ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioner approached the writ court in the year 2010 seeking pensionary dues except GPF on the strength of his claim that he served as a Forest Guard from 19.9.1951 at Palamau till 12.10.1971 when he opted for V.R.S. From Garhwa South Forest Division. Petitioner was paid his contribution towards GPF on 24.11.1872 itself. Learned writ court, by judgment dated 21.9.2016, has allowed the writ petition directing the Respondents to grant him pension including any revision for the pensionable service period within a period of three months, failing which, it shall carry statutory interest till it is paid from the expiry of three months period. Any retirement benefit, if remaining, shall also be paid within the same time and with the same stipulation relating to interest. 3. It is the case of the Respondent/appellant that the petitioner worked as a Forest Guard from 10.9.1951 till 31.12.1967. On 1.1.1968, he applied for casual leave on the ground of illness of his wife for five days. Thereafter, he fell ill and could not attend the duty. On 5.8.1968, he wrote to the Divisional Forest Officer, Garhwa South Division that he would not be able to serve due to ill-health and resigned his job. After that no trace was found of the petitioner, though lot of correspondences were undertaken to bring him back for joining official duties. However, all efforts proved futile as he did not turn up to respond to the official letters. 4. On the part of the petitioner, reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Santosh Kumar Nayak Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Others, 2006 (4) JLJR 138 . In the said case, father of the petitioner had gone on medical leave in 1960 after having been appointed in 1945 and never returned till his death in 1970. Petitioner had successfully agitated the matter before this Court in the writ petition filed in 2004. The learned Single Judge arrived at an opinion that continued absence from duty is a misconduct upon which, the employer is required to put the employee on notice before terminating him. There cannot be an automatic termination from service. 5. Petitioner had successfully agitated the matter before this Court in the writ petition filed in 2004. The learned Single Judge arrived at an opinion that continued absence from duty is a misconduct upon which, the employer is required to put the employee on notice before terminating him. There cannot be an automatic termination from service. 5. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner/Respondent has also submitted that a Government servant retiring from service on or after 1.8.1962 are covered by Liberalized Pension Rules, as contained in Government Order No. 12928F dated 4.9.1962. They are entitled to gratuity and pension, as per the prescribed scale therein. Liberalize Pension Scheme, 1950 contained in Resolution dated 23.8.1950 under Chapter-V of Pension Rules also provides that a Government servant may retire from service any time after completing 30 years qualifying service provided that he shall give in this behalf a notice in writing to the appropriate authority, at least three months before the date on which he wishes to retire. Similar option was also available to the Government to retire a Government servant after completion of 30 years of qualifying service with three months prior notice Clause 1(2)(b) also provides that a Government servant may also be required or permitted, as the case may be, to retire from service in the manner and subject to the conditions laid down in Rule 75(e) of Bihar and Orissa Service Code (Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code) or Rule 135 of Bihar Pension Rules. Clause 3 thereof provides that a Government servant who retires or is retired from service in the manner indicated in clauses (a) and (b) of para 1(2) may be granted a retiring pension which will be the appropriate amount set out in the Annexure. 6. Learned counsel for the Appellant State has taken the plea that the petitioner did not fulfill the minimum qualifying service of 30 years or 50 years of age, as per Rules 74(ii) and (iii) of Bihar Service Code to avail of the pensionary benefit. The writ petition has also been strongly opposed on the ground of inordinate delay in seeking such a relief. Reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Matropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , paras-16 &17 thereof, which reads as under:- "16. Reliance was placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Matropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , paras-16 &17 thereof, which reads as under:- "16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. I n the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill-health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons who compete with "Kumbhakarna" or for that matter "Rip Van Winkle". In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold." Learned counsel for the Appellant State have also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttarakhand & Anr. Vs. Sudhir Chandra Nautiyal and Anr. (sic-vs. Umakant Joshi & Ors.) [(2013 (1) JLJR (SC) 81] in support of the submission that the cause of action raised by the petitioner is not maintainable before the Jharkhand High Court as on admitted facts, he has resigned or taken V.R.S. in the year 1968-71 while working under the erstwhile State of Bihar. 7. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that there is no explanation on the part of the writ petitioner/Respondent for such an inordinate delay in approaching the writ court for the instant relief. Learned Single Judge has committed error of law and facts while allowing the writ petition in his favour. It therefore deserves interference in appeal. 8. We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and gone through the relevant materials on record including the impugned judgment. The first question which merits an answer is, whether in the admitted set of facts, writ petitioner was legally entitled for pension or not? Petitioner at para-5 of the writ petition has categorically stated that he had taken V.R.S. on 12.10.1971 as Forest Guard from Garhwa South Forest Division. The Respondent State on their part have stated that the petitioner resigned on his own on 5.8.1968 stating the reasons of his ill-health arid never came back. In fact, the GPF contribution was also released on 24.11.1972. Even accepting the case of the petitioner himself, claim for pension under Service Rules would not be maintainable in view of the provisions of Rule 74 of Jharkhand Service Code which are reproduced hereunder: "74. In fact, the GPF contribution was also released on 24.11.1972. Even accepting the case of the petitioner himself, claim for pension under Service Rules would not be maintainable in view of the provisions of Rule 74 of Jharkhand Service Code which are reproduced hereunder: "74. (a) The State Government may require any Government servant who has completed twenty one years of duty and twenty-five years of total service calculated from the date of his first appointing to retire from Government service, if it considers that his efficiency or conduct is not such as to justify his retention in service. Where any Government servant is so required to retire no claim to any special compensation shall be entertained. [(b)(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sub-rule a Government servant may, after giving at least three months previous notice, in writing, to the appointing authority concerned retire from service on the date on which such a Government servant completes thirty years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice: Provided that no Government servant under suspension shall retire from service except with the specific approval of the State Government] [Provided further that in case of the officers and servants of the Patna High Court (including those of Circuit Bench at Ranchi) under the rule making authority of the Chief Justice, no such officer and servant under suspension shall retire from service except with the specific approval of the Chief Justice. [(ii) The appointing authority concerned may after giving a Government servant at least three month's previous notice in writing, or an amount equal to three month's pay and allowance in lieu of such notice, require him in public interest, to retire from service on the date on which such a Government servant completes thirty years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice. [(iii) A Government servant who retires voluntarily is required to retire in public interest under this rule on attaining the age of 50 years, or completing qualifying service of 30 years, shall be entitled to retiring pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity." Rule 74-b(i) provides that a Government servant may, after giving at least three months previous notice in writing to the appointing authority concerned retire from service on the date on which such a Government servant completes thirty years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice. Rule 74(iii) further provides that a Government servant who retires voluntarily or is required to retire in public interest under this rule on attaining the age of 50 years, or completing qualifying service of 30 years, shall be entitled to retiring pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity. Petitioner's total length of service even by his admission, could be less than 30 years. Petitioner, as per the counsel for the writ petitioner, could have retired in year 1988. As a matter of fact, he had completed 16 years and 3 months till 31.12.1967 and completed 40 years of age till that date. If the petitioner has himself stated that he took voluntary retirement from service, then the question of initiating departmental proceeding to terminate him on the part of the employer, does not arise. Therefore, the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in the case of Santosh Kumar Nayak (supra) on different set of facts, does not apply to the case of the petitioner. 9. We have not found any explanation worth its name on the part of the writ petitioner for huge inordinate delay of about 40 years in seeking discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the year 2010. We have already observed hereinabove that the first issue was in relation to the legal entitlement of the writ petitioner. Delay in raising a claim of pension over some period of time may not extinguish the right of the employee, but in the facts of the present case, writ petitioner could not establish that he was legally entitled to the pensionary benefits. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner in the case of S.K. Mastan Bee vs. General Manager, South Central Railway and Another [ (2003)1 SCC 184 ] also does not come to his aid. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner in the case of S.K. Mastan Bee vs. General Manager, South Central Railway and Another [ (2003)1 SCC 184 ] also does not come to his aid. We also find substance in the submission of the counsel for the appellant, so far as the maintainability of the writ petition before this Court is concerned, in view of the pronouncement rendered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttarakhand (supra). The State of Jharkhand came into existence on 15.11.2000 and the cause of action, if any, raised by the petitioner relates to the year 1970s under the erstwhile State of Bihar. We are therefore of the considered view that the impugned judgment deserves interference in exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is set aside. Appeal stands allowed.