JUDGMENT : A.K. Rath, J. This is a defendants’ appeal against affirming judgment. 2. Plaintiff-respondent instituted the suit for recovery of Rs.1,50,801.50 paise with P.I and F.I towards arrear house rent. The case of the plaintiff is that he is the owner of a house bearing holding no.129, ward no.1 of Baripada Municipality. The same was let out to defendant no.1 on 15.7.1989 on a monthly rent of Rs.7602/-. As per terms of tenancy, the defendant no.1 paid the house rent along with other service charges till March, 1991. 3. Thereafter, the defendant no.1 stopped payment of rent with effect from 8.4.1991. He sent several letters for payment of arrear rent. The defendant no.1 maintained a sphinx like silence. With this factual scenario, the plaintiff instituted the suit seeking the reliefs mentioned supra. 4. The defendants entered contest and filed written statement. They admitted the tenancy of the plaintiff with effect from 15.7.89 at a monthly rent of Rs.7602/- and payment of the same till March, 1991. It was pleaded that since there was a vigilance report, enquiry of fair rent for the suit premises was to be re-assessed. The defendant no.1 was required to give an undertaking to refund the excess rent, if any, after the reassessment of fair rent of the suit premises. But then the plaintiff did not give an undertaking. Rent could not be paid to him. The Govt. felt the need to find out an alternative accommodation for the sports hostel. An advertisement was made on 30.12.91. Nonpayment of rent was neither intentional nor willful. The defendant no.1 was ready to pay the rent after obtaining an undertaking from the plaintiff and fixation of fair rent. It was further pleaded that the rent for the suit premises was not paid from month to month as there was no written agreement. The rent was paid only after presentation of the bill by the plaintiff and the delay, if any, was due to sanction of bill from the Govt. The plaintiff neither questioned such delayed payment nor asked for any interest at any time. The suit premise was vacated with effect from 1.4.92. But since the plaintiff avoided to receive the key of the suit premises, the same was delivered to him at a later date. Thus, the defendants are only liable to pay rent from 1.4.91 to 31.3.92. 5. The suit premise was vacated with effect from 1.4.92. But since the plaintiff avoided to receive the key of the suit premises, the same was delivered to him at a later date. Thus, the defendants are only liable to pay rent from 1.4.91 to 31.3.92. 5. On the interse pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck five issues. Parties led evidence. Learned trial court came to hold that the defendants had deliberately neglected to pay the arrear house rent from 1.4.91 to 8.10.92 and vacated the suit premises on 8.10.92. Notice under Sec.80 C.P.C. had been served on the defendants. Held so, it decreed the suit and directed the defendant no.1 to pay arrear rent of Rs.1,50,801.50 paise with interest at the rate of 12% interest per annum from the date of institution of the suit till the date of payment with cost. The unsuccessful defendants challenged the judgment and decree of the learned trial court before the learned District Judge, Baripada, which was subsequently transferred to the court of the learned Additional District Judge, Baripada and renumbered as Money Appeal No.7/3 of 1999/1995. The appeal was eventually dismissed. 6. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law. “(1) Whether the learned lower appellate court was justified in entertaining the appeal and deciding the same on merit once it has come to a conclusion that the suit is hit by Sec.16(2)(a) of Civil Courts Act because of the fact that the suit was valued at Rs.1,50,000/- only ? (2) Whether the learned lower appellate Court is justified in deciding the appeal on merit when under the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal should have been returned to be presented in appropriate court of law in view of the pecuniary jurisdiction ?” 7. Heard Mr. Swayambhu Mishra, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the appellants and Mr. Sidhartha Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent. 8. Mr. Mishra, learned A.S.C. for the appellants submits that the suit was filed for realization of Rs.1,50,801.50 paise. The same was decreed. The defendants filed appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Baripada. Learned lower appellate court came to hold that he had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, but then it proceeded to decide the appeal on merit. Mr. Mishra, learned A.S.C. for the appellants submits that the suit was filed for realization of Rs.1,50,801.50 paise. The same was decreed. The defendants filed appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Baripada. Learned lower appellate court came to hold that he had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, but then it proceeded to decide the appeal on merit. He further submits that once the learned lower appellate court came to a conclusion that it had no pecuniary jurisdiction, it could have returned the appeal to be presented in any appropriate forum. 9. Per contra, Mr. Sidhartha Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the defendants filed appeal. They argued the matter. They cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath. 10. An identical matter came up before this Court in the case of Khetra Mohan Behera & others vs. Kandra Matia & others (disposed of on 10.11.2017 in S.A. No.222 of 1990). This Court held thus : “7. Sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 postulates that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 578 (Section 99 of the present Code covering errors or irregularity) of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit had exercised it by reason of under-valuation could not be entertained by an appellate court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at or before the hearing at which the issues were first framed or the appellate court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that the over-valuing or undervaluing of the suit has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit. 8. The apex Court in the case of Pathumma (Daughter of Koopilan Uneen) and others v. Kuntalan Kutty (Son of Koopilan Uneen) Dead by LRs and others, (1981) 3 SCC 589 held that there are three pre-requisites for the applicability of the section. The apex Court held : “5. In order that an objection to the place of suing may be entertained by an appellate or revisional court, the fulfilment of the following three conditions is essential : (1) The objection was taken in the court of first instance. (2) It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement. (3) There has been a consequent failure of justice. 6. All these three conditions must co-exist. (2) It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement. (3) There has been a consequent failure of justice. 6. All these three conditions must co-exist. xxx xxx xxx” 9. Taking a cue from Pathumma v. Kuntalan Kutty, (1981) 3 SCC 589 and Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 , the apex Court in the case of K.P. Ranga Rao v. K.V. Venkatesham and others, (2015) 13 SCC 514 held thus; “8. Obviously Section 21 will apply in the three situations mentioned therein: the first situation refers to the place of suing; the second situation refers to pecuniary limits of the court’s jurisdiction; and the third refers to local limits of the court’s jurisdiction. In each of these cases it is stated that an appellate court or revisional court shall not allow an objection to the place of suing (which refers to Section 16 in the present case) unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement. What follows is important. An objection as to place of suing cannot be allowed unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. 9. In a classic exposition of the law, in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, after stating that a defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties, the law has been laid down as follows; “7….The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.” 10. The law laid down by the apex Court in the decisions cited supra applies with full force to the facts of the case. The law laid down by the apex Court in the decisions cited supra applies with full force to the facts of the case. Learned trial court has decided all issues on merit after hearing both the parties. The suit was decreed. In view of the same, judgment and decree cannot be reversed purely on technical grounds unless there is failure of justice, which is nobody’s case.” 11. The ratio in the decision cited supra applies with full force to the facts of the case. 12. Learned trial court decided all issues on merit. The unsuccessful defendants preferred appeal. The appellants argued the matter before the learned lower appellate court. The learned lower appellate court dismissed the appeal on merit. In view of the same, the judgment and decree of the learned trial court cannot be reversed purely on technical ground unless there is failure of justice, which is nobody’s case. 13. Resultantly, the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.