JUDGMENT : Achintya Malla Bujor Barua, J. Heard Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel and Mr. Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General for the State of Arunachal Pradesh appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, being the Speaker of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and the Secretary of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Mr. A. Apang, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 being the Election Commission of India, Mr. R.K. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 4, 10, 18, 20, 21 to 24, 26 to 32 and 34 to 41, Mr. B. Chahar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 7 to 17 and Mr. T.T. Tara, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 5, 6, 19, 25, 33, 42, 43 and 45. 2. The 6th Legislative Assembly of the State of Arunachal Pradesh was constituted as per the Assembly Election held in April 2014. The Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly comprises of 60 seats and out of the same, in the Election held in April 2014, 42 members were from the Indian National Congress ('INC'), whereas 11 members were from Bharatiya Janata Party ('BJP'), 5 members were from Peoples Party of Arunachal Pradesh ('PPA') and 2 members were from Independent. 3. After the election, Mr. Nabam Tuki was elected as the leader of the INC Legislature Party and accordingly was invited to form the Government and was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 4. On 19.12.2014, 5 PPA MLA's merged with the INC, thereby increasing the strength of INC in the house to 47 members. It is noted that when the 5 PPA MLA's merged with the INC on 19.12.2014, the required information of change in party affiliation was provided to the Speaker of the Assembly and the Speaker had caused the publication of the information in the Bulletin Part-II of the Arunachal Legislative Assembly. 5. In September, 2015, certain dissident activities took place within the INC, which ultimately resulted in some INC MLAs having merged with the PPA and late Kalikho Pul on being elected as the leader of the PPA Legislature Party with the support of 11 BJP and 2 Independent MLAs, was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State of Arunachal Pradesh on 19.2.2016. Prior to it, there were certain political activities resulting in the Governor of the State proroguing the sitting of the Assembly, which was assailed by the then Speaker in a writ petition, which ultimately resulted in the judgment and order dated 14.7.2016 of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Nabam Rebia v. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. By the said judgment, a status quo ante of the INC Government led by Mr. Nabam Tuki was restored. 6. On 19.7.2016, Mr. Pema Khandu was elected as the leader of the Legislature Party of the INC and he was sworn as the Chief Minister of the State with the support of 47 INC MLA's. 7. On 16.9.2016, a joint meeting of the INC Legislature Party Arunachal Pradesh in the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and the other members of the INC was held in the office of the Chief Minister at the Chief Minister's Secretariat at 10.00 a.m. As per the minutes of the said meeting of 16.9.2016, the joint meeting was chaired by Mr. Pema Khandu, the Chief Minister and leader of the INC Legislature Party, which was attended by leaders, office bearers and the workers of the INC and out of the 44 INC MLAs, 43 were present. The minutes stated that the 43 MLAs constituted ?rd of the total strength of the members of the INC Legislature Party in the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, thereby enabling the claimants therein to go for a merger with the PPA, which according to them would be a protection against disqualification under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. By stating the reason as to why such merger would be benefited, the leaders, office bearers and the workers of the INC and the members of the INC Legislature Party, who were present in the meeting, took an unanimous resolution to merge the INC Arunachal Pradesh with the PPA. By stating the reason as to why such merger would be benefited, the leaders, office bearers and the workers of the INC and the members of the INC Legislature Party, who were present in the meeting, took an unanimous resolution to merge the INC Arunachal Pradesh with the PPA. The resolution taken in the said meeting of 16.9.2016 is as follows : "The leaders, Office bearers and workers of the Indian National Congress in Arunachal Pradesh and the members of the Legislature Party of the Indian National Congress in the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly whose number is two thirds of the said Legislature Party, as assembled here at the Office of the Chief Minister, Chief Minister Secretariat, Itanagar, Papum pare district, Arunachal Pradesh at 10.00 a.m. on 16.9.2016, hereby resolve to merge the Indian National Congress, Arunachal Pradesh with the PPA (People's Party Of Arunachal) in terms of paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India." 8. Accordingly, the minute reveals that 43 MLAs of the INC and 246 leaders/office bearers/workers of the INC Arunachal Pradesh had also affixed their signatures to the minutes, although the 246 leaders/office bearers/workers had put their signatures in different groups in separate sheets of paper. 9. The said resolution of the INC and the INC Legislature Party, Arunachal Pradesh was communicated by Mr. Pema Khandu, Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh and leader of the INC Legislature Party to Mr. Kamen Ringu, Chairman of the Central Committee of PPA by letter No. CLP/2/2016/01 dated 16.9.2016. Consequent thereof, a meeting of the PPA was held at Itanagar on 16.9.2016 for considering the proposal of the INC Arunachal Pradesh for merger with PPA and by its resolution, had decided to accept the proposal of the merger. Accordingly, the following resolution was taken : "The PPA (People's Party of Arunachal) in Arunachal Pradesh at the meeting at Itanagar held on the 16.9.2016, unanimously approves the proposal of the Indian National Congress, Arunachal Pradesh to merge with the PPA (People's Party of Arunachal) as conveyed through the letter No. CLP/2/2016/01 dated 16.9.2016 of Shri Pema Khandu, the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh and CLP Leader of Arunachal Pradesh Sixth Legislative Assembly." 10. In affirmation of the resolution approving the merger of the INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA, 8 PPA functionaries along with their designations had affixed their signatures to the same. 11. In affirmation of the resolution approving the merger of the INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA, 8 PPA functionaries along with their designations had affixed their signatures to the same. 11. The said resolution of the PPA on being forwarded to Mr. Pema Khandu, Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh and leader of the INC Legislature Party in Arunachal Pradesh, a meeting of the PPA Legislature Party in the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly was held after the said approval of the merger of the INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA. 12. The said meeting records that consequent upon the proposal of the INC Arunachal Pradesh to merge with PPA as per resolution dated 16.9.2016 of the INC and the approval of the proposal by the PPA on 16.9.2016 and with 43 erstwhile INC MLA's signing their party change information in Form-III of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on ground of defection) Rules, 1987 ('Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987'), the merger of INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA got consummated. Accordingly, a meeting of the members of the Legislature Party of the PPA was held at the Chief Minister's office, Itanagar at 12 noon on 16.9.2016, which was chaired by Mr. Pema Khandu. In the said meeting, the following resolution was taken : "We the undersigned members of the Legislature Party of the PPA (People's Party of Arunachal) in the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly assembled at Chief Minister's private residence at Itanagar at 12 noon on 16.9.2016 hereby elect Shri Pema Khandu, the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh & now a PPA (People's Party of Arunachal) MLA, to be the leader of the PPA (People's Party of Arunachal) Legislature Party in the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly with effect from 16th September, 2016." 13. In the said resolution, the 43 members of the Legislature Party of the PPA had affixed their signatures. Mr. Pema Khandu, Chief Minister by describing himself also to be the leader of the PPA Legislature Party of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly made a communication No. CM/01/2016 dated 16.9.2016 to the Speaker Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, enclosing a claim of merger of the INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA for being taken on record of the Legislative Assembly Secretariat. Pema Khandu, Chief Minister by describing himself also to be the leader of the PPA Legislature Party of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly made a communication No. CM/01/2016 dated 16.9.2016 to the Speaker Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, enclosing a claim of merger of the INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA for being taken on record of the Legislative Assembly Secretariat. The enclosed claim of merger dated 16.9.2016 contained the minutes of the joint meeting of the INC Arunachal Pradesh proposing the merger of INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA, the minutes of the meeting dated 16.9.2016 of the Executive Committee of PPA approving the merger, minutes of the meeting dated 16.9.2016 of the Legislature Party of the PPA electing Mr. Pema Khandu as the Legislature Party leader of PPA in the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly w.e.f. 16.9.2016, Form-I under rule 3 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 intimating the names and other details of the members of the Legislature Party of PPA in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly after such merger as signed by the leader of the Legislature Party of PPA and Form-III of the 43 INC MLA's, informing about the change in party affiliation and signed by each of them. 14. By the said claim of merger, which was signed by the 43 MLA's, the Speaker was requested to publish a summary of the information filed by the 43 PPA MLA's, in Form-III, in the Bulletin Part-II of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The claim of merger further made a request to the Speaker to hear the 43 MLA's in case any petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India and the Rules framed there under is filed against any of the 43 MLA's, so that the 43 MLA's can invoke the claim of merger as a defence against any disqualification. Mr. Pema Khandu as the Chief Minister and leader of the PPA Legislature Party also made a communication dated 16.9.2016 to the Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly informing that as required under rule 3 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987, information in Form-I of all the 43 members of the PPA Legislature Party in the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly was being furnished, for being entered in the register maintained under rule 5 of the said Rules and accordingly, the Form-I information was enclosed. 15. 15. By a similar communication addressed to the Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Mr. Pema Khandu by referring himself to be the Chief Minister and Leader of the Legislature Party of PPA, furnished the information given by the 43 members in Form-III for being published in the Bulletin Part-II under rule 4 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 by enclosing the same. 16. On a perusal of one such Form-III information, which is in respect of Mr. Pema Khandu, it is noticed that in clause 6 of the Form, the party affiliation as on the date of election was shown as INC and as on the date of signing the Form-III, it was shown as PPA with a further declaration that the information provided is true and correct and that in the event of any change in the information provided, the signatory to the Form-III undertakes to intimidate the Speaker immediately. 17. The Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly accordingly puts up a "Notes and Order" by stating the subject to be claim of merger of INC with PPA in File No. LA/LEG-46/2016/Vol-1. In the said Notes and Order, the Secretary stated that at about 13 hrs. on 16.9.2016 Mr. Pema Khandu Chief Minister along with 42 other MLA's personally presented a claim of merger of INC MLAs with PPA. It further stated that the claim was supported by the aforementioned 5 documents, being the minutes of the INC proposing the merger, minutes of the PPA approving the proposed merger, minutes of the PPA MLA's electing Mr. Pema Khandu as the leader of the PPA Legislature Party, Form-I of Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 and the Form-III of the 43 MLA's. The Secretary further stated that he had checked the papers and found them in order and accordingly submits the same for the orders of the Speaker. 18. The Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly accordingly passes the following order : "1. I have also gone through the papers. 2. Secretary may please publish the information given in Form-III by 43 MLAs in Bulletin Part-II dated 16.9.2016 and also publish in Gazette. 3. As there is no procedure for recognizing merger by Speaker under the anti-defection law, in view of their party change information in Form III given by the MLAs and information given in Form I given by the Leader of the Legislature Party, they will be shown as PPA MLAs. 3. As there is no procedure for recognizing merger by Speaker under the anti-defection law, in view of their party change information in Form III given by the MLAs and information given in Form I given by the Leader of the Legislature Party, they will be shown as PPA MLAs. Accordingly, no separate order recognizing merger may be issued. This claim however will be taken as defence against disqualification in a petition under the Tenth Schedule whenever filed." 19. Accordingly, the Bulletin Part-II of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly under the heading Matters for General Information dated 16.9.2016 was published. In the Bulletin, it was stated that the summary of the information filed by the 43 members of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly as on in Form-III of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 is published for the information of all members. In the Bulletin Part-II in the column party affiliation, Mr. Pema Khandu was shown to be a INC as on the date of election and as on the date of filing fresh Form-III on 16.9.2016, he was shown as PPA. Similarly, in respect of the other 42 MLA's also, the information as to their party affiliation on the date of election and their party affiliation as on the date of filing fresh Form-III on 16.9.2016 were shown. Subsequently, the revised Bulletin Part-II of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly dated 19.9.2016 was also published, wherein there were some rectification of the information of the members. 20. It is also noticed that the Bulletin Part-II publication was forwarded to 43 different authorities, including the Government Press at Naharlagun with a request to publish it in the Extraordinary Gazette. 21. Subsequent thereto, Mr. 20. It is also noticed that the Bulletin Part-II publication was forwarded to 43 different authorities, including the Government Press at Naharlagun with a request to publish it in the Extraordinary Gazette. 21. Subsequent thereto, Mr. Temsi Tahar, Joint Secretary of the Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee filed a petition under Article 191(2) of the Constitution of India read with clause 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India and the Arunachal Disqualification rules, 1987/2003 with a prayer that the respondents therein being the 42 numbers of MLAs, who were earlier elected under the party affiliation of the INC and subsequently changed the party affiliation to PPA be declared to be disqualified from being a member of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly in terms of Article 191(2) of the Constitution of India and clause 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India and the Assembly seat of the corresponding Assembly Constituency be declared to be vacant. 22. In the aforesaid factual background, this writ petition has been preferred by one Sri Padi Richo, who in paragraph 2 of the writ petition describes himself to be the President of the Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee, praying for a writ in the nature of certiorari for setting aside the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, showing the 43 MLAs as MLAs of PPA and also the Bulletin Part-II dated 16.9.2016 under Memo Nos.26 and 27, wherein 43 MLA's of INC have been shown as MLA's of PPA and declare the same as illegal and unconstitutional. 23. Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner contended that : (i) After receiving the information as regards the merger of the INC, Arunachal Pradesh with the PPA, the Speaker ought to have kept the information on record and should not have ordered for its publication. As a corollary, Mr. 23. Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner contended that : (i) After receiving the information as regards the merger of the INC, Arunachal Pradesh with the PPA, the Speaker ought to have kept the information on record and should not have ordered for its publication. As a corollary, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel contended that keeping on record means keeping it in the file and that the publication of the summary of the change of the party position has a great implication and further that by publishing the information of the change in party affiliation, the Speaker had recognized the merger as claimed by the 43 MLA's. (ii) The Speaker himself being a signatory to the resolution for merger, could not have been a judge in his own cause to recognize the merger and by doing so, the Speaker had violated the principle of natural justice. Further, democracy being the basic feature of the Constitution of India, multiple party system is an inherent and basic structure thereof and when the persons are elected by the means of a political party, the concerned political party, being the INC in the present case, is entitled to at least a notice before the change of party position had been published and accordingly, the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker ordering such publication has been made in violation of the principle of natural justice. (iii) Rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 does not empower the Speaker to cause the publication of subsequent change in party position by the MLAs and such publication only refers to the initial publication that may be made immediately after the election, where the respective candidates are issued a certificate of being elected and as such, the order of the Speaker of 16.9.2016 to publish the information is without jurisdiction. As a corollary to the said contention, it has been contended by Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel that the jurisdiction of the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule gets invoked only upon a disqualification petition being filed under rule 6 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 and prior to such disqualification petition being filed, the speaker has no jurisdiction to order for the publication of the information relating to change in party. A further corollary to the said contention raised by Mr. A further corollary to the said contention raised by Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel is that the order of the Speaker recognizing the change in party position and merger is, therefore, also without any jurisdiction and premature inasmuch as, the petition for disqualification was filed only on 14.10.2016. (iv) Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner also raised a contention that the resolutions of the INC proposing the merger and the PPA accepting the merger and the subsequent resolution of the PPA Legislature Party after the merger to elect Mr. Pema Khandu as the Chief Minister are all false and fabricated and that no such meeting of the INC, Arunachal Pradesh and Legislature Party of the INC in the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, minutes of the Executive Committee of the PPA as well as the Joint Meeting of the Legislature Party of PPA in the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly had taken place on 16.9.2016 and from the manner in which such meetings have been described to have been taken place is also an indication that such meetings not only have not taken place, but also could not have taken place in the manner stated therein. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel by relying upon the words " they will be shown as PPA MLA's" appearing in the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker contended that the expression they will be shown as PPA MLA's gives a clear indication that the Speaker had taken a decision on the recognition of the merger and have recognized the 43 MLA's as PPA MLA's. 24. Mr. Dwivedi and Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior counsel and learned Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, respectively, on the other hand contended that the petitioner cannot isolate a few words from the order dated 16.9.2016 and draw a conclusion that the Speaker had taken a decision and had recognized the merger by showing the 43 MLA's as PPA MLA's. To arrive at a true purport of the order of the Speaker, it is necessary to read the whole of the order and not rely upon a few isolated words. It was contended that when the whole order of 16.9.2016 is read, it is clear that the Speaker indicated that there was a claim by 43 MLA's that they have changed their party affiliation to that of PPA and therefore, such information provided by the 43 MLA's in Form-III be shown in the Bulletin Part-II and also be published in the Gazette by further providing that no separate order recognizing the merger be issued. It was their contention that on a reading of the entire order of 16.9.2016, it cannot be concluded that the Speaker had taken a decision and had recognized the merger. 25. Mr. R.K. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.4 and others contended that : (i) The writ petitioner has a misconception as to what the Speaker did on 16.9.2016 and accordingly contended that in order to arrive at the order dated 16.9.2016, the Speaker was neither requested nor he had decided on the question as to whether the 43 INC MLA's had merged with the PPA and had merely provided that the claim of merger will be taken up as a defence when a petition for disqualification is filed. The learned senior counsel raised a question as to what would have happened if no disqualification petition is filed and whether in such event also the order of 16.9.2016 of the Speaker would be construed to be an order deciding on the merger of the aforesaid MLA's. (ii) The requirement of rule 3 and 4 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 are pre-adjudicatory procedures and even if there is no disqualification petition, the requirement of rule 3 and 4 has to be complied with. As a corollary, it is the contention that the order of the Speaker of 16.9.2016 requiring to show the 43 MLA's as PPA MLA's is a consequence of the pre-adjudicatory requirement of the Rules and the same is not a decision of the Speaker to recognize the merger. Further, the respondent MLAs while giving the information to the Speaker, did not seek for any adjudication and on the other hand, there was a request to keep the information as a caveat for a defence in the event of there being a disqualification petition. (iii) The Speaker on 16.9.2016 had neither accepted the merger nor did he decide the validity or existence of a merger and nor was any verification done. (iii) The Speaker on 16.9.2016 had neither accepted the merger nor did he decide the validity or existence of a merger and nor was any verification done. The Speaker merely stated that as per the claim, the 43 MLA's should be shown as PPA MLA's by specifically stating that it is only a claim and which is to be treated as a defence in the event of a petition for disqualification. (iv) The ratio of the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Rajendra Singh Rana and Others v. Swami Prasad Maury a and Others, 2007 (2) SCR 591 is not applicable in the present writ petition inasmuch as, in Shri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), the Speaker had a disqualification petition before him, but without deciding the disqualification petition, had accepted the split upon verification and proceeded to decide the merger. In the instant case, on 16.9.2016, when the order was passed by the Speaker to show the 43 MLA's to be PPA MLA's, there was no disqualification petition pending before him and as such, the law laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court to the effect that the Speaker is dis-entitled to decide the merger without deciding the disqualification petition is inapplicable in the present case. (v) The speaker by requiring the information to be published in the Bulletin Part-II and Incorporating it in the register of the Assembly had in fact complied it with the principle of natural justice so as to give an opportunity to anyone, who seeks for a hearing on the matter by filing a petition for disqualification, upon which the question of merger would also be decided. (vi) As regards the contention of the petitioner that the conduct of the Speaker in passing the order dated 16.9.2016 requiring to show the 43 MLA's as PPA MLA's is hit by the principle of nemo judex in causa sua, inasmuch as, the Speaker himself being the signatory had also acted as a judge in his own cause is inapplicable in the present case as under the Constitutional scheme, the Speaker is the only authority for the purpose and therefore, he is protected by the Doctrine of Necessity and that the said principle of nemo judex in causa sua cannot stand in isolation. (vii) In paragraphs 14, 20 and 21 of the petition for disqualification that has been filed before the Speaker, there are specific averments that the Speaker had not accepted the merger. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner in the present writ petition that the order dated 16.9.2016 shows that the Speaker had taken a decision and had recognized the merger is self contradictory to the stand of the same party in the petition for disqualification and such conflicting stand also gives an indication that in the order dated 16.9.2016, the Speaker had neither taken a decision nor had recognized the merger. 26. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General for the State of Arunachal Pradesh appearing for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 contended that : (i) Any member of the Assembly when indulges in the act of leaving one political party and joining another, has the obligation under the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 to inform the Speaker and in turn the Speaker has a further obligation to publish such information as provided to him in Form-III in the Bulletin Part-II and also the Gazette so as to enable all other persons having interest in the matter to know that there is a claim of party change by the concerned members of the Assembly. The Speaker for a proper functioning of the house has to know the party affiliation of the members of the Assembly and also to inform all other members about such affiliation and hence, there is need for a publication of any such information about change of party affiliation. (ii) The information published by the Speaker about party affiliation is an official publication which is required in the public interest and further there is no such law which prohibits the Speaker from undertaking such publication. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General contended that if there is any restriction in the publication and all such information of party change is to be merely kept in the record and not made known to the public, the same would result in a chaos. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General contended that if there is any restriction in the publication and all such information of party change is to be merely kept in the record and not made known to the public, the same would result in a chaos. (iii) The learned Advocate General also raised a contention that there is no plea from any quarter that the information provided in Form-III were incorrect information or that the signatories to such Form-III had taken a plea that they had not signed the form in the manner it was presented and further that the official publication is a must to inform the people about such change. (iv) It was also the contention that the order of 16.9.2016 of the Speaker is neither an approval, nor an acceptance of the merger and all that the order indicates is the party affiliation as it stood at the time of filing of the earlier Form-III and as it stands on the given day, and the order as well as the publication of the claim of party change is a mere information about the position of the party affiliation, as claimed, at the time of filing of the Form-III. It was also contended that there is no indication in the record to show that 43 MLA's had anywhere stated that the information made in the Bulletin Part-II and published in the Gazette are incorrect information and the corrigendum of 16.9.2016 is merely a correction of the earlier information of 16.9.2016 upon certain mistakes therein being noticed. (v) One of the requirement to publish the information under rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 is to give effect to para 2 of the Tenth Schedule and such publication would sub-serve the object of paragraph 2. The interest of the Tenth Schedule would be sub-served if the information is published and on the contrary by keeping the information on record, without publishing the same, would not sub serve the purpose of the Tenth Schedule. The interest of the Tenth Schedule would be sub-served if the information is published and on the contrary by keeping the information on record, without publishing the same, would not sub serve the purpose of the Tenth Schedule. The interpretation of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 as regards the requirement of publishing the information of the claim of party change cannot be made in a manner so as to take away the right of a public to know the appropriate party affiliation for the purpose of filing of an application under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule read with rule 6 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987. (vi) Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General also contended that under the provisions of Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India, no person shall be liable in respect of any publication by or under the authority of a House of the Legislature of any report, paper, votes or proceedings and therefore, the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker requiring the publication of the information of the change in party affiliation of the 43 MLAs also cannot be questioned in any proceeding in any court. According to the learned Advocate General, expression no person means all the persons involved in the process of the publication, meaning thereby starting from the authority of the House, which in the view of the learned Advocate General is the Speaker up to the person involved in the actual printing for the purpose of publication. (vii) Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General also contended that it is incumbent on the Speaker to cause a publication of the party affiliation on a given day, as informed to him by the members, so as to enable the Speaker to make allotment of seats for conducting the business of the House. The learned Advocate General on the basis of record available in the Secretariat of the Speaker contended that when on an earlier occasion, 5 PPA MLAs had joined the congress on 19.12.2014, the said information given by the five PPA MLAs in Form-III was also published in Part-II Bulletin as well as in the Gazette, but no such objection as raised by the members of the INC at that relevant point of time by stating that the publication of the information had resulted in recognition of the merger of the five PPA MLAs. 27. Mr. 27. Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in his reply contended that : (i) The Speaker in his order dated 16.9.2016 by providing that the 43 MLAs be shown as PPA MLAs has assumed the power on himself to show them as PPA MLAs, meaning thereby that he had recognized them as PPA MLAs, inasmuch as, the meaning of the word shown and recognition, according to the learned senior counsel has the same meaning. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the word 'shown' has a different meaning from that of the word treat and therefore a more appropriate wording ought to have been "treat them as PPA MLAs." (ii) The learned senior counsel also raised a question as to from where does the Speaker gets the power to show the 43 MLAs as PPA, as no such power is available either in the Tenth Schedule or in the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 as well as under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business ('Business Rules'), which according to the learned senior counsel has been admitted by the respondent No.4 in page 11 of their affidavit in opposition. (iii) Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel also reiterated that the application of rule 4 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 has its applicability only in the initial stage after election and it has no role to play subsequently. (iv) It is contended that a second publication can be made in the Bulletin only under rule 8(3), i.e., after the disposal of the disqualification petition by the Speaker. Accordingly, it is contended that the publication in the Bulletin can be made only in two stages, i.e., immediately after the election and after the decision as regards the disqualification and the publication under the said Rules has no application at any other intermediate stage. As a MLA takes oath only once, i.e., under rule 96 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and section 152 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, which is at the beginning and taken under Form VII(B) of Schedule-II, there is no further scope for the Speaker to record any change of party affiliation thereafter and that any information of party change has to be obtained only from the media and not through a publication of the Speaker. (v) The publication of a Bulletin under rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 is done by the Secretary under the instruction of the Speaker and any such subsequent publication would amount to an amendment of the original publication under rule 4(3) and the same, under the law cannot be done. (vi) Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel also raised a contention that the Bulletin and Bulletin Part-II are two different documents and has no relationship with each other and therefore, rule 321 of the Business Rules providing for printing a publication of Assembly papers, which also includes the bulletin, is not attracted in the present case and further that disqualification proceedings not a part of the Assembly proceeding. 28. Mr. Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, learned counsel also appearing along with Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner had contended that: (i) Rule 8(1)(a) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 when applied to interpret rule 4 of the said Rules, it is noticed that the political position of the parties at the time of initiation of the House is to be maintained for maintenance of the register. (ii) The Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 has to be taken as a Code of itself and no other rules can be taken into consideration for interpreting any provision of the said disqualification rules. (iii) Further it was also contended that there is no scope of reading into Tenth Schedule, all the powers of the Speaker, which he otherwise has under the Constitution of India. 29. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General in the form of a clarification had contended that if Form-III is not applicable for providing the information of any change in the party affiliation, in such event, any such subsequent change of party position is not required to be informed to the Speaker by the members of the Assembly. 30. Mr. R.K. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the respondent No.4 further makes a clarificatory contention that para 8(c) of the Tenth Schedule which provides for the reports, which a political party shall furnish with regard to admission to such political party of any member of the house, also gives an indication that such report includes subsequent change of party affiliation by a member. The learned senior counsel also contended that a decision involves a determination and it is a concluded opinion, but in the instant case, the order of the Speaker requiring the 43 MLAs to be shown as PPA MLAs is not a concluded opinion of the Speaker. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel also contended that the Tenth Schedule is not a complete code and it is in fact a part of the procedure of the House. 31. Mr. T.T. Tara, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 5, 6, 19, 20, 23, 25, 42, 43, 44 and 45 stated that the party position in the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly as on 2.3.2016 was INC-45, BJP-11, Independent-2 and Vacant-2. But on 30.3.2016, 30 members of the INC merged with PPA and all the MLAs and leader had filed the required information in Form-III and hence, a question has arisen as to whether these 30 MLAs remain as INC MLAs or they were PPA MLAs. The said information was not made available even under the Right to Information Act of 2005. 32. Mr. A. Apang, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 being the Election Commission of India contended that the Election Commission had merely been made a formal party and they have no contention of their own to be raised as regards the subject-matter in dispute involved in the present writ petition. 33. In the aforesaid premises, Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in order to substantiate his contention has referred to the minutes of the INC dated 16.9.2016, the minutes of the Executive Committee of the PPA dated 16.9.2016, the minutes of the meeting of the PPA MLAs dated 16.9.2016 as well as the Form-I and Form-III information provided by the MLA's on 16.9.2016. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in order to substantiate his contention has referred to the minutes of the INC dated 16.9.2016, the minutes of the Executive Committee of the PPA dated 16.9.2016, the minutes of the meeting of the PPA MLAs dated 16.9.2016 as well as the Form-I and Form-III information provided by the MLA's on 16.9.2016. By referring to the minutes of the INC, the learned senior counsel pointed out that the said meeting was held at 10.00 a.m. on 16.9.2016 in the office of the Chief Minister at the Chief Minister's Secretariat, Itanagar, whereas the meeting of the Executive Committee of the PPA was held thereafter and at 12 noon, the meeting of the PPA MLAs were held on 16.9.2016 in the office of the Chief Minister at Itanagar and thereafter the Form-I and Form-III information were provided to the Speaker and the note was prepared for the Speaker by the Speaker Secretariat at 1.00 p.m. on 16.9.2016. By referring to the time and place where the meeting of the INC MLAs and the meeting of the PPA MLAs had taken place with further reference that thereafter the information in Form-I and Form-III were provided to the Speaker at Naharlagun and at 1.00 p.m. the Speaker Secretariat had prepared the note, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the sequence of events could not have taken place in the manner stated therein. He raised an apprehension that the meeting of the PPA MLAs having taken place at 12 noon in the Chief Minister's office, it could not have been possible for the Chief Minister thereafter to provide the information in Form-I and Form-III at the Speaker Secretariat at Naharlagun in order to enable the Speaker Secretariat to prepare the note for the Speaker at 1.00 p.m. and it is more so considering the traffic situation between Itanagar and Naharlagun. Mr. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel also raised an apprehension that the INC meeting which was attended by 43 MLAs and 246 leader/office bearers of the INC, which was held in the Chief Minister's office at the Secretariat at Itanagar, could not have been taken place at the Chief Minister's Office at Itanagar, as it cannot house so many people at a time and secondly, the record pertaining to the entry of people to the Chief Minister's Office on the said day also does not reveal that 43 MLAs and 246 leaders/office bearers of the INC had attended the meeting. 34. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel also referred to the minutes of the INC, which is annexed as Annexure A to the writ petition and submitted that paragraph 8 of the said minutes repeatedly keeps on appearing in the minutes and it is not that the signatures of all the 246 leaders and workers were put after the recording of paragraph 8 of the minutes. By saying so, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel made a suggestion that perhaps the paragraph 8 of the minutes was not signed in course of the meeting, but was signed elsewhere and subsequently joined to the minutes. 35. Accordingly, on the basis of the aforesaid two stands, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel made a submission that the said minutes of the 43 INC MLAs and 246 leaders and workers of the INC had not taken place in the manner it is stated to have taken place in the minutes. Hence, it was the submission that in fact, no such meeting had taken place on 16.9.2016 and the entire process of merger of the 43 INC MLAs with the PPA is a fictitious affair. 36. Accordingly, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel sought to make out a case that even though subsequently, the Chief Minister may have provided the Speaker Secretariat with the Form-I and Form-III information of the 43 MLAs, the Speaker ought to have made an enquiry of the same by issuing at least a notice to the INC authorities and only upon verification of the information, the order dated 16.9.2016 ought to have been ordered for its publication in the Bulletin Part-II and the Gazette by showing the 43 MLAs as PPA MLAs. 37. Mr. 37. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel further submitted that all the 43 MLAs, who were shown to be PPA MLAs by the order of the Speaker dated 16.9.2016, were elected to the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly on the basis of the party ticket of the INC. It is submitted that in a multi-party democratic system, the party affiliation is a paramount importance inasmuch as the electorate elects its representative on the basis of the party manifesto and choice for a particular party and therefore, when subsequent to the election, there is a change in the party position by the elected representative, the original party in whose party ticket such representative had got elected, has a right to be at least given an opportunity of hearing and explaining as regards the claim of party change. As the entire effort of getting elected is through the party mechanism, which again is on the basis of the preference of the party before the electorate, any subsequent change of party affiliation by the elected representative causes an injury to the party in whose ticket such representative had got elected. Therefore, from the said perspective also, the INC has the right of being given an opportunity to explain as regards the claim of the 43 INC MLAs for a change in party affiliation to that of PPA MLAs. 38. To substantiate the same, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel also asserts that the mandate having been given by the people in favour of the INC for election of the representative, the Speaker does not have any power to change the party position by giving membership to the PPA as sought to be done by the order dated 16.9.2016. With regards to the relevance of the political party in whose party ticket a particular representative gets elected through the electorate, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana and Others, 2006 (11) SCC 1 . Paragraph 69 of the said judgment has been relied upon wherein it was provided that if the Speaker without being satisfied even prima-facie about the genuineness and bona fides of the claim of split, has to accept it, the acceptance of such a broad proposition would defeat the object of defection law and accordingly it was held that mere making of a claim is not sufficient. Mr. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel also relied upon paragraph 72, wherein it was provided that if a member is set up by a national party, it would be unnecessary to say that events at national level have no concern to decide whether there is a split or not and in case a member is put up by a national political party, it is split in that party which is of relevant consideration and not a split of that political party at the State level. 39. Further reliance had been made to the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Kihoto Hallohan v. Zachillhu and Others, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 641. Reliance had been made to the following paragraphs : (i) In paragraph 9 wherein the object underlining the provisions of the Tenth Schedule was examined and held that the object is to curb the evil of political defections motivated by lure of office or other similar considerations which endanger the foundations of our democracy. (ii) In paragraph 13 wherein it is provided that the Tenth Schedule gives recognition to the role of political parties in the political process and a political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the election on the basis of such programme and the person, who gets elected as a candidate set up by a political party is so elected on the basis of the programme of that political party. Further, if a person after the election changes his affiliation and leaves the political party, which had set him up as a candidate at the election, then he should give up his membership of the Legislature and go back before the electorate. (iii) In paragraph 42 it was provided that democracy is the basic feature of the Constitution and so there is a need to protect and sustain the purity of the electoral process. (iv) In paragraph 44 it was provided that a political party functions on the strength of shared beliefs of its political stability and social utility and depends on such shared beliefs and concerted action of its members in furtherance of those commonly held principles. (iv) In paragraph 44 it was provided that a political party functions on the strength of shared beliefs of its political stability and social utility and depends on such shared beliefs and concerted action of its members in furtherance of those commonly held principles. It was also provided that any freedom of its members to vote as they please independently of the political party's declared policies will not only embarrass its public image and popularity but also underline public confidence in which in the ultimate analysis is the source of its sustenance. 40. Reliance had also been made to the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi and Others, 1985 (4) SCC 628 . Reference had been made to paragraph 10 of the said judgment, wherein the hon'ble Supreme Court viewed that till recently, the Constitution did not expressly refer to the existence of political parties, but their existence is implicit in the nature of democratic form of Government, which our country has adopted. The use of symbol gives rise to a unifying effect amongst the people with common political and economic programme. The political parties have to be there, if the present system of Government should succeed and the chasm of dividing the political parties should be so profound that a change of administration would in fact be a revolution disguised under a constitutional procedure. 41. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel also relied on the decision of the Full Bench of the hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court rendered in Prakash Singh Badal and Others v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 263. Reliance had been placed on paragraph 23, wherein it is provided that political parties exist because the people wish to see the Government of the country carried on according to a particular policy. The electors, therefore, do not vote for a candidate but usually for a party with some exception here and there. A successful candidate is almost invariably returned to Parliament not because of his personality nor because of his judgment and capacity, but because of his party label. 42. The electors, therefore, do not vote for a candidate but usually for a party with some exception here and there. A successful candidate is almost invariably returned to Parliament not because of his personality nor because of his judgment and capacity, but because of his party label. 42. Further reference has been made to the judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Kuldip Nayar and Others v. Union of India and Others, (2006) 7 SCC 1 : (i) In paragraph 382, it is provided that the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution recognises the importance of the political parties in our democratic setup, especially when dealing with Members of the Houses of Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies or Councils. (ii) In paragraph 451, it is provided that it cannot be forgotten that the existence of political parties is an essential feature of our parliamentary democracy and that it can be a matter of concern for the Parliament if it finds that electors were resorting to cross-voting under the garb of conscience voting and flouting party discipline in the name of secrecy of voting. Such cross voting would weaken the party discipline over the errant legislators and that political parties are sine qua non of parliamentary democracy in our country. (iii) In paragraph 452, it is provided that parliamentary democracy and multi-party system are an inherent part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. (iv) In paragraph 462, it has been again reiterated that the multi-party democracy is a necessary part of the basic structure of the Constitution. 43. By placing reliance on the aforesaid provisions as laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the multi-party democratic system being the basic feature of the Indian Constitution, any claim of change of party affiliation by any of the elected legislators requires that the original party in whose ticket such legislators had got elected, are entitled to a notice before the Speaker recognizes and decides to show such Legislatures as MLA's of the party, to which they claimed their change. 44. With regard to the contention that the Speaker did not have the jurisdiction or authority of law to take a decision and recognize the 43 INC MLA's to be PPA MLA's by providing in the order dated 16.9.2016 to show the 43 MLA's to be PPA MLA's, Mr. 44. With regard to the contention that the Speaker did not have the jurisdiction or authority of law to take a decision and recognize the 43 INC MLA's to be PPA MLA's by providing in the order dated 16.9.2016 to show the 43 MLA's to be PPA MLA's, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Shri Rajendra Singh Rana and Others v. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others, 2007 (2) SCR 591, wherein - (i) In paragraph 14, it was observed that the Speaker had not passed any order on the application for disqualification of the 13 MLA's made by Maurya, the leader of the B.S.P. Legislative Party in terms of paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule, but proceeded to pass an order on the petition filed by 37 MLA's before him, claiming that there has been a split in the B.S.P. and that they constitute ?rd of the Legislature Party, which had 109 members. (ii) In paragraph 16 it had been recorded that Shri Maurya, the leader of the Legislature B.S.P. had filed a petition before the Speaker seeking disqualification of 13 members on the ground that they had voluntarily left B.S.P, which was recognized by the Election Commission as a national party. It was while the said proceeding was pending that on 6.9.2003, an application for recognition of the split was moved by 37 MLA's before the Speaker. (iii) In paragraph 17, it had been recorded that it is on this application dated 6.9.2003 for recognition of the split that the Speaker had passed an order in the same evening and the said order is the subject-matter of challenge in the writ petition before the High Court. Further, the Speaker had overruled the argument that only 13 MLAs had initially quit the original political party and therefore, they should be disqualified and the others subsequently joining them would not improve the position. The Speaker proceeded to observe that he had to decide the question of disqualification of the 13 MLAs as raised by Shri Maurya by functioning as a Tribunal and he would take a decision thereon at the appropriate time. Accordingly the split of the 37 members was recognized by the Speaker. The Speaker proceeded to observe that he had to decide the question of disqualification of the 13 MLAs as raised by Shri Maurya by functioning as a Tribunal and he would take a decision thereon at the appropriate time. Accordingly the split of the 37 members was recognized by the Speaker. (iv) In paragraph 23, the submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner was recorded that when an independent decision is purported to be taken by the Speaker on the question of split alone, such decision would be outside the purview of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. The said submission was made on the factual background that the Speaker had not decided the application for disqualification filed against the 13 MLAs, whereas he had proceeded to decide the application made by 37 members filed subsequently for recognizing them as a separate group on the ground that they had split from the original B.S.P. in terms of paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule. (v) In paragraph 25, the hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that the Tenth Schedule cannot be read or construed independent of Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution of India and the object of those articles. A defection is added as a disqualification and the Tenth Schedule contains the provision as to disqualification on the ground of defection. A proceeding under the Tenth Schedule gets started before the Speaker only on a complaint being made that certain persons belonging to a political party had incurred disqualification on the ground of defection. To meet the claim so raised, the members of the Parliament or Assembly against whom the proceeding have been initiated have the right to say that there has been a split in the original political party and they form ?rd of the members of the Legislature of that party. Accordingly, it was held that on the scheme of articles 102 and 191 and the Tenth Schedule, the determination of the question of split or merger cannot be divorced from the motion before the Speaker seeking a disqualification of a member or members concerned. Accordingly, it was held that on the scheme of articles 102 and 191 and the Tenth Schedule, the determination of the question of split or merger cannot be divorced from the motion before the Speaker seeking a disqualification of a member or members concerned. Accordingly, the argument that under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the Speaker has an independent power to decide that there has been a split or merger of a political party as contemplated by paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, cannot be accepted. It was also held that the power to recognize a separate group in Parliament or Assembly may rest with the Speaker on the basis of Rules of Business of the House, but that is different from saying that the power is available to him under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution independent of a claim being determined by him regarding a member or a number of members incurring disqualification. (vi) In paragraph 28, it had further been held that under the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker is not expected simply to entertain a claim under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Schedule without first acquiring the jurisdiction to decide a question of disqualification in terms of paragraph 6 of the Schedule. The power, if any, to independently recognize a merger, cannot be addressed to the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and the power under the Tenth Schedule is accrued only when the Speaker is called upon to decide the question referred in paragraph 6 of the Schedule. (vii) Accordingly, in paragraph 29, it was held that the Speaker had totally misdirected himself in purporting to answer the claim of the 37 MLAs that there has been a split in the party, while declining to decide the question of disqualification raised before him by way of an application that was still pending. 45. Based on the aforesaid view of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel submitted that the Speaker could not have passed the order dated 16.9.2016 requiring the publication showing the 43 MLAs as PPA MLAs in the Bulletin Part-II and the Gazette inasmuch as by passing the order to show the 43 MLAs as PPA MLAs, the Speaker had taken a decision to recognize the 43 MLAs as PPA MLAs. In other words, it was the submission of the learned senior counsel that the Speaker had recognized the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with that of PPA. It was further submitted that an application for disqualification was filed on 14.10.2016 and the same is still pending and therefore, the order of the Speaker dated 16.9.2016 recognizing the merger of 43 INC MLAs as PPA MLAs was passed by the Speaker before deciding the application for disqualification. Hence, according to Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, by following the ratio laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), the order of the Speaker recognizing the merger of the 43 INC MLAs as PPA MLAs is not sustainable, inasmuch as, the said decision to recognize the merger was taken before arriving at a decision on the application for disqualification. 46. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel in order to substantiate his contention that the order of the Speaker of 16.9.2016 is a decision on the recognition of the merger, submitted that when the information in Form-I and Form-III were submitted in the Secretariat of the Speaker and accordingly the Secretary in the Secretariat had put up a note before the Speaker, citing the information provided in Form-I and Form-III, the Speaker ought to have gone through such information and kept the same on record by keeping it in the concerned file. But, moment the Speaker had ordered that the said information be published in the Bulletin Part-II and the Gazette, the Speaker had taken A decision to recognize the merger by showing the 43 INC MLAs as PPA MLAs. In this respect, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel submitted that the publication of the information of Form-I and Form-III are required to be done when the MLAs immediately upon their election provide such information to the Speaker Secretariat by enclosing the certificate of election, which contains the name of the political party under whose ticket the member was elected. Such publication is required as the information is backed by a certificate of election from the competent authority indicating the political party and therefore, no further process is required before it could be published in the Bulletin Part-II and the Gazette. According to Mr. Such publication is required as the information is backed by a certificate of election from the competent authority indicating the political party and therefore, no further process is required before it could be published in the Bulletin Part-II and the Gazette. According to Mr. Mittal, subsequent thereto when there is a change in the party affiliation, there is no provision under the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 to cause any such publication in a Bulletin Part-II and Gazette. The only subsequent situation where any such publication can be ordered is after an order that the Speaker may ultimately pass under rule 8(1) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987. According to the learned senior counsel, during the intermediate stage of informing the Speaker Secretariat about the initial election and a subsequent stage of a final order being passed on a disqualification application, there is no provision under the law to make any such publication in Bulletin Part-II and the Gazette as regards any information of the change in party affiliation. In view of the absence of any such provision, it was the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that any order for publication of the information of change in party affiliation would have to be construed to be a decision by the Speaker recognizing the merger. 47. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel in support of his contention that the Speaker being a signatory to the resolution of merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA, submitted that the Speaker could not have passed the order of 16.9.2016 inasmuch as, by doing so, the Speaker acts as a Judge of his own cause and therefore, the principle of nemo judex in causa sua would be violated and consequence thereof, the principle of natural justice would also be violated. Mr. Mittal, submitted that the Speaker himself was a part of the resolution taken by the 43 INC MLAs to merge with the PPA and therefore, it would be inappropriate for the Speaker to subsequently pass an order on the very same day recognizing the merger of the MLAs. According to the learned senior counsel, the Speaker ought to be an independent authority to take a decision on such question as to whether any recognition to a merger is required to be given. 48. Mr. According to the learned senior counsel, the Speaker ought to be an independent authority to take a decision on such question as to whether any recognition to a merger is required to be given. 48. Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner also made a submission that the INC being a national party, the State unit of the INC in Arunachal Pradesh is not competent to take a decision on the merger. In this respect, the learned senior counsel relied upon paragraph 72 of Jagjit Singh (supra), wherein the hon'ble Supreme Court had provided that if a member is set up by a national party, it would be unnecessary to say that events at national level have no concern to decide whether there is a split or not and in case a member is put up by a national political party, it is split in that party which is of relevant consideration and not a split of that political party at the State level. 49. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner also submitted that in passing the order dated 16.9.2016, the Speaker had not followed the responsibilities of a high constitutional office of that of the Speaker and that he had acted in a partisan manner in favour of the MLAs, who belongs to the same political party as that of the Speaker. 50. Per-contra, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 4, 7, 10, 20, 21 to 24, 26 to 32 and 34 to 41 submitted that the writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner upon a misconception as to what the Speaker did on 16.9.2016. According to Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel, the Speaker while passing the order dated 16.9.2016 requiring the publication in the Bulletin Part-II and the Gazette by showing the 43 MLAs as PPA MLAs, had not taken any decision on the question of merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA. On 16.9.2016, the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the Ruling party had informed the Secretariat of the Speaker by enclosing the Form-I and Form-III information of the individual MLAs. On 16.9.2016, the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the Ruling party had informed the Secretariat of the Speaker by enclosing the Form-I and Form-III information of the individual MLAs. By referring to the Annexure D letter of the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, the learned senior counsel indicated that by the said letter, the claim of merger of the INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA was enclosed for the kind perusal of the Speaker and for being taken on record of the Legislative Assembly Secretariat. The claim for merger at paragraph 3 request the Speaker to publish a summary of the information filed by the 43 PPA MLAs after the merger in Form-III, in the Bulletin Part-II of Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly as required under rule 4 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987. Paragraph 4 of the said claim of merger, request the Speaker to hear the 43 MLAs in case any petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule and the relevant rules is filed against any of them, so that the 43 MLAs can appropriately invoke the claim of merger as a defence against disqualification. 51. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel also referred to the letter dated 16.9.2016 of the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party, by which as required under rule 3 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987, the information of all the 43 members of the PPA Legislature Party in Form-I was furnished, for being entered in the register maintained under rule 5 of the said Rules. The learned senior counsel further referred to the other letter of the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party also dated 16.9.2016 by which as required under rule 4 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987, the information in Form-III furnished by the 43 members of the PPA Legislature Party was being furnished for the purpose of being published in the Bulletin Part-II under rule 4 of the said rules. 52. By referring to the said three communications of the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party, the learned senior counsel submitted that neither the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party nor any of the other MLAs who had made a claim to the merger had made any request to the Speaker for an appropriate order to recognize the merger. By referring to the said three communications of the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party, the learned senior counsel submitted that neither the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party nor any of the other MLAs who had made a claim to the merger had made any request to the Speaker for an appropriate order to recognize the merger. All that the communications indicated is that the Speaker was firstly requested to publish the information in the Bulletin Part-II and for entering the information in the register of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly as required under rule 4 and 5, respectively of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987. 53. According to Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel, the requirement of publishing the information of the claim of merger in the Bulletin Part-II and entering it in the Register are procedural requirement, which precedes the requirement of a Speaker to decide on the question of merger and therefore, an order of the Speaker to publish such information in the Bulletin Part-II and to enter the same in the Register do not constitute either to be a decision or to be an order recognizing the merger. The learned senior counsel further submits that the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party having clearly spelt out that the said claim of merger be allowed to be taken as a defence in the event of any disqualification petition being filed, by itself is a clear indication that there was no request by the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party or by any of the members for a decision of the Speaker on the question of the merger and that it was the expectation that the decision on the question of merger would be taken only upon when the said claim of merger is used by the concerned MLAs as a defence in a petition for disqualification. 54. Accordingly, Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel submitted that what the Speaker had done on 16.9.2016 is that neither he was requested to make a decision on the question of merger, nor he had decided as to whether there had been a merger or not and all that the Speaker had provided was that the claim of merger will be taken as a defence when an application for disqualification is field against the MLAs. 55. Mr. 55. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel while asserting that the order dated 16.9.2016 is not a decision recognizing the merger had further submitted that no judicial review is maintainable before the Speaker decides on the question of merger and to that effect, the learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Kihoto Hallohan (supra), wherein in paragraph 110, it was provided that in view of the limited scope of judicial review that is available on account of the finality clause of paragraph 6 and also having regards to the constitutional entailment and the status of the repository and the adjudicatory power of the Speaker, judicial review cannot be available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker and a quia timet action would not be permissible. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel also refers to paragraph 44 of the judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Speaker Haryana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldip Bishnoi and Others, 2015 (12) SCC 381 wherein in paragraph 44, it had been held that the decision of the Speaker in a petition under para 4 of the Tenth Schedule concerns only a question of merger, on which the Speaker is not entitled to adjudicate and the High Court could not have assumed jurisdiction under its powers of review before a decision was taken by the Speaker in paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule. 56. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel also referred to paragraph 14 of the judgment of the hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan in jaswant Singh Gurjarv. Hon'ble Speaker, Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha, wherein it was concluded that the Apex Court had specifically held that judicial review could not cover any such power to the making of a decision by the Speaker. Further, reference had been made to a decision of the hon'ble High Court at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in M.S. Prabhakara Rao and Others v. K.R Amos and Others, wherein in paragraph 14, it had been held that before the Speaker renders his decision, judicial review is clearly impermissible in view of the mandate under the Constitution of India. Reference had also been made to the decision of the hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in Errabelli Dayakar Rao and Others v. Talasani Srinivas Yadav and Others, wherein in paragraph 9, it had been held that judicial review should not cover any stage prior to making any decision by the Speaker and no quia timet action is permissible at any stage prior to the making of any decision by the Speaker. 57. By referring to the aforesaid provisions of law, it was the submission of Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel that on 16.9.2016, as the Speaker had neither been called upon nor he had decided on the question as to whether to recognize the merger of the 43 INC MLAs to PPA, the present writ petition assailing the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker requiring the publication of the information provided in Form-I and III, in the Bulletin Part-II and in the Register of the Legislative Assembly is not maintainable. 58. In support of his submission that the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker did not construe a decision or recognition of the merger, Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel submits that the ratio of the judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court laid down in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), is not applicable in the present case inasmuch as, there is a vital difference in the factual situation of the present case andffhat was involved in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra). 59. By referring to Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel pointed out that on 27.8.2003, 13 MLAs elected on B.S.P. tickets had met the Governor and requested him to invite the leader of the Samajwadi Party to form the Government. On 4.9.2003, the leader of the B.S.P. Party Sri Swami Prasad Maurya filed an application before the Speaker in terms of article 191 read with Tenth Schedule for a disqualification of the 13 B.S.P. MLAs'. On 6.9.2003, an application was made by 37 B.S.P. MLAs requesting the Speaker to recognize a split in the B.S.P. on the basis that ?rd member of the B.S.P. Legislature Party had in a body separated from the party. On 6.9.2003, an application was made by 37 B.S.P. MLAs requesting the Speaker to recognize a split in the B.S.P. on the basis that ?rd member of the B.S.P. Legislature Party had in a body separated from the party. The Speaker accordingly verified that the 37 MLAs, who had signed the application had in fact signed or not by requiring them to physically remain present before him and by overruling the objection of Sri Maurya, leader of the B.S.P. Legislature Party, the Speaker passed an order accepting the split in B.S.P. on an arithmetic calculation that 37 MLAs comprised of ?rd of the total strength of the B.S.P. Legislature Party. A little later, the Speaker on 6.9.2003 also accepted that the 37 B.S.P. MLAs had merged with the Samajwadi Party. The said order of the Speaker of 6.9.2003 accepting the merger of the 37 B.S.P. MLAs was assailed in the writ petition, which ultimately culminated in the appeal before the hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein it was held that before deciding the disqualification petition, the Speaker could not have decided on the merger of the 37 B.S.P. MLAs. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel in order to substantiate his submission, also referred to the application dated 4.9.2003 of the 37 B.S.P. MLAs addressed to the Speaker, Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. In the said application of 4.9.2003, the 37 MLAs had clearly stated as follows : "It is, therefore, requested that the aforesaid Lok Tantrik Bohujan Dal be recognized as a separate group within the Legislative Assembly and a separate arrangement for their sitting in the Assembly be made." Pursuant to the said application of 4.9.2003, the Speaker passed its order dated 6.9.2003, wherein it was held as follows : "Therefore, for the above reasons, I accept the request of the aforesaid 37 MLAs and recognize the Lok Tantrik Bohujan Dal in the Legislative Assembly." 60. Based upon such requisition being made in the application dated 4.9.2003 and the order of the Speaker dated 6.9.2003, Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel submitted that factual background of Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), was that there was an application by the concerned MLAs with a specific request to recognize their merger and based upon such application, there has been a specific order by the Speaker recognizing such merger. 61. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel submitted that factual background of Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), was that there was an application by the concerned MLAs with a specific request to recognize their merger and based upon such application, there has been a specific order by the Speaker recognizing such merger. 61. But, in the present case, the factual background is that the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party had made a request to the Speaker to publish the information provided in Form-I and III in the Bulletin Part-II and also enter the same in the Register of the Legislative Assembly and the Speaker by its order dated 16.9.2016 had provided that the said information be published in the Bulletin Part-II and the Register by showing the 43 MLAs as PPA MLAs and accordingly it was the submission of the learned senior counsel that in the present case, neither there was a request by the 43 MLAs to recognize the merger and nor there was an order by the Speaker recognizing such merger. Accordingly, it was submitted that in view of the vital difference in the factual background, the ratio of the law laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 62. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel further submitted that there is another vital difference in the factual background of Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), and the present writ petition, which is that in the present case, the order of the Speaker was passed on 16.9.2016, whereas the disqualification application was filed on 4.10.2016, whereas in the Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), the disqualification petition was filed on 4.9.2003 and the decision of the Speaker on the recognition of merger was on 6.9.2003. In other words, it was the submission of the learned senior counsel that on the day when the Speaker had passed the order dated 16.9.2016, there was no such application for disqualification pending before the Speaker. In other words, it was the submission of the learned senior counsel that on the day when the Speaker had passed the order dated 16.9.2016, there was no such application for disqualification pending before the Speaker. As the ratio of Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), is that a decision on the recognition of merger cannot be made independently without deciding the application for disqualification, which is pending, the said ratio is not applicable in the present case inasmuch as, neither any decision had been taken by the Speaker on the recognition of the merger without adjudicating any disqualification application, as on 16.9.2016, there was no such disqualification petition which was pending before the Speaker. 63. On the application of the principle nemo judex in causa sua, Mr. Dwivedi submits that the said principle is not applicable in the present case, inasmuch as, the speaker is the only authority under the scheme to do the act of passing the order to publish the information about the claim of change in party affiliation in the Bulletin Part-II and the Gazette. Hence, the Doctrine of Necessity would be applicable. 64. In this respect, learned senior counsel referred to paragraph 44 of Jagjit Singh (supra), wherein, the hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the Speaker, in law, was the only authority to decide whether the petitioners therein had incurred disqualification under the Tenth schedule, in his capacity as a speaker and that it is not a case where the Speaker would have transferred the case to some other Tribunal. Accordingly, it was held that the Doctrine of Necessity under the circumstance would be applicable and no illegality can be inferred merely on the Speaker relying on his personal knowledge to arrive at the conclusion. 65. Reliance had also been made to paragraph 16 of the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Election Commission of India v. Dr. Subramaniam Swami, (1996) 4 SCC 104 , wherein, it has been held that it is well settled that law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which would otherwise not countenance to the touchstone of judicial propriety and it is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority to decide the issue. Subramaniam Swami, (1996) 4 SCC 104 , wherein, it has been held that it is well settled that law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which would otherwise not countenance to the touchstone of judicial propriety and it is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority to decide the issue. If the choice is between allowing a bias person to act or to stifle the action altogether, the choice must fail in favour of the former as it is the only way to promote decision making. 66. Reliance had also been made to paragraph 12 of the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in J. Mohapatra and Company v. State of Orissa, (1984) 4 SCC 103 , wherein, it has been held that there is an exception to the Rule that no man shall be a judge in his own cause, namely, the Doctrine of Necessity. An adjudicator, who is subject to disqualification on the ground of bias or interest in the matter which he has to decide, may be required to adjudicate, if there is no other person who is competent to adjudicate and in such cases, the principle of natural justice would have to give way to necessity, as otherwise there would be no means of deciding the matter. 67. Mr. Dwivedi also submitted that in the application for disqualification which was filed on 14.10.2016, the Speaker had been deleted from the array of respondents. Such deletion of the Speaker as a respondent from the application for disqualification is also indicative that the writ petitioner and others are well aware that the Speaker is the only adjudicating authority in the matter and as such, he should not be arrayed as a respondent in the dispute to be decided by him. 68. Accordingly, by invoking the doctrine of necessity, Mr. Dwivedi sought to enforce his submission that the principle of nemo judex in causa sua was not violated by the Speaker while passing the order dated 16.6.2016. 69. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General for the State of Arunachal Pradesh appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 68. Accordingly, by invoking the doctrine of necessity, Mr. Dwivedi sought to enforce his submission that the principle of nemo judex in causa sua was not violated by the Speaker while passing the order dated 16.6.2016. 69. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General for the State of Arunachal Pradesh appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, being the Speaker of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and Secretary to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, respectively, submitted that under rule 3(1) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules 1987, the leader of the Legislature Party within 30 days after the first sitting of the House or where such Legislature Party is formed after the first sitting, within 30 days after its formation shall furnish to the Speaker a statement in writing containing the names of the members of such Legislature Party together with other particulars of such members as in Form-I. Further under rule 4(2), every member who takes a seat in the House, before making and subscribing an oath or affirmation under article 188 of the Constitution and taking his seat, deposit with the Secretary, his election certificate or, as the case may be, a certified copy of the notification nominating him as a member and shall also furnish to the Secretary a statement of particulars and declaration as in Form-III. Further a summary of the information furnished by the members under the Rule shall be published in the Bulletin, where, Bulletin is defined to be the Bulletin Part-II. 70. Mr. Dutta further referred to the Form-III, wherein in clause 6 the information regarding the party affiliation as on the date of election/nomination and as on the date of signing the Form-III are required to be provided, with a further undertaking that in the event of any change in the information provided, the informant Member undertakes to intimate e the Speaker immediately. 71. By referring to the aforesaid provisions, Mr. Dutta submitted that it is a procedural requirement for every Member to inform the Speaker in Form-I and Form-III about any change in the party affiliation and such information on being furnished, the Speaker is required to publish it in the Bulleting Part-II. 71. By referring to the aforesaid provisions, Mr. Dutta submitted that it is a procedural requirement for every Member to inform the Speaker in Form-I and Form-III about any change in the party affiliation and such information on being furnished, the Speaker is required to publish it in the Bulleting Part-II. Accordingly, it is the submission of the learned Advocate General that the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker was merely a compliance of the procedural requirement and it was not a decision on the recognition of merger as claimed by the MLAs. 72. In the context Mr. Dutta also submitted that the publication by the Speaker is an official publication which is required in the public interest and that there is no provision under the law which prohibits the Speaker from undertaking such publication. 73. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and respondent No.2, being the Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly in support of his contention that any member of the Legislative Assembly when indulges in the act of leaving one political party and joining another party, has the obligation under the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 to inform the Speaker, submitted that the said obligation is implicit under the rules 4(3), 5(1) and (2) of the Arunachal disqualification Rules of 1987. By referring to rule 4(2), the learned Advocate General submitted that every member before making and subscribed an oath or affirmation under Article 188 of the Constitution of India and taking a seat in the house shall deposit with the Secretary his election certificate or a certified copy of the notification nominating him as a member and also furnish to the Secretary a statement of particulars and declaration in Form-III. By referring to Form-III, the learned Advocate General submitted that under clause 6 of the Form, the member is required to state his party affiliation as on the date of the election/nomination and also as on the date of signing the Form-III. The learned Advocate General further referred to the declaration that the member is required to give in Form-III, i.e., in the event of any change in the information provided, the member undertakes to intimate the Speaker immediately. The learned Advocate General further referred to the declaration that the member is required to give in Form-III, i.e., in the event of any change in the information provided, the member undertakes to intimate the Speaker immediately. According to the learned Advocate General, Form-III requires two kind of information, i.e., party affiliation on the date of election/nomination and the party affiliation on the date of signing the Form-III form. Further, the Form-III also requires that in the event of any change in the party affiliation, the member is required to intimate the Speaker immediately. Accordingly, it was submitted that the Form-III being a requirement of rule 4, therefore, rule 4 has to be interpreted in a manner that in the event of there being any change in party affiliation, it is a requirement on the part of the members to immediately inform the Speaker of such change. 74. Again, by referring to rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987, the learned Advocate General submitted that upon the subsequent information being provided by the members to the Speaker of the change in party affiliation, it is a statutory requirement on the part of the Speaker to publish such information furnished by the members in the Bulletin. Bulletin as defined in rule 2(1)(A) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987, means the Bulletin Part-II of the House. Therefore, reading of rules 4(2), 4(3) and 2(1)(A) conjointly, according to the learned Advocate General, makes it a statutory procedural requirement on the part of the Speaker to publish the information furnished by the members as regards change in party affiliation in the Bulletin Part-II. 75. Accordingly, such publication of the information of change of party affiliation of the members is an obligation on the part of the Speaker to publish the same in the Bulletin Part-II and the order of the Speaker for such publication does not amount to a recognition by the Speaker of the merger. 76. 75. Accordingly, such publication of the information of change of party affiliation of the members is an obligation on the part of the Speaker to publish the same in the Bulletin Part-II and the order of the Speaker for such publication does not amount to a recognition by the Speaker of the merger. 76. With regard to his contention that the information published by the Speaker about party affiliation is an official publication, which is required in the public interest, the learned Advocate General submitted that the publication of such information about the change in party affiliation is a requirement to facilitate the functioning of the House and for conducting its functioning, the Speaker has to know the party affiliation and also inform the members as to the party affiliation that stand on the given day. It is for such reason that there is a necessity for publication. 77. The learned Advocate General also submitted that the publication of the information regarding the change in party affiliation is an official publication of the claim of such change and same is required in the public interest. The learned Advocate General also submitted that apart from there being a requirement of such publication in the public interest, there is also no such restriction under the law which prohibits such publication. It is further submitted that the members having furnished the Speaker the information regarding their change in party affiliation and more so when there is no such plea from such members that they had not signed the Form-III, there cannot be any reason for the Speaker not to publish such information in the Bulletin Part-II. 78. The learned Advocate General also submitted that under rule 3(7) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987, if a member voluntarily gives up his membership of the political party or he has been expelled from or admitted to any such political party in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution, rules or regulations of such political party, as the case may be, the leader of such Legislative Party shall immediately submit a report to the Speaker and not later than 10 days of such event. Further, rule 4(2) requires that every member to take a seat in the House, shall also furnish to the Speaker a statement of particulars and declaration in Form-III and rule 4(3) provides that such summery of the information furnished by the member, shall be published in the Bulletin, i.e., Bulletin Part-II. The learned Advocate General submitted that furnishing of information of party change or change in party affiliation and the publication of such information is implicit under rule 3(7), 4(2) and 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the information that a member may provide the Speaker under rule 3 and 4 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 are required to be maintained by the Speaker in the Form-IV Register and the information in relation to each member shall be recorded on a separate page in the Register. It was the submission of the learned Advocate General that the Form-IV Register requires maintenance of the information furnished by the members under rule 3 and 4 as regards its party affiliation on the date of furnishing of such information. Further, the information to be recorded in the Form-IV Register is not related to any decision by the Speaker on the recognition of a merger by any such political party. 79. Accordingly, it was the submission that the purpose of rule 3(7), 4(2) and 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 is to inform the members as well as the public at large that there is a claim by a particular member of a change in party affiliation. The requirement of such information to the members as well as to the public at large is to inform them of such claim of change in party affiliation, so as to enable them to prefer any application for disqualification, if they intend to do so. 80. Further, the purpose of publishing such information in the Gazette is that by its publication in the Gazette, the existence of the information becomes a conclusive proof by itself. 80. Further, the purpose of publishing such information in the Gazette is that by its publication in the Gazette, the existence of the information becomes a conclusive proof by itself. Countering the argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that such publication had hit the democratic multi-party system, it was the submission of the learned Advocate General that the publication is not to de-mean the democratic multi-party system, but on the other hand, it is a method by which the democratic multi-party system is further strengthened, so as to enable any person to prefer the disqualification petition on the basis of some definite information. 81. With regard to the submission of Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that by the publication of the information in the Bulletin Part-II, there had been a tacit acceptance of merger by the Speaker of the members of the INC with the PPA, Mr. Dutta, learned Advocate General referred to the publication dated 16.9.2016 in the Bulletin Part-II of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and pointed out that the Bulletin reads as follows : Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly Bulletin Part-II (Matters for general information) Friday, the 16th September, 2016 No.26 The following summary of information filed by the following 43 members of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly on 16.9.2016 in form III of the Members of Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1987 is hereby published for the information of all Members: Sl. No. Name of Member Constituency Date of filing Party Affiliation fresh Form III As on date of election As on filing fresh Form III (16.9.16) 1 Sri Pema Khandu 3 Mukto (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 2 Shri Tenzing Norbu Thongdok 5. Kalakatang (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 3 Shri Jambey Tashi 1. Lumia (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 4 Shri Phurpa Tsering 4. Dirang (ST) 16.9.2016 PPA PPA 5 Shri Kumsi Sidisow 6. Thrizino-Buragaon (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 6 Shri Kumar Waii 8. Bameng (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 7 Smt. Karya Bagang 9. Chayangtajo (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 8 Shri Tapuk Taku 10. Seppa East (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 9 Shri Mama Natung 11. Seppa West (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 10 Shri Kameng Dolo 12. Pakke-Kessang (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 11 Shri Techi Kaso 13. Itanagar (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 12 Shri Nabam Rebia 14. Chayangtajo (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 8 Shri Tapuk Taku 10. Seppa East (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 9 Shri Mama Natung 11. Seppa West (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 10 Shri Kameng Dolo 12. Pakke-Kessang (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 11 Shri Techi Kaso 13. Itanagar (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 12 Shri Nabam Rebia 14. Doimukh (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 13 Shri Likha Saaya 16. Yachuli (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 14 Shri Takam Tagar (Pario) 18. Palin (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 15 Shri Bamang Felix 19. Nyapin (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 16 Er. Markio Tado 20. Tali (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 17 Shri Pani Taram 21. Koloriang (ST) 16.9.2016 PPA PPA 18 Shri Tanga Byaling 22. Nacho (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 19 Shri Punji Mara 23. Taliha (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 20 Shri Dikto Yekar 24. Daporijo (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 21 Shri Nyamar Karbak 27. Liromoba (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 22 Shri Jomde Kena 28. Likabali (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 23 Shri Gojen Gadi 29. Basar (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 24 Shri Jarkar Gamlin 31. Along East l(ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 25 Shri Pasang Dorjee Sona 33. Mechukha (ST) 16.9.2016 PPA PPA 26 Shri Alo Libang 34. Tuting-Yingkiong (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 27 Shri Tapang Taloh 35. Pangin (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 28 Er. Tatung Jamoh 37. Pasighat East (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 29 Shri Lombo Tayeng 39. Mebo (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 30 Shri Rajesh Tacho 41. Anini (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 31 Smt Gum Tayeng 42. Dambuk (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 32 Shri Mutchu Mithi 43. Roing (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 33 Shri Chow Tewa Mein 46. Chowkham (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 34 Shri Zingnu Namchoom 47. Namsai (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 35 Shri Chowna Mein 48. Lekang (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 36 Shri Nikh Kamin 49. Bordumsa-Diyun 16.9.2016 PPA PPA 37 Shri Kamlung Mossang 50. Miao (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 38 Shri Phosum Khimhun 52. Changlang South (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 39 Shri Wangki Lowang 54.Namsang (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 40 Shri Tirong Aboh 56. Khonsa West (ST) 16.9.2016 PPA PPA 41 Shri Wanglin Lowangdong 57. Borduria-Bogapani 16.9.2016 INC PPA 42 Shri Thangwang Wangham 59. Londing-Pumao 16.9.2016 INC PPA 43 Shri Honchun Ngandam 60. Miao (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 38 Shri Phosum Khimhun 52. Changlang South (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 39 Shri Wangki Lowang 54.Namsang (ST) 16.9.2016 INC PPA 40 Shri Tirong Aboh 56. Khonsa West (ST) 16.9.2016 PPA PPA 41 Shri Wanglin Lowangdong 57. Borduria-Bogapani 16.9.2016 INC PPA 42 Shri Thangwang Wangham 59. Londing-Pumao 16.9.2016 INC PPA 43 Shri Honchun Ngandam 60. Pongchau-Wakka 16.9.2016 INC PPA By referring to such publication, the learned Advocate General submitted that the publication clearly indicates that there is no such tacit acceptance of any merger and that the publication in Bulletin Part-II is merely of the summary of the information filed by 43 members of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly on 16.9.2016 in Form-III. 82. Mr. Dutta, learned Advocate General also spelled out that the objective of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 is to give effect to the provisions of para 8 of the Tenth Schedule so as to enable the authorities to implement the provisions of para 2 and para 6 of the Tenth Schedule. Accordingly, it is submitted that the information to be published under rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 is to sub-serve the object of the para 2 of the Tenth Schedule. The learned Advocate General submitted that the interest of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, i.e., to prevent the defection in the House would be sub-served if the information regarding change of party affiliation furnished by the members is published so as to invite any disqualification petition from any quarter. Such purpose of the Tenth Schedule would not be served if such information is merely kept in the record without any further publication of it. An interpretation cannot be given to the requirements of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, which would take away the right of the public to know the claim of any change in party affiliation in order to enable any such person to file an application for disqualification under rule 6. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the question of defection and disqualification is a matter of public interest and not a matter confined only to the members of the House. 83. Mr. Dutta, learned Advocate General also submitted that while the petition for disqualification was filed before the Speaker on 14.10.2016, the present writ petition had been filed on 23.11.2016. 83. Mr. Dutta, learned Advocate General also submitted that while the petition for disqualification was filed before the Speaker on 14.10.2016, the present writ petition had been filed on 23.11.2016. In para 14 of the disqualification petition, a stand had been taken that the Speaker did not recognize the merger and no order was passed permitting the merger of the 43 MLAs with PPA. But on the other hand, a contrary stand had been taken in the writ petition that by the order dated 16.9.2016, the Speaker had recognized the merger and in doing so, the Speaker firstly did not have jurisdiction to do so inasmuch as, a decision on the recognition of merger cannot be taken independently of the disqualification petition by keeping the same pending and secondly, in doing so, the Speaker is bound to issue notice on the authorities of the INC, which would also fulfil the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, it was the submission of the learned Advocate General that the two stands of the petitioner in the disqualification petition and that of in the writ petition are in conflict and contrary with each other. 84. In this respect, the learned Advocate General relied upon the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Sunita Mehra, 2001(9) SCC 344 , paragraphs 2 and 3 and Piare Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 650 paragraphs 3, 6 and 7. 85. It was further submitted by the learned Advocate General that in the disqualification petition in para 21, it had been stated that the Speaker had not accepted/recognized the merger with the PPA, which is evident from the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker. 86. A further technical submission had also been made by the learned Advocate General that the prayer in the writ petition is only for setting aside the publication in the Bulletin Part-II dated 16.9.2016 and there is no such prayer for setting aside the revised publication of 19.9.2016 and therefore, even if the Bulletin dated 16.9.2016 is set aside, the revised publication of 19.9.2016 would still remain. 87. 87. The learned Advocate General by referring to Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India, which inter alia provides that no person shall be liable to any proceeding in any court in respect of the publication by or under the authority of a House of such Legislature of any report, paper, vote or proceeding, submitted that the order dated 16.9.2016 requiring the publication of the information of party change in the Bulletin Part-II is a publication by or under the authority of the House and as such, the present writ petition assailing such order dated 16.9.2016 is not maintainable. The learned Advocate General submitted that the order dated 16.9.2016 for the publication of the information of party change furnished by the 43 MLAs and also the publication of such party change in the Bulletin Part-II was done by an authority of the House, i.e., the Speaker of the Assembly. Therefore, it being a publication by the Speaker being the authority of the House, the same is not amenable to a proceeding in a court of law. 88. In order to substantiate his contention, the learned Advocate General also submitted that under rule 321(1) of the Assembly Rules, which authorizes publication in connection with the business of the House, the publication of the Bulletin Part-II is also connected with the business of the House. Therefore, the decision of the Speaker under 321(3) as to whether the publication is in connection with the business of the House would be final. 89. In the premises of the aforesaid submission of the parties, the core question for determination would be whether the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker to show the 43 MLAs as PPA MLAs and further to publish the information given in Form-III in the Bulletin Part-II dated 16.9.2016 and also to publish it in the Gazette can be construed to be an order by the Speaker recognizing the merger of the INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA. Further question for determination would be whether the INC as a political party was to have been given an opportunity of hearing before the order of 16.9.2016 was passed by the Speaker, which in other words, would mean whether there was any violation of the principles of natural justice. Further question for determination would be whether the INC as a political party was to have been given an opportunity of hearing before the order of 16.9.2016 was passed by the Speaker, which in other words, would mean whether there was any violation of the principles of natural justice. Also a question for determination would be whether the Speaker being a part of the change of party affiliation of the 43 MLAs could have passed the order dated 16.9.2016 for its publication by showing the 43 MLAs as PPA MLAs, which in other words would mean whether the principle of nemo judex in causa sua had been violated. As raised by the learned Advocate General, a further question for determination would be whether in view of the restrictions provided under Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India, the order of the Speaker dated 16.9.2016 can be called in question in a proceeding before a court. Whether the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker was a decision of the Speaker to recognize the merger. 90. Under the scheme of the Indian Constitution, the Speaker's powers and functions can broadly be classified to be of two categories. Firstly, the Speaker facilitates the conduct of the business of the House, which also includes the role of the Speaker in the House as a disciplinarian to maintain the decorum in the house. Secondly, the other role of the Speaker is to perform the quasi-judicial role under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. 91. In Ramdas Athazvala (5) v. Union of India and Others, (2010) 4 SCC 1 , in paragraph 31, it had been held that the Speaker is the guardian of the privileges of the House and its spokesman and representative on all occasions. He is the interpreter of its roles and procedures and is invested with the power to control and regulate the course of debate and to maintain order. The powers to regulate the procedure and conduct the business of the House are vested in the Speaker. 92. He is the interpreter of its roles and procedures and is invested with the power to control and regulate the course of debate and to maintain order. The powers to regulate the procedure and conduct the business of the House are vested in the Speaker. 92. On the other hand, in Nabam Rebia and Baman Felex v. The Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 1 , in paragraph 186, it had been held that as provided in para 6 of the Tenth Schedule, if a question arises as to whether a member of the Legislative Assembly has become subject to disqualification, the adjudicatory role for determining the question will fall within the exclusive authority of the Speaker. In the said decision, the question before the hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the Speaker against whom a notice of resolution for his removal had been issued, can take up a petition for disqualification of any of the members of the Assembly. In the above context, the hon'ble Supreme Court had held that when the position of a Speaker is under challenge through a notice of resolution for his removal, it would be just and appropriate that the Speaker first demonstrate his right to continue as such by winning the support of the majority in the State Legislature. In the aforesaid context, in paragraph 192, it had been provided that the purpose sought to be achieved through the Tenth Schedule is clear and unambiguous and the same is unrelated to and distinct from the purpose sought to be achieved through article 179(c), which pertains to removal of a Speaker and neither of the provisions can be seen to be in conflict with each other. In paragraph 193, it had further been held that if the Speaker survives the vote, on a motion for his removal from the office of the Speaker, he would still be able to adjudicate upon the disqualification petition filed under the Tenth Schedule. 93. From the above formulation by the hon'ble Supreme Court, it can be seen that the role of the Speaker in conducting the proceedings of the House and matters ancillary thereto and the role of the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India are separate and distinguishable. 94. 93. From the above formulation by the hon'ble Supreme Court, it can be seen that the role of the Speaker in conducting the proceedings of the House and matters ancillary thereto and the role of the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India are separate and distinguishable. 94. The Speaker lays down the procedure for conducting of the business of the House by framing rules under Article 208 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, for conducting the proceeding of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, where a decision as regards the claim of a merger can be taken up as a defence against disqualification and the matters incidental and ancillary thereto, the Speaker is empowered to frame the rules for laying down its procedure under para 8 of the Tenth Schedule. 95. As the role of the Speaker in conducting the business of the House under Chapter-Ill, para 6 of the Constitution of India is distinguishable and separate from its role as a quasi-judicial authority under, the Tenth Schedule, the requirement of the Speaker in undertaking the two roles has also to be construed within its own perspective and requirement. 96. In the State of Arunachal, in exercise of its power under Article 208 of the Constitution of India, the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly had been framed. Again, on the other hand, in exercise of its power in para 8 of the Tenth Schedule. The Members of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1987 had been framed. Some of the relevant provisions of the Conduct of Business Rules of the Arunachal Legislative Assembly are that under rule 4, the members shall sit in such order as the Speaker may determine and under rule 6, there shall be a roll of the members of the Assembly, which shall be signed in the presence of the Secretary by every member after taking the oath and affirmation and before taking his seat. All such other provisions of the Conduct of Business Rules pertain to the procedure to be adopted for conducting the various businesses of the House. Chapter-XXIII of the Conduct of Business Rules pertains to the question relating to breach} of privilege and how to bring it to the notice of the House as regards such breach. All such other provisions of the Conduct of Business Rules pertain to the procedure to be adopted for conducting the various businesses of the House. Chapter-XXIII of the Conduct of Business Rules pertains to the question relating to breach} of privilege and how to bring it to the notice of the House as regards such breach. Rules 192 to 194 pertains to the intimation to the Speaker as regards arrest, detention, etc., and release of a member of the Assembly whereas rules 195 and 196 pertain to the procedure regarding arrest of a member within the precincts of the House. Rule 202 pertains to grant of leave to a Member to remain absent from the sitting of the House. 97. From the provisions of the Conduct of Business Rules of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, it is noticed that neither in the Rules itself nor in the forms appended to the Schedule thereof, there is any provision for any of the members to make a declaration of his party affiliation. All that rule 6 requires is that every member shall sign in the roll of members of the Assembly in the presence of the Secretary after making the oath and affirmation and before taking his seat. Even, rule 6 does not give any indication that the dominant purpose of signing in the roll of members is to indicate the party affiliation of the member. The requirement of rule 6 would be to keep it on record of the Assembly as regards the roll of the members. All other provisions of the Conduct of Business Rules pertain to the procedures that are to be adopted and followed while conducting various business of the House. Accordingly, it is inferred that the Conduct of Business Rules pertains mainly to the affairs of the House and the business conducted thereof. 98. Further, reading of Article 208 of the Constitution of India also indicates that a House of Legislature of a State may make rules for regulating its procedure and conduct of its business, subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Article 208 itself provides that the rules framed there under would be for the purpose of regulating the procedure and conduct of the business of the House. 99. Article 208 itself provides that the rules framed there under would be for the purpose of regulating the procedure and conduct of the business of the House. 99. On the other hand, para 8 of the Tenth Schedule also empowers Speaker of a House to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Schedule. Clause (a) of rule 8(1) provides that the rules may provide for the maintenance of Register or other records of the political parties, if any, to which different members of the House belongs and clause (d) thereof provides for the procedure for deciding any question referred in sub-para 1 of paragraph 6, including the procedure for any enquiry, which may be made for the purpose of deciding such question. Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule provides that subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, a member of the House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified from being a member of the House, (a) if he voluntarily gives up his membership of such political party or (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in the House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorized on its behalf, without obtaining in either case, prior permission of such political party. 100. Paragraph 4 of Tenth Schedule, inter alia, provides that a member of a House shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2, where his original political party merges with another political party and he claims that he and any other member of his original political party have become members of such other political parties, or as the case may be of a new political party formed by such merger, or have not accepted such merger and have opted to function as a separate group. It is further provides that the merger of the original political party shall be deemed to have taken place if and only if not less than ?rd of the members of the Legislature Party concerned have agreed to such merger. Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule inter alia provides that if any question arises as to whether a member of a House has become subject to disqualification under the Schedule, the question shall be referred for a decision of the Speaker of such House and his decision shall be final. Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule inter alia provides that if any question arises as to whether a member of a House has become subject to disqualification under the Schedule, the question shall be referred for a decision of the Speaker of such House and his decision shall be final. It provides that where a question has arisen as to whether the Speaker of the House has become subject to such disqualification, the question shall be referred for decision for such members of the House as the House may elected in this behalf and the decision shall be final. Paragraph 6(2) further provides that all proceeding under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 shall be deemed to be a proceeding of the Legislature of the State within the meaning of article 212. The said provision of paragraph 6(2) also does not indicate that the Speaker while exercising its powers under the Tenth Schedule conducts itself in a manner for regulating the procedure and business of the House. All that paragraph 6(2) provides for is that while exercising its powers under paragraph 6(1), the Speaker is protected by the privileges granted under article 212. 101. The Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 had been framed in exercise of the powers in paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule. Accordingly, it is to be understood that the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987, amongst others, pertains to the maintenance of Register or other records as to the political parties, if any, to which the different members of the House belongs and also for regulating the procedure for deciding any question referred in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule including the procedure for any enquiry, which may be made for the purpose of deciding such question. Rule 3(1)(a) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules of 1987 provides that the leader of the Legislature Party shall within 30 days after the first sitting of the House, or where such Legislature Party is formed after the first sitting, within 30 days after its formation or within a week of the constitution of the House following the general election, whichever is earlier in either case, shall furnish to the Speaker (a) a statement in writing containing the names of the members of such Legislature Party together with other particulars 1 regarding such members in Form-I, (b) a copy of the rules and regulations of the concerned political party, including the functionaries or other authorities of the party exercising powers to expel any member and (c) where the Legislature Party has a separate set of rules and regulations, a copy thereof. Rule 3(2) provides that where the Legislature Party consists of only one member, such member shall furnish the copy of the rules and regulations as required under rule 3(1)(b). Rule 3(3) provides that in the event of any increase in the strength of a Legislature Party consisting of only one member, the provisions of sub-rule (2) of rule 3 shall also apply as if such Legislature Party had been formed on the first date on which its strength has increased. Rule 3(4) provides that whenever any change takes place in the information furnished by the leader of a Legislature Party under sub-rule (1), or by a member under sub-rule (2), he shall within 30 days thereafter or within such further period as the Speaker may allow, furnish in writing the information to the Speaker with respect of such change. Rule 3(6) provides that where a member belonging to any political party votes or abstains from voting in the house contrary to any such direction issued by such political party or by any other authorized authority, shall within 30 days of such voting or abstention, inform the Speaker in Form-II, whether such voting or abstention has been condoned by the political party or not. Rule 3(7) provides that if a member has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party or he has been expelled from, or admitted to such political party in accordance with the procedure established by the constitution rules or regulations of such political party, a report shall be submitted to the Speaker with relevant facts and details, by the leader of each Legislature Party immediately, but not later than 10 days after such event takes place. 102. Rule 4(1) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 provides that every member, who has taken his seat in the House, before the date of commencement of the Rules, shall furnish to the Secretary a statement of particulars and declaration in Form-III. Rule 4(2) provides that every member, who takes a seat in the House after the commencement of the Rules shall, before making and subscribing an oath or affirmation under article 188 of the Constitution and taking his seat in the House shall deposit with the Secretary his election certificate or as the case may be a certified copy of the notification nominating him as a member and also furnish a statement of particulars and declaration in Form-III. Rule 4(3) again provides that the summary of the information furnished by the members shall be published in the Bulletin, which as defined under rule 2(a), is the Bulletin Part-II of the House. Rule 5(1) provides that the Secretary shall maintain in Form-IV, a Register based on the information furnished under rules 3 and 4 in relation to the members and the information in relation to each member shall be recorded on a separate page in the Register. Rule 6 provides that in the event a member has become subjected to disqualification under Tenth Schedule, the same can be decided in no other manner except by a petition made in accordance with the provisions of rule 6, while rules 7 and 8 provide for the procedure that the Speaker may adopt considering a petition for disqualification under rule 6. A further provision of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 is the Form-III in which the members are required to furnish the information to the Speaker under rule 4 as regards their party affiliation, "on the date of election/nomination and on the date of signing of the Form-III, with further declaration that in the event of any change in the information of the party affiliation, amongst others, the members undertake to inform the Speaker immediately". 103. From a bare reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987, it is noticed that one of the dominant purpose and requirement of the disqualification rules is the requirement of the information to be furnished by the members as regards their party affiliation, while the other purpose of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules is to provide for a procedure for conducting the disqualification proceeding. The purpose of the requirement of providing the information of the party affiliation of the members in the beginning and during the currency of the particular Legislative Assembly is to facilitate the determination as to whether any such member is subjected to disqualification for any change in party affiliation during the currency of the particular Legislative Assembly. As a corollary, it is noticed that, perhaps apart from the privileges granted to a proceeding under the Tenth Schedule under article 212 and the disqualification referred under article 191(2), neither the Disqualification Rules nor the Tenth Schedule pertain to any matter relating to the proceedings and conduct of the business of a House. 104. In the aforesaid premises of the provision of Chapter-Ill, Part-VI of the Constitution of India as well as the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India with relevant emphasis on the Business Rules and the Disqualification Rules, respectively, the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly is being examined for arriving at a satisfaction as to whether the said order constitutes a decision on the recognition of a merger of the INC Arunachal Pradesh with PPA or that the said order is a procedural requirement under the Tenth Schedule and the Arunachal Disqualification Rules for accepting and publishing the information furnished by the members as regards their change in party affiliation. 105. 105. At the outset, it is noted that an order for publication of an information, is merely an order where certain information's provided to the authority is being ordered to be published in a public notification. On the other hand a decision on the question on the recognition of a merger would involve an adjudicatory procedure where the facts and the counter facts would be called for its consideration and upon its evaluation, a decision would be arrived at as to whether the given set of facts and the counter facts constitutes a merger as provided under the relevant law. 106. In this respect, the submission of Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner is taken note of wherein the learned senior counsel had questioned the authority and power of the Speaker to order for a publication of the information of change in party affiliation of the 43 INC MLAs to PPA by contending that there is no such power available under the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987, or as a matter of fact, under any other law. The learned senior counsel submitted that the only power available to the Speaker is to take a decision on the recognition of the merger, which again can be under taken only while deciding a petition for disqualification filed under rule 6(1). Accordingly, it is the submission that there is no such power available for ordering a publication and therefore, the order dated 16.9.2016 has to be construed to be an order containing the decision on the recognition of the merger. 107. In Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), the hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that a proceeding under the Tenth Schedule get started before the Speaker only on a complaint being made that certain persons belonging to a political party had incurred disqualification on the ground of defection. To meet the complaint so raised, the members against whom the proceedings are initiated for disqualification, have the right to show that there has been a split in the original political patty or that the party had merged with another political party and hence paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule is not attracted. To meet the complaint so raised, the members against whom the proceedings are initiated for disqualification, have the right to show that there has been a split in the original political patty or that the party had merged with another political party and hence paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule is not attracted. Accordingly, as per the scheme of articles 102 and 191 and the Tenth Schedule, the determination on the question of split or merger cannot divorced from the motion before the Speaker seeking a disqualification of a member or members concerned. Accordingly, the argument that under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the Speaker has an independent power to decide that there has been a split or merger of a political party had been rejected. It had further been held that under the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker is not expected to simply entertain a claim under paragraph 4 for a merger, without first acquiring jurisdiction to decide a question of disqualification in terms of paragraph 6. The power if any that the Speaker may otherwise exercise independently to recognize a group or a merger, cannot be traced to the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and the power under the Tenth Schedule to do so accrues only when he is called upon to decide the question referred in paragraph 6. Accordingly, it was held that the Speaker under the Scheme of the Tenth Schedule and the rules framed thereunder had to decide the application for disqualification and while deciding the same had to decide whether in view of the claim for merger under paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule, the claim of disqualification has to be rejected. Accordingly, the ratio laid down in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), is that the Speaker is not empowered to decide the question as regards the claim of a merger independently and without deciding the claim for disqualification that had been made in paragraph 6 of the Schedule. 108. But having said so, it is also to be determined as to whether the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker, which had been assailed in the present writ petition is an order containing a decision as regards the recognition of the merger of the INC, Arunachal Pradesh with PPA. 108. But having said so, it is also to be determined as to whether the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker, which had been assailed in the present writ petition is an order containing a decision as regards the recognition of the merger of the INC, Arunachal Pradesh with PPA. In this respect, it would be relevant to take into consideration the factual background in which the aforesaid principle of law had been laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court. In Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), 13 MLAs elected to the Assembly on tickets of B.S.P. had met the Governor on 27.8.2003 and requested him to invite the leader of the Samajwadi Party to form the Government. On 29.8.2003, the Governor had invited the leader of the Samajwadi Party to form the Government and gave him two weeks' time to prove his majority in the Assembly. On 4.9.2003, Sri Swami Prasad Maurya, leader of the Legislature B.S.P. filed a petition before the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule praying that the 13 B.S.P. MLAs, who had proclaimed support to the Samajwadi Party be disqualified in terms of paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule. On 6.9.2003, a request was made by 37 B.S.P. MLAs requesting the Speaker to recognize a split in the B.S.P. on the basis that ?rd of the B.S.P. Legislature Party comprising of 109 Legislatures, had in a body separated from the party pursuant to a meeting held on 26.8.2003. The Speaker verified the 37 members, who had sent the application for split and by overruling the objection of Mr. Maurya, who had filed the disqualification petition, the Speaker had passed an order on 6.9.2003 accepting the split in the B.S.P. by concluding that 37 out of 109 comprised of ?rd of the members. A little later, on 6.9.2003 itself, the Speaker accepted that the said group of 37 MLAs of B.S.P. had merged with the Samajwadi Party. It was noted by the hon'ble Supreme Court that in the order dated 6.9.2003, the Speaker did not decide the application made by the B.S.P. seeking disqualification of the original 13 MLAs, who were a part of the 37 that appeared before the Speaker to establish the split and merger. 109. It was noted by the hon'ble Supreme Court that in the order dated 6.9.2003, the Speaker did not decide the application made by the B.S.P. seeking disqualification of the original 13 MLAs, who were a part of the 37 that appeared before the Speaker to establish the split and merger. 109. In the aforesaid factual background, a circumstance had arisen that a disqualification petition was filed on 4.9.2003 and keeping the same pending, the Speaker had decided on 6.9.2003 accepting the split and merger as claimed for. In the aforesaid premises, the principle laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court has to be understood that when a disqualification petition is pending, the Speaker without deciding the same, cannot independently take a decision on the claim of a split or merger. Accordingly, it was held that the Speaker had totally misdirected himself in purporting to answer the claim of the 37 MLAs that there was a split and merger even while not deciding the question of disqualification raised before him by way of an application that was already pending. Accordingly, the failure on the part of the Speaker to decide the application seeking a disqualification was held to be not a mere aberration of the procedure, but to be against the very constitutional scheme of an adjudication contemplated by the Tenth Schedule. 110. But, in the instant case, it is noticed that the factual circumstance in which the order dated 16.9.2016 was passed by the Speaker was different from that of Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra). Firstly, on 16.9.2016 when the required information was furnished by the leader of the PPA Legislature Party to the Speaker, there was no such disqualification petition pending before the Speaker by any person against any of the 43 MLAs, who had claimed to have changed their party affiliation from INC to PPA. Firstly, on 16.9.2016 when the required information was furnished by the leader of the PPA Legislature Party to the Speaker, there was no such disqualification petition pending before the Speaker by any person against any of the 43 MLAs, who had claimed to have changed their party affiliation from INC to PPA. It is also to be noticed that in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), there was an application dated 6.9.2003 by the 37 B.S.P. MLAs addressed to the Speaker, Uttar Pradesh Legislature Assembly stating that it was unanimously resolved that the B.S.P. be split up and a new faction in the name of Lok Tantrik Bahujan Dal be constituted under the leadership of Sri Rajendra Singh Rana, ML A and further the number comprising the new faction is more than ?rd of the total number of MLAs of the original B.S.P. Accordingly, by the said application of 6.9.2003, the Speaker was requested that the Lok Tantrik Bahujan Dal be recognized as a separate group within the Legislative Assembly and separate arrangement for their sitting inside the Assembly be made. Accordingly, it is noticed that the said application dated 6.9.2003 was a specific application for an order for a decision that the 37 MLAs be recognized as a separate group, thereby constituting a split. On the basis of the said application, the Speaker had passed the order dated 6.9.2003, wherein the Speaker had given a hearing to both the groups i.e. claiming the split as well as opposing the split and upon a factual determination and deliberation thereof, an order was passed that the group known as Lok Tantrik Bahujan Dal having associated themselves with the decision taken by the group in its meeting held on 6.8.2003 regarding its merger with the Samajwadi Party be recognized as members of the Samajwadi Party. Accordingly, by the order of 6.9.2003, the Speaker accepted the request of the 37 MLAs and recognized the Lok Tantrik Bahujan Dal in the Legislative Assembly by providing that a decision on the petition for disqualification would be taken by him at an appropriate time. 111. In the present case, the factual situation is different inasmuch as, there is no such application by the 43 MLAs before the Speaker claiming that they be recognized to have merged with the PPA. 111. In the present case, the factual situation is different inasmuch as, there is no such application by the 43 MLAs before the Speaker claiming that they be recognized to have merged with the PPA. Further, the order dated 16.9.2016 also does not make any deliberation on the factual background of any claim of a merger and hence it also cannot be said to be a decision by the Speaker on any application by any members for a recognition of a merger. 112. In the instant case, it is the contention of the petitioner that the order of the Speaker dated 16.9.2016 is a decision recognizing the merger of the INC with the PPA, whereas, on the other hand, it is the contention of the respondent MLAs that it is not a decision of a merger, while the learned Advocate General is of the contention that the order of 16.9.2016 is merely a publication of the information furnished by the 43 MLAs as required under rule 4(3) of the Disqualification Rules. 113. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, the contents of the letters providing the information as well as the order of the Speaker dated 16.9.2016 would be relevant. The Annexure D letter dated 16.9.2016 of Shri Pema Khandu Chief Minister & leader of the PPA Legislature Party, addressed to the Speaker encloses a claim of merger of the INC Arunachal Pradesh with the PPA with a request for its perusal and for being taken on record of the Legislative Assembly Secretariat. The claim of merger, contained to the minutes of the joint meeting dated 16.9.2016 proposing the merger, the minutes of the joint meeting dated 16.9.2016 of the Executive Committee of the PPA approving the merger, the minutes of the meeting dated 16.9.2016 of the Legislature Party of the PPA containing the resolution electing Shri Pema Khandu as the Legislature Party Leader of the PPA in the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly w.e.f. 16.9.2016, the Form-I under rule 3 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules intimating the names and other details of the members of the Legislature Party of the PPA in the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly after such merger, as signed by the leader of the Legislature Party of PPA and the Form-III of the 43 PPA MLAs signed by each one of them as required under rule 4 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules. By the said claim of merger dated 16.9.2016, the 43 MLAs requested the Speaker to publish a summary of the information filed by the 43 PPA MLAs after the merger in Form-III in the Bulletin Part-II of the Arunachal Legislative Assembly, as required by rule 4 of the Disqualification Rules. The said claim of the merger also requested the Speaker to give a hearing to the 43 MLAs in case any application under the Tenth Schedule or the Rules framed there under. 114. The Annexure E letter dated 16.9.2016 of the Chief Minister and leader of the Legislature Party of PPA addressed to the Secretary to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly encloses the Form-I information of all the 43 members of the Legislature Party of PPA for being entered in the register maintained under rule 5 of the Disqualification Rules. Again by the Annexure F letter dated 16.9.2016 of the Chief Minister and leader of the Legislature Party of PPA addressed to the Secretary to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly encloses the information in Form-III furnished by the 43 members of the Legislature Party of PPA for being published in the Bulletin Party-II under Disqualification Rules. 115. The said Annexures D, E and F letters all dated 16.9.2016 makes a request to the Speaker to publish a summary of the information filed by the 43 PPA MLAs in Form-III in the Bulletin Part-II of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly by stating it is required under rule 4 of the Disqualification Rules and further to hear the 43 MLAs in the event any petition for disqualification is filed under the Tenth Schedule and the rules framed thereunder and with further request to the Secretary of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly to enter the information given in Form-I in the register maintained under rule 5 of the Disqualification Rules. 116. 116. It is noticed that unlike the petition dated 4.9.2003 or the petition dated 6.9.2003 in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), where there was a specific prayer for recognizing the split or the merger, as the case may be, in the instant case, the letter dated 16.9.2016 makes a prayer for publication of the information given in Form-III in the Bulletin Part-II under rule 4 of the Disqualification Rules and hear the members in case any petition for disqualification under Tenth Schedule and the Rules thereunder is filed and also to enter the information in the register maintained under rule 5 of the Disqualification Rules. 117. In such view of the matter, there is a substantial difference in the requests made in the petitions filed in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) and the letters of 16.9.2016 made in the present case. 118. As regards the order passed by the Speaker in Rajendra Singh Rana's case and in the present case, it is again noticed that in the order dated 6.9.2003 in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), the Speaker had passed an order by providing that the request of the 37 MLAs therein was accepted and the newly created Lok Tantrik Bohujan Dal was recognized in the Legislative Assembly, with further provision that the decision in the petition for disqualification would be taken up at an appropriate time. The said order of the Speaker dated 6.9.2003 in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), clearly spells out a decision by the Speaker to recognize the split/merger. In the said context when the order dated 16.9.2016 passed by the Speaker in the present case is examined, it is noticed that in his order of 16.9.2016, the Speaker had provided that the Secretary may publish the information given in Form-III by the 43 MLAs in the Bulletin Part-II dated 16.9.2016 and also publish m the gazette and further as no procedure for recognizing a merger by The Speaker is available under the anti-defection law and in view of the information of party change given in Form-III by the MLAs and in Form-I by the leader of the Legislature Party, the MLAs be shown as the PPA MLAs by further providing that as no order of recognizing merger is issued, the claim would be taken up as a defence in a disqualification petition, if filed, under the Tenth Schedule. 119. 119. The order of the Speaker of 16.9.2016, thus comprises of an order to publish the information of party change in the Bulletin Part-II and to show the MLAs as PPA MLAs, while clearly refusing to pass any order recognizing the merger, by further providing that the question of merger would be taken up as a defence if any application for disqualification is filed. 120. In order arrive at a conclusion as to whether the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker is a decision recognizing the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA, the relevant provisions of law under which the request was made by the Chief Minister and leader of the PPA Legislature Party and the MLAs for publication and recording of the information would also be relevant. As already noticed by the letters of 16.9.2016, the requests were made for publishing the information given in Form-III in Bulletin Part-II under rule 4 of the Disqualification Rules and for recording of the information given in Form-I in the register maintained under rule 5 of the Disqualification Rules. 121. Rule 3(1) of the Disqualification Rules requires the Leader of the Legislature Party, where such Legislature Party is formed after the first sitting of the Assembly to furnish the information to the Speaker containing the names of the members of such Legislature Party in Form-I and rule 3(7) requires the leader of the Legislature Party to submit a report to the Speaker in the event any member is admitted to such political party. Further rule 4(2) requires every member before subscribing an oath or affirmation under article 188 of the Constitution to deposit his election certificate or a certified copy of the notification nominating him as a member with the Secretary and also to furnish the Secretary a statement of particulars and declaration in Form-III, while rule 4(3) requires the said information provided by the members to be published in the Bulletin, which is defined to be the Bulletin Part-II. Also under rule 5(1) the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly is required to maintain a register in Form-IV of the information furnished under rules 3 and 4. 122. Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner sought to make out a case that under the aforesaid Rules, the Speaker is not empowered to publish any such information that the members may provide as regards change in party affiliation. 122. Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner sought to make out a case that under the aforesaid Rules, the Speaker is not empowered to publish any such information that the members may provide as regards change in party affiliation. The learned senior counsel seeks to interpret the provision of rule 4(2) of the Disqualification Rules in a manner that only after the election of a member to the assembly there is a requirement of the member to furnish the election certificate or the nomination certificate along with a statement of particulars and declaration in Form-III. Subsequent to such election, even in the event of there being a change in party affiliation, rule 4(2) does not make it incumbent upon such member to provide the information to the Secretary. As such, as the information is not required to be provided to the Secretary of the Assembly Secretariat, therefore, even if any such information is provided, the Speaker would merely keep the same in the file and not publish it in the Bulletin Part-II under rule 4(3). Accordingly, it is submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that under rule 4(3) there is no provision for the Speaker to publish any subsequent information of change in party affiliation and therefore, the order of the Speaker dated 16.9.2016 requiring such publication is without jurisdiction. 123. To answer the said question, an analysis and interpretation of rule 4(2) of the Disqualification Rules would be relevant. Rule 4(2), amongst others, provides that before making and subscribing an oath or affirmation under article 188 of the Constitution and before taking seat in the House, a member is required to deposit his election certificate or a certified copy of the notification nominating him as a member with the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly and also to furnish to the Secretary a statement of particulars and declaration in Form-III. 124. The first part of the requirement of rule 4(2) is that before making the oath or affirmation and taking his seat in the House, the member is required to deposit his election certificate or the certified copy of nomination him as a member with the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. The second part of the requirement of rule 4(2) is that the member shall also furnish to the Secretary a statement of particulars and declaration in Form-III. 125. The second part of the requirement of rule 4(2) is that the member shall also furnish to the Secretary a statement of particulars and declaration in Form-III. 125. It is noticed that the first of the requirement of rule 4(2) of depositing the election certificate or the nomination as a member and the second requirement of furnishing the Form-III are joined together in a conjunctive manner by the expression 'and also'. The expression 'and' indicating the conjunctive nature of two provisions or requirements, makes it a composite class. But when the expression 'and' is qualified by another expression 'also' making it 'and also', the conjunctive nature of the two provisions or requirements would not make it a composite class, but would give the indication that both the provisions or requirements can exist independently of each other. 126. In view of the above, the two requirements of rule 4(2), i.e., the requirement of depositing the certificates or nominations as member and the requirement of furnishing the information under Form-III are independent and separate requirements which can exist even in the absence of the other. 127. In such view of the matter, it is not necessary that a member is required to furnish the information under Form-III only at the stage while he deposits his election certificates or nomination as member. 128. In order to interpret the provision of rule 4(2) of the Disqualification Rules, as to whether the required information to be furnished by the members to the Secretary would only be in respect of the stage when such member has been elected to the House or such information are also required to be furnished whenever there is any change in party affiliation by any of the members subsequent to his election to the House, a relevant consideration would also be the contents of the Form-III. For the purpose, as the information is required to be submitted in Form-III, the contents and requirement of Form-III would also give an indication as to whether such information is to be furnished only immediately after being elected to the House or at any subsequent stage also whenever there is a change of party affiliation by the Member. 129. The Form-III is noticed to be a part of the Disqualification Rules and it relates to rule 4 of the Rules. 129. The Form-III is noticed to be a part of the Disqualification Rules and it relates to rule 4 of the Rules. Clause 6 of the Form-III pertains to the information of the member of his party affiliation as on the election/nomination and also as on the date of signing the Form. Further the Form-III also includes a declaration by the member that in the event of any change in the information, the member undertakes to intimate the Speaker immediately. 130. The first information to be furnished by the member as per clause 6, is therefore, the party affiliation of the member on the date of his election/nomination and the second information in the party affiliation as on the date of signing the Form-III. Therefore, Form-III contemplates information relating to the change in party affiliation of the member even subsequent to his election/nomination. Further the required declaration that the member undertakes to inform the Speaker immediately about any change in party affiliation, is also an indication that the Form-III contemplates the furnishing of information relating to the change in party affiliation of the member even subsequent to his election/nomination. 131. In view such provision of Form-III, it can also be interpreted that the requirement of furnishing the information by a Member to the Speaker about any change in party affiliation is applicable also to a stage subsequent to the election/nomination of the member. In other words, as per the requirements of Form-III, a member is required to inform the Speaker about his change in party affiliation whenever it takes place, even subsequent to his election/nomination. 132. Although it can be argued that the Form-III is merely in the nature of a schedule to the Disqualification Rules and therefore, it cannot be utilized for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of rule 4(2), which is a part of the main enactment, but the said argument would not be acceptable, as it is, in the context of the factual circumstance of the present case. 133. As already noticed, rule 4(2) can be attempted to be interpreted in both ways, as sought to be done by Mr. 133. As already noticed, rule 4(2) can be attempted to be interpreted in both ways, as sought to be done by Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner by submitting that furnishing of the information under Form-III, is required to be done only once, i.e., when the member is elected to the House and the same would be accompanied by his election certificate or his nomination certificate. But at the same time, as already explained, rule 4(2) can also be interpreted to mean that the required information in Form-III would have to be furnished at any subsequent stage to the election, whenever there is a change in the party affiliation. Although by considering the implication of the expression 'and also' appearing in the rule 4(2), it is to be interpreted to mean that the Form-III information is also required to be given whenever there is a change in the party affiliation of the member, but by taking into consideration the submission of Mr. Mittal, the provision of rule 4(2) can also be said to be ambiguous in nature. 134. It is the interpretation of law that whenever any provision in the main enactment is ambiguous in nature, the provisions in the Schedule thereof, can be relied upon to remove the ambiguity and arrive at the correct interpretation between the two conflicting possible interpretations. The aforesaid principle of interpretation would be an exception to the general principle of interpretation that in the event of there being a conflict between the main enactment and that of the schedule, the provision of the main enactment would prevail. 135. The said principle of interpretation of the schedule being relied upon to remove an ambiguity in the main enactment was considered in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Gittus, 1920 (1) KB 563, wherein, in p.576 it has been held as follows : "It seems to me there are two principles or rules of interpretation which ought to be applied to the combination of Act and schedule. If the Act says that the schedule is to be used for a certain purpose and the heading of the part of the schedule in question shows that it is prima facie at any rate devoted to that purpose, then you must read the Act and the schedule as though the schedule were operating for that purpose, and if you can satisfy the language of the section without extending it beyond that purpose you ought to do it." 136. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 44 (4th edn.), in clause 880, it has been provided as under : "Reference to scheduled forms and plans. It is not generally permissible to limit the meaning of an unambiguous enactment by reference to a form scheduled to it but a scheduled form may be referred to for the purpose of throwing light on the construction of a doubtful or ambiguous enactment." 137. Again in M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (1989) 4 SCC 378 , wherein the hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that : "The schedule may be used in construing provisions in the body of the Act. It is as much an act of Legislature as the Act itself and it must be read together with the Act for all purposes of construction." 138. From the above proposition of law, the appropriate principle of interpretation would be that if the provisions in the main enactment are clear and unambiguous and no two interpretations are possible, the provisions of the main enactment would prevail over any other provision of the schedule, which may be in conflict in the main enactment. But when the provisions of the main enactment are open for two interpretations, meaning thereby, that the main enactment is unclear and ambiguous, the provisions of the schedule can be relied upon to give a correct and appropriate interpretation to the main enactment. 139. But when the provisions of the main enactment are open for two interpretations, meaning thereby, that the main enactment is unclear and ambiguous, the provisions of the schedule can be relied upon to give a correct and appropriate interpretation to the main enactment. 139. Applying the aforesaid provision of law in the context of interpreting rule 4(2) of the Disqualification Rules, which otherwise provides that information under Form-III is required to be given by a member on every subsequent change in party affiliation, but as a possible interpretation can also be argued that such information in Form-III is required to be given only at the time of the initial election, along with election certificate of nomination certificate, therefore, it would be apposite to fall back and rely upon the provision of Form-III to interpret the actual requirement of rule 4(2). 140. Further when the provision of rule 4(2) is read conjointly with the provision of rule 3(1) and 3(7) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, it is noticed that under rule 3(1), the leader of the Legislature Party shall, where such Legislature Party is formed after the first sitting of the House, within 30 days after its formation, shall furnish the Speaker with a statement in writing containing the names of the members in Form-I. Again under rule 3(7), if a member has voluntarily given up his membership of political party, a report is required to be submitted to the Speaker with the relevant fact and details as available. 141. Rules 3(1) and 3(7) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, clearly postulates a situation, where there may be a change of the party affiliation of a member during the currency of the Legislative Assembly and after its first sitting, or where, there may be a formation of a Legislature Party again during the currency of the Legislative Assembly and after its first sitting. In view of such provisions of rule 3(1) and rule 3(7) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, where a change in party affiliation or a formation of a Legislature Party comprising of a different political affiliation is also contemplated, the interpretation of rule 4(2) regarding the requirement of furnishing the information by a member in Form-III would also have to be considered accordingly. 142. 142. All the aforesaid considerations, i.e., interpreting the second part of rule 4(2), requiring the members to furnish the information under Form-III to be a requirement independent of the requirement to provide the election or nomination certificates, to take aid of the provision of Form-III to interpret rule 4(2) to mean that the members are also required to furnish the information in Form-III in the event of there being any change in party affiliation after the election of the member to the Legislative Assembly and that a conjoint reading of rules 3(1), 3(7) and 4(2) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules gives an indication that the Form-III information has to be furnished by the members even on there being a change in party affiliation, or formation of a Legislature Party, subsequent to the first sitting of the House, leads this court to a conclusion that under rule 4(2) there is a procedural requirement for every member to furnish the information to the Speaker in Form-III about any change in party affiliation, even subsequent to the initial stage where the member is elected and the election certificate or nomination certificate is required to be furnished. 143. As the requirement of furnishing the information in Form-III as regards any change in party affiliation is a procedural requirement under rule 4(2), such information of subsequent party change would also require a publication under rule 4(3) in the Bulletin Part-II. 144. Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, relies upon the words "....they will be shown as PPA MLAs" to substantiate his argument that the Speaker in his order dated 16.9.2016 had taken a decision to recognize the meatier of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA and therefore, they have been ordered to be shown as PPA MLAs. In order to appreciate the correct implication of such submission, it would also be relevant to take note of, firstly, as to under what circumstance the said words have been used in the order dated 16.9.2016 and also, secondly, to refer to the complete order of the Speaker so as to understand the full meaning of the said words. 145. What is noticeable is that the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker was passed in response to the letters, all dated 16.9.2016 of the Chief Minister-cum-leader of the PPA Legislature Party. 145. What is noticeable is that the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker was passed in response to the letters, all dated 16.9.2016 of the Chief Minister-cum-leader of the PPA Legislature Party. By the first letter of the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party encloses the claim of merger, of the INC with PPA, requesting the Speaker to publish a summary of the information filed by the 43 PPA MLAs after the merger in Form-III, in the Bulletin Part-II. By the other letter of 16.9.2016, the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party provides the information of the members of the PPA Legislature Party in Form-I, to the Secretary of Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly for the purpose of being entered in the register maintained under rule 5 of the Disqualification Rules. Again, by the other letter of 16.9.2016 of Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party to the Secretary of Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, the information furnished by the 43 members in Form-III was attached for being published in Bulletin Part-II under rule 4 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987. 146. From the said three letters of the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party, it is seen that the requests were made to the Speaker as well as the Secretary of Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly to firstly publish the information furnished by the 43 members, in the Bulletin Part-II, as required by rule 4(3), in respect of the information furnished in Form-III and to enter the information so furnished in the register maintained under rule 5, in respect of the information furnished in Form-I. No such request or prayer has been made by the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the Legislature Party to recognize the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA, nor there is any request to recognize them as PPA MLAs subsequent to any such merger. 147. From such view of the matter, it is noticed that the nature of the request made by the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA on 16.9.2016 is at a substantial variance from the nature of the request or prayer made m the application dated 6.9.2003 of the 37 B.S.P. MLAs involved in Sn Rajendra Singh Rana (supra). 147. From such view of the matter, it is noticed that the nature of the request made by the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA on 16.9.2016 is at a substantial variance from the nature of the request or prayer made m the application dated 6.9.2003 of the 37 B.S.P. MLAs involved in Sn Rajendra Singh Rana (supra). In Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), the prayer before the Speaker was that the 37 B.S.P. MLAs constituting the Lok Tantnc Bahujan Dal be recognized as a separate group in the Legislative Assembly and a separate arrangement for their sitting inside the Assembly be made. The request for publishing the information provided by the members in Form-III in the Bulletin Part-II and entering the information provided in Form-I in the register cannot at all be said to be a request for recognizing the 43 MLAs as a separate group or in other words, to recognize the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA, or to recognize them as PPA MLAs subsequent to any such merger. 148. As already held, furnishing of the information of a party change by the concerned MLAs in Form-III and by the Leader of the Legislature Party as regards the information regarding the members in the party in Form-I is a procedural requirement of rules 3 and 4 of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987. In the event of any change in the composition of a Legislature Party and also in the change of party affiliation, both such information's under the procedure of the rules 3 and 4 are required to be furnished to the Speaker. 149. Rule 4(3) further provides that the summary of the information furnished by the members under the rule shall be published in the Bulletin Part-II, while under rule 5(1) the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly shall maintain in Form-IV, a register based on the information furnished under rule 3 and 4. Rule 4(3) and 5(1) also makes it incumbent upon the Speaker or the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly to publish the information in the Bulletin Part-II and also to enter the information in the register. 150. Rule 4(3), requires that the summary of the information published by the members be published, whereas, rule 5(1) requires that the information given under rules 3 and 4 be enter under register. 150. Rule 4(3), requires that the summary of the information published by the members be published, whereas, rule 5(1) requires that the information given under rules 3 and 4 be enter under register. The main crux of what is to be published in the Bulletin Part-II or entered in the register is the summary of the information or the information as may be furnished by the members or the leader of the Legislature Party. The summary of the information or the information is different from publishing or entering the claim made by such members. If the requirement of rules 4(3) and 5(1) would have been to publish the claim made by the members, in such event, the Speaker or the Secretary would be required to state that the published or the entered material is a claim. But when the requirement of the said two rules is to publish or enter the summary of the information or information, it is the content of the information which has to be published or entered. In the instant case, both the information's contained in the Form-I and Form-III is that the 43 MLAs are furnishing the information that they are PPA MLAs. 151. In the above view of the matter, in the considered view of this court, the words that "....they will be shown as PPA MLAs" is the information provided by the Members aid the leader of the Legislature Party. That it is not a decision of the Speaker, also flows from the language used in the whole of the order of 16.9.2016, which provides that the Speaker had gone through the papers and the Secretary may publish the information given in Form-III by the 43 MLAs in the Bulletin Part-II dated 16.9.2016 and also publish in the gazette and that as there is no procedure for recognizing merger under the anti-defection law in view of their party change information given in Form-III and Form-I, they will be shown as PPA MLAs, by further providing that no separate order recognizing the merger is issued and the claim be taken as a defence against disqualification in a petition under Tenth Schedule, whenever filed. The Speaker firstly provides that the relevant information be published and secondly as there is no procedure for recognizing the merger, the claim of merger will be taken up as a defence in a proceeding of disqualification, if filed, meaning thereby, that whether it is a merger or not would be decided in the disqualification proceeding, if taken as a defence. But for the purpose of publishing, the information be published by showing as PPA MLAs. From a reading order of the whole order of the Speaker of 16.9.2016 also makes imperative that there is no decision by the Speaker recognizing the merger. 152. Upon considering all the aforesaid aspects, mainly, that there is a substantial difference in the request made in the applications, in the present case and that of the application made in the Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) and also the actual decision by the Speaker in the Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) and that the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 requires a publication of the information furnished by the Members and the Leader of the Legislature Party and the Speaker by the order dated 16.9.2016 had ordered such publication by showing the information so given, and further that reading of the whole of the order dated 16.9.2016 makes it explicitly clear that the Speaker had refused to decide the claim of the merger by keeping the issue open to be decided whenever any petition for disqualification is filed, this court is of the view that the order dated 16.9.2016 is not an order rendering a decision on the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA. 153. The said conclusion is further fortified by the statements made in the Disqualification Petition being Petition No. LA/LEG-65 of 2016 of the General Secretary of Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee. The said Disqualification petition being filed by one Tamchi Tahar, General Secretary of Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee and the present petition being filed by Shri Padi Richo, who states himself to be the President of the Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee, it is to be understood that both the petitions are by the same entity and claims a relief based on the same set of facts. 154. 154. In paragraph 13 of the Disqualification Petitions it is stated that the Speaker by the order dated 16.9.2016 took on record the information regarding change of party by the INC members as furnished in Form-III by the MLAs and given by the Leader of the Legislature Party in Form-I. In paragraph 14, it has been stated that the Speaker did not recognize the merger and no order was passed permitting merger of 43 MLAs with PPA. In paragraph 21, it has been stated that the Speaker had not accepted/recognize the merger with PPA, which is evident from the order dated 16.9.2016, passed by the Speaker. 155. The said averments in the Disqualification Petition, which again has been made a part of the present writ petition, also shows that even the institution represented by the petitioner had accepted the position that by the order dated 16.9.2016, the Speaker had not accepted and recognized the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA. 156. As explained hereinafter, a decision would be a finally concluded opinion upon a determination. In the order of 16.9.2016, it is noticed that the claim of the 43 MLAs as regards the merger with the PPA had not been finally concluded by the Speaker upon a determination and on the other hand, the said question was kept open to be considered as and when the petition for disqualification, if filed, would be considered. 157. Accordingly, as the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker is held to be not a decision to recognize the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA, the further requirement of a determination is as to whether the Speaker had the jurisdiction to publish any such information that the Members may provide as regards change in party affiliation. As discussed earlier, the same power can be traced to the rules 3(1), 3(7), 4(2), 4(3) and 5(1) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987. When it is held that under 4(2), there is also requirement of a Member to inform the Speaker of a change in party affiliation, even after the initial election of the Member to the House, there is corresponding requirement under rule 4(3) to publish the same in the Bulletin Part-II. When it is held that under 4(2), there is also requirement of a Member to inform the Speaker of a change in party affiliation, even after the initial election of the Member to the House, there is corresponding requirement under rule 4(3) to publish the same in the Bulletin Part-II. In this respect, the contention of the respondents, that the information of change in party affiliation is required to be published in the Bulletin for the information of the Members as well as the public, is a more reasonable and a logical view to be taken. The counter contention of the petitioner in this respect that the information to be provided is simply to be kept in file to be used at the time when a Disqualification Petition is filed and the only basis for a Disqualification Petition would be the media reports is also found to be inconsistent with the purpose of publication of the information. A media report regarding change in party affiliation may be acted upon for the purpose of filing a Disqualification Petition, but merely because it is permissible to do so, the same by itself cannot be conclusive that media report is the only basis for filing a Disqualification Petition. Accordingly, the contention of the petitioners that the Speaker did not have any authority to publish the information of change in party affiliation is found to be unacceptable. 158. Accordingly, the contention of the petitioners that the Speaker did not have any authority to publish the information of change in party affiliation is found to be unacceptable. 158. In the aforesaid factual matrix, where in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), there was an application by the 37 MLAs therein making a specific request for an order to recognize them as a separate group within the Legislative Assembly and the Speaker having accepted the request of the 37 MLAs and recognized the Lok Tantrik Bahujan Dal in the Legislative Assembly and wherein the present case the Chief Minister-cum-Leader of the PPA Legislature Party had made a request to the Speaker to publish the information provided in Form-III in the Bulletin Part-II and enter the information provided in Form-I in the register of the Legislative Assembly and the Speaker having ordered for such publication by showing them as PPA MLAs and further by providing that the decision as regards the merger would be taken up when a Disqualification Petition is filed, the ratio laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court that the Speaker could not have decided the recognition of merger, by leaving aside the petition of disqualification, is inapplicable in the present case. It is further noticed that whereas, in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), the Disqualification Petition was filed prior to the decision of the Speaker, but in the present case on the day the order dated 16.9.2016 was passed, no such Disqualification Petition was pending before the Speaker. 159. For a better appreciation of the contentions of Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the Speaker ought to have kept the information of change of party affiliation in the file and should have used it only upon the petition for disqualification being filed, a comparative analysis of the situation as to what would have happened had the Speaker kept the information in the file, would be appropriate. The information by the members as regards change of party affiliation is the basis for filing of a petition for disqualification of such members. So, if the Speaker keeps the information in the file and does not let others know about it, it can also be seen as an attempt by the Speaker to inhibit such filing of the petition for disqualification, which would again be against the Constitutional scheme under the Tenth Schedule. 160. So, if the Speaker keeps the information in the file and does not let others know about it, it can also be seen as an attempt by the Speaker to inhibit such filing of the petition for disqualification, which would again be against the Constitutional scheme under the Tenth Schedule. 160. Such submission on the part of the learned senior counsel appears to be fallacious and not supported by any logical reasoning. Further, although there had been submission and reiteration that the Speaker ought to have kept the information in the file, but no material basis to substantiate such submission had been provided by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. The only basis as submitted was that the Speaker did not have the jurisdiction to publish the information, which again had already been dealt elaborately hereinbefore. 161. With regard to the further submissions of Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that in a multi-party democratic system, the party affiliation is of paramount importance and that in the event of any change in the party affiliation, loss and injury is caused to the original party from which the change has been made, and that the manner in which the resolutions of 16.9.2016 were taken resulting in the proposal and acceptance of a merger would render the same unsustainable and hence, there was in fact no merger, would be more appropriate, if the same are raised by the petitioner before the Speaker, when the petition for disqualification would be given its consideration. As available under the law, a defence against such petition for disqualification, would be a claim of a merger and therefore, the submission of the petitioner that the sequence of events that had taken place on 16.9.2016 do not warrant it to be called a merger, would have to be taken up for consideration whenever a claim of merger would be taken up as a defence against a disqualification. 162. 162. In the said circumstance, this court refrains itself from expressing any view on the claim of the petitioner that the INC as a political party had suffered loss and injury as because of the change of party affiliation by the 43 MLAs and also that the claim of the merger in the resolutions of 16.9.2016 are not sustainable in view of the manner in which they were taken and as such, there was no merger at all. Any attempt by this court to adjudicate and decide upon the said issues would amount to usurping the power and authority of the Speaker to decide such issues in the proceeding under the Tenth Schedule. Nemo judex in causa sua 163. Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner had contended that as the Speaker himself was one of the 43 MLAs who had changed the party affiliation from INC to PPA, therefore, for the purpose of issuing the order dated 16.9.2016, requiring the publication of the information furnished by the 43 MLAs, the Speaker had decided his own cause and as such, his conduct had violated the principles of natural justice as regards the principle of nemo judex in causa sua. It was stressed that the Speaker was also a party to the resolutions of the proposal of merger, acceptance of merger and the election of the leader of the Legislature Party and therefore, any order passed by the Speaker to publish the said information showing the 43 INC MLAs to be the PPA MLAs, would be a decision by the Speaker in his own cause. 164. In this respect, Mr. R.K. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 and others had contended that under the scheme of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, it was the Speaker alone who could have passed that order and no other authority other than the Speaker has been authorized to pass the same and therefore, by the applicability of the doctrine of necessity, the Speaker was required to act accordingly and for the purpose placed reliance on the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in J. Mohapatra and Company (supra). It had also been the contention of Mr. It had also been the contention of Mr. R.K. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel that the petitioner is also even aware of the said factor and therefore, when the petition for disqualification was filed on 14.10.2016, the Speaker had not been made a respondent therein and only 42 of the MLAs out of the 43 INC MLAs, who had changed their party affiliation to PPA, were arrayed as respondents. According to Mr. Dwivedi, the said fact itself is an indication that it is an acknowledgement on the part of the petitioner that the principle of nemo judex in causa sua is not applicable in respect of the Speaker. 165. The question of change of party affiliation during the currency of a Legislative Assembly, or to that effect the claim of any merger of one political party with another and the consequences thereof, are all matters within the purview of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. While paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule provides for a disqualification of a member in the event a member belonging to one political party voluntarily given up his membership of such political party, or votes or abstains from voting contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs, without obtaining prior permission of such political party, paragraph 6 provides for a decision on the question as to disqualification on the ground of defection, which the Speaker is required to take and paragraph 4 provides for an exemption for such member from being disqualified, if he claims that he and any other member of his original political party became members of such other political parties, or a new political party has been formed, by merger. Therefore, all matters relating to, or incidental to a disqualification for defection or the exemption thereof through a merger, are within the purview of the Tenth. Schedule alone, where the Speaker is the only authority to decide upon it. Under paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker of the House is empowered to frame rules to give effect to the provisions of the Tenth Schedule and for the furtherance of carrying out its provisions, certain procedural requirements are provided in the Rules as regards the party affiliation of the members or to that effect also as regards the claim of any change in party affiliation of the members. The provisions of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987, which had been framed under paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule, clearly provides for a procedure, where the members are required to inform the Speaker about its party affiliation at the beginning of the commencement of the Assembly as well as of any change in party affiliation during the currency of the Assembly, which information the Speaker is required to cause a publication in the Bulletin Part-II. 166. In the aforesaid premises of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule and the Rules framed there under, it is the Speaker alone, who can be informed about the party affiliation, or the subsequent change in party affiliation, as the case may be, and again on the information being so provided, it is the Speaker alone, who can cause its publication by passing an appropriate order. 167. Accordingly, it is to be concluded that under the scheme of the Tenth Schedule and the Rules framed there under, no other authority, other than the Speaker could have passed the order dated 16.9.2016, requiring the publication of the information of the change in party affiliation by the 43 INC MLAs to that of PPA, by showing them as PPA MLAs. 168. In Election Commission of India (supra), the hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 16 had explained the concept of the doctrine of necessity. It was provided that the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not countenance on the touch stone of judicial propriety and the doctrine makes it imperative for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial propriety must yield. It is often invoked in case of bias, where there is no other authority or judge to decide the issue and if the doctrine is not allowed full play in certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course of justice and the defaulting party would benefit from it. 169. In J. Mohapatra and Company (supra), the hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 12 had held that there is an exception to the rule that no man should be a judge in his own cause, namely, the doctrine of necessity. 169. In J. Mohapatra and Company (supra), the hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 12 had held that there is an exception to the rule that no man should be a judge in his own cause, namely, the doctrine of necessity. It was provided that an adjudicator, who is the subject to disqualification on the ground of bias or interest in the matter, which he has to decide, may be required to adjudicate, if there is no other person, who is competent or authorized to adjudicate. In such cases, the principle of natural justice would have to give way to necessity, for otherwise there would be no means to decide the matter and the machinery or administration of justice would break down. 170. Further, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava, (2006) 3 SCC 276 , the hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 15 had held that although it is true that the principle of natural justice is based on two pillars, i.e., nobody shall be condemned without hearing and nobody shall be a judge in his own cause, but in a case where the doctrine of necessity is applicable, compliance with the principle of natural justice would be excluded. In paragraph 16, Sir William Wade in his administrative law had been quoted, which is as follows : "But there are many cases where no substitution is possible, since no one else is empowered to act. Natural justice then has to give way to necessity; for otherwise there is no means of deciding and the machinery of justice or administration will break down." "In administrative cases the same exigency may arise. Where the stature empowers a particular minister or official to act, he will usually be the one and only person who can do so. There is then no way of escaping the responsibility, even if he is personally interested. Transfer of responsibility is, indeed, a recognized type of ultra vires. In one case it was unsuccessfully argued that the only minister competent to confirm a compulsory purchase order for land for an airport had disqualified himself by showing bias and that the local authority could only apply for a local Act of Parliament." 171. Transfer of responsibility is, indeed, a recognized type of ultra vires. In one case it was unsuccessfully argued that the only minister competent to confirm a compulsory purchase order for land for an airport had disqualified himself by showing bias and that the local authority could only apply for a local Act of Parliament." 171. In the instant case, as already indicated, under the scheme of the Tenth Schedule and the rules framed thereunder, the Speaker is the only authority to be informed about any change in the party affiliation and to further cause such information to be published in the Bulletin Part-II of the Assembly. The order of 16.9.2016 being an order where the Speaker had caused the information about the 43 INC MLAs changing its party affiliation to PPA, to be published in the Bulletin Part-II, therefore, could not have been passed by any other authority and even if, it may have been done, the same would have been without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the factual situation in which the Speaker had passed the order of 16.9.2016 would attract the provision of the doctrine of necessity. Hence, the said order of 16.9.2016 of the Speaker would be an exception to the applicability of the principle of nemo judex in causa sua. 172. The status and the position of the Speaker in the constitutional scheme had also been discussed by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Kihoto Hallohan (supra). In paragraph 116 of the majority view of the Constitution Bench, an extract from G.V. Mavalankar's "Office of Speaker" had been quoted, wherein it is stated as follows : "In parliamentary democracy, the office of the Speaker is held in very high esteem and respect. There are many reasons for this. Some of them are purely historical and some are inherent in the concept of Parliamentary democracy and the powers and duties of the Speaker. Once a person is elected Speaker, he is expected to be above parties, above politics. In other words, he belongs to all the members or belongs to none. He holds the scales of justice evenly irrespective of party or person, though no one expects that he will do absolute justice in all matters; because, as a human being he has his human drawbacks and shortcomings. However, everybody knows that he will intentionally do no injustice or show partiality. He holds the scales of justice evenly irrespective of party or person, though no one expects that he will do absolute justice in all matters; because, as a human being he has his human drawbacks and shortcomings. However, everybody knows that he will intentionally do no injustice or show partiality. Such a person is naturally held in respect by all." Further, in paragraph 117 of the said judgment, by referring Pandit Nehru, it was stated as follows : "....The Speaker represents the House. He represents the dignity of the House, the freedom of the House and because the House represents the nation, in a particular way, the speaker becomes the symbol of the nation's freedom and liberty. Therefore, it is right that should be an honoured position, a free position and should be occupied always by men of outstanding ability and impartiality." In the aforesaid judgment, by referring Erskine May, it was stated as follows : "The Chief characteristics attaching to the office of Speaker in the House of Commons are authority and impartiality. As a symbol of his authority he is accompanied by the Royal mace which is borne before him when entering and leaving the chamber and upon State occasions by the Serjeant-at-Arms attending the House of Commons, and is placed upon the table when he is in the chair." "....Confidence in the impartiality of the Speaker is an indispensable condition of the successful working of procedure, and many conventions exist which have as their object not only to ensure the impartiality of the Speaker, but also to ensure that his impartiality is generally recognized...." 173. Although the minority view in paragraphs 180 and 181 of Kihoto Hallohan (supra) is somewhat contrary, but going by the majority view of the Constitution Bench, the status of the Speaker under the constitutional scheme and the stature attached to it, any likelihood of there being a political bias ness in passing any order or taking any decision has to be ruled out. Therefore, the apprehension of there being a violation of the principle of nemo judex in causa sua by the Speaker by passing the order dated 16.9.2016 would also have to be looked from the aforesaid point of view of the majority in the Kihoto Hallohan (supra). 174. Therefore, the apprehension of there being a violation of the principle of nemo judex in causa sua by the Speaker by passing the order dated 16.9.2016 would also have to be looked from the aforesaid point of view of the majority in the Kihoto Hallohan (supra). 174. Further, as already been held, the order of 16.9.2016 of the Speaker is not a decision on the recognition of the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA, whereas on the other hand, it is merely a publication of the information of the change in party affiliation provided by the members as required under rules 4(2) and (3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987. From such view of the matter also, the principle of nemo judex in causa sua is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 175. In this respect, the submission of Mr. R.K. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the responder No.4 and others that the petitioner was also well aware and convinced to himself that the principle of nemo judex in causa sua is not applicable in the present case inasmuch as, in the petition for disqualification dated 4.10.2016 the Speaker was not arrayed as a respondent although he was amongst the 43 INC MLAs, who had changed the party affiliation, also finds sufficient force to merit its acceptance. 176. Accordingly, the contention of the petitioner that the order of the Speaker dated 16.9.2016 is not sustainable, inasmuch as, the same is vitiated by the principle of nemo judex in causa sua, is found to be unacceptable. Violation of Natural Justice for not affording the petitioner or any person from the INC any opportunity of hearing before the order of 16.9.2016 was passed by the Speaker: 177. Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner had raised a contention that the dominant aspect of a multi-party democracy is the party affiliation and whenever there is any unauthorized change in the party affiliation by the members of the Assembly, the original political party from where the change has been effected, do suffer a loss and injury. Therefore, it was imperative on the part of the Speaker to afford the INC party an opportunity of hearing and presenting their case before the order of 16.9.2016 was passed. Therefore, it was imperative on the part of the Speaker to afford the INC party an opportunity of hearing and presenting their case before the order of 16.9.2016 was passed. According to the learned senior counsel, the order of 16.9.2016 was a decision of the Speaker on the recognition of the merger and as the facts and circumstances leading to such claim of merger was not in accordance with the requirement of effecting such a merger, therefore, the INC party was entitled to an opportunity of hearing to establish that the claim of merger is to be rejected by the Speaker. Further, as per the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker has an adverse civil consequence upon the INC party and therefore, from such point of view also they were entitled to an opportunity of hearing. As no such opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner, it was the contention of the learned senior counsel that the principle of natural justice had been violated. 178. It is noticed that the entire contention of Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner was that the members having been elected on the basis of tickets provided by the INC and the acceptance of political party being an inherent part of the multi-party democratic system, any severance by any such member from the original political party from which he was elected, do cause a loss and injury to such party. Therefore, before any such decision of the Speaker to recognize a merger, which entails the recognition of a legitimate severance from the original political party, such party is entitled to an opportunity of hearing to produce their case that there was no such legitimate severance and the attempt by the concerned members to change the party affiliation would not be recognized by the law. To that effect, Mr. Mittal, learned senior counsel had also highlighted certain instances in which the resolutions of 16.9.2016 were taken and that such instances do make the resolutions unsustainable. As such, had the opportunity been given, the INC party could have been able to convince the Speaker and produce the relevant materials to desist the Speaker from taking the decision on the recognition of the merger. 179. As such, had the opportunity been given, the INC party could have been able to convince the Speaker and produce the relevant materials to desist the Speaker from taking the decision on the recognition of the merger. 179. In this respect the hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 42 of Kihoto Hallohan (supra), had expressed the concern that any freedom of its members to vote as they feels, independently of the political party's declared policies, will not only embarrass its public image and popularity, but also undermine the public confidence in it which, in the ultimate analysis, is its source of sustenance. In paragraph 13, observations were made that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule give recognition to the role of political parties in the political process and the political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and sets up its candidate in the election on the basis of such programmes. Again in paragraph 9, it had been observed that the object of the Tenth Schedule is to curb the evil of political defections motivated by lure of office or other similar considerations, which endangers the foundation of our democracy. 180. Further, in paragraph 72 of Jagjit Singh (supra), it had been observed that if a member is set up by a national party, it would be no answer to say that events at national level have no concern to decide whether there is a split or not. 181. In Kanhiya Lai Omar (supra), in paragraph 10, it had been observed that although till recently the Constitution did not expressly refer to the existence of the political parties, but their existence is implicit in the nature of democratic form of Government. The use of symbols does give right to a unifying effect amongst the people with common political and economic programme. The political parties have to be there if the present system of Government should succeed and the chasm dividing the political parties should be so profound that a change of administration would in fact be a revolution disguised under the constitutional procedure. The political parties have to be there if the present system of Government should succeed and the chasm dividing the political parties should be so profound that a change of administration would in fact be a revolution disguised under the constitutional procedure. Further, the Full Bench of the hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Prakash Singh Badal (supra), was of the view that political parties exists because the people wish to be governed according to a particular policy and the electors do not vote for a candidate, but for a party, with a few exceptions here and there. 182. In Kuldip Nayar (supra), in paragraph 451, the hon'ble Supreme Court had expressed the view that it cannot be forgotten that the existence of the political parties is an essential feature of our parliamentary democracy and that it can be a matter of concern for the Parliament if it finds that electors were resorting to cross voting etc. The same would weaken the party discipline. In paragraph 452 it was stated that Parliamentary democracy and multi-party system are an inherent part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution and it is the political parties that set up candidates in an election. 183. As the aforesaid propositions laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the other courts clearly indicates the prevalence and relevance of the political parties in the democratic set up of our Country, which in fact is the basic structure of the Constitution, therefore, the submission of Mr. K.C. Mittal, learned senior counsel that the INC had suffered a loss and injury on the acceptance of the merger by the Speaker of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA as per the order dated 16.9.2016, would have to be considered from the said perspective. 184. But for the purpose of deciding as to whether the same can be construed to be a basis for deciding as to whether there is any violation of the principles of natural justice, in respect of Audi Alterem Partem, a relevant consideration to be examined would be as to what is the purpose as well as the purport of the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker. Although in principle, the loss and injury of the INC can be relevant from the point of view of the prevalence and relevance of the political parties in the Indian democratic system, but again the actual determination as to whether there was any such loss and injury would again defend upon the factual determination as to whether the change in party affiliation by the 43 INC MLAs to that of PPA and also the claim of merger with PPA, do satisfy the rigours of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. 185. As already noticed the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India provides for a member to be disqualified in the event his change of party affiliation is not as per the procedure prescribed therein and again, a member who claims or indulges in such change of party affiliation, also has for his defence to take up the plea of merger as provided in paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule. Therefore, the entire decision as to whether the original political party had suffered a loss or injury would be subject to the decision by the Speaker while deciding the petition for a disqualification where the available defence of a merger would also be given its due consideration. 186. In the context, therefore, to decide the question as to whether the INC party was entitled to a hearing before the order dated 16.9.2016 was passed by the Speaker, would invariably depend upon as to what was the nature and purport of the order dated 16.9.2016. 187. In this context, the contention of the petitioner is that by the said order, the Speaker decided the recognition of the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with PPA inasmuch as, in the order of 16.9.2016, the Speaker had ordered that they be shown as PPA MLAs. Such contention of the petitioner has already been answered herein before by arriving at a conclusion that on a reading of the whole of the order dated 16.9.2016, it is explicitly clear that the Speaker had refused to decide the claim of the merger by keeping the issue open to be decided whenever any petition for disqualification is filed and therefore the order dated 16.9.2016 is not an order rendering a decision on the recognition of the merger. 188. 188. If hearing is given before the order of 16.9.2016, both sides would raise their contentions, either supporting or objecting to the claim of the merger, or to that effect as to whether change in party affiliation was done in the manner as prescribed by law. An adjudication of such rival claims would have the necessary implications of there being a decision on the claim of the merger. But, as no petition for disqualification was filed or pending at that stage, any such decision on the merger would have been against the law laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), where it was held that the decision on merger cannot precede the decision in the petition for disqualification. 189. Because of such implication of an opportunity of hearing being given, also leads to a conclusion that as without there being a decision on the basis of the contention and counter contentions that would have been required in the event of an opportunity of hearing being given, such opportunity of hearing would have been a futile exercise. Hence, from the said point of view also, there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. 190. The concept of 'decision' was indeed considered by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Purnima Manthena v. Renuka Datla, (2016) 1 SCC 237 , wherein it was opined that a decision logically presupposes an adjudication on the facets of the controversy involved and mere deferment thereof to a future point of time till the completion of the essential legal formalities would not ipso-facto fructify into a verdict to generate a question of law to be appealed from. 191. Again in Tirumalachetti Rajaram v. Tirumalachetti Radhakrishnayya Chetty, AIR 1961 SC 1795 , it was concluded that the decision in the context means the decision on the points for determination and that is the meaning of the word decision. 192. In Oxford's Advanced Dictionary, the word decision is defined to mean a choice or judgments that you make after thinking and talking about what is the best thing to do. While Chambers Dictionary defines decision to mean the act of deciding where the word 'decide' is defined to mean to settle something or to make the final result of something certain. 193. While Chambers Dictionary defines decision to mean the act of deciding where the word 'decide' is defined to mean to settle something or to make the final result of something certain. 193. From the aforesaid proposition, what Ian be concluded is that when it is stated that there is a decision, it would mean a finally concluded opinion upon a determination. 194. When the order of the Speaker dated 16.9.2016 is examined from the point of view as to whether there is any finally concluded opinion as regards the claim of the merger of the 43 INC MLAs with that of PPA, it is noticeable that the order firstly requires the Secretary to publish the information given in Form-III by the 43 MLAs in the Bulletin Part-II dated 16.9.2016 and also to publish the same in the Gazette and secondly, as there is no procedure for recognizing merger by the Speaker under the Anti-Defection law, therefore, in view of the information of party change given in Form-III by the MLAs and in Form-I by the leader of the Legislature Party, they will be shown as PPA MLAs and thirdly, no separate order recognizing the merger be issued and the claim be taken up as a defence against disqualification in a petition under the Tenth Schedule whenever filed. 195. What the order of 16.9.2016 provides is that in the publication in the Bulletin Part-II, the 43 MLAs be shown as PPA MLAs and without arriving at any conclusion upon determining the question as to whether there had been any merger, the said question was kept open to be taken up as a defence against disqualification in a petition under the Tenth Schedule. The aforesaid provisions of the order of 16.9.2016 clearly indicates that without there being any conclusive determination as to whether any merger had taken place, the said question is kept open to be decided in future as a defence in a petition for disqualification. Therefore, the order of 16.9.2016 merely indicates a preliminary procedure before embarking on the actual determination on the question whether a merger had taken place or not. 196. Therefore, the order of 16.9.2016 merely indicates a preliminary procedure before embarking on the actual determination on the question whether a merger had taken place or not. 196. In the aforesaid premises, the question for determination would be whether the principles of natural justice in respect of audi alterem partem would be applicable in a situation where a preliminary procedure was undertaken before embarking on a final decision on the question as to whether the conduct of the 43 MLAs constituted a merger. 197. In the book Natural Justice by Paul Jackson, at page 113 by referring to the decisions in Wiseman v. Borneman, (1971) AC 297, 308 per Lord Reid and Norwest Holst Ltd. v. Department of Trade, [1978] 2 All ER 1033, it is provided that "a decision which does not affect rights, because, for example, it is a preclude to taking further proceedings in the course of which the party concerned will have an opportunity to be heard, will, very likely, not itself be subject to the requirements of natural justice, or only in a modified form". It had also been provided that "a great weight was attached to the distinction between a final determination of the rights of the parties and that of a decision that there is or not a prima-facie case." 198. In the instant case, the provisions of the order dated 16.9.2016 is in the nature of a prelude to take up further proceedings for determining the question as to whether there had been a merger or not in the event a petition for disqualification is filed, where the determination on the question of merger may be taken up as a defence. 199. The party concerned, being the petitioner in the instant case, representing the cause of the INC party would have an adequate opportunity to present their case to substantiate that there has been no merger and that the requirements of law for accepting a merger had not been fulfilled. 199. The party concerned, being the petitioner in the instant case, representing the cause of the INC party would have an adequate opportunity to present their case to substantiate that there has been no merger and that the requirements of law for accepting a merger had not been fulfilled. Further, in course of such opportunity of hearing, it will also be open for the petitioner and other similarly situated persons to raise the question that by such claim for change of party affiliation, the INC as a political party had suffered loss and injury and that under the scheme of democracy in the Indian context, where the original political party under whose ticket a member is elected has a great relevance, the claim for change in party affiliation and the consequential merger are unacceptable. 200. In the aforesaid circumstances, more particularly, in view of the meaning and purport of the order dated 16.9.2016, as it appears from reading the whole of the order, the assertion of the petitioner that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, is found to be unacceptable. 201. The loss and injury that the original political party may suffer upon some of its members indulging in a change in party affiliation, can also be looked into from the perspective that under the provisions to the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, there is no such remedy available to the original party to either prohibit any of its members from indulging in change in party affiliation, or to that effect to reverse the situation in the event any of the members undertake such change in party affiliation. Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule provides that in the event a member voluntarily gives up his membership of a political party or he votes or abstains from voting in the house contrary to any direction by the political party, such member shall be liable to be disqualified from being a member of the House. But there is no such provision in the Tenth Schedule which enables the political party to prevent any member from voluntarily giving up the membership of the political party or in the event of any such voluntary change of party affiliation to bring such member back to the original political party. Whether the writ petition is maintainable in view of the provisions of Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India. 202. Mr. Whether the writ petition is maintainable in view of the provisions of Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India. 202. Mr. N. Dutta, learned Advocate General raises a question of maintainability of the writ petition in view of the provisions of Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India. The learned Advocate General argues that the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker is essentially an order requiring the publication of the information provided and therefore, it amounts to a publication by or under the authority of the House. The Speaker, being the authority of a House and the order of 16.9.2016 having been provided by the authority of the House for the publication of the information, the same amounts to a publication and therefore, is not liable to any proceeding in any court. 203. The aforesaid contention of the learned Advocate General would require a consideration on firstly, the various roles of the Speaker under the scheme of the Indian Constitution as well as, as to whether the publication ordered in the order dated 16.9.2016 is the same publication as contemplated under Article 194(2) of the Constitution of India. 204. As already alluded, under the scheme of the Indian Constitution, the Speaker's powers and functions can broadly be classified to be of two categories. One of the power and function of the Speaker is to facilitate the conduct of the business of the House and the other is to perform the quasi-judicial role under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. 205. The hon'ble Supreme Court in Kashinath G. Jalmi (Dr.) v. The Speaker, (1993) 2 SCC 703 , in paragraph 42 has held that "There is no scope for reading into the Tenth Schedule any of the powers of the Speaker which he otherwise has while functioning as the Speaker in the House, to clothe him with any such power in his capacity as the statutory authority functioning under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. This is well settled by the decisions of the court relating to Speaker's orders under the Tenth Schedule. This is well settled by the decisions of the court relating to Speaker's orders under the Tenth Schedule. Accordingly, any power of the Speaker, available to him while functioning in the House, is not to be treated as his power or privilege as the authority under the Tenth Schedule." The said provisions clearly provides that the power exercised by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is different and separable from the powers exercised by the Speaker as may be available to him while functioning in the House and in order to exercise the powers under the Tenth Schedule, no such powers as may be exercised while functioning in the House, is available. 206. The powers of the Speaker for functioning in the House are appropriately provided under Part-VI Chapter-Ill of the Constitution of India. Article 208 of the Constitution of India provides for the House of the Legislature of the State to make the rules for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business, subject to the provisions of the Constitution. In exercise of such power under article 208, "The Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly" ('Business Rules') had been framed. 207. As regards the publication, the relevant rules under the Rules of Business is rule 321, which is as follows : "321. Printing and Publication of Assembly Papers- (1) The Speaker may authorise printing, publication, distribution or sale of any paper, document or report in connection with the business of the House or any paper, document or report laid on the Table or presented to the House or a Committee thereof. (2) A paper, document or report printed, published, distributed or sold in pursuance of sub-rule (1) shall be deemed to have been printed, published distributed or sold under the authority of the House within the meaning of clause (2) of article 194 of the Constitution. (3) If a question arises whether a paper, document or report is in connection with the business of the House or not, the question shall be referred to the Speaker whose decision shall be final." 208. (3) If a question arises whether a paper, document or report is in connection with the business of the House or not, the question shall be referred to the Speaker whose decision shall be final." 208. Article 194(2) of the Constitution and rule 321 of the Business Rules on a conjoint reading makes it explicitly clear as to what would be the nature of the publications in respect of which the privilege from any proceeding in any court is available to any person in respect of any publication by or under the authority of the House. Article 194(2) of the Constitution makes it explicit that the privilege in respect of a proceeding in any Court is available in respect of a publication made by or under the authority of the House or any report, vote, paper or proceeding. Whereas, rule 321 of the Business Rules makes it further explicit as to what would be the nature of such printing and publication, which would have the privilege against the proceeding in any court. Under rule 321, the Speaker may authorize printing, publication, distribution or sale of any paper, document or report in connection of the business of the House, or any paper, document or report laid on the Table of the House or presented to the House or a Committee thereof. Therefore, in order to be a printing or publication, where the privilege of a proceeding in a Court would be available, such printing or publication would have to be a paper, document or report in connection with the business of the House, or laid on the Table of the House or presented to the House or a Committee thereof. To the corollary, it is to be understood that if any printing or publication had been authorized by the Speaker, which does not relate to any paper, document or report, in connection with the business of the House or laid on the Table of the House, or presented to the House or a Committee thereof, such printing or publication may not have the privilege against a proceeding in a court under article 194(2) of the Constitution. 209. 209. Rule 321(2) of the Business Rules makes it further explicit that only such paper, document or report printed, published, distributed or sold pursuant to sub-rule (1) alone shall be deemed to have been printed or published within the meaning of article 194(2) of the Constitution. Therefore, any publication which does not conform to the requirement of rule 321(1) of the Business Rules, would not be deemed to be a publication within the meaning of article 194(2) of the Constitution and therefore, such publication would not have the privilege against the proceeding in any court. 210. Rule 321(3) of the Business Rules further provides that if there is any question as to whether a paper, document or report is in connection with the business of the House, the question shall be referred to the Speaker, whose decision shall be final. Although the question of maintainability of the writ petition had been raised by the learned Advocate General, representing the Speaker of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, but no such records had been produced to indicate that there has been a satisfaction by the Speaker that the publication of the information ordered by the order dated 16.9.2016 would also be within the purview of rule 321(1) of the Business Rules. Neither any such records had been produced, nor any stand had been taken by the learned Advocate General that the Speaker had expressed any satisfaction that the publication ordered in the order dated 16.9.2016 was a publication under rule 321(1) of the Business Rules. 211. On the other hand, another role of the Speaker within the scheme of the Indian Constitution is to exercise the powers conferred upon it by the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. 211. On the other hand, another role of the Speaker within the scheme of the Indian Constitution is to exercise the powers conferred upon it by the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The basic parameters of the powers conferred under the Tenth Schedule confines to a role of the Speaker to arrive at a decision as to whether any member is to be declared to be disqualified for having voluntarily giving up the membership of any political party or having voted or abstained from noting contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs, as provided under paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule and in order to arrive at such decision, the Speaker would also have to decide an the question of any merger, if the same is taken up as a defence by :he member, against whom the disqualification petition had been filed. 212. Paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule empowers the Speaker to frame the Rules to regulate the procedure for considering a petition for disqualification or as the case may be to examine the defence of a merger in the event of there being any such petition for disqualification. In exercise of powers under paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule, the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 had been framed. 213. As already alluded, rule 4(2) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 requires a member to inform the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly as regards his party affiliation at the time the member takes his seat in the House and also at any time thereafter in the event of there being a change in party affiliation. As per rule 4(3), the said information to be provided under rule 4(2) in the Form-III is required to be published in the Bulletin Part-II. 214. It is accordingly noticed that rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 also authorizes the Speaker to publish in the Bulletin Part-II any information that a member may provide to the Secretary of the Assembly as regards his party affiliation or as to any change in party affiliation. 215. 214. It is accordingly noticed that rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 also authorizes the Speaker to publish in the Bulletin Part-II any information that a member may provide to the Secretary of the Assembly as regards his party affiliation or as to any change in party affiliation. 215. The power of the Speaker to publish the information in the Bulletin Part-II under rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 is clearly different and distinguishable from the printing, publication, distribution or sale of any paper, document or report in connection with the business of the House or laid on the Table of the House or presented to the House or a Committee thereof. 216. In other words, the scope and ambit of the Speaker to authorize a publication under rule 321(1) of the Business Rules and under rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 are different with each other. 217. The publication of the information as regards party affiliation or change in party affiliation is obviously a prelude to a disqualification petition being filed, where such information would be merely a basis for the claim of disqualification. Another noticeable aspect is that under rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987, the publication ordered is a publication of the information regarding party affiliation or change in party affiliation, which is presented before the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. The Secretary of the Legislative Assembly places the information before the Speaker and not before the Table of the House or present to the House or a Committee thereof and not it is put up in the Business of the House. In such view of the matter also, the publication ordered by the Speaker under rule 4(3) of the Arunachal Disqualification Rules, 1987 cannot be construed to be a publication under rule 321 of the Business Rules. 218. The aforesaid interpretation would also be in conformity with the law laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 42 of the Kashinath G. Jalmi (supra), wherein it had been clearly provided that the powers of the Speaker which he otherwise has while functioning as a Speaker in the House is not available when the Speaker discharges the powers under the Tenth Schedule. Although it had been held in Sri Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) in paragraph 25 that a proceeding under the Tenth Schedule of the constitution is one to decide whether a member has become disqualified on the ground of defection and the Tenth Schedule cannot be read or construed independent of Article 102 and 191 of the Constitution of India, but such observation does not give the power to the Speaker to exercise any of its powers under the Business Rules while exercising its jurisdiction under the Tenth Schedule or the powers under the Tenth Schedule, while exercising jurisdiction under the Business Rules. 219. In the instant case, the order being assailed is the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker wherein the information provided by the members in Form-III was asked to be published in the Bulletin Part-II by showing them as PPA MLAs and further to decide the claim of merger on being taken up as a defence in the event of there being a petition for disqualification. 220. In the view of the court, the publication referred in the order dated 16.9.2016 is not a publication of any paper, document, report in connection with, the business of the House or laid on the Table of the House or presented to the House or a Committee thereof, in order to bring it within the purview of the rule 321(1) of the Business Rules and accordingly, the privilege against any proceeding in any court, as provided under article 194(2) of the Constitution, is unavailable. 221. In view of such conclusion, the contention raised by the learned Advocate General that the present writ petition against the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly is not maintainable in view of the provisions of the article 194(2) of the Constitution, is found to be unacceptable. 222. 221. In view of such conclusion, the contention raised by the learned Advocate General that the present writ petition against the order dated 16.9.2016 of the Speaker of the 6th Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly is not maintainable in view of the provisions of the article 194(2) of the Constitution, is found to be unacceptable. 222. In the premises above, the contentions raised by the petitioner that the claim of merger by the 43 INC MLAs as flows from the different resolutions of 16.9.2016 does not satisfy the requirements of a merger, both factually as well as under the law, as well as the contention that the 43 MLAs having been elected on the INC tickets by taking a recourse to the policies of the INC, which were found acceptable by the electorate, the INC would suffer loss and injury on their claim of a merger with the PPA, would now be taken up by the petitioner and the other similarly situated persons of the INC before the Speaker, while deciding the petition for disqualification dated 14.10.2016, which had already been filed. This court does not express any opinion on its merit either on the validity or the acceptability of such contentions and it would be for the Speaker to consider and decide the same. 223. In terms of the above, the writ petition stands disposed of.