JUDGMENT : Prakash Gupta, J. 1. Instant Civil Execution Second Appeal under Section 100 read with Order 21, Rule 103 CPC is directed against the judgment dated 31st August, 2013 passed by the learned District Judge, Karauli in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 21/2003 whereby the judgment dated 4th March, 2003 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) Karauli in Execution Application No. 60/78 had been confirmed and the appeal had been dismissed. By the order dated 4th March, 2003 the learned trial court had dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order 21 Rules 97, 99,101 read with Section 151 CPC. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that Civil Suit bearing O.S. No. 188/1969 was filed in the court of Munsif, Karauli by plaintiff Devilal, Narvada and Shri Shivjiprasad against Kedar Lal wherein it was stated by the plaintiffs that the disputed Baithak (Drawing Room) shown by blue colour in the map annexed to the plaint was a joint undivided property of the parties in which the plaintiffs have 2/3 share and defendant Kedar Lal was having his 1/3 share. The Baithak was stated to be in joint possession. In the suit it was prayed by the plaintiff that by issuing permanent injunction, the defendant be restrained from creating hurdle in the use of the joint Baithak by the plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff's vide its judgment and decree dated 20th March, 1975. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs filed an Appeal No. 123/76 before the learned District Judge, Sawai Madhopur camp at Gangapur City. In the appeal, on 26th October, 1977 defendant Kedar Lal and Plaintiffs entered into a compromise, whereby it was agreed between the parties that Kedar lal would sell the 1/3rd portion of the disputed Baithak to Shivji Prasad for a consideration of Rs. 1250/- and Kedar Lal would execute a sale-deed in favour of Shivji Prasad at his cost. In view of the compromise, the appeal was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 26th October, 1977. Thereafter the decree holder filed execution petition No. 60/78 before the trial court for execution of the aforesaid decree against Kedar Lal, judgment debtor. 3. It is pertinent to mention here that in the execution proceedings first the judgment debtor Kedar Lal filed objections under section 47 CPC. Thereafter the decree holder filed execution petition No. 60/78 before the trial court for execution of the aforesaid decree against Kedar Lal, judgment debtor. 3. It is pertinent to mention here that in the execution proceedings first the judgment debtor Kedar Lal filed objections under section 47 CPC. The same were rejected by the executing court vide its order dated 9.11.1983, against which appeal filed by the judgment debtor before the lower appellate court was also dismissed vide order dated 17.10.1986. 4. The present appellants filed the objections under Order 21 Rules 99 and 101 CPC stating that the disputed Baithak was a coparcenery property of appellants and their father late Shri Kedar Lal and the appellants are having equal shares with their father in the said property. At the time of compromise dated 26.10.1977, late Shri Kedar Lal was not the Karta of the family of the appellant and he was not having any right to enter into the compromise and to agree to sell the coparcenery property of appellants. On the date of compromise, appellants Nos. 3 and 4 were minor and late Shri Kedar Lal entered into the compromise to sell the coparcenery property of the minors without any legal necessity of money and further late Shri Kedar lal did not obtain previous permission of the court as envisaged under section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Plea of ownership right by virtue of adverse possession on the remaining 2/3 portion of the disputed property was also taken. Lastly, it was stated in the objections that the decree is not executable against the appellants. 5. The decree-holders contested the objections by filing written reply to the same wherein it was stated that the decree dated 26th October, 1977 had attained finality between the parties and the objectors are bound by the same and have no right to file the objections and they are step in the shoes of judgment debtor Kedar lal. The property was sold by Kedar lal in the capacity of Karta of the family which was well within the knowledge of objector Nos. 1 and 2. 6. The executing court framed necessary issues and both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their case. 7. The property was sold by Kedar lal in the capacity of Karta of the family which was well within the knowledge of objector Nos. 1 and 2. 6. The executing court framed necessary issues and both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their case. 7. The executing court after recording evidence of the parties and hearing both the parties, rejected the objections vide its judgment dated 4th March, 2003. Against which the objectors filed civil misc. appeal in the lower appellate court that too was dismissed vide judgment dated 31st August, 2013. 8. Hence, this execution second appeal. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 10. It is submitted by Shri Satyavrata Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants that both the learned courts below have not properly considered this aspect of the matter that the decree holder has not proved the fact that the compromise dated 26th October,1977 has binding effect on the appellants. This burden squarely lay on the vendees to prove that the compromise dated 26th October, 1977 for selling the 1/3rd portion of the Baithak was valid and binding on the appellants for their respective shares. It is further submitted that at the time of compromise dated 26th October, 1977, appellants Nos. 3 and 4 were minor and no previous permission from the court was sought by Kedar Lal as envisaged under section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The suit for permanent injunction was filed only against late Shri Kedar lal and the appellants were not the party in the same. They were neither party in the appeal nor in the compromise. Therefore, they are not bound by the compromise. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that both the learned courts below have not properly considered this aspect of the case that Late Shri Kedar Lal was not a Karta of the family and, therefore, he had no right to sell the coparcenery property of the appellants. It is also argued that the learned courts below have not properly considered the settled legal proposition of law that a Karta of the family cannot sell the coparcener property of a minor without any legal necessity. It is also argued that the learned courts below have not properly considered the settled legal proposition of law that a Karta of the family cannot sell the coparcener property of a minor without any legal necessity. The appellants have been able to prove this aspect of the matter by producing evidence that Late Shri Kedar Lal entered into a compromise for the sale of coparcenery property of the minors without any legal necessity of money and in the interest and benefit of the minors. It is then argued that both the learned courts below have failed to appreciate this aspect of the case that neither in the suit for permanent injunction nor in the compromise dated 26th October, 1977 it has been mentioned that Kedar Lal entered into compromise in the capacity of a Karta of the family. Therefore, it was only a compromise between Kedar Lal and the plaintiffs in their personal capacity which does not affect the right, title and interest of the appellants regarding their shares in coparcenery property. 11. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.K. Bhikan vs. Mehamoodabee, AIR 2017 SC 1243 , learned counsel for the appellants has argued that when the court is called upon to interpret the documents and examine its effect, it involves question of law. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide such questions on merits, which the High Court could do after framing substantial questions of law as required under section 100 CPC. 12. It is submitted that while deciding the objections all questions raised by the objectors have to be comprehensively considered on their merits, learned counsel for the appellants in this regard has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maya Devi vs. Lalta Prasad, AIR 2014 SC 1356 . 12. It is submitted that while deciding the objections all questions raised by the objectors have to be comprehensively considered on their merits, learned counsel for the appellants in this regard has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maya Devi vs. Lalta Prasad, AIR 2014 SC 1356 . It is further submitted by him that before the son could be bound, in a case of alienation of joint Hindu Property by the father or the Manager, the condition which must be satisfied is that the father or manager acted like a prudent man and in order to uphold an alienation of a joint Hindu family property by the father or the manager (Karta) it is not only necessary to prove that there was legal necessity but also that the father or the manager acted like a prudent man and did not dispose off the property for an inadequate consideration, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Prasad and Others vs. Govindaswami Mudaliar and Others, AIR 1982 SC 84 . 13. Per contra, Shri J.P. Goyal, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the respondents-decree holders has supported the judgments of both the learned courts below. Learned counsel submitted that the findings recorded by both the learned courts below are based on proper appreciation of documentary as well as oral evidence. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that acting as Karta of the joint hindu family, Kedar Lal entered into a compromise to sell the property in dispute for a consideration of Rs. 1250/-. The decree dated 20.10.1977 had attained finality and the objectors are bound by the same. As per the compromise, sale-deed was to be executed by Kedar Lal but he did not do so and his objections were rejected by the executing court and the appeal filed by him had already been dismissed. Pointing towards the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the issues raised by the learned counsel for the appellants are purely questions of facts. No substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. Hence the same is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage. Pointing towards the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the issues raised by the learned counsel for the appellants are purely questions of facts. No substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. Hence the same is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sri Narayan Bal and Others vs. Sridhar Sutar and Others, AIR 1996 SC 2371 , Sunil Kumar and Another vs. Ram Parkash and Others, AIR 1988 SC 576 , Prasad and Others vs. V. Govindaswami Mudaliar and Others, AIR 1982 SC 84 and Ram Charan Das vs. Girja Nandini Devi and Others, AIR 1966 SC 323 . 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I have gone through the impugned judgments and the material available on record. 15 As regards the sale of the property by Kedar Lal without obtaining permission of the court before disposing of the joint Hindu Family property as envisaged under section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is, concerned, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Bal (supra) have held in para 5 of the judgment as under:- "5. With regard to the undivided interest of the Hindu minor in joint family property, the provisions afore-culled are beads of the same string and need be viewed in a single glimpse, simultaneously in conjunction with each other. Each provisions and in particular Section 8, cannot be viewed in isolation. If read together the intent of the legislative in this beneficial legislation becomes manifest. Ordinarily the law does not envisage a natural guardian of the undivided interest of a Hindu minor in joint family property. The natural guardian of the property of a Hindu minor, other than the undivided interest in joint family property, is alone contemplated under Section 8, where under his powers and duties are defined. Section 12 carves out an exception to the rule that should there be no adult member of the joint family in management of the joint family property, in which the minor has an undivided interest, a guardian may be appointed; but ordinarily no guardian shall be appointed for such undivided interest of the minor. Section 12 carves out an exception to the rule that should there be no adult member of the joint family in management of the joint family property, in which the minor has an undivided interest, a guardian may be appointed; but ordinarily no guardian shall be appointed for such undivided interest of the minor. The adult member of the family in the management of the Joint Hindu Family property may be a male or a female, not necessarily the Karta. The power of the High Court otherwise to appoint a guardian, in situations justifying, has been preserved. This is the legislative scheme on the subject. Under Section 8 a natural guardian of the property of the Hindu minor, before he disposes of any immovable property of the minor, must seek permission of the court. But since there need be no natural guardian for the minor's undivided interest in the joint family property, as provided under sections 6 and 12 of the Act, the previous permission of the Court under Section 8 of disposing of the undivided interest of the minor in the joint family property is not required. The joint Hindu family by itself is a legal entity capable of acting through its Karta and other adult members of the family in management of the joint Hindu family property. Thus section 8 in view of the express terms of Sections 6 and 12, would not be applicable where a joint Hindu family property is sold/disposed of by the Karta involving an undivided interest of the minor in the said joint Hindu family property. The question posed at the outset therefore is so answered. 15.1. In view of the above, I find no merit in the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that previous permission of the court is required in all the cases before disposing of the property. Thus I am of the view that the compromise entered into by Shri Kedar Lal as a Karta of the Joint Hindu Family regarding an undivided interest of the minors is not void and is binding on the objectors-judgment debtors. 16. In case of Sunil Kumar (supra), it was held that it is true that a coparcener takes by birth an interest in the ancestral property, but he is not entitled to separate possession of the coparcenary estate. His rights are not independent of the control of the Karta. 16. In case of Sunil Kumar (supra), it was held that it is true that a coparcener takes by birth an interest in the ancestral property, but he is not entitled to separate possession of the coparcenary estate. His rights are not independent of the control of the Karta. It would be for the karta to consider the actual pressure on the joint family estate. It would be for him to foresee the danger to be averted and it would be for him to examine as to how best the joint family estate could be beneficially put into use to sub-serve the interests of the family. A coparcener cannot interfere in these acts of management. Apart from that, a father-karta in addition to the aforesaid powers of alienation has also the special power to sell or mortgage ancestral property to discharge his antecedent debt which is not tainted with immorality. 17. In Prasad (supra) the Supreme Court considering the power of the natural guardian of Hindu Minor has observed as under:- "A natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power in the management of his estate to mortgage or sell any part thereof in case of necessity or for the benefit of the estate. If the alienee does not prove any legal necessity or that he does not make reasonable enquiries, the sale is invalid. But the father in a joint Hindu family may sell or mortgage the joint family property including the son's interest therein to discharge a debt contacted by him for his own personal benefit and such alienation binds the sons provided (a) the debt was antecedent to the alienation and (b) it was not incurred for an immoral purpose." 18. But the father in a joint Hindu family may sell or mortgage the joint family property including the son's interest therein to discharge a debt contacted by him for his own personal benefit and such alienation binds the sons provided (a) the debt was antecedent to the alienation and (b) it was not incurred for an immoral purpose." 18. So far as the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that there was no legal necessity for the judgment debtor Kedar Lal to dispose of the property of coparcener is concerned, both the courts below have considered this aspect of the matter and after considering the evidence available on record and the law laid by the Supreme Court in the case of Prasad (supra) and Ram Charan (supra) the executing court has observed as under:- ^^fd fnuakd 26-10-1977 ds dsnkj yky }kjk fd;k x;k jkthukek mlds }kjk cgSfl;r drkZ [kkunku fd;k x;k Fkk ,oa ;g ln~HkkoukiwoZd ifjokj ds fgr esa fd;k x;k Fkk mlds ,ot esa 1250@& :i;s izkIr djus dk jkthukek fd;k x;k Fkk tks 1977 dh dher ds vuq:i lEifr dh mi;qZDr ,oa mfpr dher ekuh tk ldrh gSA** On the above point, the lower appellate court observed as under:- ^^izLrqr gqbZ lk{; ls izdV gS fd dsnkj yky ifjokj ds eqf[k;k Fks vkSj mudh gSfl;r drkZ [kkunku dh Fkh vkSj drkZ [kkunku dks ,d lkekU; izKkoku O;fDr dh rjg ls ifjokj ds fgr esa dke djuk Fkk vkSj ifjlkj ds fgr esa dke dj ldrk gS vkSj ;fn ikfjokfjd fof/kd vko';drk cM+h gks rks vf/kd lEifr Hkh vUrfjr dj ldrk gSA mtjnkjku dks ;g fl) djuk Fkk fd fd;k x;k jkthukek ifjokj ds fgr esa ugha Fkk ijUrq ,slk rF; fl) ugha gks ik;kA lk{; esa ;g rF; vk;k gS fd dsnkj yky dks dksbZ cqjh vknr ugha Fkh vkSj ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS fd dsnkj yky us vius iq=ksa ds lkFk dHkh dksbZ vU;k; ugha fd;kA chekj gksus ij vius iq=ksa dks laHkkyk vkSj nok&nk: Hkh djokbZ vkSj ,slk dksbZ d`R; ugha fd;k] ftlls ifjokj ds eku&lEeku ij dksbZ vkap vkbZ gks] rks bu fLFkfr;ksa esa tc dsnkj yky us vius HkkbZ;ksa ls jkthukek dj muds vkokxeu ds fy, vFkok vU; iz;ksx ds fy, cSBd esa viuk 1@3 fgLlk mudks vUrfjr dj fn;k vkSj ikjokfjd ln~Hkko] Lusg dk;e j[kus ds fy, jkthukek dj fy;k rks mlds i'pkr~ ;g vc ugha dgk tk ldrk fd ,slk jkthukek vFkok ,slk vUrj.k voS/k gSA** 19. The findings recorded by the courts below are findings of facts and are based on proper appreciation of the evidence available on record. Therefore, I find no substance in the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. A perusal of the impugned judgments of both the courts below would reveal that after considering each and every aspect of the matter, that too on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties both the courts below have recorded the findings which require no interference being finding of fact. 20. For the discussions herein above, I am of the view that no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, is involved in the present second appeal. Hence, the same is liable to be dismissed at the stage of admission. 21. The present second appeal is dismissed accordingly at the stage of admission.