ORDER : Antony Dominic, J. 1. These revision petitions were referred to be heard by a Larger Bench doubting the correctness of Sasi v. Bindu S.J. George 2015 (4) KLTSN 36 (C. No. 40) : 2015 (4) KHC 580 ). in O.S. 23/2000, the Sub Court, Kochi passed a decree for realisation of Rs. 2,10,000/- with interest at 6% per annum. In E.P. 73/02 filed by the decree holder, Rs. 2,733/- was attached from the salary of the fourth judgment debtor. The attachment continued for 24 months. Subsequently, for realisation of the balance decree debt, E.P. 13/05 was filed and on 18.6.2008, that E.P. was dismissed for default. Still later, E.P. 17/13 was filed for the same purpose wherein the fourth judgment debtor contended that his salary has already been attached for 24 months in the earlier E.P., and, therefore, is finally exempted from attachment in view of the provisions contained in S. 60(1)(i) of C.P.C. That plea was rejected and the Execution Court ordered attachment of Rs. 7,000/- per month from salary. This order is challenged by the fourth judgment debtor in C.R.P. 721/14. 2. In the aforesaid E.P., the Execution Court attached Rs. 3,000/- per month from the salary of the second judgment debtor. The decree holder is impugning that order in C.R.P. 60/15 contending that the amount attached from the salary of the judgment debtor is far below "such portion of the salary as is liable for attachment" under S. 60(1)(i) of the C.P.C. 3. When the CRPs came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge, the petitioner in C.R.P. 721/14 relied on the judgments of this court in Suseela A.K. v. Inasu & Anr. ( 2007 (4) KLT 692 ) and Sasi v. Bindu S.J. George 2015 (4) KLT SN 36 (C. No. 40) : 2015 (4) KHC 580 ). The learned Single Judge considered the matter and passed Reference Order doubting the correctness of the judgment in Sasi's case (supra). 4. We heard the counsel for the revision petitioners and the learned counsel for the judgment debtors. 5. Before us also, the counsel for the revision petitioners contended that as per S. 60(1)(i) C.P.C., once any part of the portion of the salary liable to attachment has been under attachment for a total period of 24 months, the salary of the judgment debtor shall be finally exempted from attachment in execution of that decree. 5. Before us also, the counsel for the revision petitioners contended that as per S. 60(1)(i) C.P.C., once any part of the portion of the salary liable to attachment has been under attachment for a total period of 24 months, the salary of the judgment debtor shall be finally exempted from attachment in execution of that decree. According to them, since attachment was in force for 24 months in E.P. 73/02, there cannot be any further attachment of the salary. To substantiate this plea, reliance was placed on Suseela's case and Sasi's case (supra), and also the judgments of the Calcutta High Court in Biman Kumar Biswas v. M/s. Commercial Engineering Corporation Pvt. Limited & Ors. AIR 1983 Cal 45 ) and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Prabhudas v. Usirikayaia Venkata Ramana & Anr. ( AIR 2012 A.P. 13 ). 6. However, counsel for the decree holder contended that the view taken in the aforesaid judgments are against the plain language of the proviso to S. 60(1)(i) and according to him, the benefit of exemption provided therein is only to the part of such portion of salary liable to attachment and was under attachment. According to him, insofar as these cases are concerned, part of the portion of the salary liable for attachment and under attachment, is not sought to be attached again and, therefore, the view taken by the Execution Court ordering attachment is perfectly legal. 7. We have considered the submissions made. 8. Answer to the issue referred for the consideration of this court would depend upon the manner in which the provisions of S. 60(1)(i) of the C.P.C. and the proviso thereto are understood. Therefore, this provision is extracted below for easy reference: "60. 7. We have considered the submissions made. 8. Answer to the issue referred for the consideration of this court would depend upon the manner in which the provisions of S. 60(1)(i) of the C.P.C. and the proviso thereto are understood. Therefore, this provision is extracted below for easy reference: "60. Property liable to attachment and sale in execution of decree.- (1) The following property is liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree, namely, lands, houses or other buildings, goods, money, bank notes, cheques, bills of exchange, hundis, promissory notes, Government securities, bonds or other securities for money, debts, shares in a corporation and, save as hereinafter mentioned, all other saleable property, movable or immovable, belonging to the judgment debtor, or over which, or the profits of which, he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit, whether the same be held in the name of the judgment debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf: Provided that the following particulars shall not be liable to such attachment or sale, namely:-- (a).............................................. (b)....................................... (c)......................................... (d)............................................ (e).............................................. (f).............................................. (g)............................................. (h).............................................. (i) salary to the extent of the first one thousand rupees and two-thirds of the remainder in execution of any decree other than a decree for maintenance: Provided that where any part of such portion of the salary as is liable to attachment has been under attachment, whether continuously or intermittently, for a total period of twenty four months, such portion shall be exempt from attachment until the expiry of a further period of twelve months, and, where such attachment has been made in execution of one and the same decree, shall, after the attachment has continued for a total period of twenty four months, be finally exempt from attachment in execution of that decree; (ia).........................................................." 9. Section 60(1) provides that the properties mentioned therein are liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree. These properties are lands, houses or other buildings, goods, money, bank notes, cheques, bills of exchange, hundis, promissory notes, Government securities, bonds or other securities for money, debts and shares in a corporation. Section 60(1) provides that the properties mentioned therein are liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree. These properties are lands, houses or other buildings, goods, money, bank notes, cheques, bills of exchange, hundis, promissory notes, Government securities, bonds or other securities for money, debts and shares in a corporation. This provision further provides that save as thereafter mentioned, all other saleable property, movable or immovable, belonging to the judgment debtor, or over which, or the profits of which, he has a disposing power, which he may exercise for his own benefit, whether the same be held in the name of the judgment debtor himself or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf, are also liable for attachment and sale in execution of a decree. Thereafter, a proviso has been added enumerating the particulars, which shall not be liable to such attachment and sale. Clause (i) thereof exempts from attachment salary to the extent of the first one thousand rupees and two-thirds of the remainder in execution of any decree other than a decree for maintenance. Proviso to Clause (i) is relevant for these cases. This proviso can be understood in the following manner: (1) Where any part of such portion of the salary, viz. the portion of salary specified in clause (i), as is liable to attachment, has been under attachment and, (2) The attachment of any part of such portion of salary, should have continued for a total period of 24 months, whether continuously or intermittently. (3) Once there has been attachment for 24 months, such portion, viz., the portion of the salary specified in clause (i), shall be exempted from attachment until the expiry of a further period of 12 months. (4) Where such attachment, viz., attachment of any part of such portion of the salary specified in clause (i), has been made in execution of one and the same decree, and the attachment has continued for a total period of 24 months, such portion of salary as was liable for attachment, shall be finally exempted from attachment in execution of that decree. 10. To clarify the position still further, the provisions contained in the proviso to clause (i) can be explained with an example. 10. To clarify the position still further, the provisions contained in the proviso to clause (i) can be explained with an example. Let us take a case where, after excluding one thousand rupees and two thirds of the remainder, the balance available in the salary of a judgment debtor is Rs. 10,000/. That Rs. 10,000/- is the "such portion of the salary as is liable to attachment' as provided in the proviso. In an Execution Petition, even if only a part of such portion of Rs. 10,000/- has been under attachment, if such attachment has continued, whether continuously or intermittently, for a total period of 24 months, such portion, viz., Rs. 10,000/- shall be exempted from attachment until the expiry of a further period of 12 months. If the attachment obtained has been made in execution of one and the same decree and the attachment has continued for a period of 24 months, Rs. 10,000/- shall be finally exempted from attachment in execution of that decree. To put it differently, such portion of the salary which is finally exempted is the portion of salary as was available to attachment, when attachment was ordered in execution of the decree. 11. From the language of the proviso, it is also clear that, if there has been an increase in such portion of the salary that was liable to attachment, the benefit of exemption will not be available to the increased amount. In other words, if such portion of the salary as is liable for attachment has increased; say from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 20,000/-, the benefit of exemption will be to the initial portion of the salary which was liable for attachment, viz. Rs. 10,000/- and the balance Rs. 10,000/- is liable to be attached again. According to us, such an interpretation alone will serve the object of S. 60, which is to make provision for exemption to enable public officers and others to maintain themselves and their families in a suitable manner and the interest of the decree holders to realize the decree debt by execution by attachment from salary. 12. We find that in the judgment in Union of India v. Hira Devi & Anr. ( AIR 1952 SC 227 ), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider whether in execution proceedings, Receiver can be appointed in respect of Provident Fund money due to the judgment debtor. 12. We find that in the judgment in Union of India v. Hira Devi & Anr. ( AIR 1952 SC 227 ), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider whether in execution proceedings, Receiver can be appointed in respect of Provident Fund money due to the judgment debtor. After considering the issue in detail, though the Apex Court held that execution cannot be sought against the Provident Fund money by way of appointment of a Receiver, it was further held that the aforesaid conclusion does not, however, apply to the arrears of salary and allowance due to the judgment debtor as they stand upon a different legal footing inasmuch as unlike salary which is not attachable, to the extent provided in S. 60(1) CPC, there is no such exemption as regards arrears of salary. This judgment has been followed by a Division Bench of this court in Sheeba C. Thomas v. Rosamma Thomas ( 2009 (3) KLT 260 ), The ratio of these judgments reinforces our aforesaid conclusion/for, the arrears of salary which is held to be attachable are amounts which subsequently became due to the judgment debtor in addition to the salary already drawn by him. 13. We may now refer to the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Suseela A.K. v. Inasu & Anr. ( 2007 (4) KLT 692 : 2007 (3) KHC 980 ), was a Writ Petition filed by the judgment debtor in an execution proceedings seeking, inter alia, a declaration that his salary is finally exempt from attachment in execution of the decree on the ground that attachment had continued for a period of 26 months and the judgment reads thus: "The writ petitioner seeks to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the second respondent to produce full details of attachment effected from the salary of the petitioner in Execution Petition No. 517/04 in O.S. 566/2000 and to declare that the salary of the petitioner is finally exempt from attachment in execution of the decree in O.S. 566/2000 of the Chittur Munsiff Court. It is the case of the writ petitioner that the salary is attached for a period of 26 months and it is against the mandate of the proviso to S. 60(1)(i) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). It is the case of the writ petitioner that the salary is attached for a period of 26 months and it is against the mandate of the proviso to S. 60(1)(i) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). Proviso to S. 60(1)(i) stipulates that where attachment has been made in execution of one and the same decree, shall, after the attachment has continued for a total period of twenty four months, be finally exempt from attachment in execution of that decree. So, it is mandatory not to attach the salary of a person in execution of one decree for more than twenty four months. If salary is attached, thereafter it is against law and it has to be instantaneously stopped. Since it is contended that already attachment of twenty six months had been effected, I direct the second respondent not to effect any attachment hereafter till a direction is given by the Munsiff. Meanwhile, the learned executing Court is directed to apply its mind regarding the months which salary has been attached and if twenty four months had already expired, direct the attaching authority to forthwith stop attachment of the salary. I also, make it clear that in these type of cases the court while issuing the order of attachment of salary should make it specifically clear that the attachment shall be only for a period of twenty four months and not thereafter. With these observations the writ petition is disposed of." 14. Insofar as this judgment is concerned, we find that the learned Judge has not referred to the proviso in its totality and instead has only held that the attachment under the execution petition in question could not have continued for more than 24 months. That alone being the finding of the learned Single Judge, such a finding cannot be faulted. 15. Sasi v. Bindu S.J. George 2015 (4) KLT SN 36 (C. No. 40) : 2015 (4) KHC 580 ) appears to be a case where initially there was an attachment for 24 months and when a subsequent attachment was sought for, that was declined. Dealing with the validity of such an order, this court has held thus: "Initially there was an attachment of the salary of the judgment-debtor for a period of 24 months. Dealing with the validity of such an order, this court has held thus: "Initially there was an attachment of the salary of the judgment-debtor for a period of 24 months. When subsequently, further attachment was sought for from the salary, it seems that the Court below has rightly declined to do so within the meaning of the proviso to S. 60(i) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioner has taken a stand that what is exempted from attachment through the said proviso is "such portion" of the salary that was attached, a reading of the provision clearly shows that the provision regarding "such portion" is meant only when the execution of another decree is sought for. If it is the very same decree, it is finally exempt from attachment. Without prejudice to the right of the decree holder to have recourse to the provisions under Order XXI R. 37 C.P.C., this Original Petition (Civil) is dismissed. 16. This judgment, according to us, does not correctly lay down the law. Reading of this judgment would give an impression that once an attachment has continued for a period of 24 months, the salary of the judgment debtor is immune from attachment permanently. Such an interpretation is not warranted from the language of the proviso to S. 60(1)(i) of the C.P.C. 17. The counsel for the judgment debtors referred us to a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Biman Kumar Biswas v. M/s. Commercial Engineering Corporation Pvt. Limited & Ors. ( AIR 1983 Cal. 45 ). From the facts of the case, we find that pursuant to a decree that was passed, Execution Petition was filed and by order dated 23.11.78, the executing Court had attached a sum of Rs. 100/- from the salary of the judgment debtor with effect from December 1978. On 3rd January 1979, the decree holder made a further application to the effect that a sum of Rs. 300/- should be attached out of the salary of the judgment debtor as according to him under Clause (i), such portion of his salary could lawfully be attached. That application of the decree holder was allowed. Review applications filed by the judgment debtor were dismissed by the Execution Court and it was in this background, the revision application was filed by the judgment debtor. That application of the decree holder was allowed. Review applications filed by the judgment debtor were dismissed by the Execution Court and it was in this background, the revision application was filed by the judgment debtor. Dealing with the above case, the Calcutta High Court held thus: 4. On a careful review of the material provisions in this regard we are unable to sustain the view taken by the learned Judge in the executing Court. In our considered opinion, such a view may well frustrate the very object of the proviso since a decree holder may from time to time either on the ground of enhancement of salary or on any plea of mistake seek review of the assessment of the attachable portion of the judgment debtor's salary and if the period of 24 months is to be calculated from every such date of review of reassessments, the exemption contemplated by the proviso may never be available to a judgment debtor. That certainly was not the intention of the legislature when it incorporated the proviso. Moreover the learned Judge in the executing Court overlooked the express words used in the proviso and the clear implication thereof. It would be useful to refer to the terms of the proviso which may be set out as follows:- "(i) salary to the extent of the first four hundred rupees and two-thirds of the remainder in execution of any decree other than a decree for maintenance: Provided that where any part of such portion of the salary as is liable to attachment has been under attachment whether continuously or intermittently for a total period of twenty-four months, such portion shall be exempt from attachment until the expiry of a further period of twelve months, and, where such attachment has been made in execution of one and the same decree, shall after the attachment has continued for a total period of twenty-four months, be finally exempt from attachment in execution of that decree." It is quite clear on the terms of this proviso that even where a part of the attachable portion of the salary is attached continuously or intermittently for a total period of 24 months, the judgment debtor is entitled to the exemption prescribed. It is not necessary that the entire attachable portion of the salary should be subjected to such attachment before the judgment debtor becomes entitled to the exemption. It is not necessary that the entire attachable portion of the salary should be subjected to such attachment before the judgment debtor becomes entitled to the exemption. The clause as is liable to attachment qualifies the term 'portion of the salary', that is, the attachable portion of the judgment debtor's salary, a part whereof had been subjected to attachment. That clause does not mean, as the learned judge in the executing Court seems to think, that until the Court correctly determines what is attachable, the period of 24 months does not start to run notwithstanding the fact that a part of the judgment debtor's attachable portion of the salary had already been attached. The proviso, our view, cannot be read to convey any such implication as its terms clearly indicate otherwise. 18. On the aforesaid reasoning, the High Court upheld the claim of the judgment debtor that his salary earned the protection of total exemption from attachment in execution of the decree on the expiry of 24 months of attachment calculated from December 1978. Having closely considered the reasoning of the Calcutta High Court, we confess our inability to agree with the same. From paragraph 4 of the judgment extracted above, it can be seen that the court had not given any importance to the fact that the exemption from attachment in execution of the decree is confined only to "such portion of the salary as is liable for attachment" and it was without taking note of this vital factor that the court has proceeded to conclude that once attachment has continued for 24 months, irrespective of any pay revision that is received by the judgment debtor resulting in increase of attachable portion of the salary, his salary would be totally exempted from attachment. Such an interpretation is not warranted from the terms of the provisions contained in the proviso to Clause (i). Therefore, we are unable to agree with the law laid down by the Calcutta High Court. 19. Learned counsel also referred us to the Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment in Shaik Noorjahan v. M. Rajeswari (2010 KHC 6371). Reading of this judgment shows that it was rendered entirely relying on the interpretation of the provisions as contained in the Calcutta High Court judgment in Biman Kumar's case (supra) and, therefore, the principles laid down do not appeal to us. 20. Reading of this judgment shows that it was rendered entirely relying on the interpretation of the provisions as contained in the Calcutta High Court judgment in Biman Kumar's case (supra) and, therefore, the principles laid down do not appeal to us. 20. The learned counsel then also referred us to the Division Bench judgment of this court in Pappachan v. Oriental Kuries Ltd., Thrissur ( 2017 (2) KLT 305 : 2017 (2) KHC 706 ). Reading of this judgment shows that the question that was referred to be considered by the Division Bench, as recorded in paragraph 1 of the judgment itself, was regarding the nature and character of the amounts realised by attachment of salary of the judgment debtor in execution of a decree for money beyond the permissible period of 24 months. This question was considered and was answered by the Court vide paragraph 10 of the judgment that the salary attached in execution of a decree for money during the period exceeding 24 months does not lose its nature or character and enjoys statutory exemption. According to us, this judgment or the principles laid down therein are of no relevance to the issue that is raised in these cases. 21. For the aforesaid reasons, this reference is answered holding that the benefit of exemption as provided in the proviso to Clause (i) to S. 60(1) of the C.P.C. is only to such portion of the salary as is liable for attachment and has been under attachment for 24 months. If there has been an upward variation in the portion of the salary as is liable to attachment, the benefit of exemption would not be available to the portion in excess of the portion which was liable for attachment. Consequently, the judgment of the learned Single Judge Sasi v. Bindu S.J. George 2015 (4) KLT SN 36 (C. No. 40) : 2015 (4) KHC 580 ) is overruled. Reference is answered accordingly. The Registry shall post the cases before the appropriate court.