Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant Civil Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has laid challenge to the award dated 17.1.2011 (Annexure P-1) passed by learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla, H.P. (for short ‘Tribunal’) in Reference No.52 of 2008, whereby reference has been answered against the petitioner. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerged from the record, are that the petitioner-workman was engaged by respondent-Forest Corporation as Field-man in the year 1989 on daily wage basis and was initially posted at Nankhari Sub Division of Forest Corporation. As per averments contained in this petition as well as in the impugned award dated 17.1.2011, petitioner continuously worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year till 2003, whereafter, he was transferred from Forest Division Nankhari to Forest Division Rampur. As per petitioner-workman, his service conditions were changed arbitrarily and illegally and he was posted as conductor in Truck of Forest Corporation. He informed the Divisional Manager, Forest Corporation that it was not possible for him to travel with the Truck to distant places and thereafter his services were terminated by Forest Corporation on 15.1.2015 in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short `Act’). Petitioner-workman claimed before the Tribunal below that during his service of 14 years, he had completed 240 days in each calendar year and he had good service record, but his services were terminated in illegal manner by the Forest Corporation that too in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. 3. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-workman sent demand notice to Forest Corporation seeking his re-engagement with consequential benefits, but in vain. Accordingly, he approached Conciliation Officer, Rampur to seek redressal of his grievance. Since conciliation efforts failed, appropriate Government sent reference under Section 10 of the Act for adjudication to the Tribunal below in the following terms:- “Whether the termination of services of Shri Prem Singh S/o Shri Mohan Lal, daily wages Field man w.e.f. 15.1.2005 by the Divisional Manager, HP State Forest Corporation, Rampur, District Shimla without complying the provisions of section 25-F & G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits, amount of compensation, back wages and seniority the aggrieved workman is entitled to?” 4. If not, what relief of service benefits, amount of compensation, back wages and seniority the aggrieved workman is entitled to?” 4. Respondent-Corporation by way of detailed written statement refuted the aforesaid claim of the petitioner on various grounds including maintainability. Respondent, while admitting that the petitioner was initially engaged as Field-man in Nankhari Unit of the Forest Corporation on daily wage basis on 18.7.1989 to perform watch and ward duty, stated that he was habitual absentee from duty and was to remain absent from duty. Respondent further claimed before the Tribunal below that services of the petitioner-workman were terminated due to willful absent from duty and he was also negligent in performing his duties. As per respondent, petitioner-workman remained willfully absent from duty continuously for a period of 5/6 months before termination of his services. Respondent specifically denied that petitioner-workman was in continuous service for a period of 240 days preceding twelve months period. In the aforesaid background, respondent sought dismissal of the statement of claim of the petitioner-workman filed before the Tribunal below. 5. The petitioner-workman by way of rejoinder reasserted his claim made in the statement of claim and denied the averments of written statement filed by respondent-Corporation. 6. On the pleadings of the parties learned Tribunal below has framed the following issues for determination:- “1. Whether the retrenchment of services of petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. 15.1.2015 without complying with the provisions of section 25F & G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is illegal and unjustified as alleged? … …OPP. 2. If issue no.1 is proved, to what relief of service benefits, amount of compensation, back wages and seniority, the petitioner is entitled to? … …OPP. 3. Relief.” 7. Learned Tribunal below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence led on record by respective parties answered reference in negative and dismissed the claim of the petitioner-workman. 8. Mr.P.P. Chauhan, learned counsel representing the petitioner, vehemently argued that impugned award passed by learned Tribunal below is not sustainable in the eye of law as the same is not based upon correct appreciation of evidence led on record as well as law on the point. 8. Mr.P.P. Chauhan, learned counsel representing the petitioner, vehemently argued that impugned award passed by learned Tribunal below is not sustainable in the eye of law as the same is not based upon correct appreciation of evidence led on record as well as law on the point. While referring to the impugned award passed by Tribunal below, Mr.Chauhan forcefully contended that learned Tribunal below miserably failed to appreciate that services of the petitioner-workman were terminated without complying with the provisions of law contained in the Act and as such impugned award being against well established principle of law deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. Mr.Chauhan strenuously argued that since absenteeism of the petitioner was made basis by the respondent to dispense with his service, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have conducted a domestic enquiry after following due procedure of law. Mr.Chauhan further contended that absenteeism, if any, of the petitioner, at best could be termed to be misconduct on his part and disciplinary action, if any, could be taken by conducting domestic inquiry against him. Since no domestic inquiry was conducted before alleged termination of petitioner, action of respondent in terminating the services of petitioner-workman, which was further upheld by the impugned award, is required to be rectified in accordance with law. 10. While concluding his arguments, Mr.Chauhan further contended that since petitioner had completed more than 10 years of service with more than 240 days in each calendar year as on 1.9.1997, as such, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have granted work charge status to the petitioner-workman on completion of 10 years of service in terms of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mool Raj Upadhyaya vs. State of H.P. and Others, 1994 Supp(2) SCC 316 and in that eventuality, the services of the petitioner-workman could not have been dispensed with in such cursory manner by the respondent. In the aforesaid background, Mr.Chauhan, prayed that the petitionerworkman may be reinstated in service with consequential benefits after setting aside the impugned award having been passed by the learned Tribunal below. 11. Mr.P.P. Singh, learned counsel representing the respondent-Corporation, supported the impugned award. As per Mr.Singh, there is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal below and the same is based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties. 11. Mr.P.P. Singh, learned counsel representing the respondent-Corporation, supported the impugned award. As per Mr.Singh, there is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal below and the same is based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties. While referring to the impugned award, Mr.Singh argued that evidence led on record by respective parties has been dealt with in its right perspective and there is no scope of interference, whatsoever, of this Court, especially, while exercising writ jurisdiction. While refuting the aforesaid submissions having been made by learned counsel representing the petitioner-workman, Mr.Singh argued that points raised before this Court by Mr.Chauhan were never raised before the learned Tribunal below and as such present petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground only. 12. While concluding his arguments, Mr.Singh invited the attention of this Court to the terms of the reference made by appropriate Government to the learned Tribunal below to demonstrate that cogent and convincing evidence was led on record by the respondent-Corporation to prove its case within the ambit of question passed to the Tribunal and as such there is no force in the contention of learned counsel representing the petitioner-workman. In the aforesaid background, Mr.P.P. Singh, learned counsel representing the respondent-Corporation, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 13. During proceedings of the case, this Court had an occasion to peruse the pleadings as well as complete record of Tribunal below (annexed with the petition), perusal whereof clearly suggests that learned Tribunal below, while exploring the answer to specific term of reference sent to it by appropriate Government, dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and as such this Court sees no force in the contention put forth on behalf of the petitioner-workman that evidence adduced on record by respective parties have not been dealt with in its right perspective. 14. In nutshell, case of the petitioner-workman was that since he had completed 240 days in the preceding twelve months, his services could not be terminated in illegal manner by respondent-Corporation without resorting to provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, whereas respondent-Corporation claimed that the petitioner-workman left the job voluntarily and he had not completed continuous service of 240 days preceding his termination. 15. 15. Petitioner-workman, while appearing as PW-1 before learned Tribunal below, stated that he was engaged as Field-man in the year 1989 on daily wage basis and he continued to work as such till the year 2003 for more than 240 days in each calendar year. He also stated that in the year 2003, he was transferred from Nankhari to Forest Division, Rampur in an illegal manner and was detailed for duty as conductor in the Truck. It has also come in his statement that since he was deputed for duties to places like, Nahan, Baddi, Nalagarh and Kumarhatti, he requested Divisional Manager, Forest Corporation that it was not possible for him to travel with the Truck to distant places, accordingly his services were terminated on 15.1.2005 without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Though petitioner-workman claimed that he rendered continuous service of more than 240 days in each calendar year during the span of his fourteen years of service, but he was unable to prove on record aforesaid factum by leading cogent and convincing evidence in the shape of ocular or documentary evidence. In his cross-examination he admitted that he had worked for 224 days during the calendar year 2003 and for 29 days during the calendar year 2004. He also admitted that he had not worked w.e.f. 18.5.2004 to 31.12.2004. Perusal of Ex.PB i.e. mandays chart led in evidence by him also does not prove that he had completed 240 days during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of his termination. There is no illegality in the findings returned by Tribunal below that onus was upon workman to prove that he infact had completed 240 days in the preceding twelve months period. 16. Whereas, respondent examined RW-1 Shri Yogesh Parsad Gupta, Divisional Manager, Forest Corporation, who appeared before the Tribunal as RW-1 and deposed that petitioner-workman was not performing his duty properly and was habitual absentee. While placing reliance upon the documents, RW-1 stated that since he remained absent from duty from 1.5.2004, his explanation in writing was called by Assistant Manager and thereafter he joined duty on 19.5.2004, but failed to submit any reply. RW-1 further stated that petitioner-workman again remained absent from duty w.e.f. 27.5.2004, whereafter he was also asked to join his duties vide notice Ex.P-2 dated 16.6.2004, but in vain. RW-1 further stated that petitioner-workman again remained absent from duty w.e.f. 27.5.2004, whereafter he was also asked to join his duties vide notice Ex.P-2 dated 16.6.2004, but in vain. Perusal of notices Ex.R-4 and Ex.PD clearly prove on record that repeatedly petitioner-workman was asked to join his duties but petitioner-workman failed to join, as a result of which his services came to be terminated on 15.1.2005. Cross-examination conducted on RW-1 nowhere suggests that the petitioner-workman was able to extract anything contrary to what he stated in his examination-in–chief, rather, this Court, after carefully perusing the record, has no hesitation to conclude that there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings returned by the learned Tribunal below that petitioner-workman was habitual absentee from duties and since he did not respond to the notices issued by Corporation to join his duties, his services were rightly terminated by the Corporation. 17. Similarly, this Court sees no illegality or infirmity in the findings returned by Tribunal below that there is no evidence on record to show that the petitioner-workman had actually completed 240 days in preceding 12 months period and as such there was no occasion for Forest Corporation to issue notice under Section 25-F of the Act. Since petitioner-workman had claimed that he had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year, onus was upon him to prove the same by leading cogent and convincing evidence. 18. In the present case, as has been discussed above, no evidence was led on record to prove factum of his completion of 240 days in preceding 12 months, rather, respondent- Corporation, by placing on record ample evidence, proved to the hilt that despite repeated communications, petitioner-workman failed to join his duties as a result of which his services came to be terminated. 19. Consequently, this Court sees no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award passed by the Tribunal below, which appears to be based upon correct appreciation of evidence as well as law and hence calls for no interference of this Court. 20. Another contention of Mr.P.P. Chauhan, learned counsel representing the petitioner-workman, that since absenteeism of the petitioner was made basis by the respondent to dispense with his services, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have conducted a domestic enquiry before taking disciplinary action, deserves out right rejection. 20. Another contention of Mr.P.P. Chauhan, learned counsel representing the petitioner-workman, that since absenteeism of the petitioner was made basis by the respondent to dispense with his services, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have conducted a domestic enquiry before taking disciplinary action, deserves out right rejection. Perusal of pleadings as well as impugned award nowhere suggests that aforesaid point was ever raised before Tribunal and as such same cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage in writ proceedings, where legality of impugned award is under challenge. Moreover, Tribunal in reference petition was only bound to answer specific term of reference as referred to it by the appropriate Government for adjudication. “Term of reference” nowhere suggests that Tribunal was required to decide whether services of the petitioner-workman could be terminated without conducting disciplinary proceedings, especially, when charge was of absenteeism. 21. This Court also sees no force in another arguments having been made by Mr.Chauhan that since petitioner-workman had completed more than 10 years of service with more than 240 days in each calendar year as on 1.9.1997, as such, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have granted work charge status to the petitioner on completion of 10 years of service in terms of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mool Raj Upadhyaya’s case supra because this was not the issue before learned Tribunal below, who, well within four corners of reference specifically referred to it, returned its findings. 22. This Court is conscious of the fact that it has very limited jurisdiction to re-appreciate the findings of fact returned by learned Tribunal below, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it has very limited scope to re-appreciate the findings of fact. In this regard reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s.Hindalco Industries Ltd. 2014 AIR SCW 315, wherein the Court held as under:- “16. ………The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. ………The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is no entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened for questioned in writ proceedings. nA error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. 17. The judgments mentioned above can be read with the judgment of this Court in Harjinder Singh’s case (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: 21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: 10…. The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State. 18. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower Courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. 18. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower Courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer the point No. 1 in favour of the appellant.” [Emphasis added] 23. Learned counsel representing the petitioner was unable to point out any particular mistake, if any, committed by learned Tribunal below in admitting the evidence illegally or error in law, while dismissing the claim of petitioner-workman and as such, this Court sees no occasion to interfere in the findings of the learned Tribunal below which otherwise appear to be based on proper appreciation of evidence. 24. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court sees no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award dated 17.1.2011 passed by learned Presiding Judge, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla and as such the same is up-held and present petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. 25. All the interim orders are vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.