ORDER : 1. These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners seeking to quash the impugned orders of termination passed by the second respondent in his proceedings Ref. Nos.TNSTC/DS/D5/17/0065/06; TNSTC/DS/D4/76/06, TNSTC/DS/D4/81; TNSTC/ DS/D4/77/06; TNSTC/DS/D3/43; TNSTC/DS/D2/14; TNSTC/DS/D3/31/06; TNSTC/ DS/D4/74; TNSTC/DS/D4/64; TNSTC/DS/D4/75; TNSTC/DS/D4/79 and TNSTC/ DS/D5/20/0068/06, (all) dated 19.10.2015, and TNSTC/DS/D3/33/06, dated 25.11.2015, respectively, and to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioners into service with all monetary benefits and service benefits. Brief facts:- 2. The petitioners herein had completed their eighth standard in Panchayat Union Middle Schools/Government High Schools/Municipal Middle Schools and were issued with Transfer Certificates. During the years between 1992 and 2002, the petitioners were appointed as Trainee Drivers in the respondents Corporation and later their services were confirmed as Drivers. 2.1. On 25.05.2005, the petitioners, along with 15 drivers, were issued with Charge Memos stating that they have produced bogus educational certificates at the time of their appointments. The petitioners submitted their explanations denying the charges. Without accepting the explanations submitted, the second respondent issued Notices and thereafter, ordered enquiry. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report stating that the petitioners had produced bogus certificates. 2.2. The second respondent issued notices to the petitioners calling for their objections, if any, on the enquiry report. The petitioners submitted their representations to the second respondent, seeking some documents, which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer, during enquiry. The second respondent refused to furnish copies of the documents stating that there is no necessary to produce the documents, since the petitioners had signed each and every page of the enquiry proceedings and were made known the contents of the enquiry proceedings. The petitioners again sent representations to the second respondent, requesting to furnish documents and also sought for time to submit their explanations. The second respondent, without furnishing the documents, sent notices to the petitioners, calling upon them to submit explanations on the enquiry report. 2.3. The petitioners have been repeatedly sending representations to the second respondent, requesting to furnish the documents and also sought for time to submit their explanations after furnishing the required documents. The second respondent sent reminder letters to the petitioners, calling upon them to submit their explanations. 2.4. The second respondent issued show cause notices/warning notices, calling upon the petitioners to submit explanations on the enquiry report within seven days, failing which, to face the consequences of termination. The second respondent sent reminder letters to the petitioners, calling upon them to submit their explanations. 2.4. The second respondent issued show cause notices/warning notices, calling upon the petitioners to submit explanations on the enquiry report within seven days, failing which, to face the consequences of termination. Since no explanations were forthcoming, the second respondent passed the impugned orders, dated 19.10.2015 and 25.11.2015, terminating the petitioners from service. Challenging the same, these writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners. 3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides. Jurisdiction:- 4. Earlier, by the order, dated 16.11.2015, this Court has held that the writ petitions are not maintainable and the petitioners have to approach the forum created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Challenging the same, the petitioners moved Writ Appeals, which were allowed holding that the writ petitions will be examined subject to the parameters within which, the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will be examined. Aggrieved over that, the Transport Corporation has filed a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has kept the question of law open. 5. The main contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the Labour Court alone is vested with jurisdiction; that the employees who suffered orders of termination ought to have raised the industrial dispute only before the Labour Court; and that these writ petitions are therefore not maintainable. In support of the said proposition, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the following decisions:- (i) (2011) 2 SCC 575 (Transport and Dock Workers Union and Others v. Mumbai Port Trust and another):- “14. In our opinion the writ petition filed by the appellants should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction, and the discretion should not ordinarily be exercised if there is an alternative remedy available to the appellant. In this case there was a clear alternative remedy available to the appellant by raising an industrial dispute and hence we fail to understand why the High Court entertained the writ petition. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction, and the discretion should not ordinarily be exercised if there is an alternative remedy available to the appellant. In this case there was a clear alternative remedy available to the appellant by raising an industrial dispute and hence we fail to understand why the High Court entertained the writ petition. It seems to us that some High Courts by adopting an over liberal approach are unnecessarily adding to their load of arrears instead of observing judicial discipline in following settled legal principles. However, we may also consider the case on merits.” (ii) (1995) 5 SCC 75 (Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant):- “We may now summarise the principles flowing from the above discussion: (1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act. (3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - which can be called 'sister enactments' to Industrial Disputes Act- and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to Civil Court is open. (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate government. Otherwise, recourse to Civil Court is open. (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex-facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex-facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication. (5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to the Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly - i.e., without the requirement of a reference by the government - in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. (6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to "statutory provisions". Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court where recourse to Civil Court is open according to the principles indicated herein. (7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the Courts and Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.? (iii) CDJ 2008 MHC 3790 (V.Lional Singh v. The General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Madurai Division II, Tirunelveli Division III):- “13. (iii) CDJ 2008 MHC 3790 (V.Lional Singh v. The General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Madurai Division II, Tirunelveli Division III):- “13. In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. 14. Placing reliance upon AIR 2004 Andhra Pradesh 198, Estate Officer & Manager (Recoveries), A.P.Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd and Anr v. Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore & Others and 1999-II-LLJ 88, Mysore Paper Mills Ltd., Bangalore v. Mysore Paper Mills Officers Association, Bhadravathi & another, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that when the order of complained is illegal and ultravires, in an appropriate case the High Court can entertain the writ petition and adjudicate the same on merits. The learned counsel would further submit that once the writ petition has been ordered to be admitted and the same cannot be dismissed after a period of about six years on the ground of its non-maintainability. The learned counsel would further contend that since no opportunity was given to the petitioner in respect of second charge there was a gross violation of principles of the natural justice and therefore the writ petition is well maintainable. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner is not right in contending that there was no enquiry for the second charge. From the averments of counter affidavit and from the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent, it comes to be known that abusing the Checking Inspector on 29.11.2000 in respect of the charge memo dated 16.01.2001 it was sent to the petitioner and the same was returned with the endorsement “Left Without Instructions”. Though initially domestic enquiry was conducted exparte after the petitioner sent reply it appears further enquiry was held wherein the petitioner is said to have participated. In such circumstance it cannot be said that there was gross violation of principles of natural justice in respect of the second charge. The petitioner is not made out any exceptional circumstance to entertain the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner is not right in contending that once the writ petition is admitted the court cannot dismiss the same on the ground of non-maintainability. 16. The petitioner is not made out any exceptional circumstance to entertain the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner is not right in contending that once the writ petition is admitted the court cannot dismiss the same on the ground of non-maintainability. 16. In view of the efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner before the Labour Courts, the writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable. However it is open to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order before the appropriate forum in a manner known to law, if he is so advised. No order as to costs.? (iv) 2004 (3) CTC 1 (P.Pitchumani v. The Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., Madurai 2):- “14. However it is open to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order before the appropriate forum in a manner known to law, if he is so advised. No order as to costs.? (iv) 2004 (3) CTC 1 (P.Pitchumani v. The Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., Madurai 2):- “14. In view of what is stated supra, we hold that (i) only such violations under I.D. Act, which involve public duties, are amenable to Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India; (ii) dismissals, transfers and other matters concerning the service conditions of employees governed by I.D. Act, have to be adjudicated only by the forums created under the said statute and not otherwise; (iii) it is needless to mention that the disputes relating to matters not governed by I.D. Act have to be resolved only by common law Courts; (iv) the transfers effected in these cases do not involve any public duties and involve the disputed questions of fact and they should be resolved only before the forums under the I.D. Act; (v) the appellants/petitioners-employees shall be entitled to seek for reference by filing application under Section 10 of the I.D. Act within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; (vi) if any industrial disputes are raised, then the concerned forums, be it Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, shall dispose of the same within four months the date of receipt of the reference, after affording opportunity to either party; (vii) without prejudice to the contentions of the appellants/petitioners-employees, one week time from the date of receipt of a copy of this order is given to the employees to join at the transferred places and in respect of such of those dismissed employees, for non-joining at the transferred places, the delay is condoned if they join as stipulated above and in that event, dismissal orders passed against them disappear automatically; and (viii) the respondents-managements shall sympathetically consider the payments of wages/salaries to the appellants/petitioners-employees so as to maintain the industrial peace and harmony.? (v) 1999 (1) L.L.J. 604 (Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Others):- “41 ... As such, there was absolutely no evidence in support of the charge framed against the appellant and the entire findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are vitiated by reason of the fact that they are not supported by any evidence on record and are wholly perverse....? As such, there was absolutely no evidence in support of the charge framed against the appellant and the entire findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are vitiated by reason of the fact that they are not supported by any evidence on record and are wholly perverse....? (vi) AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2090 (Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. v. Lakshmidevamma):- “22. The question as to at what stage the management should seek leave of the labour court/tribunal to lead evidence/additional evidence justifying its action is considered in the draft judgment of Hedge J. and not the power of the court/tribunal requiring or directing the parties to produce evidence if deemed fit in a given case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. As per Section 11(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the 'Act') a court/tribunal can follow the procedure which it thinks fit in the circumstances of the case subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Under Section 11(3), labour court/tribunal and other authorities mentioned therein have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of certain matters which include enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath and compelling the production of documents and material objects. 23. It is consistently held and accepted that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to the proceedings before labour court/tribunal but essentially the rules of natural justice are to be observed in such proceedings. Labour courts/tribunal have power to call for any evidence at any stage of the proceedings if the facts and circumstances of the case demand the same to meet the ends of justice in a given situation. We reiterate that in order to avoid unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings, the management has to seek leave of the court/tribunal in the written statement itself to lead additional evidence to support its action in the alternative and without prejudice to its rights and contentions. We reiterate that in order to avoid unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings, the management has to seek leave of the court/tribunal in the written statement itself to lead additional evidence to support its action in the alternative and without prejudice to its rights and contentions. But this should not be understood as placing fetters on the powers of the court/tribunal requiring or directing parties to lead additional evidence including production of documents at any stage of the proceedings before the year concluded if on facts and circumstances of the case it is deemed just and necessary in the interest of justice....” 5.1. The applicability of these decisions to the facts of these cases are discussed in the later part of this order. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in all the writ petitions, would submit that when there is violation of principles of natural justice and the findings are perverse, the appropriate remedy is to invoke the writ jurisdiction and not the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The learned counsel further submitted that the issue, as to whether the Labour Court has got jurisdiction, has been decided by a decision of the Division Bench of this Court, in the cases of the similar nature and therefore, the writ petitions are maintainable. 6.1. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in W.A.No.1389, etc., of 2015 (U.Sethupathi v. The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Limited) :- “7.This a very strange case where the workmen want to come before this Court despite the settled legal position that the Labour Court has much better jurisdiction than this Court. Similarly, this is a case where the Management will have a larger protection in writ petition, but they want the workmen to go before the Labour Court. 8. The jurisdiction of this Court does not stand ousted by the fact that remedy is available under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned counsel for the respondents Corporation sought to rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant - (1995) 5 SCC 75 . As a matter of fact, there is no one Rajasthan Road State Transport Corporation Case. There are seven Rajasthan State Transport Corporation cases, each of which speak on different language. As a matter of fact, there is no one Rajasthan Road State Transport Corporation Case. There are seven Rajasthan State Transport Corporation cases, each of which speak on different language. The purport of all these seven decisions have been dealt with by one of us (VRSJ) in The Madras Race Club v. M.Victor - 2013 (6) CTC 481 . But, all these decisions deal with the question about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court vis-à-vis Labour Court. They do not deal with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution vis-a-vis Labour Court.” 6.2. The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in W.A.(MD) No.600 of 2010, dated 20.04.2011 (The Managing Director, TNSTC (Kumbakonam) Ltd. v. R. Thangaraj):- “7. The orders under challenge in the writ petition are of dismissal from service. The allegation levelled against the respondent/writ petitioner is that he had produced bogus educational certificate. It is not in dispute that as far as Driver is concerned, the required educational qualification is a pass in 8th standard and possession of driving licence of heavy vehicle. As far as driving licence is concerned, there is no dispute. The question relates to the educational certificate submitted by the respondent/writ petitioner with regard to his passing in the 8th standard. The respondent/writ petitioner had joined the appellant Transport with regard to the genuineness of the certificate produced by the respondent/writ petitioner, certainly, they have got a right and power to conduct an enquiry on the same and to take further action if the certificate is found to be a bogus one. But, till 2003, after the lapse of six years, a doubt arose in the appellant Transport Corporation that the educational certificate produced by the respondent/writ petitioner is a bogus one. Even assuming for a moment that the certificate produced by the petitioner/writ petitioner is a bogus one, had it been found out by the appellant Transport Corporation before the service of the respondent/writ petitioner was confirmed, on that ground, the appellant Transport Corporation would have even refused to confirm the appointment of the respondent/writ petitioner and the respondent/writ petitioner also would have gone for some other job. Now, after the lapse of nearly ten years, the impugned order of dismissal from service has been issued. Now, after the lapse of nearly ten years, the impugned order of dismissal from service has been issued. By this time, the respondent writ petitioner would have become over-aged and he may not be in a position to get any other job also.” 6.3. The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the following decisions:- (i) (2010) 3 MLJ 742 (SC) (State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha):- “34. ... Non-disclosure of documents having a potential to cause prejudice to a government servant in the enquiry proceedings would clearly be denial of a reasonable opportunity to submit a plausible and effective rebuttal to the charges being enquired into against the government servant. 36. The proposition of law that a government employee facing a department enquiry is entitled to all the relevant statement, documents and other materials to enable him to have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the department enquiry against the charges is too well established to need any further reiteration....” (ii) AIR 2015 SC 2876 (Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Madanlal Tandon):- “8. ...The only controversy that falls for our consideration is as to whether the documents, which were the basis of the charges leveled against the respondent, were supplied to the respondent or not” 9. Indisputably, no documents were supplied to the respondent along with the charge-sheet on the basis of which charges were framed. Some of the documents were given during departmental inquiry, but relevant documents on the basis of which findings were recorded were not made available to the respondent. It further appears that the list of documents and witnesses were also not supplied and some of the documents were produced during the course of inquiry. 10 ...The Division Bench then following a catena of decisions of this Court came to the conclusion that the order of punishment cannot be sustained in law. However, taking into consideration the fact that the respondent was out of employment since 1991, a lump sum payment of Rs.5,00,000/- towards the salary would meet the ends of justice.” (iii) 2011 Writ L.R. 298 (N.P.K.S.Sheik Abdullah v. The State of Tamil Nadu & Others):- “14. However, taking into consideration the fact that the respondent was out of employment since 1991, a lump sum payment of Rs.5,00,000/- towards the salary would meet the ends of justice.” (iii) 2011 Writ L.R. 298 (N.P.K.S.Sheik Abdullah v. The State of Tamil Nadu & Others):- “14. Normally, the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per the relevant rules, but then the delay defeats justice, delay causes prejudice to the charged officer, unless it can be shown that he is to be blamed for the delay or where there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting disciplinary proceedings. In this case, the respondent has not explained the reason as to why there was an inordinate delay for the issuance of the charge dated 03.11.2009. Therefore, the delay caused in initiating the disciplinary proceedings for more than seven years appears to be inordinate and unexplained.” (iv) (2011) 5 MLJ 706 (SC) (Union of India v. S.K.Kapoor):- “.. In the aforesaid decision, it has been observed in para 25 that 'the provisions of Article 320(3)(c)of the Constitution of India are not mandatory'. We are of the opinion that although Article 320(3)(c) is not mandatory, if the authorities do consult the Union Public Service Commission and rely on the report of the commission for taking disciplinary action, then the principles of natural justice require that a copy of the report must be supplied in advance to the employee concerned so that he may have an opportunity of rebuttal. Thus, in our view, the aforesaid decision in T.V.Patel's case is clearly distinguishable.” (v) 2005 (4) CTC 403 (P.V.Mahadevan v. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board):- “14. ... The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a Government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.” 6.4. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.” 6.4. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents focus the expansive jurisdiction of the Labour Court, in terms of speedy, effective and wider relief to the workmen. The policy of law reinforces the same. 6.5. Whereas the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners would focus on the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court compared to the special jurisdiction of the Labour Court and that, if the remedy needed by the petitioners could be provided by this Court, which is based upon the consequences of not following the principles of natural justice, then it is not necessary to drive the workmen to the Labour Court, especially when there is a delay in initiating the Departmental proceedings and also there is a mistake on the part of the Department in not providing copies of documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. Added to that, the decisions also focuses on the consequences of belated initiation of departmental proceedings. 7. From the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for both sides, if the decisions are contextually considered, the main question to be considered is, whether the relief needed to the petitioners can be provided only by the Labour Court or by this Court also. Added to that, if the remedy is provided by this Court, instead of driving the parties to the Labour Court, whether any prejudice would be caused to the respondents. 8. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to quote the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2005) 8 SCC 264 (U.P. State Spinning Company Ltd. Vs. R.S. Pandey and Another), wherein, the workmen filed a writ petition, challenging the termination order. The writ petition was allowed on the ground that services were terminated in violation of the principles of natural justice. Before the Apex Court, the Company submitted that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition when there being an alternate remedy available. The relevant observations, in the said judgment, reads as under :- “16. ..... The writ petition was allowed on the ground that services were terminated in violation of the principles of natural justice. Before the Apex Court, the Company submitted that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition when there being an alternate remedy available. The relevant observations, in the said judgment, reads as under :- “16. ..... There are two well-recognized exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings themselves are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. 17. ..... But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [ (1970) 2 SCC 355 : AIR 1971 SC 33 ] that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies, unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.? 9. Based on the said proposition, it is for this Court to consider whether any dispute on facts are involved and whether it is desirable/non-desirable to deal with the same in these writ petitions. 10. So far as the scope of the writ petitions is concerned, there is no dispute to be decided on facts, even though the facts are in dispute with regard to justifiability of termination. 10. So far as the scope of the writ petitions is concerned, there is no dispute to be decided on facts, even though the facts are in dispute with regard to justifiability of termination. Therefore, it is not undesirable to deal with the same by invoking writ jurisdiction. 11. Contextually, considering the contentions, this Court is of the opinion that there is no necessity to drive the parties to the Labour Court, especially when the workmen allege serious prejudices on account of delay involved in initiating the departmental proceeding itself. Moreover, it is specifically pointed out that, the Department passed the dismissal order after nine years of issuing the second show cause notices. Driving the petitioners again to the Labour Court would cause prejudice to the petitioners on account of delay already involved and it is not likely to cause any prejudice to the respondents, especially when the issue to be decided is only with regard to the observance of the principles of natural justice. 12. The benefits available by invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, if waived/not utilized / not invoked by the petitioners, then, the losers are the petitioners and not the respondents. 13. To decide the issue involved, i.e., whether the respondents should have provided the copies of the documents, which are relied upon in the Enquiry Report, it is enough if this Court invokes its jurisdiction. The special powers available under the Labour Law and the special jurisdiction, to be exercised by the Labour Court, are not essential to decide the issue raised. The issue is so simple and it does not require any evidence, as no complicated question of fact is involved. 14. As per the decision reported in (2010) 3 MLJ 742 (SC) (referred to supra), it is mandatory on the part of the authorities to have provided copies of documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. Without furnishing copies of documents, the mere furnishing of report itself would not amount to sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice. 15. Under the stated circumstances, the orders of termination passed, without following the principles of natural justice, have to be set-aside and they are set-aside accordingly. 15.1. Without furnishing copies of documents, the mere furnishing of report itself would not amount to sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice. 15. Under the stated circumstances, the orders of termination passed, without following the principles of natural justice, have to be set-aside and they are set-aside accordingly. 15.1. The second respondent is directed to furnish copies of documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report and after getting explanation from each of the petitioners and after providing sufficient opportunity of hearing, the second respondent shall take a final decision, after following the due process of law. 15.2. Till such time, as a stop-gap arrangement, the second respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioners, which would be subject to the result of the Enquiry. 15.3. The writ petitions are ordered in the above terms. No costs. Consequently, the connected MPs are closed.