JUDGMENT VINEET SARAN, C.J. - The writ petition no. 7840 of 2017 has been filed with the prayer for a direction to the opposite party to dispose of the first Renewal of Mining Lease (RML) application of the petitioner, as well as the lapsing proceeding with regard to Murgabeda Iron Ore Mines, in the light of the order dated 11.5.2016 passed by the Revisional Authority and also keeping in view the judgment of the Apex Court dated 4th April, 2016 rendered in the case of Common Cause vs. Union of India, (2016) 11 SCC 455 . 2. The other writ petition no. 18859 of 2017 has been filed by the State with a prayer for quashing the order dated 11.5.2016 passed by the Revisional Authority in the case of the petitioner whereby the matter relating to case of the petitioner and several other mining lease holders has been remanded back to the State Government for a fresh decision after giving them notice. 3. Briefly the facts of the case are that challenging the order dated 7.1.2015 passed by the State, whereby the mining lease of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 7840 of 2017 (Lessee) was declared to have lapsed with effect from 18.4.2012 under the provision of Section 4A(4) of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 read with Rule 28(1) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the petitioner filed a revision application No. 22/05/2015/RC-I on 12.1.2015 before the Revisional Authority, being the Government of India, Ministry of Mines. During the pendency of the revision before the Central Government, the Apex Court, in the case of Common Cause (supra) interpreted the provision of Section 4A(4) of Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 and Rule 28 of the Mineral Concession Rules, which relates to lapsing of lease and held that there would be no automatic lapsing and the order of lapsing could be passed only after giving opportunity to the lease holders. The relevant portion of paragraph 35 and 37.7 of the aforesaid judgment in the case of Common Cause (supra) are reproduced below:- “35. The relevant portion of paragraph 35 and 37.7 of the aforesaid judgment in the case of Common Cause (supra) are reproduced below:- “35. It is not possible for us to accept that vital vested rights in a leaseholder can be curtailed without affording him an opportunity to repudiate the impression(s) of the competent authority, namely, that the leaseholder could not have (or had actually not) carried out mining operations for a continuous period of two years…. 37.7. Based on the interpretation placed by us on Section 4-A(4) of the MMDR Act, and Rule 28 of the Mineral Concession Rules, we can draw the following conclusion. Firstly, unless an order is passed by the State Government declaring that a mining lease has lapsed, the mining lease would be deemed to be subsisting up to the date of expiry of the lease period provided by the lease document, secondly, in situations where in an application has been filed by a leaseholder, when he is not in a position to (or fro actually not) carrying on mining operations, for a continuous period of two years, the lease period will not be deemed to have lapsed till an order is passed by the State Government on such application. Where no order has been passed, the lease shall be deemed to have been extended beyond the original lease period for a further period of two years. Thirdly, a leaseholder having suffered a lapse is disentitled to any benefit of the amended MMDR Act because of the express exclusion contemplated under Section 8-A (9) of the amended MMDR Act.” 4. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court and after recording the statement made on behalf of the State Government before the Revisional Authority to the effect that “keeping in view the direction of the Apex Court, the pending cases need to be reviewed on the basis of fresh direction” and that the State Government had no objection if the case is remanded back to the State Government for fresh consideration in the light of the Apex Court’s direction and also that “certain pending case need fresh review”, the Revisional Authority remanded the matter of the petitioner, as well as 55 other revision petitioners back to the State Government for fresh decision with the following direction: “6. Notwithstanding the perceived understanding on lapsing provisions, with the Apex Court judgment, on the issue there is clarity on the lapsing framework and related process. In accordance with Apex Court direction now it is clear position that lapsing is not an automatic provision and cause of discontinuation of mining operation has to be preceded by scrutiny and steps/fulfilling the maxim of natural justice. In view of the above discussion, the Impugned Orders listed in Annexure-A, need reconsideration to follow the directions provided in the said Apex Court judgment. Therefore, all the Impugned orders as list in Annexure A are set aside herewith and remanded back to the State Government for suitable reconsideration in-line with the Hon’ble Apex Court’s direction on the provisions of lapsing expeditiously.” 5. The writ petition no. 7840 of 2017 was filed by the leaseholder on 1.5.2017 when, after a lapse of nearly one year from the passing of the order of the revision authority dated 11.5.2016, no orders were passed by the State authorities with regard to the lapsing of the mining lease of the petitioner in the light of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. 6. Counter affidavit to the said petition was filed by the State-Opposite party on 11.9.2017 stating that the order of lapsing in the case of the petitioner had been filed after giving notice and thus, the decision of the Apex Court would not apply to the facts of the case of the petitioner. The writ petition no. 18859 of 2017 was then filed by the State on 4.9.2017 after a lapse of more than sixteen months of the passing of the revisional order dated 11.5.02016. The explanation for laches in filing the writ petition, as has been given in paragraph-12 of the writ petition, is very vague. It is merely mentions that immediately after the passing of the order dated 11.5.2016 by the Revisionla Authority, the office of Advocate General was contacted on 18.5.2017 for filing the writ petition, after which the Advocate General made some queries on 23.06.2017 and prepared the writ petition on 3.8.2017, which was filed on 4.9.2017. It is merely mentions that immediately after the passing of the order dated 11.5.2016 by the Revisionla Authority, the office of Advocate General was contacted on 18.5.2017 for filing the writ petition, after which the Advocate General made some queries on 23.06.2017 and prepared the writ petition on 3.8.2017, which was filed on 4.9.2017. It is not understood as to how it is stated in the counter affidavit that the writ petition was filed and the decision was taken immediately in the said case when admittedly the first communication seeking the opinion of the Advocate General was on 18.5.2017, which was after more than year after passing of the revisional order on 11.5.2016. In our opinion, the said explanation is very vague. 7. However, keeping in view that the matter is of general importance, we may now also take up the issue raised by the State in its writ petition on merits. 8. It is contended that since the petitioner in writ petition no. 7840 of 2017 (lessee) had been afforded an opportunity as a show-cause notice was issued to him prior to the passing of the lapsing order dated 17.5.2015, it cannot be said that he had not been given adequate opportunity and as such, in the facts of this case, there was no necessity for the matter to be remanded back for fresh decision. 9. What is noteworthy is that the Revisional Authority has recorded the submission made on behalf of the State Government to the effect that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in pending cases (i.e. including that of the petitioner) needed to be reviewed and had agreed to all the revision petitions being remanded back to the State Government for fresh decision in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Common Cause (supra). Admittedly, no application has been filed before the Revisional Authority stating that such statement recorded on behalf of the State Government was not made on its behalf. It is for the first time (in a writ petition filed after 16 months) that such a plea is being taken in this writ petition that the petitioner lessee was afforded opportunity before passing of the initial order. 10. It is for the first time (in a writ petition filed after 16 months) that such a plea is being taken in this writ petition that the petitioner lessee was afforded opportunity before passing of the initial order. 10. In support of his contention that this writ petition would not be maintainable as no such plea was taken before the Revisional Authority, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat vs. Rajinder Singh & others, (2006) 5 SCC 566 wherein (in paragraph-17), it has been held as under :- “17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus: (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 93(3) CPC. (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the Court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43. (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A. (iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppels and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the Court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso the Rule 3 Order 23. Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the Court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise…..” 11. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law and in the light of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (surpra), we are of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the State would not be maintainable on merits. 12. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law and in the light of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (surpra), we are of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the State would not be maintainable on merits. 12. As regards the prayer made in W.P.(C) No. 7840 of 2017 is concerned, since by the order of the Revisional Authority dated 11.5.2016, the matter has been remanded back to the State authorities for fresh decision in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Common Cause (supra), it is expected that fresh decision should have been taken by the State Government within a reasonable time. The petitioner waited for about a year before approaching this Curt for a direction to the State Government to decide the matter afresh. No justifiable reason has been stated in the counter affidavit of the State for not deciding the matter, even though more than one and half year has passed. As such, in the facts of this case we dispose of this writ petition with the direction that the order of the Revisional Authority shall be implemented by the State authorities within three months from today. The petitioner shall co-operate in the proceedings before the said authorities. 13. Accordingly, both the writ petition stand disposed of with the directions as given hereinabove. No order as to cost. Petitions disposed of.