JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. The authorities below have held petitioner Sachidanand (hereinafter referred to as tenant) to be in arrears of rent, w.e.f. November, 2008 till September, 2015, as also having sublet the tenanted premises, without the consent of the landlord-respondent Kailash Chand (hereinafter referred to as the landlord), to the sub-tenant Banarsi Dass. 2. Petition filed by the landlord, for ejectment on these two counts, stands allowed by the Rent Controller (III), Shimla, vide Order dated 10.9.2014, passed in Rent Petition (RBT) No.37/2 of 15/09, titled as Kailash Chand & another v. Sachidanand & another, as affirmed by the Lower Appellate Authority (IV), Shimla, vide judgment dated 29.12.2016, passed in Rent Appeal No.35-S/14 of 2015, titled as Sachidanand v. Kishal Chand and others. 3. Insofar as the question of non-payment of rent is concerned, one may only observe that by virtue of Section 14 (2) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), if the tenant were to pay the amount so quantified by the Rent Controller, within the statutory period, the order of ejectment becomes in-executable. This is the position as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in Madan Mohan versus Krishan Kumar Sood, 1994 (Supp1) SCC 437. 4. Issue, which is contentious, is with regard to subletting. 5. Present petition filed by the tenant, and not the sub-tenant, lays challenge to the findings of fact recorded by the authorities below. Tenant’s right to file the present petition emanates from sub-section (5) of Section 24 of the Act. 6. This Court is examining the record for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of the orders passed by the authorities, established under the provisions of the Act. 7. The order of the authority attaches finality not to be called in question in any Court of law, except by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction which can be either on an application filed by an aggrieved party or suo motu by the Court. The Court can call for and examine the records for “satisfying itself” about the “legality and propriety” of the “order” or the “proceedings”. The High Court may pass orders as it may “deem fit”. 8. The Court can call for and examine the records for “satisfying itself” about the “legality and propriety” of the “order” or the “proceedings”. The High Court may pass orders as it may “deem fit”. 8. What is the scope of interference in a petition seeking revision of order passed by the Rent Controller or Appellate Authority is now no longer res integra. 9. A five-Judge Bench of the apex Court reported in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 has dealt with the issue and the findings can be summarized as under: (i) The term ‘propriety’ would imply something which is legal and proper. (ii) The power of the High Court even though wider than the one provided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not wide enough to that of the appellate Authority. (iii) Such power cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. (iv) Issues raised in the original proceedings cannot be permitted to be reheard as a appellate Authority. (v) The expression “revision” is meant to convey the idea of much narrower expression than the one expressed by the expression “appeal”. The revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the CPC but certainly it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal. While holding so the Court reiterated the view taken in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagawal, (1975) 2 SCC 246 . (vi). The meaning of the expression “legality and propriety” so explained in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 was only to the extent that exercise of the power is not confined to jurisdictional error alone and has to be “according to law”. (vii) Whether or not the finding of fact is according to law or not is required to be seen on the touch stone, as to whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any illegality like misreading of the evidence; overlooking; ignoring the material evidence all together; suffers from perversity; illegality; or such finding has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice. Court clarified that the ratio of Ram Dass (supra) does not exposit that the revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a finding contrary to the findings returned by the authority below. (viii) In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction High Court shall not reverse findings of fact merely because on reappreciation of the evidence it may have a different view thereupon. (ix) The exercise of such power to examine record and facts must be understood in the context of the purpose that such findings are based on firm legal basis and not on a wrong premise of law. (x) Pure findings of fact are not to be interfered with. Reconsideration of all questions of fact is impermissible as Court cannot function as a Court of appeal. (xi) Even while considering the propriety and legality, high Court cannot reappreciate the evidence only for the purposes of arriving at a different conclusion. Consideration of the evidence is confined only to adjudge the legality, regularity and propriety of the order. (xii) Incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the context of such findings being perverse, based on no evidence; and misreading of evidence. 10. On 9.8.2001, Sachidanand was inducted as a tenant in the premises, i.e. Shop No.21, Main Bus Stand, Shimla. On 5.11.2008, the ownership changed hands, with the landlord purchasing the tenanted premises vide sale deed (Mark ‘X’). On 21.5.2009, the landlord filed a petition for ejectment. 11. Record reveals the tenant to have disputed the factum of subletting as also relationship of landlord and tenant. 12. On the issue of ownership and the relationship of landlord and tenant, this Court can safely hold the findings returned by the lower Appellate Authority, in Paras 21, 22 & 23, to be clearly borne out from the record. Original owner sold the demises premises to the landlord. Thus, the purchaser would squarely fall within the meaning of expression “landlord”, so defined under Section 2(3) of the Act. He is, in law, entitled to receive the rent. 13. This, thus, takes the Court to the next question of tenant having sublet the premises to Banarsi Dass. Significantly, in response to the petition, jointly filed by the respondents therein, tenant admits the sub-tenant to be “sitting as his salesman”. The admission is in the following terms. He is, in law, entitled to receive the rent. 13. This, thus, takes the Court to the next question of tenant having sublet the premises to Banarsi Dass. Significantly, in response to the petition, jointly filed by the respondents therein, tenant admits the sub-tenant to be “sitting as his salesman”. The admission is in the following terms. “It is pertinent to mention here that respondent no.1 is exclusive tenant of rented premises. Respondent no.2 is sitting as a sales man of respondent no.1 in his absence.” 14. It is in this backdrop, one need to examine the propriety and/or legality of the orders passed by the authorities below. Can it be said that the tenant has sublet the premises? 15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties as also perused the record, this court, affirmatively, is of the view that tenant Schidanand has sublet the premises to sub-tenant Banarsi Dass. The tenant has parted away with the possession of the premises and forfeited his right of re-entry. 16. What is “subletting” is no longer res integra. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Maghi Ram v. Arya Samaj Lower Bazar, Shimla, 1992(2) Sim L.C. 393, has observed as under: “4. Before dealing with this submission, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Rent Act which is as under: “14. Eviction of tenants: (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the Applicant is satisfied: (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of this Act without the written consent of the landlord: (a) transferred his rights under the lease or sublet the entire building or rented land or any portion thereof, or....” 5. By transferring his rights under the lease or sub-letting the building or portion thereof, the tenant parts with legal possession of the tenanted premises and creates sub-tenancy. In a number of its judgments, the Supreme Court of India has reiterated that in order to prove tenancy or sub-tenancy, two ingredients have to be established. Firstly, the tenant must have exclusive right of possession or interest in the premises or part of the premises in question and, secondly, that right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. Firstly, the tenant must have exclusive right of possession or interest in the premises or part of the premises in question and, secondly, that right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. (See : Dipak Banerjee v. Smt. Lilabati Chakraborty, 1987 AIR(SC) 2055, M/s Shalimar Tar Product s Ltd. v. H.C Sharma and Others., 1988 AIR(SC) 145, and Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayan, 1989 AIR(SC) 1141. 6. In Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma (supra), the Supreme Court has further laid down that "Parting of legal possession means possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others" which according to the Hon'ble Judges is a matter of fact By transfer of rights under the lease by a tenant or sub-letting of the entire building or part thereof, physical possession of the tenanted premises is parted with in such a manner that tenant is divested of his right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property. Keeping these principles, in view, the pleadings and the evidence on record of this case are to be assessed.” (Also: Sham Sunder Mehra v. Mastan Singh and others, 1994(1) Sim.L.c. 171) 17. While dealing with the very same provisions, the Apex court in Parvinder Singh v. Ranu Gautam and others, (2004) 4 SCC 794 , has observed that “A lease of immovable property is transfer of a right to enjoy such property. Parting with possession of control over the tenancy premises by the tenant in favour of a third person would amount to tenant having “transferred his rights under the lease” within the meaning of Section 14(2)(ii)(a) of the Act”. 18. The landlord establishing the factum of the tenant having parted with the exclusive possession of the demised premises in favour of a stranger and the tenant having no possessory or other control of the same, it would be open for the Rent Controller to draw the presumption, which the tenant necessarily must rebut. 19. Otherwise, what is “subletting”, in reference to different legislations dealing with the laws, relating to tenancy, stands considered by the Apex Court in Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1998) 3 SCC 1 ; Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao and others, (2000) 7 SCC 522 ; and Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur, (2005) 1 SC 31. 20. 20. In the instant case, from the statement of landlord (PW-1) and his supportive witness Kedar Sharma (PW-2), it stands established that the subtenant alone is in exclusive possession of the demised premises. He, in his own name, is running his business. Landlord has proved on record bills for purchase of goods from different vendors, as also receipt (Ex.PW- 1/B), issued by the authority under the Standards of Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1985. Additionally, photographs, placed on record, indicate only the sub-tenant to be running the business from the demised premises. Not only that, the sub-tenant has paid the amount of fine, so imposed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, vide receipt (Ex.PW-1/L). Also, there is evidence of Bank Account of the sub-tenant and other revenue record, establishing such fact. 21. Significantly, sub-tenant has not stepped into the witness box, out of fear of being confronted with such evidence, and the testimony of tenant (RW-1) is more on the issue of relationship of tenancy than the premises having been let out to the sub-tenant. 22. There is no evidence of the tenant carrying out his business from the premises and/or the tenant having engaged the sub-tenant as a salesman, and also the sub-tenant carrying on business activity for and on behalf of the tenant. 23. It is in this backdrop, this court is of the considered view that the findings returned by the authorities below are neither perverse nor illegal, warranting interference in the line of principles of law laid down in Dilbahar Singh (supra). Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons, present petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.