JUDGMENT : 1. Mr. Y. N. Krishna Murthy, the petitioner-in-person, has challenged the legality of the removal order dated 11.07.2012, and the order passed by the Appellate Authority, dated 20.03.2013, whereby the Appellate Authority has confirmed the removal order, and dismissed his departmental appeal. 2. This case has an extremely involved and checkered history. But in order to understand the legal issues which need to be examined by this Court, it is imperative that the historical background should be narrated. 3. On 11.09.1987, Mr. Krishnamurthy was appointed as an Assistant Sales Officer with the Karnataka Silk Industries Corporation, Bengaluru, the respondent No.1. Although he was required to work as a Probationer for a period of one year, but due to certain alleged irregularities committed by him, due to lack of satisfactory performance, his probationary period was extended till 31.03.1994. By order dated 31.03.1994, he was discharged from the service. Since he was aggrieved by the said discharge order, he filed a writ petition, namely W.P.No.9752/1994, before this Court. However, by order dated 19.07.1994, this Court dismissed the said writ petition. Subsequently, challenging the order dated 19.07.1994, he filed an intra-court appeal, namely W.A.No.1991/1994, before this court. Since the learned Division Bench was divided in its opinion, the appeal was referred to a third Hon'ble Judge of this Court. By judgment dated 25.09.1996, the Hon'ble Judge set aside the discharge order dated 31.03.1994, and directed that the petitioner should be reinstated with all consequential benefits. Since the learned third Judge had agreed with the opinion of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, in terms of the of the opinion of the learned Third Judge, the appeal was allowed by Judgment dated 01.10.1996. Consequently, the petitioner was reinstated on 06.11.1996. 4. However, immediately two days after the petitioner was reinstated, on 08.11.1996, he was served with a show-cause notice. After completing the departmental enquiry, by order dated 23.08.1997, the petitioner was terminated from his service. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the termination order, 23.08.1997, he filed a departmental appeal before the Board of Directors. However, by order dated 03.01.1998, his appeal was dismissed. Therefore, the petitioner filed a second writ petition, namely W.P.No.8147/1998 before this court. By order dated 06.10.2001, this court allowed the said writ petition, and directed the petitioner's reinstatement with full back wages, and continuity of service, and with consequential benefits. However, by order dated 03.01.1998, his appeal was dismissed. Therefore, the petitioner filed a second writ petition, namely W.P.No.8147/1998 before this court. By order dated 06.10.2001, this court allowed the said writ petition, and directed the petitioner's reinstatement with full back wages, and continuity of service, and with consequential benefits. This Court also awarded a cost of Rs.5,000/- to the petitioner. Consequently the petitioner was reinstated in the service. 5. For four long years, the respondents sat quietly. But on 14.02.2005, the petitioner was served with a show-cause notice. The show-cause notice related to the same set of allegations as were leveled against the petitioner in the show-cause notice dated 08.11.1996. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the said show-cause notice, he filed his third writ petition, namely W.P.No.9159/2005 before this Court. By order dated 12.07.2005, this court allowed the said writ petition, quashed the show-cause notice dated 14.02.2005, and awarded a cost of Rs.10,000/- in favour of the petitioner. 6. Since the respondent was aggrieved by the order dated 12.07.2005, it filed a writ appeal, namely W.A.No.3137/2005 before the learned Division Bench. By judgment dated 10.02.2006, the appeal was allowed, and the order dated 12.07.2005 was set aside. 7. With the show-cause notice restored by the learned Division Bench, the departmental enquiry commenced again. After the completion of enquiry, by order dated 08.03.2006, the petitioner's services were again terminated. Since the petitioner was again aggrieved by the said termination order, he again filed a departmental appeal. However, by endorsement dated 15.04.2006, the Appellate Authority claimed that the appeal was not maintainable under Rule 32 of the KSIC Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Rules. 8. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the termination order dated 08.03.2006, and the endorsement dated 15.04.2006, he filed his fourth writ petition, namely W.P.No.1449/2008 before this court. By order dated 03.02.2012, this court allowed the said writ petition. However, instead of directing the petitioner's reinstatement and payment of back-wages, this court directed the respondents therein to complete the enquiry within a period of three months. 9. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by his non-reinstatement, by non-payment of full back-wages, and by the re-commencing of the enquiry, he filed a writ appeal, namely W.A.No.681/2012 before this court. Since the learned Division Bench did not stay the departmental proceedings, the said proceedings continued during the pendency of the writ appeal. 9. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by his non-reinstatement, by non-payment of full back-wages, and by the re-commencing of the enquiry, he filed a writ appeal, namely W.A.No.681/2012 before this court. Since the learned Division Bench did not stay the departmental proceedings, the said proceedings continued during the pendency of the writ appeal. Eventually, after completing the departmental enquiry, by order dated 11.07.2012, the petitioner was removed from service. Moreover, by judgment dated 16.07.2012, while disposing the writ appeal, liberty was granted to the petitioner to raise the issue of payment of allowances, or back-wages. 10. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the termination order dated 11.07.2012, he filed his fifth writ petition, namely W.P.No.35519/2012 before this court. By order dated 08.11.2012, this court directed the petitioner to file a departmental appeal within fifteen days and directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal within three months. Therefore, on 19.11.2012, the petitioner filed his departmental appeal. However, by order dated 30.03.2013, the departmental Appellate Authority has upheld the termination order dated 11.07.2012, and has dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. Hence, the present petition before this court. 11. Mr. Y.N. Krishnamurthy, the petitioner-in-person has raised the following contentions before this Court:- Firstly, repeatedly, the respondents have tried to get rid of him through every means. Although on numerous occasions termination orders have been passed, each time this court has rushed to his rescue, and set aside the termination orders. Thus, throughout his service career, he has been subjected to a running battle with the respondents. He has been and is being victimized by the respondents. Secondly, even this time, the respondents have gone hammer and tongs to get rid of him. Their mala fide intention is clear from the very beginning as the show-cause notice issued to him contains vague charges. The charges are so vague, that they cannot be countered by the petitioner. Thirdly, since the charges are vague, the entire departmental enquiry stands vitiated. For, unless and until a delinquent employee is given concrete details of his alleged misconduct, the delinquent employee cannot defend his action or omission. In order to buttress this plea, the petitioner-in-person has relied upon the case of Anant R. Kulkarni v Y. P. Education Society [ (2013) 6 SCC 515 ]. For, unless and until a delinquent employee is given concrete details of his alleged misconduct, the delinquent employee cannot defend his action or omission. In order to buttress this plea, the petitioner-in-person has relied upon the case of Anant R. Kulkarni v Y. P. Education Society [ (2013) 6 SCC 515 ]. Fourthly, the charges also deal with the previous misconduct which were proven against the petitioner, and for which he has already been punished. Therefore, he is being punished twice for the same set of alleged misconducts. Since a person cannot be punished twice for the same misconduct, a grave injustice is being done to the him. Moreover, while punishing the petitioner for the same set of facts, both the termination order, and the appellate order stand vitiated. Fifthly, although the petitioner had pointed out the lapses being committed during the enquiry proceedings, his contentions have been ignored by the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority has failed to notice that the charges themselves are vague, and that the petitioner is being punished for the same set of facts. Thus, both the termination order dated 11.07.2012, and the appellate order dated 30.03.2013, deserve to be set aside. Sixthly, both the impugned termination order, and the appellate order suffer from colourable exercise of power. The power to terminate the service is being exercised with a mala fide intention to get rid of the petitioner by hook or crook. Therefore, the termination order is arbitrary, unfair, unjust and unreasonable. Hence, both the impugned orders are in violation of Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Lastly, since the petitioner has been victimized from the very initial stage of his service, since the respondents have terminated his services repeatedly in clear violation of law, exemplary costs should be imposed upon the respondents for their arbitrary exercise of power. 12. On the other hand, Mr. H. M. Muralidhar, the learned counsel for the respondents, has made the following submissions:- Firstly, it is not a case of victimization of an employee. In fact, since the petitioner has been hopelessly inefficient in his working, has refused to improve his performance despite the repeated warnings, has committed grave misconducts, therefore, the respondents were justified in removing the petitioner from his service by the removal order dated 11.07.2012. Secondly, the charge-sheet does not suffer from any vagueness as each charge is distinct and clear. In fact, since the petitioner has been hopelessly inefficient in his working, has refused to improve his performance despite the repeated warnings, has committed grave misconducts, therefore, the respondents were justified in removing the petitioner from his service by the removal order dated 11.07.2012. Secondly, the charge-sheet does not suffer from any vagueness as each charge is distinct and clear. Therefore, neither the departmental proceedings, nor the appellate order is vitiated as claimed by the petitioner-in-person. Thirdly, on 03.02.2012, in W.P.No.1449/2008, a writ petition filed by the petitioner-in-person, although this Court had set aside the termination order dated 08.03.2006, this Court had directed that the enquiry should proceed from the stage left on 04.03.2006, i.e., the department should present its evidence against the petitioner. In the said order, this Court had clearly noticed the fact that the petitioner was not co-operating with the departmental enquiry. Therefore, even presently this Court should consider the fact that the petitioner has been most uncooperative during the enquiry proceedings. Hence, he should not be permitted to either challenge the departmental proceedings, or the removal order, or the appellate order. According to the learned counsel, a person who does not co-operate in a departmental enquiry is pre-empted from challenging the termination order, and the appellate order. Fourthly, in W.A. No.3137/2005, the learned Division Bench, by its order dated 10.02.2006, had merely granted an opportunity to the petitioner to offer his explanation to the show-cause notice, if he has not offered his explanation to the same. In case, the petitioner were still aggrieved by an adverse order, the learned Division Bench has granted him the liberty to approach the competent authority. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for respondents, this court should examine merely the conduct of the petitioner, and not travel farther than that. According to the enquiry report, petitioner had not co-operated with the enquiry officer, as he had failed to appear on various dates, had filed frivolous applications for seeking documents, and had failed to produce the defence evidence. Hence, the respondents were justified in finding the petitioner guilty of alleged misconduct, and in removing him from the service. Lastly, the departmental enquiry was not meant for punishing the petitioner for the alleged misconducts. The purpose of the departmental enquiry was to see the "suitability of the petitioner". Hence, the respondents were justified in finding the petitioner guilty of alleged misconduct, and in removing him from the service. Lastly, the departmental enquiry was not meant for punishing the petitioner for the alleged misconducts. The purpose of the departmental enquiry was to see the "suitability of the petitioner". For, his services were never regularized, and he continued to be on probation from his date of appointment on 21.08.1987. Therefore, the respondents were justified in taking into account his previous misconducts, and previous punishments awarded to the petitioner in previous departmental enquiries. Hence, it is not a case of punishing the petitioner for the same set of facts. It is merely a case of removing the petitioner due to his non-suitability for the post of Assistant Sales Officer. Thus, the learned counsel has supported the impugned removal order dated 11.07.2012, and the appellate order dated 30.03.2013. 13. Heard the petitioner-in-person, and the learned counsel for the respondents, perused the impugned orders, and examined the record. 14. The stand being taken by Mr. H. M. Muralidhar, the learned counsel for the respondents, is rather curious. For, even if the petitioner were still on probation, despite the lapse of over two and a half decades, even then, if a probationer's services need to be terminated due to alleged misconduct, then a complete departmental enquiry needs to be held against such a probationer. For the present case is not a case of termination simpliciter, but is a case of terminating the petitioner service due to alleged misconduct. Although repeatedly, the petitioner has been terminated from the service, as mentioned above, repeatedly this court has set aside the termination order and directed the petitioner's reinstatement into service. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondents is not justified in claiming that the respondents were merely considering the "suitability" of the petitioner for the post held by him. If it were a case of considering his suitability for the post of Assistant Sales Officer, then the termination order simpliciter should have been passed against the petitioner. However, from the beginning, petitioner's services have been terminated on the ground of his alleged misconducts. 15. Moreover, even on earlier occasion, the respondents had raised the same contention, namely that they were considering the suitability of the petitioner for the post. But this Court had rejected the said contention. However, from the beginning, petitioner's services have been terminated on the ground of his alleged misconducts. 15. Moreover, even on earlier occasion, the respondents had raised the same contention, namely that they were considering the suitability of the petitioner for the post. But this Court had rejected the said contention. Therefore, the same contention cannot be raised again by the learned counsel especially when the circumstances remain almost the same. 16. Although the learned counsel for the respondents is justified in claiming that by judgment dated 10.02.2006 in W.A.No.3137/2005, the learned Division Bench had directed the petitioner (the respondent in the said writ appeal) to offer his explanation to the show-cause notice, however, the learned counsel has ignored the rest of the directions and the liberties granted by this court. The learned Division Bench had also granted liberty to the petitioner (the respondent in the said writ appeal) to approach the competent authority in case any adverse order were passed against him. Hence, the petitioner not only has the liberty to approach the competent authority within the department, but also has the right to approach this Court in challenging the adverse orders passed by the department, and by the Appellate Authority. Therefore, the learned counsel is not justified in claiming that the scope of enquiry by this court should be limited merely to the conduct of the petitioner during the departmental proceeding. Since the petitioner has a right to challenge the removal order, and the appellate order, since the learned Division Bench has granted him the liberty to challenge the same, this court would be justified in examining the departmental proceeding, the removal order, and the appellate order impugned by the petitioner-in- person. 17. Needless to say, a charge-sheet is the foundation of a departmental enquiry against a delinquent employee. Therefore, it plays a pivotal role in the holding of the departmental enquiry. A charge-sheet defines both the parameters of the case, and also informs the delinquent about the case being brought against him by the Department. A charge-sheet informs the delinquent employee about the nature of the allegations made against him. Thus it succinctly states the case the delinquent employee is expected to meet out. For these reasons, it is essential that the charges framed against a delinquent employee should be clear, precise, unequivocal in their content, and terse in their language. A charge-sheet informs the delinquent employee about the nature of the allegations made against him. Thus it succinctly states the case the delinquent employee is expected to meet out. For these reasons, it is essential that the charges framed against a delinquent employee should be clear, precise, unequivocal in their content, and terse in their language. Charges which are vague, unclear, ill-defined are an anathema to law. 18. Undoubtedly, a departmental proceeding must be fair, reasonable and just. It must adopt a fair procedure. A fair procedure certainly entails the furnishing of a crystal clear charge-sheet where the charges are spelt out in precise terms. Although a departmental enquiry need not follow the technicalities of a Civil Procedure Code, or the rigors of the Evidence Act, but nonetheless, the departmental enquiry has to follow the principles of natural justice. Since audi alteram partem is an essential requirement of principles of natural justice, it should be observed scrupulously. The giving of an opportunity of hearing would be illusionary and farcical if the delinquent employee is ill-informed about the case brought against him by the Department. Thus, a vague charge-sheet would violate the principles the natural justice. A vague charge-sheet would vitiate the entire enquiry. 19. In the case of Anant R. Kulkarni (supra) one of the issues faced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the enquiry can be permitted to be held on vague and unspecified charges or not? Answering the said issue, the Apex Court observed as under: Thus, nowhere should a delinquent be served a charge-sheet, without providing to him, a clear, specific and definite description of the charge against him. When statement of allegations are not served with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. The evidence adduced should not be perfunctory; even if the delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a protest that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. 20. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. 20. According to the show-cause notice-cum-charge sheet, dated 14.02.2005, fourteen charges were framed against the petitioner. They are as under:- 1. Lacks capability to hold the post of Assistant Sales Officer, under utilisation of the services of Sales Staff on account of his inefficiency, resulting in causing indirect loss to the Corporation. 2. Showing dishonesty or fraud in connection with the business or property of the Corporation. 3. Acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the Corporation. 4. Willful insubordination or disobedience of the lawful and reasonable orders of his superiors. 5. Negligence and lack of interest in the performance of his duties. 6. Committing an act subversive of discipline or of good behavior. 7. Committing an act amounting to abatement of an act which amounts to misconduct. 8. Making representations directly to various authorities thereby divulging directly or indirectly official document or wrong information to the authorities detrimental to the interests and reputation of the Corporation under the guise of ventilating his grievances. 9. Committing an act resulting in loss of confidence and act in manner detrimental to the interest of the corporation resulting in maligning the confidence and integrity reposed on him by the Corporation. 10. Criticising the officers of the Corporation, making allegations against the Officers of the Corporation in disregard of the reputation of the Corporation and its Officers. 11. Poor performance in discharge of his duties throughout. 12. Indulging in cheating the customers and not mending his ways in spite of issue of warnings, thereby proving himself an incorrigible character. 13. Height of inefficiency and incorrigible act exhibited throughout, thereby putting negative contribution. 14. Exhibiting hat redness towards the Officers of the Company. 21. A bare perusal of these charges clearly reveal that they are bereft of any details with regard to particular acts, or omissions amounting to a misconduct. Instead, the charges are mere conclusions drawn with regard to the conduct of the petitioner. Since the charges are extremely vague, they neither inform the petitioner about the alleged misconduct committed by him, nor give him a chance to rebut the allegations against him. Instead, the charges are mere conclusions drawn with regard to the conduct of the petitioner. Since the charges are extremely vague, they neither inform the petitioner about the alleged misconduct committed by him, nor give him a chance to rebut the allegations against him. For example, Charge No.5 is with regard to "negligence and lack of interest in the performance of his duties". However, the charge does not spell out as to what omissions on the part of the petitioner establish "negligence and lack of interest in the performance of his duties" Similarly, Charge No. 7 alleges that the petitioner has indulged in abating commission of misconduct. But the said charge does not reveal the incident(s) on the basis of which the said conclusion is drawn. Thus, the charges are vague, ambiguous, unclear. Hence, they deprive the petitioner of his right to put forth a substantial defence in order to prove his innocence. 22. Serving of a charge-sheet is an essential element of granting an opportunity of hearing to a delinquent officer. In case the charges are equivocal, the employee is denied his right of hearing. For, he is kept in a dark, and is asked to grope in the dark, with regard to the specific allegations against him. Thus, an employee would not be in a position to raise his specific pleas of defence. Hence he will be denied an opportunity to defend himself. Therefore, a vague charge-sheet reduces the departmental enquiry into an exercise in futility. Hence, a vague charge-sheet, as in the present one, violates the principles of natural justice. 23. Undoubtedly, the charge-sheet is the foundation of the department's case against the delinquent employee. Since the foundation is so week, the superstructure of the departmental enquiry cannot rest on such shifting foundation. Therefore, the vague charge-sheet, in the present case, has vitiated the entire departmental enquiry. 24. Even on earlier occasions, namely in W.P. No. 8147/98, this court had noticed that the respondents were trying to get rid of the petitioner in violation of the law. Therefore, by order dated 06.10.2001, this court had directed the respondents to not only reinstate the petitioner in service, but also to pay a cost of Rs. 5000/- to the petitioner. Similarly, in the present case, the respondents are desperately trying to remove the petitioner from the service by illegal means. Thus, clearly, the respondents are repeatedly victimizing the petitioner. Therefore, by order dated 06.10.2001, this court had directed the respondents to not only reinstate the petitioner in service, but also to pay a cost of Rs. 5000/- to the petitioner. Similarly, in the present case, the respondents are desperately trying to remove the petitioner from the service by illegal means. Thus, clearly, the respondents are repeatedly victimizing the petitioner. Despite the fact that the respondents are supposed to act as a model employer, the respondents are behaving unfairly, unjustly, and unreasonably towards the petitioner. Even if the respondents claim that the petitioner is a bad employee, even then, the procedure of law cannot be violated, and the petitioner cannot be removed from his service by colorable exercise of power. Hence, the removal order dated 11.07.2012 is clearly illegal. 25. As far as the Order dated 20.03.2013 is concerned, suffice it to say that the said order has not considered the glaring lacunae in holding the Departmental Enquiry. The Appellate Authority has ignored the fact that even the charge-sheet did not meet the requirement of the law. Hence, the Appellate Authority has failed to apply a judicious mind. Therefore, the said order not only suffers from the virus of non-application of mind, but also from being a colorable exercise of power. Thus, the said order is legally unsustainable. 26. For the reasons stated above, the removal order dated 11.07.2012, and the order dated 20.03.2013, are hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to re-instate the petitioner into service. The petitioner shall be entitled to continuity of service, and to the consequential benefits. However, as the petitioner has not been in service for the last five years, he shall be entitled to only 50% of his back-wages. Since the petitioner has been victimised for number of years, the respondents are directed to pay a cost of Rs. 25,000/- to the petitioner for the pain and agony caused to him, and the victimization suffered by him. But it is also made abundantly clear that the respondents shall be free to hold a departmental enquiry against the petitioner, if necessary. But, the departmental enquiry shall be strictly in accordance with the procedure established by law.