite party before it to support his claim as sub-Section (2) of Section 38-B of the Act mandates the Board of Revenue to give reasonable opportunity to the parties before setting aside or nullifying the settlement of land in favour of the petitioner-deity. Having said so, we are constraint to observe that the learned Member, Board of Revenue has not only made out a third case but also has failed to exercise the jurisdiction mandated under Section 38-B (2) by not affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner-deity before setting aside the settlement of the land in favour of the petitioner-deity. 30. 30. In terms of the above discussion particularly when the petitioner-deity being the ex-intermediary was in possession of the case land on the date of vesting as has been observed earlier and in view of the extension of time to apply for settlement of land in favour of the deity and same having been made and particularly the Member, Board of Revenue having no adherence to the mandate of provision of law made out a third case without complying the mandatory provision of law, we are of the view that the settlement of land in favour of the deity still stands and it is not at all annulled by the order of the Member, Board of Revenue. The point No.(i) is answered accordingly. POINT NO.(II) 31. The impugned order of the Member, Board of Revenue thus not only suffers from infirmities regarding the scope of revisional jurisdiction as mandated under sub-Section (2) of Section 38-B of the Act but also suffers from the vice of taking suo motu cognizance of the order of settlement and setting aside the same after long unreasonable delay. 32. It is reported in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy and others; (2003) 7 SCC 667 : (AIR 2003 SC 3592) where the Hon’ble Apex Court have observed in the following manner: "9. ...............In the absence of necessary and sufficient particulars pleaded as regards fraud and the date or period of discovery of fraud and more so when the contention that the suo motu power could be exercised within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud was not urged, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were right in not examining the question of fraud alleged to have been committed by the non-official respondents. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words "at any time" are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words "at any time", the suo motu power under subsection (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power “at any time” only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that “at any time” should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, “at any time” must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation.” 33. But that does not mean that “at any time” should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, “at any time” must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation.” 33. With regard to the above decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court have made it clear that suo motu power can be exercised at any time does not mean that beyond reasonable time and reasonable time has to be made out by considering the facts and circumstances of each case. Similar provision appears in Section 38-B of the Act because the time stipulated earlier in old provision has been taken away. Now Board of Revenue has been given to exercise the revisional power at any time. So, applying the same analogy, Board of Revenue should exercise the power within reasonable time. The aforesaid view has also been followed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in another judgment reported in AIR 2015 SC 1021 (Jt. Collector, Ranga Reddy Dist. V. D. Narsing Rao). 34. This Court in the case of Smt. Parbati Mohapatra and another; 2014(I) OLR 825 , held that the revisional power under Section 38-B of the Act has to be exercised in a reasonable manner which necessarily stipulated that it should be exercised within a reasonable time and what is reasonable time would differ depending upon the facts of each case. 35. Similarly this Court in the case of Nityananda Satpathy and others v. Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa, Cuttack and others;1996(II) OLR 262, held at para-6 in the following manner: “6. xxx The power of the Board of Revenue under Sec. 38-B to revise a decision or order of any authority subordinate to it is not disputed, but that power has to be exercised in a reasonable manner within a reasonable time. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what should be the reasonable time. Each case has to be decided on facts and circumstances peculiar to it. xxx” 36. Now applying the principle laid down above, it is very clear that the Member, Board of Revenue cannot exercise the power arbitrarily at any time but must exercise the power within reasonable time after verifying the facts and circumstances of each case. Each case has to be decided on facts and circumstances peculiar to it. xxx” 36. Now applying the principle laid down above, it is very clear that the Member, Board of Revenue cannot exercise the power arbitrarily at any time but must exercise the power within reasonable time after verifying the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, when none of the parties has raised issue with regard to the settlement of the land in favour of the petitioner-deity, setting aside such settlement and passing suo motu order in favour of the G.A. Department, who is not a party to the revision, is not sustainable in law being exercised after reasonable time. Point No.(ii) is answered accordingly. CONCLUSION: 37. In terms of the above discussion, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue is not only de hors the provision of law but also smacks of travesty of justice by reopening the case long after 27 years. Hence, the impugned order in so far as it sets aside the settlement of the case land in favour of the deity is quashed, and in so far as it rejects the claim of Opposite party No.5, is confirmed. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.