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2017 DIGILAW 1321 (RAJ)

Pinki Sahu, wife of Shri Jitendra Kumar Sahu v. State of Rajasthan

2017-05-24

M.N.BHANDARI

body2017
JUDGMENT : M.N. Bhandari, J. 1. By this writ petition, a challenge is made to the order dated 19th December, 2016, whereby, the petitioner has been suspended. The petitioner is an elected Chairperson of Municipal Board, Chhabra. She has been suspended precisely on the ground that after registration of FIR, she remained behind bars for more than 48 hours. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that suspension can be effected only when the case falls under Section 39(6) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 (for short “the Act of 2009”). Section 39(6) of the Act of 2009 provides for suspension only when action is initiated under the said provision itself. Initiation of the proceedings under Section 39 of the Act of 2009 is at the stage when charge sheet is served on the elected persons. In the instant case, the petitioner has not been subjected to proceedings under Section 39 of the Act of 2009 so as to invoke Section 39(6) of the Act of 2009. In view of the above, impugned order deserves to be set aside. 3. Learned Additional Advocate General Shri JM Saxena has contested the writ petition. He submits that a person involved for offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act needs to be dealt with severely. Taking into consideration the aforesaid, an order of suspension has been passed. It is not only for the reason that petitioner remained behind bars for more than 48 hours but looking to her involvement. The prayer is, accordingly, not to interfere in the impugned order. A reference of the judgment of this court in the case of Jan Mohd. v. The State of Raj. & Ors., reported in 1992 (2) WLC (Raj.) 463 has been given. 4. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and scanned the matter carefully. 5. The order of suspension has been passed precisely on the ground that petitioner remained behind bars for more than 48 hours after registration of FIR No.315/2016. The FIR was registered on the allegation that petitioner demanded a sum of Rs.10,000/- from the complainant Shri Rajmal Soni. The question for my consideration is as to whether aforesaid can be a ground for placing an elected member under suspension. The FIR was registered on the allegation that petitioner demanded a sum of Rs.10,000/- from the complainant Shri Rajmal Soni. The question for my consideration is as to whether aforesaid can be a ground for placing an elected member under suspension. For ready reference, Section 39(6) of the Act of 2009 is quoted hereunder: “39(6) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the State Government may place under suspension a member against whom proceedings have been commenced under this section until the conclusion of the inquiry and the passing of the final order and the member so suspended shall not be entitled to take part in any proceedings of the Municipality or otherwise perform the duties of a member thereof.” 6. The provision aforesaid gives powers to the Government to place an elected member under suspension but it can be when proceedings have been commenced under Section 39 of the Act of 2009. It is not case of the State Government that proceedings under Section 39 of the Act of 2009 have been commenced. In view of the above, provision of Section 39(6) of the Act of 2009 could not have been invoked by the respondents so as to place an elected member under suspension. It cannot be merely on registration of FIR or if a person remains behind bars for more than 48 hours. The suspension of a government employee is permissible, rather, it is automatic when he/she remains behind bars for more than 48 hours. The similar provision does not exist under the Act of 2009 thus impugned order dated 19th December, 2016 is set aside. 7. The writ petition is allowed with the aforesaid. It is, however, made clear that if respondents intend to take action as per provisions of the Act of 2009 or any other provision, this judgment would not come in their way for the aforesaid.